Sentinel Capital Orlando, LLC v. Centennial Bank

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Sentinel Capital Orlando, LLC. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

Case: 15-14904

Date Filed: 01/20/2017

Page: 1 of 36

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
_______________________
No. 15-14904
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 6:12-cv-00785-PGB-GJK

SENTINEL CAPITAL ORLANDO, LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CENTENNIAL BANK,
as successor-in-interest to Old Southern Bank
by asset acquisition from the FDIC as Receiver for Old
Southern Bank,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(January 20, 2017)

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Before WILLIAM PRYOR and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges, and UNGARO, *
District Judge.
PER CURIAM:
This lawsuit arises out of a loan participation agreement that was entered
into between The Bankers Bank NA, the predecessor-in-interest of AppellantPlaintiff, Sentinel Capital Orlando, LLC, and Old Southern Bank, the predecessorin-interest of Appellee-Defendant, Centennial Bank. After a three-day bench trial,
the district court ruled that Sentinel failed to establish by competent evidence
Centennial defaulted under the terms of the participation agreement. Therefore,
Sentinel was not entitled to enforce a repurchase option in the agreement that
required Centennial to buy back Sentinel’s ownership in the loan under certain
circumstances. While the evidentiary record amply supports the district court’s
findings of fact and we agree with the ultimate decision in favor of Centennial, we
differ as to the legal conclusions applicable to such facts. Therefore, we affirm on
other grounds than those set forth in the district court’s order.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Participation Agreement

*

Honorable Ursula Ungaro, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Florida,
sitting by designation.
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In 2007, The Bankers Bank, NA (“The Bankers Bank”) and Old Southern
Bank agreed to jointly loan approximately $15,000,000 to Ocoee Golf, LLC (the
“Borrower”) for the development of a residential community in Ocoee, Florida.
On September 26, 2007, The Bankers Bank and Old Southern Bank executed the
Participation Agreement (the “Participation Agreement” or the “Agreement”),
which sets forth the terms of the joint ownership of the Loan (the “Loan”).
As defined in the Participation Agreement, The Bankers Bank was the
“Participating Bank,” or “Participant,” and the majority interest owner, responsible
for loaning 56.13% of the Loan principal. Old Southern Bank was the
“Originating Bank” and the minority interest holder, responsible for loaning
43.87% of the Loan principal.
On December 30, 2009, Club Docks, LLC assumed The Bankers Bank’s
interest and became the Participating Bank. Centennial Bank (“Centennial”)
became the Originating Bank on March 12, 2010, in place of Old Southern Bank.
Sentinel Capital Orlando, LLC (“Sentinel”) did not acquire its interest in the
Participation Agreement from Club Docks until May 26, 2011. It is noteworthy for
the purposes of evaluating Sentinel’s claims that when Sentinel purchased its
interest, the Loan had been in default since before Club Docks had purchased the
majority interest and foreclosure proceedings were being prosecuted by

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Centennial; most of the conduct that Sentinel complains of in this case occurred
prior to its acquisition of the participation interest.
B. The Borrower’s Default on the Loan
On October 4, 2008, the Borrower defaulted on the Loan by failing to make
the first payment. At that time, The Bankers Bank and Old Southern Bank were
the Participating Bank and Originating Bank, respectively, and a total amount of
$5,612,425.26 in loan proceeds had been disbursed to the Borrower. 1 The
Borrower never made a payment under the Loan.
C. Foreclosure Action and Borrower’s Offers
On July 1, 2010, approximately four months after acquiring its interest in the
Participation Agreement, Centennial initiated a foreclosure action on the Loan. In
November 2010, the Borrower and the guarantors presented a settlement offer to
Centennial. It is unclear whether this offer was conveyed to Club Docks.
Centennial rejected the offer.
On December 6, 2011, a mediation session was held in the foreclosure
action between Centennial and the Borrower and the guarantors. Centennial did
not inform Sentinel of the mediation, and Centennial did not advise Sentinel that
the Borrower made settlement offers that Centennial rejected during the mediation.

1

The Participating Bank had disbursed $3,150,254.30, and the Originating Bank had disbursed
$2,462,170.96. No additional monies were disbursed to the Borrower.
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The Borrower also offered Centennial a deed in lieu of foreclosure. Centennial
rejected the Borrower’s offer without advising Sentinel of the offer or its decision.
D. Third-Party Offers
Centennial also received various third-party offers to purchase the Loan that
it rejected. Encore Housing made an offer on May 18, 2010 to purchase the note
or property for $3.8 million, with an expiration date on the offer’s face of ten (10)
calendar days. It is unclear whether this offer was conveyed to Club Docks. On
July 19, 2010, Centennial received an offer from Ryan Homes for $3.25 million,
which Centennial did not communicate to Club Docks. Three months later, on
October 20, 2010, the offer was retransmitted by Ryan Homes to Centennial, but it
also was not conveyed to Club Docks.
On June 27, 2011, Centennial received a third offer from Embassy Homes
for $3.8 million, which Centennial rejected. At that point, Sentinel had acquired its
majority interest. Centennial did not convey this offer to Sentinel.
E. Interest Rate
The Loan documents provide that the interest rate on the Loan may be raised
to a default interest rate equal to the maximum allowed under Florida law, which
was 25%. Specifically, the note provides that the standard interest rate “shall” be
raised to the default interest rate at “the bank’s discretion.” Under the note, the

