USA v. Raul Constanza

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Raul Alfredo Constanza. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

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Date Filed: 03/21/2016

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-12893
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 6:15-cr-00024-RBD-GJK-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RAUL ALFREDO CONSTANZA,
a.k.a. Alfredo Raul Constanza-Ventura,
a.k.a. Raul A. Blanco,
a.k.a. Raul Blanco,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(March 21, 2016)

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Before HULL, WILSON, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In this direct appeal, Raul Constanza appeals his 37-month sentence imposed
after pleading guilty to one count of being a previously deported alien who
illegally reentered the United States without permission, in violation of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326(a) and (b)(1). The issue presented in this appeal is whether Constanza’s
2005 New York attempted second-degree burglary conviction qualifies as a “crime
of violence” for the purposes of a 16-point offense-level enhancement under
Section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Following
a careful review of the record and briefs, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

Offense Conduct
We recount the facts from Constanza’s presentence investigation report

(“PSI”). On April 10, 2013, Constanza stole electronics and other miscellaneous
items from his roommate’s bedroom. On or about April 16, 2013, local Florida
police officers arrested Constanza for the theft. Constanza provided the police
with a fake Mexican consulate card.
On April 17, 2013, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)
identified Constanza as an individual who was probably in the United States
illegally and, therefore, lodged an immigration detainer. ICE eventually
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discovered that Constanza was a citizen of El Salvador who was previously
deported from the United States to El Salvador in 2006. He never applied for, nor
did he receive, permission to re-enter the United States.
B.

Indictment and Guilty Plea
On February 11, 2015, a federal grand jury returned a one-count indictment

against Constanza, charging him with being a previously deported alien who
illegally reentered the United States without permission, in violation of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326(a) and (b)(1). After initially pleading not guilty, Constanza changed his
plea to guilty, which the district court accepted.
C.

Prior Felony Burglary Convictions
The PSI recounted that from January 7, 2005, to February 29, 2005, in

Suffolk County, New York, Constanza “entered different dwellings with the
purpose of committing larceny,” and stole electronics and jewelry. On October 31,
2015, Constanza was convicted of multiple counts of attempted second-degree
burglary.
For one of those convictions, the New York “Criminal Information”1 is in
the record and it charges Constanza with “burglary in the second degree” for
“unlawfully enter[ing] in a dwelling located at 297 LaFayette St., Copiague, with
intent to commit a crime therein.” According to the corresponding written
1

Constanza waived his right to an indictment and consented to prosecution by criminal
information.
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judgment, Constanza was convicted of “ATT.BURG.2,” in violation of N.Y. Penal
Law §§ 110.00 and 140.25.
D.

Sentencing
The PSI recommended a base offense level of eight, pursuant to U.S.S.G.

§ 2L1.2(a). The PSI added to that base offense level a 16-level increase under
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) because Constanza was previously deported after an
attempted second-degree burglary conviction in New York, which is a “crime of
violence.” The PSI also applied a three-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a)
and (b) for acceptance of responsibility and cooperation with authorities.
Constanza’s total adjusted offense level was 21. Based on this total offense
level and a criminal history category of III, Constanza’s advisory guidelines range
was 46 to 57 months’ imprisonment.
Constanza filed a written objection to the 16-level “crime of violence”
enhancement under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). He argued that he was eligible for only a
four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(D) for being deported after a
conviction for a felony not otherwise enumerated in § 2L1.2(b). The probation
officer disagreed, noting that the Criminal Information and written judgment—
both Shepard 2 documents—established that Constanza was convicted of attempted

2

Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 125 S. Ct. 1254 (2005).
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second-degree burglary, in violation of N.Y. Penal Law §§ 110.00 and 140.25,
which qualifies as a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii).
At sentencing, the district court determined that the 16-level enhancement
was appropriate and overruled Constanza’s objection. The court adopted the
findings of fact and guidelines calculations contained in the PSI. After reviewing
the PSI and considering the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553, the district court
varied downward 9 months below the bottom end of Constanza’s advisory
guidelines range of 46 to 57 months. The court sentenced Constanza to 37 months’
imprisonment. Constanza then reasserted his objection to the 16-level
enhancement, which the court overruled. This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Constanza argues that his 2005 New York attempted seconddegree burglary conviction is not a “crime of violence” as defined by U.S.S.G.
§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) and, therefore, the district court erred by applying the 16-level
enhancement. 3 We first examine what constitutes a “crime of violence” under that
Guideline at issue.

