Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Department of Labor

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Petitioners Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. and Signal Mutual Indemnity Association, LTD.. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. Petition DENIED. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

Case: 15-14115

Date Filed: 06/03/2016

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-14115
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
Agency No. BRB 15-0035
FEDERAL MARINE TERMINALS, INC.,
THE SIGNAL MUTUAL INDEMNITY ASSOCIATION,
Petitioners,
versus
DIRECTOR, OWCP,
JEREMY SCHOFIELD,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
Respondents.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Benefits Review Board
________________________
(June 3, 2016)
Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

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Jeremy Schofield injured his back in 2006 while working for Federal Marine
Terminals, Inc. (“Federal Marine”). In 2007 and 2008, Schofield underwent three
back surgeries, the first two of which were unsuccessful. To deal with chronic
severe pain related to his injury, Schofield began seeing a pain-management
physician in 2009.

He continues to receive pain-management treatment.

Schofield’s current treatment regimen includes the use of narcotic medications.
Schofield filed a formal claim for compensation under the Longshore and
Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act in November 2008. As part of a settlement
agreement approved in February 2010, Federal Marine and its self-insurer, The
Signal

Mutual

Indemnity

Association

(“Signal

Mutual”)

(collectively,

“Petitioners”), agreed to pay Schofield $325,000 in settlement of his compensation
claim and to remain liable for Schofield’s future medical treatment related to the
injury. See 33 U.S.C. § 908(i).
In July 2012, Petitioners notified Schofield that they would no longer
authorize narcotic-based pain-management treatment, and they requested an
informal conference on that medical-benefits issue. The matter was referred to an
administrative law judge (“ALJ”), who conducted a formal hearing. After the
hearing, the ALJ issued a decision and order finding that Petitioners were obligated
to pay for Schofield’s narcotic medications because such treatment was medically
reasonable and necessary for his continued care.
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Petitioners appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Department of Labor Benefits
Review Board (the “Board”), which affirmed the ALJ’s decision. Petitioners now
petition this Court for review. After careful review, we affirm the Board’s decision
and deny the petition for review.
Under the Longshore Workers’ Act, the Board reviews an ALJ’s decision to
ensure that it is supported by substantial evidence and based on correct legal
standards. See 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3) (“The findings of fact in the decision under
review by the Board shall be conclusive if supported by substantial evidence in the
record considered as a whole.”); Atl. Container Serv., Inc. v. Coleman, 904 F.2d
611, 613-14 (11th Cir. 1990). “Substantial evidence is ‘such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Del Monte
Fresh Produce v. Dir., OWCP, 563 F.3d 1216, 1219 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Lollar v. Ala. By-Products Corp., 893 F.2d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 1990)). We
defer to the ALJ’s credibility determinations and her resolution of conflicting
evidence. Id. When the facts permit diverse inferences, the ALJ’s choice of
inference is conclusive unless it is not supported by substantial evidence. Fulks v.
Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 637 F.2d 1008, 1011 (5th Cir. Feb. 1981).1
Our role in reviewing the decisions of the Board is to correct errors of law
and to ensure that the Board has adhered to the proper standard of review. Del
1

This Court adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions prior to October 1,
1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
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Monte Fresh Produce, 563 F.3d at 1219. If the Board has upheld the ALJ’s
decision, “our limited review effectively cloaks the [Board]’s decision with the
same deference to which the ALJ is entitled.”

Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted).
Under 33 U.S.C. § 907, employers are responsible for reasonable and
necessary medical services for an eligible employee’s work-related injury. See 33
U.S.C. § 907(a) (“The employer shall furnish such medical, surgical, and other
attendance or treatment, nurse and hospital service, medicine, crutches, and
apparatus, for such period as the nature of the injury or the process of recovery
may require.”). Disputes over whether “the treatment obtained was reasonable and
necessary” are “factual matters within the administrative law judge’s authority to
resolve.” Weikert v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 36 Ben. Rev. Bd. Serv. (MB) 38,
2002 WL 539950, *2 (Mar. 21, 2002). Accordingly, we review for substantial
evidence the ALJ’s determination that continued use of narcotic medications is
medically reasonable and necessary to treat Schofield’s chronic pain.
Here, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that continuing
use of narcotic pain treatment is reasonable and necessary. The ALJ extensively
reviewed the evidence presented at the hearing and issued a thorough order
explaining the decision.