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“Bank” was defined as Old Southern Bank, which was Centennial’s predecessorin-interest.
While the foreclosure action was pending, on November 4, 2011, Centennial
sent a proposed payoff amount based on 3.75%, the standard interest rate. On
November 8, 2011, Sentinel sent correspondence to Centennial asking Centennial
why the default interest rate was not utilized in calculating the proposed payoff
amount. Thereafter, on November 9, 2011, Centennial sent a proposed payoff
amount based on the 25% default interest.
The interest rate issue was not raised again until May 6, 2013, when the
parties were finalizing a high-bid sale of the foreclosure judgment, presumably for
the purpose of establishing the amount of the deficiency judgment against the
Borrower and the guarantors. At that time, Sentinel directed Centennial to charge
the 25% default interest rate, but Centennial refused.
Notwithstanding the disagreement as to the interest rate, on May 9, 2013,
Sentinel warned Centennial that time was of the essence and directed Centennial to
move forward with the foreclosure transaction with Sentinel’s full reservation of
rights of all claims. To facilitate resolution of the Loan foreclosure litigation,
Sentinel and Centennial entered into a Stipulation, Non-Waiver, and Consent
Agreement that preserved all claims, notwithstanding the high-bid sale. The

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Stipulation, Non-Waiver, and Consent Agreement preserved the claims between
the parties.
F. Foreclosure Settlement
The foreclosure action was ultimately settled through a forbearance
agreement with the Borrower and the guarantors, which provided for entry of a
stipulated foreclosure final judgment to be sold at a high-bid sale. The final
judgment of foreclosure calculates interest at the Loan’s standard interest rate of
3.75%. The stipulated judgment was entered on June 17, 2013. The high-bid sale
resulted in a total payment to Centennial and Sentinel of $6.5 million. On January
29, 2014, stipulated final summary judgments of deficiency were also entered in
the amounts of $1,290,751.89 against the Borrower and the guarantors, but these
judgments are uncollectible.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 23, 2012, Sentinel filed its Complaint in Florida state court against
Centennial, asserting a claim for specific performance. As the basis for its claim,
Sentinel sought to enforce Section 13 of the Participation Agreement, also known
as the Repurchase Clause (“Repurchase Clause” or “Repurchase Option”), alleging
a number of defaults by Centennial and its predecessor-in-interest. On May 23,
2012, Centennial removed the case to the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida based upon the district court’s diversity jurisdiction.
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Sentinel filed an Amended Complaint, and then a Second Amended
Complaint and added allegations based on facts developed in discovery.
Centennial then moved to dismiss Sentinel’s Second Amended Complaint. While
the Second Amended Complaint and the motion to dismiss were pending,
Centennial filed a motion for summary judgment as to each of the claims in
Sentinel’s Second Amended Complaint. The district court granted Centennial’s
summary judgment motion as to Counts I and II, which were claims alleging
breaches by Centennial’s predecessor-in-interest, because the court determined that
those claims were barred by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”). However, the district court denied
Centennial’s motion as to Count III – the breach of contract claim against
Centennial – because the court found FIREEA was inapplicable to the alleged
breaches by Centennial itself. Sentinel filed its own motion for summary judgment
as to Count III. The district court denied Sentinel’s motion as to Count III,
concluding that disputed issues of fact precluded summary judgment for Sentinel.
Additional discovery regarding Count III followed, and Sentinel then filed a
Third Amended Complaint. Centennial answered and raised a number of
affirmative defenses. Centennial also asserted a counterclaim against Sentinel
based on Sentinel’s alleged breach of the Participation Agreement in failing to pay

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its pro rata share of loan administration expenses for the loan. Sentinel answered
the counterclaim and raised defenses.
In February 2015, the district court held a three-day bench trial on Count III
of Sentinel’s Third Amended Complaint and Centennial’s counterclaim. The
district court issued its Memorandum Opinion and Order on October 1, 2015 and
ordered that judgment be entered in favor of Centennial on Count III in Sentinel’s
Third Amended Complaint. The court also ordered that judgment be entered in
favor of Centennial on Centennial’s counterclaim. The Clerk of Court entered
judgment as directed for $24,381.60 in favor of Centennial and assessed
$12,366.88 for costs at Centennial’s request. Sentinel then filed this appeal.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal of a district court order from a bench trial, we review the district
court’s conclusions of law de novo and its findings of fact for clear error. Crystal
Entm’t & Filmworks, Inc. v. Jurado, 643 F.3d 1313, 1319 (11th Cir. 2011). We
will not upset a district court’s finding of fact unless it is “clearly erroneous.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 52(a); see Proudfoot Consulting Co. v. Gordon, 576 F.3d 1223, 1230
(11th Cir. 2009). By that standard, we may review the district court’s findings of
fact if, after viewing all the evidence, we are “left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.” HGI Assocs., Inc. v. Wetmore

