Gary Glenn v. American United Life Insurance, et al

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Gary Glenn. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam.

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-13945
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 7:12-cv-03691-RDP

GARY GLENN,
an individual,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
AMERICAN UNITED LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
a corporation,
DISABILITY REINSURANCE MANAGEMENT SERVICES INC,
a corporation,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
________________________
(April 14, 2015)
Before MARCUS, ROSENBAUM, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

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Plaintiff Gary Glenn appeals from the district court’s entry of judgment as a
matter of law in favor of defendants American United Life Insurance Company
and Disability Reinsurance Management Services, Inc. on his claim for wrongful
denial of long-term disability benefits. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff previously served as Chief Executive Officer of Med Management,

LLC. At the time, Med Management participated in a trust to which American
United Life Insurance Company (“American United”) issued a Group Long-Term
Disability Policy (the “Policy”). The Policy afforded Plaintiff disability insurance
coverage. Disability Reinsurance Management Services, Inc. (the
“Administrator”) served as administrator of all claims made under the Policy.
On May 9, 2008,1 Plaintiff was forced to stop working because of anxiety
and manic symptoms—later diagnosed as Bipolar Disorder—that impaired his
decision-making and affected his mood and ability to focus. Plaintiff received
short-term disability benefits until August 2008, when he applied for long-term
disability benefits under the Policy. The Administrator approved Plaintiff’s
request on September 4, 2008, with retroactive application to August 7.
1

There is some discrepancy about the date Plaintiff ceased working. We adopt the date
alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint. But we note that Plaintiff’s brief identifies the date as March 14,
2008, while defendants claim it was May 7, 2008. Evidence in the record conflicts as to which
date is correct, but in any event, the actual date Plaintiff stopped working has no real impact on
his claim.
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Though the Administrator noted that Plaintiff was then being treated “for a
medical condition related to [his] lumbar spine,” it approved Plaintiff’s claim for
long-term disability benefits based on his “medical diagnosis of anxiety and manic
disorder.” Importantly, with certain exceptions not applicable to Plaintiff, mental
disability benefits are only available for twenty-four months pursuant to the
Policy’s Mental Illness Limitation clause.
Plaintiff collected the benefits for a time but was eager to return to work and
did so on a graduated schedule beginning in early 2009. By February 24, 2009,
Plaintiff had fully returned to work and ceased receiving benefits for the cognitive
impairments he was suffering. But Plaintiff began to think he returned to work too
soon, and in July 2009, he expressed concern to the Administrator about his ability
to continue working. Specifically, Plaintiff informed the Administrator that he
“had continued issues [with] his cognitive functioning associated [with] his bipolar,” that he felt “very negative to everything[] and ha[d] a big lack of
motivation and positive reaction,” and that, since his return, his partner had
expressed concern in “high level meetings” about his performance. Further,
Plaintiff’s psychiatrist, Dr. Joe Lucas, recommended that Plaintiff stop working.
Reluctantly, Plaintiff again ceased working on August 20, 2009. He
resumed receiving benefits under the Policy’s Recurrent Disability clause, which
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permitted him to receive payments under his prior qualifying mental health
disability. This allowed Plaintiff to collect benefits without having to endure a
second “Elimination Period,” but it also restarted the two-year benefit period clock
at the point where Plaintiff resumed working after his first stint on disability.
On May 7, 2010, while Plaintiff was still collecting benefits, the
Administrator sent Plaintiff a letter informing him that his twenty-four month
“mental and nervous limitation” period would expire on January 31, 2011. The
Administrator knew that Plaintiff also suffered from back pain, so its letter invited
him to provide medical documentation to support a disability claim for a physical
limitation.
Plaintiff and the Administrator spoke on a phone call on October 29, 2010,
during which Plaintiff informed the Administrator that “his back [pain] is an issue
but the bigger issue is bi-polar and not being able to focus, or think positively.”
When prodded as to how his back pain would preclude him from working, Plaintiff
stated that it was “[n]ot from doing the job so much as mental aspects[,] but in
terms of being problematic in meetings, [the pain] definitely contributes to not
being able to do [the] job effectively.” Plaintiff expressed particular concern about
being “self[-]conscious to have to excuse [him]self to get [his] back stretched,” and