Specifically, the ALJ found that Schofield credibly

testified that he experienced pain on a daily basis as a result of his work-related
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injury and that he would not be able to function without the use of his narcotic
medications. In support of the decision, the ALJ reasonably relied on the opinions
of Schofield’s treating pain-management physicians, Dr. John Barsa and Dr.
Miguel Attias, who both testified that narcotic medications were, and continue to
be, medically necessary to treat Schofield’s chronic pain. We conclude that the
ALJ rationally found that Dr. Barsa and Dr. Attias, as Schofield’s treating
physicians, were in the best positions to determine what course of treatment was
medically necessary and reasonable to treat Schofield’s chronic pain.
Petitioners contend that Schofield’s positive drug tests for illicit or nonprescribed drugs, such as marijuana, render continued use of narcotic therapy
unreasonable, citing guidelines from the American Pain Society. Petitioners also
rely on evidence that several other physicians advised against continuing treatment
with narcotics due to Schofield’s positive drug tests and the long-term
consequences associated with using opioid medications to treat chronic pain.
While the record does contain evidence that is favorable to their position,
Petitioners have not shown that it was unreasonable for the ALJ to conclude that
the treatment prescribed by Dr. Barsa and Dr. Attias was reasonable and necessary.
Dr. Barsa and Dr. Attias both stated that, despite the drug tests and the long-term
adverse consequences of using narcotics, the narcotic prescriptions were medically
reasonable and necessary. Dr. Attias also testified that he was working with
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Schofield to reduce and ultimately eliminate his use of narcotics. In addition, Dr.
Barsa’s and Dr. Attias’s opinions were supported by Dr. David Herson, who
evaluated Schofield and reviewed his medical records. Dr. Herson, who was
board-certified in anesthesiology and pain management, testified that Schofield’s
narcotics prescriptions were medically reasonable and necessary and that he found
no indications that Schofield abused the drugs prescribed to him. Based on this
evidence, a reasonable ALJ could conclude that Schofield’s narcotic medications
were medically reasonable and necessary, despite their risks and despite the
contrary views of other physicians. See Del Monte Fresh Produce, 563 F.3d at
1219.
Petitioners also claim that the ALJ improperly applied the “true doubt rule,”
invalidated by the Supreme Court in 1994, see Dir., Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 114 S. Ct. 2251
(1994). Despite listing the issue in the “Statement of the Issues” section of their
initial brief, however, Petitioners failed to develop any argument on that point in
the remainder of the brief. Accordingly, they have abandoned the issue. See
Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680-81 (11th Cir. 2014) (“A
party fails to adequately brief a claim when he does not plainly and prominently
raise it, for instance by devoting a discrete section of his argument to those
claims.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Petitioners’ arguments in their reply
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brief come too late. See United States v. Levy, 379 F.3d 1241, 1244 (11th Cir.
2004) (“[T]his Court . . . repeatedly has refused to consider issues raised for the
first time in an appellant’s reply brief.”).

Likewise, to the extent Petitioners

challenge the severity of Schofield’s injuries and his need for pain medication
more generally, they did not properly raise the issue in their opening brief, and we
will not consider their arguments raised for the first time in their reply brief.
In sum, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that painmanagement treatment including the prescription of narcotic medications was
medically reasonable and necessary for Schofield’s continued care. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 907(a). Therefore, we AFFIRM the decision of the Board, which affirmed the
ALJ’s decision, and DENY Petitioners’ petition for review.

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