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Printing Co., 427 F.3d 867, 873 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948)).
IV. DISCUSSION
We agree with the district court that Sentinel failed to establish that
Centennial defaulted under the terms of the Participation Agreement, and
therefore, Sentinel cannot invoke the Repurchase Clause, or Put Option, set forth in
Section 13.
Upon de novo review of the district court’s conclusions of law, we do not
agree with the district court’s construction of the Participation Agreement to the
extent that the district court found Sentinel was required to prove that it had
incurred a loss due to the Originating Bank’s lack of commercially reasonable
conduct, negligence, or willful misconduct as a predicate for enforcement of the
Repurchase Option provided for in Section 13. We also do not agree that Section
10 is inapplicable post-default insofar as it requires Centennial, in its reasonable
judgment, to keep Sentinel fully informed as to any and all information that it has
or receives relating to the Loan, the value of the collateral securing the Loan, and
the Borrower.
However, in applying our construction of the relevant provisions, we reach
the same ultimate conclusion as the district court that Sentinel failed to prove a

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breach sufficient to trigger the Repurchase Option in Section 13. Therefore, and
for the reasons stated herein, the district court’s ruling will be affirmed.
1. The District Court Erred in its Construction of the Participation
Agreement.
On appeal, Sentinel argues that the district court erred in its construction of
Sections 4, 10, 11, 13, and 16 of the Participation Agreement. Specifically,
Sentinel argues that the district court erred in refusing to enforce the Repurchase
Option because it erred in concluding that: (1) Sections 4, 10, and 11 did not
require Centennial to convey every piece of information that it had or received
relating to the Loan or the Borrower; and (2) Section 16 did not allow Sentinel to
control the course of conduct by requiring Centennial to employ the default interest
rate after the Borrower’s default. We separately address the relevant provisions of
the Agreement.
A. Section 13 of the Participation Agreement
Because Sentinel ultimately seeks to enforce the Repurchase Clause set forth
in Section 13, we begin our analysis with this provision of the Participation
Agreement. Section 13 of the Participation Agreement is entitled, “Breach by
Originating Bank,” and provides as follows:
Participating Bank shall, in addition to all other remedies
available to it at law or in equity, have the unilateral right (but
not the obligation) to sell to Originating Bank, regardless of
self-imposed lending limits of Originating Bank, its
Participation Interest up to the amount that Originating Bank is
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permitted to purchase without violating regulatory lending limit
requirements, for an amount equal to the aggregate of all
principal, interest, fees and other sums due with respect to its
Participation Interest or the portion that is being sold, if:
a. Originating Bank shall fail to cure any default by the
Originating Bank under this Agreement within thirty (30)
days after notice from Participating Bank specifying the
default[.]

Under the terms of the Agreement, before Sentinel is permitted to invoke the
Repurchase Clause in Section 13, Sentinel must establish: (1) Centennial
committed a “default” under the terms of the Participation Agreement; and (2)
Sentinel provided notice to Centennial of this “default,” which Centennial failed to
cure within thirty (30) days of receiving such notice. 2
As the district court observed, the term “default” is not expressly defined
within this section, or within any other section of the Agreement. Under Georgia
law, “the whole contract should be looked to in arriving at the construction of any
part.” O.C.G.A. § 13-2-2(4). Therefore, we must construe the Participation
Agreement as a whole to ascertain the duties that Centennial, as the Originating
Bank, owed to Sentinel, as the Participating Bank.

2

Because we do not find that Centennial committed a default under the terms of the Participation
Agreement, our analysis throughout this opinion does not consider whether Sentinel provided
adequate notice to Centennial, which is a condition precedent that must be satisfied prior to
invoking Section 13.
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B. Sections 4, 10, and 11 of the Participation Agreement
Sentinel insists that in reading Sections 4, 10, and 11 together, the parties
intended for Centennial to be completely open in communications with Sentinel,
and Centennial was prohibited from withholding any information from Sentinel
that related to the Loan, the collateral, and the Borrower, and that its failure to
observe this standard is a breach allowing it to exercise the Repurchase Option in
Section 13.
In support of its position, Sentinel heavily relies upon the Middle District of
Georgia’s decision in Sun American Bank v. Fairfield Financial Services, 690 F.
Supp. 2d 1342 (M.D. Ga. 2010), where the district court analyzed provisions in a
loan participation agreement identical to those in this case and concluded the
originating bank was required to keep the participating bank fully informed of all
matters relating to the loan, the value of the collateral securing the loan, and the
borrower.
In this case, the district court did not directly address Sections 4 and 11 of
the Agreement in its order; but the court did conclude that Centennial was required
to comply with Section 10. The court further found that Section 10 only applies up
until the time the Borrower defaults. The district court concluded Centennial was
no longer required to convey pertinent information to Sentinel once the Borrower
defaulted on the Loan.
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On appeal, Sentinel argues the district court’s analysis was incomplete
because it failed to address or give any weight to Sections 4 and 11 prior to
reaching its conclusion that Centennial did not owe a duty to Sentinel pursuant to
Section 10 to convey every piece of information relating to the Loan, the collateral,
or the Borrower. Sentinel complains the district court’s analysis was contrary to
the district court’s analysis in Sun American, which construed Sections 4, 10, and
11 as a whole. Sentinel further insists that the district court erred in determining
that Centennial was no longer required by Section 10 to inform Sentinel about
settlement offers from the Borrower or third parties after the Borrower defaulted.
We agree with the district court’s finding that Sections 4 and 11 are not
directly applicable to the claims made in this case. However, we consider Sections
4 and 11 to be relevant to the proper construction of Section 10, and for that
matter, the entire Agreement. We also do not agree that Section 10 only required
Centennial to convey information prior to the Borrower’s default. And, we find
the facts of Sun American are distinguishable from the facts of this case.
i.