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also about his ability to “try to stretch and bend” in a board meeting, as he must for
comfort.
On November 24, 2010, the Administrator sent Plaintiff a second letter
reminding him of the approaching termination date of his mental health benefits
and requesting a supplemental Attending Physician’s Statement. Plaintiff’s
primary care physician, Dr. W. Guy Patterson, completed the form, indicating that
Plaintiff suffered from, among other things, problems with his left and right
sciatica, degenerative disc disease, and depression. When the Administrator
inquired as to whether Dr. Patterson thought that Plaintiff’s physical limitations
precluded him from work, Dr. Patterson responded that he did not perform
disability exams, but he prescribed that Plaintiff undergo a Functional Capacity
Exam. Plaintiff participated in the exam, which concluded that he was able to
perform light, sedentary work.
On a subsequent call with the Administrator, Plaintiff stated that his pain had
shifted over the preceding six months from his lower back to shooting from his left
hip to ankle. Plaintiff claimed that this new pain was more severe than that
previously suffered and that he required a Lortab prescription to manage the pain.
Further, at Dr. Patterson’s behest, Plaintiff had seen a neurosurgeon, Dr. Colby
Maher, who speculated that he may be suffering from Piriformis Syndrome.
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Sometime later, the Administrator sought opinions from Drs. Patterson and
Maher regarding Plaintiff’s Functional Capacity Exam results. Both agreed with
the conclusion that Plaintiff could perform sedentary work at a light demand level.
Accordingly, on May 4, 2011, the Administrator informed Plaintiff he was no
longer entitled to long-term disability benefits.2 Relying on the Functional
Capacity Exam, Dr. Patterson and Dr. Maher’s opinions that Plaintiff could
“perform activities of a light nature,” and its own medical consultant’s conclusion
that Plaintiff was capable of performing sustained light physical activities, the
Administrator determined that Plaintiff was “not physically disabled from
performing [his] regular occupation as [CEO of Med Management].”
Plaintiff responded by lodging an appeal with the Administrator. In support,
he filed several additional documents, including a favorable disability decision
from the Social Security Administration,3 updated medical records and a sworn

2

Plaintiff’s mental health benefits expired on January 31, 2011, but the Claims
Administrator agreed to continue paying benefits until it could determine whether Plaintiff
suffered from a disabling physical condition.
3

We note here that our decision to affirm the denial of long-term benefits and the Social
Security Administration’s grant of disability benefits are not necessarily at odds. “[T]he
approval of disability benefits by the Social Security Administration is not considered dispositive
on the issue of whether a claimant satisfies the requirement for disability under an ERISAcovered plan.” Whatley v. CNA Ins. Cos., 189 F.3d 1310, 1314 n.8 (11th Cir. 1999).
Additionally, Plaintiff’s attorney refused to furnish the Administrator the materials relied upon
by the Social Security Administration, distinguishing this case from Melech v. Life Insurance
Company of North America, 739 F.3d 663, 672–76 (11th Cir. 2014). There is no allegation that
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statement from Dr. Patterson, the results of an Independent Medical Examination
performed by orthopedic surgeon Dr. Kenneth Jaffe, responses to questions
regarding Plaintiff’s Functional Capacity Exam provided by David Bledsoe, and a
report from vocational rehabilitation counselor John Long.
Upon receipt of the additional documents, the Administrator retained
medical consultant Dr. Sharon Hogan to review Plaintiff’s file. Dr. Hogan
determined that a preliminary question impeded her examination. Specifically, she
needed to know “whether [Plaintiff’s] reported cognitive dysfunction is organic or
psychological/psychiatric in etiology.” In other words, she questioned whether
Plaintiff’s cognitive impairments were the result of his back pain or his Bipolar
Disorder. Plaintiff would qualify to receive long-term benefits if his cognitive
disability stemmed from his back pain, but not if it stemmed from his Bipolar
Disorder or depression. Dr. Hogan outlined a three-part investigation to aid in this
determination: (1) request a neuropsychological evaluation with personality
testing, (2) retrieve Plaintiff’s 2011 pharmacy profile, and (3) inquire with
Plaintiff’s employer whether he had “any performance issues” between January
2007 and March 2008.

