Jean Joassin v. Lieutenant Murphy, et al

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Jean Joassin. Decision: Affirmed in part, Reversed and Remanded in part. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

Case: 15-13469

Date Filed: 08/05/2016

Page: 1 of 7

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-13469
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 3:13-cv-00607-BJD-MCR

JEAN JOASSIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
LIEUTENANT MURPHY,
SERGEANT RODGERS,
OFFICER COATS,
OFFICER MARTIN,
OFFICER WOODS,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(August 5, 2016)

Case: 15-13469

Date Filed: 08/05/2016

Page: 2 of 7

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, ROSENBAUM and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jean Joassin, a Florida state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the Defendants, five prison
officers at Suwannee Correctional Institution, on Joassin’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims
for excessive force and deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. On appeal, Joassin contends the district court abused its discretion
by failing to strike several declarations submitted by the Defendants and
erroneously granted summary judgment where the evidence presented competing
witness testimony. After review, 1 we affirm the denial of the motion to strike but
reverse summary judgment.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to strike the
declarations and incident report. Each declarant expressly limited his or her
declaration to events that he or she personally observed. The fact that some
declarants did not personally observe every relevant portion of the incident does
not render speculative their declarations regarding events the declarants did
observe. The declarations were based on personal knowledge and are therefore
admissible summary judgment evidence. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4).
1

We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s ruling on a motion to strike. See
Evans v. Books-A-Million, 762 F.3d 1288, 1295 (11th Cir. 2014). We review de novo a district
court order granting summary judgment, applying the same legal standards as the district court.
Smith v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 713 F.3d 1059, 1063 (11th Cir. 2013).
2

Case: 15-13469

Date Filed: 08/05/2016

Page: 3 of 7

The district court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of the
Defendants. While some details of Joassin’s account of the incident have varied,
the bulk of Joassin’s claims have remained consistent. In both his verified
complaint and his deposition, Joassin stated that the officers slammed him to the
ground three times without provocation while he was restrained, grabbed and
squeezed his genitals, and spit in his face, causing various injuries. Drawing all
reasonable inferences in Joassin’s favor, Joassin’s sworn testimony creates a
genuine issue of material fact as to “whether force was applied in a good faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very
purpose of causing harm.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21, 106 S. Ct.
1078, 1085 (1986).
In concluding that summary judgment was appropriate, the district court
relied on the declarations of the Defendants and three non-parties: a prison officer,
a prison nurse, and a Florida Department of Corrections investigator. Although
competing affidavits generally create a genuine issue of fact, the district court held
that this case was similar to the Supreme Court’s opinion Scott v. Harris, under
which we should disregard a party’s sworn account of the events if it is “blatantly
contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it.” Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1776 (2007). In Scott, a video of the
high-speed chase at issue in the case “so utterly discredited” the plaintiff’s
3

Case: 15-13469

Date Filed: 08/05/2016

Page: 4 of 7

description of the events that the Court held no reasonable jury could believe the
plaintiff. Id. at 380, 127 S. Ct. at 1776. We have interpreted Scott as reaffirming
our understanding of the summary judgment standard. See Morton v. Kirkwood,
707 F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Thus, where an accurate video recording
completely and clearly contradicts a party’s testimony, that testimony becomes
incredible.”). In Morton, we affirmed a district court’s denial of summary
judgment because the defendant offered not a video recording but “forensic
evidence that does not so utterly discredit [the plaintiff’s] testimony that no
reasonable jury could believe it.” Id.
Here, Joassin’s self-serving testimony is contradicted by the self-serving
testimony of the prison officials who are either Defendants in this action or
colleagues of the Defendants in this action. In concluding that Joassin’s testimony
was blatantly contradicted by the record, the district court relied upon a
Department of Corrections investigator’s declaration relaying what he saw on a
now-destroyed videotape and a prison nurse’s declaration introducing Joassin’s
medical records from the date at issue. But neither declaration is so inherently
credible as to “blatantly contradict[]” and “utterly discredit[]” Joassin’s testimony.
See Scott, 550 U.S. at 380, 127 S. Ct. at 1776. Additionally, even if we treated the
two declarations as sacrosanct, neither declaration contradicts enough of Joassin’s
testimony to warrant judgment as a matter of law.
4

Case: 15-13469

Date Filed: 08/05/2016

Page: 5 of 7

Though based on the investigator’s observation of a videotape, the
investigator’s declaration is not videotape evidence. Because the videotape was
destroyed, neither the district court nor this Court has the benefit of an irrefutable
videotape that “completely and clearly contradicts” Joassin. See Morton, 707 F.3d
at 1284. Rather, the investigator’s declaration presents just another interested
witness’s recitation of what he claims to have observed. Furthermore, the
investigator’s declaration, if credited, refutes Joassin’s allegations with respect to
only the portion of the incident that took place in or near the shower. The
investigator concedes that he observed no videotape evidence of the portion of the
incident that took place in the vestibule while prison officers led Joassin to the
infirmary. Therefore, even if we discredited Joassin’s testimony to the extent the
investigator testifies otherwise, there would remain a genuine issue of fact as to
whether the prison officers squeezed Joassin’s genitals and twice unnecessarily
slammed Joassin to the ground.
Likewise, the prison nurse’s declaration and records of Joassin’s medical
treatment do not “completely and clearly contradict[]” Joassin’s testimony. See id.
As a former employee and current contractor of the Department of Corrections, the
nurse is an interested witness. Even if the nurse was disinterested, her declaration
cannot be credited to the extent Joassin’s testimony contradicts it. See Jackson v.
West, 787 F.3d 1345, 1357 n.6 (11th Cir. 2015). The declaration and medical
5

Case: 15-13469

Date Filed: 08/05/2016

Page: 6 of 7

records, which the nurse completed, remain contradicted to the extent that Joassin
stated in his deposition that the nurse did not examine him on the date at issue.
This action is therefore no more than a swearing contest between interested
witnesses. See id. (“One cannot ‘refute’ a witness’s statements using another
witness’s statements at summary judgment; such a swearing contest is one for the
jury to resolve.”). Furthermore, the nurse’s declaration and medical records, if
credited, refute Joassin’s allegations only as to the severity or existence of
Joassin’s injuries. The nurse does not claim to have witnessed any portion of the
allegedly excessive use of force. “[T]he core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force
was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously
and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7, 112 S. Ct.
995, 999 (1992). We may not superimpose onto this inquiry an arbitrary injury
threshold. See Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 39, 130 S. Ct. 1175, 1179 (2010)
(“To conclude . . . that the absence of some arbitrary quantity of injury requires
automatic dismissal of an excessive force claim improperly bypasses this core
inquiry.” (quotation marks omitted)); Saunders v. Duke, 766 F.3d 1262, 1270 (11th
Cir. 2014) (acknowledging Wilkins and extending it to a Fourth Amendment
excessive-force case). Therefore, even if Joassin overstates his alleged injuries, the
Defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

6

Case: 15-13469

Date Filed: 08/05/2016

Page: 7 of 7

The summary judgment evidence reveals a genuine dispute regarding
whether the Defendants “maliciously and sadistically” inflicted and permitted one
another to “maliciously and sadistically” inflict force upon Joassin “for the very
purpose of causing harm.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320, 106 S. Ct. at 1085.
Therefore, summary judgment was inappropriate.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED and REMANDED in part.

7