Sections 4 and 11 of the Agreement

Section 4 is entitled “Credit Condition of the Borrower(s): Access to Credit
Information,” and states,
It is understood and agreed that Participating Bank, and not
Originating Bank, is responsible for making the ultimate credit
decision through the Participating Bank’s own review of
information pertaining to the Loan. Consequently, credit
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evaluation performed by Originating Bank must be
independently verified and supplemented by Participating
Bank’s review of individual Borrower(s) information with
respect to each Loan, sufficient for Participating Bank to make
its own credit decision with respect to its purchase of a
Participation Interest in the Loan and to monitor the Loan on an
ongoing basis. In the event Originating Bank decides to
terminate its credit relationship with a Borrower, or materially
downgrades its relationship with a Borrower, Originating Bank
promptly will provide written notice of such determination to
Participation Bank.
Section 11 is entitled “Files and Records,” and provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
Originating Bank shall keep and maintain at its offices, such
files and records of matters pertaining to the Loan, including all
such documentation, actions, and information as is set forth in
Participating Bank’s commitment letter, if any, which is
expressly incorporated by reference herein, as it would were the
Loan made solely by Originating Bank. All such files and
records shall be available for inspection by Participating Bank
or its agent during normal business hours.
Sections 4 and 11 do not have any direct relevance to this case. With respect
to Section 4, we agree with Centennial that this provision placed an affirmative
burden on Sentinel, not Centennial, to review every piece of information pertaining
to the Loan. This section only required the Originating Bank to give notice to the
Participating Bank if it was terminating or downgrading its credit relationship with
the borrower; however, this case does not involve any allegation that Centennial
failed to notify Sentinel of a decision to terminate or downgrade its credit

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relationship with the Borrower. Therefore, Section 4 does not directly apply to
Sentinel’s claims.
As for Section 11, this section required Centennial to make certain records
available to Sentinel. Once again, we do not find Centennial had any affirmative
obligation in Section 11 to convey every piece of information to Sentinel that it
had in its possession or received. In any event, there is no allegation that
Centennial refused Sentinel the right to review files or records pertaining to the
Loan. There is also no allegation that Centennial failed to keep and maintain files
or records in accordance with Section 11. Accordingly, we do not agree with
Sentinel that Section 11 imposed an affirmative duty upon Centennial to convey
any and all information relating to the Loan or the Borrower, or that Centennial
breached Section 11 and is therefore entitled to the enforcement of the Repurchase
Option.
However, we do agree with Sentinel that Section 10 should be construed in
light of the intent of the original parties that the Participating Bank be privy to
sufficient information to be the master of its credit risk. The problem here is that
the loan was known to be substandard and in foreclosure when Sentinel acquired
its majority interest.
ii.

Section 10 of the Agreement

Section 10, entitled “Default by Borrower,” states,
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Originating Bank shall promptly, after Originating Bank’s
having knowledge thereof, inform Participating Bank of any
circumstances (a “default”) which in Originating Bank’s
reasonable judgment: (a) constitute a material default under the
Loan Documents and of the salient facts known to Originating
Bank concerning such default; or (b) could have a material,
adverse affect [sic] on the loan or the value of the Collateral
securing the Loan.
Section 10 further reads, “Originating Bank shall keep Participating Bank
fully informed with respect to such circumstances, and any actions taken by
Originating Bank in connection therewith.”
In interpreting Section 10, the district court determined that this section
imposes the following two obligations: (1) the Originating Bank must inform the
Participating Bank of any circumstances which, in the Originating Bank’s
reasonable judgment, constitute a “material default” under the Loan Documents
along with the facts known to the Originating Bank; and (2) the Originating Bank
must inform the Participating Bank of information relative to the Borrower which,
in the Originating Bank’s reasonable judgment, may pose a material, adverse effect
on the Loan or the value of the collateral.
We agree with the district court’s finding that because Sentinel was aware
the Loan was in default when it acquired its interest in the Participation Agreement
on May 26, 2011, the only part of this section relevant to the issues in dispute was
Centennial’s duty to promptly inform Sentinel of circumstances which in
Centennial’s “reasonable judgment . . . could have a material, adverse affect [sic]
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on the loan or the value of the Collateral securing the loan.” Thus, under the terms
of Section 10, Centennial was only obligated to convey information to Sentinel,
which in its reasonable judgment, may have had a material, adverse effect on the
Loan, the value of the collateral securing the Loan, or the Borrower.
We conclude the district court went one step too far in its analysis, however,
when it determined Section 10 only applied to pre-default conduct, and once the
Borrower defaulted on the Loan, the Originating Bank was not required to provide
additional information that might have a material, adverse effect on the Loan or the
value of the collateral securing the Loan. The Agreement simply does not support
such a construction in the event of, for instance, a post-default loan modification.
Thus, in reading the last sentence of Section 10, we find that under some
conditions, Centennial had a continuing obligation to keep Sentinel fully informed
of any subsequent circumstances and any actions relevant to the Borrower’s default
on the Loan. That is not to say that Centennial’s continuing obligation was without
limits, however. In complying with its continuing obligation, Centennial was still
permitted to use its “reasonable judgment” when conveying information to
Sentinel, and Centennial was only required to convey such information if, in
Centennial’s reasonable judgment, it was capable of having a “material, adverse
effect” on the Loan or the collateral securing the Loan.

