USA v. Luis Rosales-Acosta

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Luis Enrique Rosales-Acosta in 16-10090, 16-11103. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions. [16-10090, 16-11103]

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
Nos. 16-10090; 16-11103
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cr-20488-BB-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
LUIS ENRIQUE ROSALES-ACOSTA,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(February 13, 2017)
Before MARCUS, JULIE CARNES and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Luis Rosales-Acosta appeals his convictions for three Hobbs Act robberies
and for discharging a firearm while committing a crime of violence. On appeal,
Rosales-Acosta argues that: (1) his appeal is not barred by the appeal waiver

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provision of his plea agreement because that provision does not prohibit him from
challenging the district court’s legal authority to impose mandatory sentences; and
(2) the district court committed plain error when it counted his Hobbs Act
robberies as predicate offenses because they fail to qualify as crimes of violence
under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). After careful review, we affirm.
For starters, we agree with Rosales-Acosta that his appeal is not barred by
his plea agreement’s appeal waiver provision. We will enforce an appeal waiver
according to its terms if a defendant entered into the plea agreement knowingly and
voluntarily. United States v. Bascomb, 451 F.3d 1292, 1294 (11th Cir. 2006).
However, we’ve determined that the terms of a general appeal waiver may not
preclude a challenge to an Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) enhancement.
United States v. Jones, 743 F.3d 826, 828 n.2 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[W]ithout the
ACCA enhancement, the maximum sentence [the defendant] could have received
under the statute is ten years. The enhancement gave [him] a sentence of 15 years,
which is ‘in excess of the statutory maximum.’ As a result, the reserve clause in
the appeal waiver applies and the waiver does not.” (citation omitted)).
We’ve recognized that a party may not challenge as error a ruling that was
invited by that party. United States v. Love, 449 F.3d 1154, 1157 (11th Cir. 2006).
Invited error occurs when a party induces or invites the district court to make an
error. Id. If invited error occurs, it precludes us from reversing for plain error. Id.
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We have held that the invited error doctrine applies when a party repeatedly argues
for a sentence that includes a term of supervised release instead of additional jail
time and then on appeal argues that a sentence including supervised release was
error.

Id.

But we’ve also concluded that a failure to object to a predicate

conviction being used as an enhancement for ACCA purposes does not implicate
the doctrine. See Jones, 743 F.3d at 827-28 & n.1 (noting that the defendant
“failed to object to the error, but he did not ask for it”).
Here, Rosales-Acosta’s appeal is not barred by the appeal waiver of his plea
agreement. As we’ve said, we will enforce appeal waivers that are knowing and
voluntary, but only according to their terms. See Bascomb, 451 F.3d at 1294. In
Jones, we found that appeal waiver terms very similar to those in Rosales-Acosta’s
plea agreement did not bar an appeal of an ACCA enhancement. The government
has not explained why the reasoning of Jones does not apply to Rosales-Acosta’s
case. We therefore hold that Rosales-Acosta’s appeal is not barred by the appeal
waiver in his plea agreement.
Moreover, as we held in Jones, failing to object to an ACCA enhancement
was not invited error. Jones, 743 F.3d at 827-28 & n.1. While the government
points to Love in support of its position that invited error applies, that case is
distinguishable.

The defendant in Love repeatedly advocated in favor of

supervised release instead of jail time. 449 F.3d at 1157 & n.7. While Rosales3

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Acosta agreed to recommend a sentence to the district court, the record does not
demonstrate that he engaged in the same type of advocacy as did the defendant in
Love. The invited error doctrine therefore does not bar his appeal. Jones, 743 F.3d
at 827-28 & n.1.
Nevertheless, we are unpersuaded by Rosales-Acosta’s claim that the district
court committed plain error when it counted his Hobbs Act robberies as predicate
offenses because they fail to qualify as crimes of violence under 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(3). We generally review de novo whether a specific offense qualifies as a
crime of violence under § 924(c). United States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1336
(11th Cir. 2013). However, sentencing claims raised for the first time on appeal
are reviewed for plain error. United States v. Rodriguez, 751 F.3d 1244, 1257
(11th Cir. 2014) (“Nelida Rodriguez”). To show plain error, the defendant must
show (1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affected his substantial rights.
United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1275-76 (11th Cir.2007). If the defendant
satisfies the three conditions, we may exercise our discretion to recognize the error
if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings. Id. at 1276. An error affects a defendant’s substantial rights if there
is a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding
would have been different. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993).