the Policy required Plaintiff to apply for Social Security benefits, as did the policy at issue in
Melech. 739 F.3d at 674.
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Dr. Hogan’s effort was stymied at step one when Plaintiff, with recentlyacquired legal representation, refused to submit to a neuropsychological
examination. Plaintiff reasoned that the Policy’s Physical Examination clause
permits the Administrator to require only physical examinations—it does not
encompass mental testing. Consequently, the Administrator could not determine
the cause of Plaintiff’s mental impairments and affirmed its denial of benefits in a
letter on March 9, 2012. In support, the Administrator cited Plaintiff’s ability to
work in spite of “pain complaints [over] a number of years,” a psychiatric
condition that precipitated his earlier receipt of disability benefits for mental
impairments, and a “lack of medical evidence to support a physical condition that
would prevent [him] from working.”
Plaintiff filed suit contesting the Administrator’s findings on October 24,
2012, pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001 et seq. (“ERISA”). The parties filed cross motions for judgment as a
matter of law. Finding that Plaintiff failed to establish an entitlement to long-term
disability benefits under the Policy, the district court entered judgment as a matter
of law in favor of defendants. This timely appeal followed.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

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We review de novo a district court’s decision affirming an ERISA plan
administrator’s determination regarding benefit eligibility, applying the same
standards as the district court. Blankenship v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 644 F.3d 1350,
1354 (11th Cir. 2011). Our review considers only “the material available to the
administrator at the time it made its decision.” Id.
Because ERISA does not set out a standard of review, this Court has
developed a multipart test, relying on Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489
U.S. 101, 109 (1989), and Metro. Life Ins. Co v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 111 (2008),
as guides. We proceed in the following manner:
(1)

Apply the de novo standard to determine whether the claim
administrator’s benefits-denial decision is “wrong” (i.e., the
court disagrees with the administrator’s decision); if it is not,
then end the inquiry and affirm the decision.

(2)

If the administrator’s decision in fact is “de novo wrong,” then
determine whether he was vested with discretion in reviewing
claims; if not, end judicial inquiry and reverse the decision.

(3)

If the administrator’s decision is “de novo wrong” and he was
vested with discretion in reviewing claims, then determine
whether “reasonable” grounds supported it (hence, review his
decision under the more deferential arbitrary and capricious
standard).

(4)

If no reasonable grounds exist, then end the inquiry and reverse
the administrator’s decision; if reasonable grounds do exist,
then determine if he operated under a conflict of interest.

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(5)

If there is no conflict, then end the inquiry and affirm the
decision.

(6)

If there is a conflict, the conflict should merely be a factor for
the court to take into account when determining whether an
administrator’s decision was arbitrary and capricious.

Blankenship, 644 F.3d at 1355.

III.

ANALYSIS
Our analysis in this case begins and ends at the first step of the test. We

conclude that the Administrator’s determination that Plaintiff is not entitled to
long-term disability benefits is not “wrong.” 4 “A decision is ‘wrong’ if, after a
review of the decision of the administrator from a de novo perspective, ‘the court
disagrees.’” Glazer v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 524 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th
Cir. 2008) (quoting Williams v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 373 F.3d 1132, 1138
& n.8 (11th Cir. 2004)). We consider, “based on the record before the
administrator at the time [the] decision was made, whether [we] would reach the
same decision as the administrator. If [we] determine[] that the plan administrator
was right, the analysis ends and the decision is affirmed.” Id. at 1246–47. When
appealing the Administrator’s denial of long-term disability benefits, Plaintiff
bears the burden to prove that he is disabled. Doyle v. Liberty Life Assur. Co. of
4