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Sun American is not Applicable to the Facts of this Case.

Sentinel insists that a reading of Sun American Bank v. Fairfield Financial
Services, 690 F. Supp. 2d 1342 (M.D. Fla. 2010) supports its construction that
Centennial was required by Sections 4, 10, and 11 to inform Sentinel and its
predecessors-in-interest of any and all information relative to the Loan and that its
failure to do so requires the enforcement of the Repurchase Clause in Section 13.
In its order, the district court considered Sentinel’s citation to and reliance upon
Sun American. In one paragraph, the court concluded that Sun American was not
analogous to the instant case because Sun American involved an originating bank’s
default under Section 10 when it failed to inform the Participating Bank of a
downgrade in the borrower’s credit rating at a time when the Participating Bank
may have been able to back out of the deal. We agree with the district court’s
distinction, but we more fully set out our reasoning below.
Similar to this case, Sun American involved an action alleging a breach of a
participation agreement due to an originating bank’s failure to convey information
that related to the status of an underlying loan to a participating bank. 690 F. Supp.
2d at 1344. Specifically, it was alleged that the originating bank failed: (1) to
convey information relating to changes in the borrower’s credit status, under
section 4 of the participation agreement; (2) to convey circumstances that may
have had a material, adverse effect on the loan, under section 10 of the
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participation agreement; and (3) to make its loan file available to the participating
bank, under section 11 of the participation agreement. Id. at 1346-1347.
It is clear from Sun American that the originating bank was engaging in
deceptive conduct to ensure that the participant would remain committed to the
loan. Id. at 1361. The loan at issue called for the total sum to be disbursed to the
borrower in installments over time; therefore, it was highly material that the
adverse information was withheld from the participating bank until the final
installment was paid. Id. at 1344. And, the evidence showed that the originating
bank had intentionally withheld information relevant to the borrower’s
creditworthiness before all of the draws were funded in order to induce the
participating bank to continue making advances on the loan. Id. at 1367.
At the summary judgment stage, the participating bank established that had
the information been conveyed by the originating bank, the participant would not
have entered the participation agreement in the first place; may not have funded
future construction draws; may have insisted on additional collateral; may have
required that future construction draws were drawn directed by vendors; and/or
may have prevented the originating bank from making a new loan to the borrower.
Id. Based upon these facts, the district court enforced the repurchase clause of the
participation agreement. Id.

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The participant in Sun American acquired its interest prior to a default, and
continued to make advances on the loan in reliance on the creditworthiness of the
borrower because the originating bank failed to convey material, adverse
information. Id. at 1367. As the district court in this case correctly emphasized,
the failure to convey information in Sun American occurred “at a time when the
Participating Bank could have backed out of the deal.” Here, however, there is no
evidence that Centennial engaged in deceptive conduct or attempted to mislead
Sentinel or its predecessors-in-interest before or after the Borrower’s default. The
Loan was nonperforming at the time the offers discussed below were received, and
as explained herein, it cannot be said that any of the offers would have had a
“material, adverse effect” on the Loan.
C. Section 16 of the Participation Agreement
Sentinel further argues that it is entitled to the enforcement of the
Repurchase Option in Section 13 because Centennial breached Section 16, which
in subsection (b), required Centennial to consult Sentinel and have Sentinel
consent in writing before Centennial made or consented to any modification,
amendment, or termination of any material term or condition of the Loan
documents, including the post-default interest rate. Further, according to Sentinel,
once Centennial became aware of the Borrower’s default, Centennial was required
by Section 16(e) to notify and consult with Sentinel to agree on a course of action.
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Sentinel argues that once Centennial and Sentinel failed to agree on a course of
action, Centennial breached Section 16(e), pursuant to which Sentinel, as the
majority interest holder, should have had the sole right to control the course of
action.
In analyzing Section 16, the district court concluded that Section 16(e)’s
meet-and-confer requirement was a one-time event, which was triggered upon the
Borrower’s initial default of the Loan. The court reasoned that “[t]his section does
not allow a Participating Bank who sits on its hands for ten days to later dictate the
course of action to be undertaken by the Originating Bank.” In addition, the
district court determined that any breach of the Participation Agreement by
Centennial was limited by Section 16(d), which would allow Sentinel to recover
only for damages or exercise the Repurchase Option in the event it could prove it
sustained losses due to Centennial’s lack of commercially reasonable conduct,
negligence, or willful misconduct. Therefore, the court found the limitation on
liability in Section 16(d) also extended to any breach of Section 10.
We disagree with the district court’s construction of Section 16 to the extent
that it concluded: (1) the “meet-and-confer” requirement necessarily addressed the
initial default only; and (2) the limitation of liability in Section 16(d) is a limitation
on the circumstances under which Sentinel is entitled to exercise the Repurchase

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Option. Nonetheless, we affirm the district court because Sentinel failed to
establish a breach as required by Section 13.
i.

Section 16(b): Consult and Obtain Written Consent

Section 16 is entitled, “Administration of Loan” and sets forth Centennial’s
obligations as the Originating Bank in administering the loan and in the event of a
Borrower’s default. Section 16(b) states,
Participating Bank shall, in all events be consulted and must
consent, in writing, for Originating Bank to: (i) make or consent
to any modification, amendment, or termination of any of the
material terms or conditions of the Loan Documents (without
limiting the foregoing, a “material” term includes the interest
rate, the specific collateral pledged, guaranties made, scheduled
term and maturity date, required covenants, and like
provisions)[.]