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The plain error rule places a daunting obstacle before an appellant. United
States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Vladimir Rodriguez”).
“It is the law of this circuit that, at least where the explicit language of a statute or
rule does not specifically resolve an issue, there can be no plain error where there
is no precedent from the Supreme Court or this Court directly resolving it.” United
States v. Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003). What constitutes
plain error is determined by the state of the law at the time of appeal. Vladimir
Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1299.
The ACCA defines the term “‘violent felony’” as any crime punishable by a
term of imprisonment exceeding one year that:
(i)

has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of another; or

(ii)

is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk
of physical injury to another.

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). The first prong of this definition is sometimes referred
to as the “elements clause,” while the second prong contains both the “enumerated
crimes” and what is commonly called the “residual clause.” See United States v.
Owens, 672 F.3d 966, 968 (11th Cir. 2012). In Johnson v. United States, 135 S.
Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015) (“Samuel Johnson”), the Supreme Court held that the
residual clause of the ACCA is unconstitutionally vague. The Supreme Court, in
holding that the residual clause is void, clarified that it was not calling into
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question the elements clause or the enumerated crimes in the ACCA’s definition of
a violent felony. Id.
A similar but distinct sentencing provision provides for a separate
consecutive sentence if any person uses or carries a firearm during and in relation
to a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime or possesses a firearm in
furtherance of such crimes.

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).

For purposes of

§ 924(c)(1)(A), a “‘crime of violence’” is defined as an offense that is a felony and
(A)

has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person or property of another, or

(B)

that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force
against the person or property of another may be used in the
course of committing the offense.

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). In the context of an application to file a successive 28
U.S.C. § 2255 motion, we have referred to the former clause as the use-of-force
clause and the later clause as the residual clause. In re Saint Fleur, 824 F.3d 1337,
1339 (11th Cir. 2016).

Although the ACCA’s residual clause and the §

924(c)(3)(B) residual clause contain similar language, neither we nor the Supreme
Court have addressed whether Samuel Johnson applies to § 924(c)(3)(B). See In re
Pinder, 824 F.3d 977, 978–79 (11th Cir. 2016) (noting that this “Court hasn’t
decided if [Samuel] Johnson applies to § 924(c)(3)(B)” and that “the law is
unsettled” as to whether Samuel Johnson invalidates sentences imposed pursuant
to the § 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause).
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However, we have denied an application for leave to file a successive § 2255
motion because the applicant’s conviction for Hobbs Act robbery, which was the
predicate felony for his § 924(c) conviction, was a crime of violence under the useof-force clause of § 924(c)(3)(B). In re Saint Fleur, 824 F.3d at 1341. In In re
Saint Fleur, we determined from the indictment and judgment that the applicant’s
Hobbs Act robbery conviction qualified under the use-of-force clause of § 924(c)
because it was committed “‘by means of actual and threatened force, violence, and
fear of injury.’” Id. Accordingly, we concluded that the applicant’s § 924(c)
sentence, based on his Hobbs Act robbery conviction, was valid regardless of
whether Samuel Johnson invalidates the § 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause. Id.
On appeal, Rosales-Acosta argues for the first time that the district court
erred by counting his Hobbs Act robberies as predicate offenses because they fail
to qualify as crimes of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). We therefore review
for plain error only. See Nelida Rodriguez, 751 F.3d at 1257. Rosales-Acosta’s
argument fails because, as our caselaw makes clear, “where the explicit language
of a statute or rule does not specifically resolve an issue, there can be no plain error
where there is no precedent from the Supreme Court or this Court directly
resolving it.” Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d at 1291. Neither we nor the Supreme Court
have

yet

decided

whether

Samuel

Johnson

renders

unconstitutionally vague. See In re Pinder, 824 F.3d at 978–79.
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§

924(c)(3)(B)

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In deciding applications for second and successive motions under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255, however, we’ve indicated that Hobbs Act robberies are crimes of violence
for purposes of § 924(c)(3)(A). See, e.g., In re Saint Fleur, 824 F.3d at 1341.
While it may be true, as Rosales-Acosta argues, that In re Saint Fleur is not
controlling because it deals with an application for second and successive motions
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, this misses the point. The standard for plain error is the
reverse -- for an error to be plain, Rosales-Acosta did not need to cite precedent
directly on point supporting the district court’s decision. Instead, he had to show
precedent directly on point from the Supreme Court or this Court contrary to the
district court’s decision. See Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d at 1291. Because he has
failed to do so, Rosales-Acosta has not proven any error, much less plain error.
AFFIRMED.

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