The parties agree that the Administrator did not possess discretion when reviewing
claims and that the correct standard of review is de novo.
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Boston, 542 F.3d 1352, 1362 (11th Cir. 2008); Glazer, 524 F.3d at 1247; see also
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2014). Plaintiff has not carried that burden.
Under the Policy, Plaintiff must show that “because of [i]njury or
[s]ickness[,] [he] cannot perform the material and substantial duties of his regular
occupation.” The policy defines “injury” as “bodily injury resulting directly from
an accident and independently of all other causes.” It defines sickness as an
“illness, bodily disorder, disease, Mental Illness, or pregnancy.” Here, Plaintiff
had already exhausted his two years of mental health benefits, so in order to obtain
long-term disability benefits, he had to show that a disabling physical condition
precludes him from performing his duties at Med Management.
To that end, Plaintiff claims (1) that his back pain makes it impossible to
maintain a work posture for an eight-hour day and (2) that his necessary pain
medications cloud his mind to the point that he cannot perform his tasks as CEO.
We consider each of these claims, beginning with the effects of the medication,
and we conclude that the Administrator was not “wrong” to deny Plaintiff’s claim
for long-term benefits.
A.

The Impairing Side Effects of Plaintiff’s Medications

Plaintiff began suffering from back pain as early as July 2006, when an MRI
revealed an impinged nerve in his lower back. In July 2007, a neurosurgeon
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diagnosed Plaintiff with foraminal stenosis, 5 for which he received epidural steroid
injections in February 2008. Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s back pain did not preclude
him from working at that point, nor did his short-term memory problems, which he
experienced as a side effect of the medication he was then taking.
Not long after, in March 2008, Plaintiff was admitted to the hospital for
chest pain. While there, Plaintiff reported “mental [] and personality symptoms”
that began when he received epidural steroid injections the month prior. The
mental and personality changes caused problems at work, where Plaintiff struggled
in meetings, and at home, where he was “obsessive and agitated.” Plaintiff
admitted to staff that he was stressed, and the discharging physician concurred,
writing that Plaintiff’s “problems are related to stress as he has trouble with his
son, his mother, and his job.” A consultative neurological examination concluded
that Plaintiff suffered from “cognitive impairment and personality change.”
Consequently, the discharging physician recommended that Plaintiff resume taking
Lexapro, a prescription medication used to treat depression and anxiety, which he
had recently stopped taking.

5

Stenosis is “a narrowing of spaces in the spine [] that results in pressure on the spinal
cord and/or nerve roots” and “may give rise to pain or numbness in the legs.” What is Spinal
Stenosis?, Nat’l Inst. of Arthritis & Musculoskeletal & Skin Diseases (Jan. 2013), available at
http://www.niams.nih.gov/Health_Info/Spinal_Stenosis/ (last accessed Jan. 22, 2015, 5:27 p.m.).
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Subsequently, Dr. Lucas diagnosed Plaintiff with Bipolar Disorder and
depression, to which he was predisposed. Thereafter, Plaintiff received the full
two-year limit of long-term disability benefits solely for the “medical diagnosis of
anxiety and manic disorder,” which affected his ability to perform the critical
thinking that his position required.
Now, Plaintiff claims that the same cognitive impairments for which he
previously received mental illness disability benefits—and that he and his
physicians consistently attributed to his Bipolar Disorder—are in fact side effects
of the medications that he takes for his back pain. Simply put, there are conflicts
in the record as to the source of Plaintiff’s cognitive impairments that prevent him
from performing his job. Reviewing that record, we conclude that Plaintiff has
failed to show that these impairments stem from a physical condition, which is a
showing that is necessary to entitle Plaintiff to long-term disability benefits.
First, Plaintiff’s contention that his disabling cognitive impairments are the
result of his pain medications finds no support in Dr. Lucas’s psychiatric treatment
notes, which persistently diagnose Plaintiff with Bipolar Disorder and depression
and identify those mental illnesses as the source of his disability. To the extent
that Dr. Lucas believed the epidural steroid injections for back pain precipitated
Plaintiff’s Bipolar Disorder, Plaintiff admits that other physicians disagreed.
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Nor does internist Dr. Patterson’s recent sworn statement convince us that
Plaintiff’s pain medications impact his focus, concentration, and processing
abilities to the point that he is unable to function as CEO because Dr. Patterson
previously found that those disabling conditions stemmed from Plaintiff’s Bipolar
Disorder and depression. See Blankenship, 644 F.3d at 1356 (“Plan administrators
need not accord extra respect to the opinions of a claimant’s treating physicians.”).
Of course, orthopedic surgeon Dr. Jaffe did find that the side effects of
Plaintiff’s pain medications, of which he required a “significant amount,” caused
him problems “relat[ing] to cognition.” However, several factors weigh against
Dr. Jaffe’s opinion. First, according to Dr. Patterson, Plaintiff “does not take pain
medications regularly,” and no information in the record explains how the sporadic
use of medications could cause Plaintiff’s constant cognitive impairments.
Second, Plaintiff has repeatedly complained of mental impairments at work over a
number of years despite his physicians’ frequent tinkering with his prescriptions.
During this time, his symptoms persisted even though his medications were
changed. Additionally, Plaintiff at times informed the Administrator that his pain
medications were helping his condition. And finally, while Plaintiff occasionally
complained about these medications, in March 2010 he identified the cause of his

