USA v. Johanns Tejeda

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Johanns Tejeda. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

Case: 15-11198

Date Filed: 01/09/2017

Page: 1 of 4

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 15-11198
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 6:14-cr-00075-PGB-DAB-4

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOHANNS TEJEDA,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(January 9, 2017)
Before JORDAN, JULIE CARNES and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

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Johanns Tejeda appeals his 120-month total sentence, the statutory
mandatory minimum, after pleading guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess
with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine and aiding and
abetting the possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of
methamphetamine. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), (b)(1)(A)(viii), 846; 18 U.S.C. § 2.
He argues on appeal the district court abused its discretion when it denied his
motion to continue his sentencing hearing so he could complete the disclosure
requirement for safety-valve relief. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a).
Upon review,1 we affirm the district court’s denial of his motion to continue.
I. DISCUSSION
Tejeda has the burden to demonstrate that the denial was an abuse of
discretion and that it “produced specific, substantial prejudice.” Edouard, 485
F.3d at 1350. “In determining whether the denial of a motion for continuance was
proper, we must decide the matter in light of the circumstances presented, focusing
upon the reasons for the continuance offered to the trial court when the request was
denied.” Id. (quotation omitted). “If the district court finds that the factual
circumstances warrant a continuance, then it may”—but is not required to—
“continue the sentencing hearing to give the defendant more time to fully debrief

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“We review a district court’s denial of a motion to continue sentencing for abuse of
discretion.” United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1350 (11th Cir. 2007).
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and give a formal safety-valve statement.” United States v. Garcia, 405 F.3d 1260,
1275 (11th Cir. 2005).
Tejeda has failed to meet his burden to show the district court abused its
discretion in denying his motion to continue his sentencing hearing. Tejeda was
not diligent in providing the testimony necessary to complete the proffer for safetyvalve relief. See United States v. Milkintas, 470 F.3d 1339, 1345–46 (11th Cir.
2006) (“[The Government] is under no obligation to solicit information from
defendants who seek to satisfy the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5) and U.S.S.G.
§ 5C1.2(a)(5) requirement to provide information.”). As the district court noted,
Tejeda had months between his guilty plea and the sentencing hearing to provide
the Government with all relevant information at his disposal, which he could have
done by written proffer, obviating any alleged scheduling conflicts. See United
States v. Milkintas, 470 F.3d 1339, 1345–46 & n.4 (11th Cir. 2006)
(acknowledging that a defendant may make a proffer for safety-valve relief in
writing). Tejeda’s counsel ultimately admitted this failure stemmed from Tejeda’s
“concerns about what to tell [the Government] about other people and other
things.” In addition, Tejeda did not establish he could have made the proffer in a
reasonable time had the court granted the continuance.
Tejeda has also failed to meet his burden to show that he suffered specific,
substantial prejudice because of the denial. It is true that safety-valve relief, when
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applicable, is mandatory. United States v. Quirante, 486 F.3d 1273, 1275 (11th
Cir. 2007). However, though Tejeda argues that not receiving safety-valve relief at
sentencing substantially prejudiced him by denying him the chance to avoid the
statutory-minimum sentence, he has not explained why he did not pursue
substantial-assistance relief after sentencing, which could have provided the same
benefit. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e); U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1; Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b).
Indeed, both the court and the Government indicated at the sentencing hearing their
willingness to cooperate in the event Tejeda elected to pursue this alternative.
II. CONCLUSION
Tejeda has demonstrated neither that the district court abused its discretion
in denying his motion to continue his sentencing hearing, nor that he suffered
specific, substantial prejudice because of the denial. Accordingly, we affirm the
district court’s denial of his motion to continue.
AFFIRMED.

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