As the district court correctly noted in analyzing Section 16(b), Centennial
was required to consult and obtain Sentinel’s written consent before undertaking
certain conduct, such as modifying, amending, or terminating any of the material
terms or conditions of the Loan documents, including the interest rate. Thus, in
determining whether Centennial breached its duty under Section 16(b), as
discussed below, the question is whether Centennial intended to “modify, amend,
or terminate” the interest rate.
ii.

Section 16(e): Meet and Confer

Section 16(e) states,
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Upon becoming actually aware of a default by Borrower(s)
under any of the Loan Documents or with respect to the
Collateral, or any event which, with the giving of notice or
passage of time or both, would constitute a default thereunder,
Originating Bank immediately shall notify Participating Bank
of such default or event, and Originating Bank and Participating
Bank shall mutually agree upon a course of action within ten
(10) business days. If, within ten (10) business days a mutually
agreeable course of action can not be decided, then, so long as
either: (i) the Participation Interest, together with any other
interests held by other participants in agreement with the course
of action proposed by Participant, equals or exceeds a majority
of the then outstanding principal balance of the Loan, or (ii) the
Participating Bank holds any Participation Interest as a result of
the Originating Bank’s inability to purchase that retained
portion of the Participation Interest due to regulatory lending
limits considerations as provided in paragraph 13 above, the
decision of the Participating Bank shall control.

The district court found Section 16(e) provided one opportunity to “meet and
confer” regarding an agreed course of action following the Borrower’s default.
The court acknowledged that if the parties had modified the terms of the Loan
post-default, and the Borrower again defaulted, then Section 16(e) would have
provided the parties with an opportunity to amicably determine the course of
conduct relative to that particular default. However, the court determined that in
the absence of a modification, the language of Section 16(e) expressly required the
meet and confer to take place within ten (10) days of the parties becoming aware of
the Borrower’s initial default. In reaching this conclusion, the district court

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rejected Sentinel’s position that a ten-day “meet and confer” was required by
Section 16(e) every time some activity occurred relative to the Loan.
We disagree with the district court’s construction of Section 16(e), in part.
As Sentinel correctly argued on appeal, the district court’s reasoning is flawed
because under the terms of the Agreement, the Borrower can technically default
every month that a payment is missed, every time a principal payment is missed,
and for every tax bill that goes unpaid. In applying the district court’s reasoning,
the majority owner of the Loan would be stripped of the opportunity to ever
control the course of action after the Borrower’s first initial default. From then on,
the minority owner and servicer would be able to make decisions without
consulting the majority owner, without any regard to changed circumstances, and
without any regard for the majority owner’s economic interests.
Nonetheless, Sentinel was still required to identify the specific “default” by
the Borrower that triggered the ten-day “meet-and-confer” requirement, and
Sentinel was still required to prove that it timely exercised its right to “meet and
confer” in good faith in order to establish a breach of Section 16(e).
iii.

Section 16(d): Limitation of Liability

Section 16(d) contains a limitation of liability clause, which limits the
Originating Bank’s liability as follows:
Originating Bank agrees to exercise the same degree of care in
administering Participating Bank’s Participation Interest in the
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Loan that Originating Bank, customarily exercises in handling
similar loans for its own account; however, Originating Bank
shall be liable to Participating Bank only for losses due to
Originating Bank’s lack of commercially reasonable conduct,
negligence, or willful misconduct.

The district court concluded that if Centennial breached any of its Section 16
duties, such as by modifying the loan without the Participating Bank’s consent or
failing to “meet and confer” in the event of the Borrower’s default, Sentinel was
without a remedy unless Sentinel could prove that it incurred a loss due to
Centennial’s commercially unreasonable conduct, negligence, or willful
misconduct. The district court further concluded that because the term “default” is
undefined throughout the Participation Agreement, the term should be given the
same meaning throughout the Agreement, and therefore, Sentinel could not
exercise its Repurchase Option in the event of any breach without proof of a loss
due to Centennial’s commercially unreasonable conduct, negligence, or willful
misconduct.
We agree with the district court that insofar as the duties related to loan
administration set forth in Section 16 are concerned, Sentinel lacks any remedy in
the absence of a proof of loss attribute to Centennial’s misconduct. Through its
structure and plain language, the Agreement clearly provides so.
We disagree, however, that the limitation of liability in Section 16(d)
restricts the enforcement of the Repurchase Option for breaches unrelated to loan
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administration. The Participation Agreement imposes numerous duties on the
Originating Bank apart from its responsibility for loan administration. Certain of
those duties are concerned with the ability of the Participating Bank to manage its
credit risk and therefore require the Originating Bank to exercise reasonable
judgment in disclosing material, adverse information regarding the Borrower to the
Participating Bank on an ongoing basis. And because, as between the Participating
Bank and the Originating Bank, the Participating Bank has the greatest financial
exposure and the least access to information, Section 13 makes clear that in the
event of a material breach of such duties, the Participating Bank can shift the risk
back to the Originating Bank regardless of a demonstrable loss by exercising the
Repurchase Option, that option is “in addition to all other remedies available to it
at law or in equity.”
2. Centennial did not Default under the Terms of the Agreement.
We now turn to consider Sentinel’s alleged defaults within the context of the
construction of the Participation Agreement set forth above.
At trial and on appeal, Sentinel argues that Centennial defaulted in the
following ways: (1) in failing to keep Sentinel fully informed about the Loan, the
value of the collateral securing the Loan, and the Borrower; and (2) in defaulting
on its obligation to follow Sentinel’s directives regarding the course of action
against the Borrower. Specifically, Sentinel argues that Centennial concealed third27