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disability as Bipolar Disorder, to which he attributed his “anxiety; depression;
[inability] to focus; [lack of] motivation[; and] memory loss.”
In sum, there are inconsistencies in the record about the source of Plaintiff’s
cognitive disability. Up to the point that Plaintiff exhausted his mental health
benefits, his physicians consistently ascribed his cognitive disability to his Bipolar
Disorder and depression. Their diagnoses later changed. See Blankenship, 644
F.3d at 1356. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not carried his burden of proving that his
cognitive impairments are side effects of his pain medications, rather than the
effects of his Bipolar Disorder and depression.
B.

Disabling Physical Pain

In addition to the cognition-related side effects of his pain medications,
Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from disabling physical pain that entitles him to
long-term disability benefits under the Policy. Plaintiff’s strongest piece of
evidence indicating a disabling physical impairment is the Independent Medical
Exam performed in September 2011 by Dr. Jaffe. Dr. Jaffe found that Plaintiff
was “unable to sit or stand for any extended lengths of time because of the severe
pain in his lower back.” He explained that sitting for more than thirty minutes
caused Plaintiff significant pain, and, in his opinion, Plaintiff could only sit or

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stand for less than one hour at a time and less than a total of three hours in a single
work day.
On the other hand, the Functional Capacity Exam that Plaintiff underwent in
February 2011—on which he “performed well” and which he undertook without
the assistance of his medications—found that Plaintiff “demonstrated the ability to
function at the full range of LIGHT work.” Upon review, Drs. Patterson and
Maher agreed with this conclusion. 6
Later, in a sworn statement taken by Plaintiff’s attorney, Dr. Patterson
qualified his earlier agreement with the result of the Functional Capacity Exam.
Namely, while he did not disclaim his prior opinion that Plaintiff could physically
perform light work, he did note that he did not consider at the time “the question of
[whether Plaintiff was] able to function at a cognitive level as well.” With that

