Laura A v. Limestone Co. Bd. of Education

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Laura A. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam.

Case: 14-12892

Date Filed: 04/28/2015

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-12892
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 5:11-cv-04038-CLS
LAURA A.,
individually and as grandmother and next friend of J.O., a minor,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
LIMESTONE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Defendant - Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
________________________
(April 28, 2015)
Before HULL, MARCUS and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff-Appellant Laura A. appeals from the district court’s order granting
summary judgment in her case asserting claims as the grandmother and next friend
of J.O., a minor, against the Limestone County, Alabama, Board of Education,

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pursuant to the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §1400 et
seq. (“IDEA”), and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §
79Limestone County4 (the “Rehabilitation Act”).

The complaint alleges that

Limestone County violated IDEA by determining that J.O. was no longer eligible
for special education, and violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by failing to
provide J.O. with a non-discriminatory public education program. On appeal, Ms.
A. argues that the district court erred in concluding that she failed to exhaust
administrative remedies for her § 504 claim. After thorough review, we affirm.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Weeks v. Harden Mfg.
Corp., 291 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2002). Summary judgment is proper if the
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, raises no genuine
issue of material fact and compels judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(a). We also review de novo legal questions involved in the interpretation of
statutes. CP v. Leon Cnty. Sch. Bd. Fla., 483 F.3d 1151, 1156 (11th Cir. 2007).
IDEA seeks to provide a “free appropriate public education” (“FAPE”) to
students qualifying for special education and related services under one of IDEA’s
thirteen eligibility classifications.

20 U.S.C. § 1401(9).

Section 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act, on the other hand, is anti-discrimination legislation aimed at
providing federally-financed services to individuals with disabilities. 29 U.S.C. §
794(a) (“No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . .
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shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”). Section 504 applies to all
public schools that receive federal financial assistance. Id. § 794(b)(2). While
IDEA recognizes thirteen categories of disability, § 504 defines individuals with
disabilities to include anyone with a condition that substantially limits a major life
activity, as well as those with a history of disability and those perceived to have a
disability. Id. § 705(20).
In this case, the Board argues that Ms. A.’s § 504 claim should be dismissed
because she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.

The exhaustion

requirement for § 504 is found in IDEA, and provides:
Nothing in this chapter [pertaining to IDEA] shall be construed to restrict or
limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution,
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 [42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 et seq.],
title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C.A. § 791 et seq.], or other
Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities, except that
before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also
available under this subchapter, the procedures under subsections (f) and (g)
shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the action
been brought under this subchapter.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(l).

“Thus, whether claims asserting the rights of disabled

children are brought pursuant to the IDEA, the ADA, Section 504, or the
Constitution, they must first be exhausted in state administrative proceedings.”
M.T.V. v. DeKalb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 446 F.3d 1153, 1158 (11th Cir. 2006).
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In M.T.V., the parents of a child eligible for IDEA services claimed that a
school district retaliated against them for advocating for their son. Prior to suit, the
parents had requested a due process hearing seeking reimbursement from
Limestone County for M.T.V’s vision therapy, and the County had requested a due
process hearing to enforce its right to evaluate M.T.V. by an expert of its choice.
The parents had raised their retaliation claims at these due process hearings, but
had never requested a due process hearing on the retaliation claims. Id. at 1159.
In rejecting the notion that raising these claims at earlier due process
hearings was sufficient for exhaustion, our Court quoted from the IDEA, which
says that “any party aggrieved by the findings and decision [made by an ALJ]
under this subsection shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the
complaint presented pursuant to this section.”

Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. §

1415(i)(2)(A)). Relying on this “plain language,” we held that M.T.V.’s parents
were required “to file a separate administrative complaint to raise [the retaliation]
issue and exhaust all administrative remedies regarding that complaint before filing
a judicial action.” Id. As we explained, “[t]he philosophy of the IDEA is that
plaintiffs are required to utilize the elaborate administrative scheme established by
the IDEA before resorting to the courts to challenge the actions of the local school
authorities.” Id. at 1158 (quotation omitted). We thus concluded that M.T.V.’s
parents had not exhausted administrative remedies for the retaliation claim.
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In Babicz v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., 135 F.3d 1420 (11th Cir. 1998),
parents sought relief for their children under § 504 and the ADA, but not under
IDEA. They had not requested a due process hearing, and argued that because
they had not sought IDEA relief they did not need to comply with its exhaustion
requirements.

The Court rejected this argument, and -- though we did not

expressly hold that the plaintiff’s children fell within the ambit of IDEA -concluded that IDEA exhaustion cannot be avoided simply by seeking relief not
available under IDEA. Id. at 1422 n.10.
In this case, Ms. A.’s letter requesting a due process hearing under IDEA
challenged Limestone County’s decision that J.O. was no longer eligible for IDEA
services, alleging that Limestone County had failed to comprehensively evaluate
J.O. and had improperly denied him a FAPE, as required by IDEA. She did not
mention § 504 other than to say that Limestone County had found him eligible for
§ 504 services. Under the plain language of IDEA, before a civil action may be
brought under § 504, “the procedures under subsections (f) and (g) [of § 1415]
shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the action been
brought under this subchapter.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). The IDEA further provides
that an aggrieved individual has the “right to bring a civil action with respect to the
complaint presented pursuant to this section.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). Thus,
whether Ms. A.’s claims are brought pursuant to IDEA, the ADA, § 504 or the
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Constitution, they must first be exhausted in state administrative proceedings.
Indeed, it would subvert the purposes of the exhaustion requirement to allow
exhaustion of an IDEA claim to also suffice for a Rehabilitation Act claim seeking
some of the same relief, when the claims have different elements, the proof
required under both statutes is different, and the Rehabilitation Act claim was not
addressed at all during the administrative proceedings. See Association for
Retarded Citizens of Alabama, Inc. v. Teague, 830 F.2d 158, 160 (11th Cir. 1987)
(holding that the purposes behind the exhaustion requirement include: “(1)
permitting the exercise of agency discretion and expertise on issues requiring these
characteristics; (2) allowing the full development of technical issues and a factual
record prior to court review; (3) preventing deliberate disregard and circumvention
of agency procedures established by Congress; and (4) avoiding unnecessary
judicial decisions by giving the agency the first opportunity to correct any error”).
Since Ms. A. did not seek a due process hearing for her § 504 claims, she cannot
now pursue a civil action for those claims.
Contrary to Ms. A.’s argument, we need not decide whether IDEA
exhaustion is required even if an individual is not eligible for relief under IDEA.
As the record shows, Ms. A. pursued relief under IDEA and instituted an IDEA
hearing; thus, she was not claiming that IDEA did not apply to J.O. Moreover, our
case law bars her argument that it would have been futile to raise her § 504 claims
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in the due process hearing. See N.B. v. Alachua County Sch. Bd., 84 F.3d 1376,
1379 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding litigants cannot “avoid the exhaustion requirement
simply by asking for relief that administrative authorities [cannot] grant,” such as
money damages or relief from a former school district). In any event, IDEA
provides that “[t]he party requesting the due process hearing shall not be allowed
to raise issues at the due process hearing that were not raised in the notice filed
under subsection (b)(7), unless the other party agrees otherwise.” 20 U.S.C. §
1415(f)(3)(B). She did not give notice of her § 504 claim in her IDEA notice, and
therefore could not have pursued her § 504 claim at the hearing no matter what the
hearing officer had jurisdiction over. As a result, she has not demonstrated futility.
See M.T.V., 446 F.3d at 1159 & n.4 (“The burden of demonstrating futility is on
the party seeking exemption from the exhaustion requirement.”).
AFFIRMED.

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