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party offers to buy the Loan, concealed the Borrower’s post-default settlement
offers, and refused to abide by Sentinel’s directives to apply the Loan’s “default
interest rate” against the Borrower after the Borrower defaulted.
A. Failure to Convey Offers by the Borrower and Third Parties
Sentinel insists that Centennial had an obligation pursuant to Sections 4, 10,
and 11 of the Participation Agreement to convey to Sentinel every piece of
information that Centennial received or possessed relating to the Loan. As
addressed above, we do not find Sections 4 and 11 are directly applicable to this
case; therefore, we will consider Sections 4 and 11 only to the extent they bear on
the issue of whether Centennial’s failure to convey the settlement offers by the
Borrower and third parties violated Section 10.
i.

Offers by the Borrower

Sentinel argues that Centennial violated Section 10 when Centennial failed
to convey a settlement offer that it received from the Borrower to Sentinel’s
predecessor-in-interest in November 2010. The district court ruled that Sentinel
failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the offer by the
Borrower in November 2010 was not communicated to the Participating Bank,
which at the time was Sentinel’s predecessor-in-interest. At trial, the precise terms
of the Borrower’s offer were not disclosed, and aside from ambiguous testimony
given by Centennial’s Vice President of Special Asset Department, there was no
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testimony that the offer was not communicated. We have no basis to disturb this
finding.
We also agree with the district court that there is nothing in the record to
suggest Centennial failed to use its reasonable judgment in deciding whether to
communicate such an offer to Sentinel. It is undisputed that the Loan was already
in default at the time Centennial received the November 2010 offer from the
Borrower. As testified to by Centennial’s Vice President of Special Asset
Department at trial, Centennial would not forward offers to Sentinel unless
Centennial deemed those offers to be “viable.” While Sentinel may disagree with
Centennial’s decision, Centennial was permitted by the plain language of Section
10 to use its “reasonable judgment” in deciding what information should be
conveyed to Sentinel, and Sentinel did not show that Centennial failed to use its
reasonable judgment in doing so.
Moreover, there is nothing in the record to establish how this offer may have
had a material, adverse effect on the Loan or the value of the collateral securing the
Loan, as is required by the language of Section 10. Aside from a conclusory
argument that “[o]ffers to buy the note . . . are critically important because when a
loan is nonperforming, the primary goal is to minimize risk exposure,” Sentinel
fails to establish how the November 2010 offer would have amounted to a
“material, adverse effect on the Loan or the value of the collateral” in light of the
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fact that no payment had ever been made on the Loan, the Loan had been in default
for nearly two years, and foreclosure proceedings were pending.
Sentinel also argues that Centennial’s failure to inform Sentinel of the deed
in lieu of foreclosure offered by the Borrower and failure to invite Sentinel to
mediation amounted to a violation of Section 10. Centennial admitted that it
rejected the Borrower’s offers without seeking the Participant’s approval.
Centennial further admitted that it did not invite Sentinel to participate at
mediation, and it failed to inform Sentinel of the offers that it received and rejected
at mediation.
We agree with the district court that Centennial’s failure to convey the offer
of the deed in lieu of foreclosure and failure to invite Sentinel to participate at
mediation are not defaults under the terms of the Participation Agreement. There
is simply nothing in the record to establish that Centennial failed to use its
reasonable judgment in making such determinations. Similarly, there is nothing in
the record to substantiate that the Borrower’s offer of a deed in lieu of foreclosure
and any offers received at mediation had or could have a “material, adverse” effect
on a non-performing Loan. To the contrary, it is undisputed that the Ocoee Golf
Development ultimately sold at a foreclosure sale for $6.5 million, and the highest
third-party offer prior to the foreclosure sale was $3.8 million as the district court
pointed out. Any offer whatsoever on a non-performing loan would prove to have
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at least somewhat of a positive effect on the Loan, as opposed to a material,
adverse effect.
However, we do not agree with the district court’s finding that even
assuming Centennial failed to convey any of the Borrower’s offers to Sentinel’s
predecessor-in-interest, Sentinel’s argument would still fail because it did not
sustain a loss as defined in Section 16(d). As addressed above, it is not necessary
for Sentinel to prove Centennial sustained a loss as defined in Section 16(d) prior
to invoking the Repurchase Option in Section 13.
In reaching our conclusion that Centennial did not default under Section 10
when it failed to disclose the Borrower’s offers and failed to invite Sentinel to
mediation, we construed Section 4, 10, and 11 as a whole. However, we do not
find that the parties’ intent underlying Sections 4 and 11 – that the Participating
Bank have sufficient information to make decisions concerning its credit risk –
alters our conclusion. Under Georgia law, “[t]he cardinal rule of construction is to
ascertain the intention of the parties. If that intention is clear and it contravenes no
rule of law and sufficient words are used to arrive at the intention, it shall be
enforced[.]” O.C.G.A. § 13-2-3. Here, Sentinel was already privy to the potential
risks that it might encounter because at the time it acquired its majority interest, the
Loan was already non-performing and in foreclosure. We therefore cannot agree

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with Sentinel that our consideration of Sections 4, 10, and 11 together conflicts
with the district court’s finding.
ii.