3

“We review de novo whether a defendant’s prior conviction qualifies as a ‘crime of
violence’ under the Sentencing Guidelines.” United States v. Palomino Garcia, 606 F.3d 1317,
1326 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted).
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A.

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Definition of “Crime of Violence” in U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2
Section 2L1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for a 16-level increase

to a defendant’s base offense level “[i]f the defendant previously was deported . . .
after . . . a conviction for a felony that is . . . a crime of violence.” U.S.S.G.
§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). The Application Notes to § 2L1.2(b)(1) define a “crime of
violence” as any of several enumerated offenses, expressly including “burglary of
a dwelling.” Id. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii).
The Application Notes also provide that a predicate “crime of violence”
includes “the offenses of aiding and abetting, conspiring, and attempting” to
commit a “crime of violence.” Id. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.5. Thus, attempted burglary of a
dwelling qualifies as a “crime of violence” under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii).
B.

Constanza’s Burglary Conviction—Modified Categorical Approach
The next question is whether Constanza’s New York attempted second-

degree burglary conviction constitutes a conviction for attempted “burglary of a
dwelling” as provided by the Application Notes to § 2L1.2(b)(1), and thus qualifies
as a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). To make this
determination, we generally apply a categorical approach. United States v.
Ramirez-Flores, 743 F.3d 816, 820 (11th Cir. 2014). However, “in cases involving
a ‘divisible’ statute—i.e., one that sets out one or more elements of the offense in

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the alternative, in effect creating several different crimes”—we apply a modified
categorical approach. Id.
C.

Divisibility
Before applying the modified categorical approach, we examine whether

Constanza’s attempted second-degree burglary conviction violated a divisible
statute. See United States v. Estrella, 758 F.3d 1239, 1245 (11th Cir. 2014). The
parties agree that New York’s second-degree burglary statute is divisible. New
York law has a tiered statutory scheme for burglary. See N.Y. Penal Law
§§ 140.20, 140.25, 140.30. At issue here is New York’s second-degree burglary
statute, § 140.25, which reads as follows:
§ 140.25. Burglary in the second degree
A person is guilty of burglary in the second degree when he
knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to
commit a crime therein, and when:
1. In effecting entry or while in the building or in immediate flight
therefrom, he or another participant in the crime:
(a) Is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon; or
(b) Causes physical injury to any person who is not a participant in
the crime; or
(c) Uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous instrument;
or
(d) Displays what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun,
machine gun or other firearm; or
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2. The building is a dwelling.
Id. § 140.25 (emphasis added). Thus, a person is guilty of second-degree burglary
when he “knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to
commit a crime therein” and that “building is a dwelling.” Id. Indeed, New York
law even narrows further the definition of a “dwelling” and defines it as “a
building which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night.” Id.
§ 140.00(3).
We agree with the parties that § 140.25 is a divisible statute. Courts can
usually determine whether a statute is divisible by simply reading its text and
asking if its elements or means are drafted in the alternative. Estrella, 758 F.3d at
1246. It is clear from “simply reading its text” that the elements or means of
§ 140.25 are drafted in the alternative. See id. Specifically, the text of § 140.25
contains a distinct subsection that creates a separate and divisible crime for
unlawfully entering a building that is a dwelling with intent to commit a crime
therein. N.Y. Penal Law § 140.25(2).4 Accordingly, we may employ the modified
categorical approach to determine under which of the alternative statutory phrases
Constanza was convicted.