6

On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the Administrator abused its discretion by considering
the results of Plaintiff’s 2011 Functional Capacity Exam because it lacked the authority to
require Plaintiff to undergo an examination conducted by an occupational therapist. For three
reasons, we reject this claim. First, Plaintiff consented to the Functional Capacity Exam, for
which his primary care physician provided a prescription. Second, and notably, the
Administrator only resorted to the Functional Capacity Exam because its request for Dr.
Patterson’s opinion about the extent of Plaintiff’s disability returned the response that Dr.
Patterson “do[es] not perform disability exams.” Cf. Capone v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 592 F.3d
1189, 1199–1200 (11th Cir. 2010) (an insurer’s denial of disability benefits was clearly “wrong”
where the insurer failed “to fully investigate [the plaintiff]’s claims” to determine the cause and
circumstances surrounding his injury). Finally, Plaintiff’s notion that the Administrator
“undoubtedly would have used [any] refusal to be examined as grounds to terminate his benefits”
is conjecture.
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consideration in mind, Dr. Patterson now contends that Plaintiff’s “pain level is
significant enough that he would not be able to function at work.”
This opinion contrasts starkly with neurosurgeon Dr. Maher’s March 2011
treatment notes, where he found that Plaintiff’s leg pain “ha[d] completely
resolved and [that] he is very happy.” As for Plaintiff’s back, Dr. Maher noted that
“he is better” and that “[i]t is still a bit of a mystery what caused his symptoms.”
Indeed, Dr. Maher wrote that Plaintiff had only “very mild low back pain” at the
time.
Nor does Dr. Patterson’s sworn statement jibe with his earlier view of
Plaintiff’s physical impairment. Dr. Patterson’s initial Attending Physician’s
Statement identified Plaintiff as physically capable of performing sedentary work
for an eight-hour day. Although he indicated in September 2008 that Plaintiff felt
back pain when standing for more than one hour or sitting for more than thirty
minutes, Dr. Patterson did not indicate that such pain would preclude Plaintiff from
performing his job, in contrast to his view of Plaintiff’s cognitive impairments,
which were attributed to his Bipolar Disorder. And one year later, Dr. Patterson
indicated that Plaintiff had only a Class II physical impairment, meaning that he
was limited to “[m]edium manual activity,” maintaining that Plaintiff’s “reason for
disability relates to [his] depression with bipolar features.”
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The most severe diagnosis of Plaintiff’s physical disability came in
December 2010, when Dr. Patterson determined that Plaintiff suffered a Class IV
physical impairment, meaning that he had a “[m]oderate limitation of functional
capacity” but was still “capable of clerical/administrative (sedentary) activity.”
Notably, Dr. Patterson did not indicate that Plaintiff had a Class V physical
impairment, meaning that he would be precluded from even sedentary activity.
Finally, there are Plaintiff’s own conflicting statements, which present
several different narratives. Plaintiff earlier informed the Administrator that his
back condition was “[a]lways there,” and that he had “realized that it will always
be there.” Rather than creating complications at work, Plaintiff described his
“[forty-five] minute drive” as the most difficult aspect of his back pain. Then, in
September 2009, Plaintiff told the Administrator that he would be able to return to
work if he did not have his back condition. However, the next year he told the
Administrator that “his back is an issue[,] but the bigger issue is bi-polar and not
being able to focus, or think positively, [and his] negative thoughts.” And in
February 2011, Plaintiff told the Administrator that his pain “changed totally” from
occurring in his lower back to “start[ing] in his hip and ma[king] its way down to
[his] left leg to about his ankle,” which statement Dr. Patterson’s treatment notes
confirm. The very next month, though, Dr. Maher wrote that Plaintiff’s leg pain
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had “completely resolved.” Finally, Plaintiff admits that he possesses the physical
capacity to perform household chores, complete yard work, and go fishing, albeit
with some difficulty.
Accordingly, because there is ample evidence that Plaintiff’s physical pain
does not prevent him from performing “the material and substantial duties of his
regular occupation,” and because the policy requires Plaintiff to show that physical
pain is the cause of his disability, Plaintiff has not met his burden. See Glazer, 524
F.3d at 1247 (finding that the district court was not “wrong” to deny claimant
disability benefits where “[t]he record contains ample evidence that Glazer is not
disabled within the meaning of the policy”). Plaintiff is thus not entitled to longterm disability benefits.
C.

Conclusion

Plaintiff has not carried his burden to prove that he suffers from a disabling
physical impairment for which he is entitled to receive long-term disability
benefits. See Doyle, 542 F.3d at 1362; Glazer, 524 F.3d at 1247. First, he has not
provided evidence sufficient to indicate that his cognitive impairments result from
side effects of his pain medications, as the record shows that his physicians
previously believed that the impairments stem from his Bipolar Disorder and
depression. Nor has he shown that he suffers disabling pain that precludes him
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from “perform[ing] the material and substantial duties of his regular occupation”
because the record contains ample evidence that he could adequately perform his
duties. See Glazer, 524 F.3d at 1247. Drs. Patterson and Maher agreed that
Plaintiff could perform light, sedentary work, with the latter subsequently finding
that Plaintiff’s pain had completely resolved. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not shown
an entitlement to long-term disability benefits, and the Administrator’s decision
denying his claim for such was not “wrong.”
Because we arrive at this conclusion, we do not reach Plaintiff’s argument
on appeal that the Administrator did not possess the authority to compel him to
undergo a neuropsychological examination. Because we analyze the
Administrator’s determination de novo, we also do not reach Plaintiff’s argument
that the district court erred in considering Plaintiff’s refusal to undergo a
neuropsychological examination.
AFFIRMED.

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