Third-Party Offers

The record is undisputed that Centennial received third-party offers to
purchase the Loan in May 2010 for $3.8 million, in July 2010 for $3.5 million, and
in July 2011 for $3.8 million. It is also undisputed that these offers were not
conveyed to Sentinel. The district court ruled that under the express terms of the
Participation Agreement, Section 10 did not require Centennial to communicate
these offers to Sentinel. The district court then turned to Section 16(d) and found
that Sentinel’s argument failed because it was unable to establish that it sustained a
loss under section 16(d) due to the failure of Centennial to convey this offer, or any
other offer for that matter.
As stated, we do not believe that the limitation of liability set forth in
Section 16(d) applies to the analysis under Section 10. However, as with the
foregoing offers that were not communicated to Sentinel, we believe the record
lacks any evidence that Centennial failed to use reasonable judgment when it chose
not to convey these offers. Sentinel also failed to establish that such offers may
have had a “material, adverse effect” on the Loan and/or the collateral.
For the same reasons addressed above, we do not find that our construction
of Sections 4, 10, and 11 together alter our conclusion.
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B. Sentinel’s Right to Control the Course of Action
On appeal, Sentinel contends that the district court erred in concluding
Sentinel did not have the right as the majority owner to dictate the application of
the default interest rate after the Borrower’s initial default and after the
commencement of the foreclosure proceedings. Sentinel argues that 16(b) and
16(e) together provided Sentinel with the rights to be consulted, to control the
course of action, and to make decisions regarding material items such as interest
rates, foreclosure and modification of the Loan. Therefore, when Centennial
refused Sentinel’s directive to set the Loan interest rate at the default interest rate
of 25%, rather than the standard interest rate of 3.75%, Sentinel insists that
Centennial materially breached this provision of the Participation Agreement and
that this breach triggered its rights under Section 13’s Repurchase Option.
The district court recognized that Centennial unilaterally elected to obtain a
final judgment using the 3.75% standard interest rate, as opposed to the 25%
default interest rate, over the objection of Sentinel in violation of Section 16(b).
However, in considering the limitation on liability set forth in Section 16(d), the
court found the element of “loss” was lacking relative to the failure to utilize the
25% interest rate because the evidence was undisputed that any deficiency
judgment against the Borrower and the guarantors was uncollectable. Because a
default consists of conduct, which violates a duty imposed under Section 16(b),
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coupled with a loss pursuant to Section 16(d), there was no “default” to trigger the
Repurchase Option under the facts of this case.
As an initial matter, we take issue with the district court’s finding that
Centennial violated Section 16(b). Section 16(b) requires Centennial to consult
and obtain the written consent of Sentinel prior to any “modification, amendment,
or termination” of any “material terms” in the Loan documents. While it is
undisputed that in the Final Judgment of Foreclosure, Centennial refused Sentinel’s
demand that it charge the default interest rate, we fail to see how that amounted to
a “modification, amendment or termination.” Under the terms of the Loan,
whenever the Borrower defaulted, the Note provided “to the extent permitted by
law, the Rate of Interest on the unpaid balance shall be increased at Bank’s
discretion up to the maximum rate allowed by law.” While the district court noted
that the “Bank” was defined to be both the Participating Bank and the Originating
Bank, the record does not support this. Rather, the Loan documents define only
Old Southern Bank as the “Bank” in this case. Therefore, it follows that
Centennial, as Old Southern Bank’s predecessor-in-interest, had the discretion to
charge the 25% interest rate, but this was not an obligation. The fact that it
exercised its discretion not to charge the 25% cannot be somehow re-characterized
as a “modification, amendment, or termination” of the Loan documents, and
therefore, we do not find that Centennial violated Section 16(b).
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Even assuming Centennial violated Section 16(b), we find that Sentinel
failed to demonstrate that it had the right pursuant to Section 16(e) to require
Centennial to apply the default interest rate. Sentinel failed to present evidence
that its predecessor-in-interest exercised its rights under Section 16(e) after the
Borrower defaulted in October 2008, and failed to identify any subsequent default
that would have resuscitated the “meet-and-confer” requirement, which are the
conditions precedent, which would allow the Participating Bank to control the
post-default course of conduct.
Finally, even if Sentinel had proven that Centennial breached Section 16(b),
Section 16(b) is part of the Section entitled, “Administration of Loan,” and
pursuant to Section 16(d), liability for breaches attributable to the loan
administration are limited to losses due to the Originating Bank’s lack of
commercially reasonable conduct, negligence, or willful misconduct. Because
Sentinel’s ultimate objective was to exercise the Repurchase Option, it produced
no evidence sufficient to satisfy this standard.
3. Centennial Prevails on its Counterclaim.
Because we rule in favor of Centennial on its breach of contract claim, we
also find in favor of Centennial on its counterclaim.

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V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in this Opinion, we AFFIRM the judgment in favor
of Centennial.

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