4

We also point out that N.Y. Penal Law § 140.00(2) sets out another definition of a
“building” that encompasses many types of structures, such as watercraft. In contrast,
§ 140.25(2) has its own definition of what constitutes a building. To violate § 140.25(2), the
building must be a dwelling. Thus, the broader definition of “building” in § 140.00(2) does not
apply to this alternative crime in § 140.25(2).
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D.

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Shepard Documents
Under the modified categorical approach, we may consult a limited class of

documents, such as indictments, plea agreements, jury instructions, and undisputed
facts contained in the PSI to determine which alternative elements or statutory
phrases formed the basis of the defendant’s prior conviction. Ramirez-Flores, 743
F.3d at 820 & n.3. These documents are known as Shepard documents. Id. at 820
n.3.
Upon review of the available Shepard documents, Constanza was convicted
of attempted burglary of a dwelling under §§ 110.00 and 140.25(2).5 A written
judgment from a New York state court provides that in 2005, Constanza was
convicted of attempted burglary in the second degree, in violation of N.Y. Penal
Law §§ 110.00 and 140.25. The Criminal Information charged that Constanza
“unlawfully entered in a dwelling located at 297 LaFayette St., Copiague, with
intent to commit a crime therein.” (emphasis added). The Criminal Information’s
use of the word “dwelling,” the designation of a specific address, and the omission
of the other terms used in § 140.25(1)(a)-(d) make clear that § 140.25(2) was the
alternative statutory phrase underlying Constanza’s conviction.
5

Under New York law, criminal attempt is committed “when, with intent to commit a
crime, [the defendant] engages in conduct which tends to effect the commission of such crime.”
N.Y. Penal Law § 110.00. As noted earlier, the Application Notes to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 expressly
enumerate “burglary of a dwelling” as a “crime of violence” and provide that an attempt to
commit such an enumerated offense qualifies as a “crime of violence.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt.
nn.1(B)(iii), 5.
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We recognize that Constanza argues that he pleaded guilty to only the
offense of attempted second-degree burglary—as opposed to the complete offense
of second-degree burglary charged in the Criminal Information. He argues that
this means that he pleaded guilty to a different crime and, therefore, this Court may
not rely at all on the Criminal Information here, which charged the complete
offense. But this argument ignores the fact that Constanza did not plead guilty to a
crime substantively different from the crime charged in the Criminal Information.
Rather, he pleaded guilty to the attempt form of the same crime charged in the
Criminal Information. Thus, we may look to the Criminal Information to
determine the statutory phrase of conviction.
Constanza relies on our decision in United States v. Day, 465 F.3d 1262
(11th Cir. 2006), but that decision is materially different. The defendant in Day
challenged his sentence enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act
(“ACCA”) on the grounds that his prior burglary conviction did not qualify as a
predicate “violent felony.” Day, 465 F.3d at 1264. The charging document
alleged that the defendant had unlawfully entered or remained in a dwelling and
charged him with committing second-degree burglary under Florida law. Id. at
1266. However, the written judgment indicated that the defendant pleaded nolo
contendere to third-degree burglary, which only required unlawful entry into an
unoccupied structure other than a dwelling and did not qualify as a “violent
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felony.” Id. In Day, the defendant was convicted only of the substantively
different crime of third-degree burglary. Id.
In contrast to Day, the Criminal Information alleged that Constanza
unlawfully entered a dwelling, a fact that comports with his conviction for
attempted second-degree burglary. There is no factual incongruence between the
Criminal Information and judgment in Constanza’s case.
Because Constanza’s conviction under §§ 110.00 and 140.25(2) constitutes a
conviction for an attempted “burglary of a dwelling,” it qualifies as a predicate
“crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). See U.S.S.G.
§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) & cmt. nn.1(B)(iii), 5. Constanza’s previous felony
conviction for a “crime of violence” warranted a 16-point offense level
enhancement and the district court committed no error in applying it.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant Constanza’s sentence.6
AFFIRMED.

6

Constanza does not appeal his conviction.
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