Alabama Education Association, et al v. Madison County Board o Educati, et al

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellants A-Vote, Alabama Education Association, Jeff Breece, Pam Hill, Cathey McNeal, Ronald Slaughter, Chassity Smith and Dorothy J. Strickland. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

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Date Filed: 09/28/2016

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 16-10136
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 5:11-cv-00761-CLS

ALABAMA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,
an Alabama non-profit corporation,
A-VOTE,
an Alabama political committee,
PAM HILL,
JEFF BREECE,
CHASSITY SMITH,
CATHEY MCNEAL,
DOROTHY J. STRICKLAND,
RONALD SLAUGHTER,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
versus
ROBERT BENTLEY, et al.,
Defendants,
MADISON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION,
ROBERT L. BROUSSARD,
in his official capacity as the District Attorney for Madison County,
THOMAS L. WHITE, JR.,
HUNTSVILLE CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION,
CITY OF MADISON BOARD OF EDUCATION,

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ROBERT T. TREESE, III,
DR. THOMAS BICE,
in his official capacity as Superintendent of Education,
MARK A. HEINRICH,
in his official capacity as Chancellor of Postsecondary Education, et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
________________________
(September 28, 2016)
Before MARTIN, ANDERSON and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This appeal involves Alabama Act No. 2010-761 (codified at Ala. Code §
17-17-5) (“Act 761”). Act 761 “prohibit[s] a state or local government employee
from arranging ‘by payroll deduction or otherwise’ the payment of any
contribution to an organization that uses any portion of those contributions for
‘political activity.’” Ala. Educ. Ass’n v. State Superintendent of Educ., 665 F.3d
1234, 1235 (11th Cir. 2011) (“AEA I”). The Act has birthed numerous federal and
state court opinions. See In re Mike Hubbard, 803 F.3d 1298, 1302–05 (11th Cir.
2015) (setting forth the background of Act 761 and its litigious history). Although
the overall procedural history of the Act 761 cases is somewhat complex, the
procedural history central to this appeal is not. We are reviewing the district

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court’s order dismissing plaintiffs’ claim that Act 761 violates the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine. For the following reason, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs/Appellants, the Alabama Education Association and others
(referred to collectively as the “AEA”), filed a pre-enforcement complaint
challenging Act 761 on the basis that it violated the First Amendment, Equal
Protection, and Due Process. Two days before the Act’s effective date in 2011, the
district court entered a preliminary injunction at the AEA’s request, finding that the
Act was likely overbroad in violation of the First Amendment and void for
vagueness under the Due Process Clause. Although the AEA asserted an
unconstitutional conditions claim in its complaint, the district court’s grant of the
preliminary injunction was not based on this claim. Various defendants appealed
the district court’s grant of the preliminary injunction. In its initial opinion, this
court certified questions to the Supreme Court of Alabama and modified the
injunction in the interim. See AEA I, 665 F.3d at 1238–39. The Alabama Supreme
Court answered the certified questions, see State Superintendent of Educ. v. Ala.
Educ. Ass’n, 144 So. 3d 265, 274–78 (Ala. 2013) (“AEA II”) (clarifying that the
Act only reached government-facilitated payments), and this court entered a
second opinion, reversing the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction. See
Ala. Educ. Ass’n v. State Superintendent of Educ., 746 F.3d 1135, 1139–40 (11th
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Cir. 2014) (“AEA III”) (holding that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits of either their overbreadth claim or
their void for vagueness challenge).
Meanwhile, during the pending preliminary injunction appeal, the district
court allowed discovery to proceed on the AEA’s First Amendment retaliation
claim, although the claim was not explicitly stated in the complaint. As part of the
AEA’s discovery request, the district court ordered nonparty state legislative
leaders to produce their legislative files concerning Act 761. These individuals
filed petitions for writs of mandamus in this court, challenging the district court’s
refusal to quash AEA’s subpoenas requesting their legislative files. This court held
that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to quash the AEA’s
subpoenas. See In re Mike Hubbard, 803 F.3d at 1308.
Although the district court allowed the AEA to proceed on its First
Amendment retaliation claim, it dismissed the remaining claims under Rule
12(b)(6). Pertinent to the present appeal, in its order of dismissal, the district court
found that the AEA plaintiffs failed to state an unconstitutional conditions claim
upon which relief could be granted. Under the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions, “the government may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that
infringes his constitutionally protected freedom of speech even if he has no
entitlement to that benefit.” Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional
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Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 59, 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1306–07 (2006) (internal quotation
marks and ellipses omitted). The AEA’s claim is founded on the contention that
Act 761 places unconstitutional conditions on the availability of the benefit, the
state mechanism for payroll deduction, to public employee organizations. In its
complaint, the AEA asserted that “[a] public employee organization that wishes to
avail itself of this benefit must not only refrain from engaging in constitutionally
protected ‘political activity’ but must submit a certification to the ‘appropriate
government entity’ promising that it will not use any dues collected through
payroll deduction for any ‘political activity.’” In its dismissal order, the district
court relied on its preliminary injunction order in which it rejected the AEA’s
assertion that Act 761 violated the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
II. DISCUSSION
The Defendants, the Madison County Board of Education and others,
contend that the district court properly dismissed the AEA’s unconstitutional
conditions claim, and they urge us to affirm based on the law of the case doctrine.
We agree.
“Under the ‘law of the case’ doctrine, the findings of fact and conclusions of
law by an appellate court are generally binding in all subsequent proceedings in the
same case in the trial court or on a later appeal.” This That & The Other Gift &
Tobacco, Inc. v. Cobb Cnty., Ga., 439 F.3d 1275, 1283 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting
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Heathcoat v. Potts, 905 F.2d 367, 370 (11th Cir. 1990)). This doctrine also bars
the rehashing of issues that were decided “explicitly or by necessary implication”
in a prior appeal. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th
Cir. 2005); Klay v. All Defendants, 389 F.3d 1191, 1198 (11th Cir. 2004); In re
Justice Oaks II, Ltd., 898 F.2d 1544, 1550 n.3 (11th Cir. 1990). “The doctrine’s
central purposes include bringing an end to litigation, protecting against the
agitation of settled issues, and assuring that lower courts obey appellate orders.”
This That & The Other Gift & Tobacco, Inc., 439 F.3d at 1283. There are only two
ways a party can overcome the law of the case doctrine: (1) “if, since the prior
decision, new and substantially different evidence is produced, or there has been a
change in the controlling authority” or (2) “the prior decision was clearly
erroneous and would result in a manifest injustice.” Oladeinde v. City of
Birmingham, 230 F.3d 1275, 1288 (11th Cir. 2000).
These prior decisions rejected the AEA’s unconstitutional conditions claim
by “necessary implication.” Schiavo, 403 F.3d at 1291. In reaching these
decisions, this court was reviewing the district court’s order granting a preliminary
injunction on overbreadth and vagueness grounds. In its request for a preliminary
injunction, the AEA raised the unconstitutional conditions claim as an alternative
ground for affirmance. Because this court reversed the district court’s order
granting the preliminary injunction, it implicitly rejected the AEA’s argument that
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Act 761 violated their constitutional rights based on the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions. This doctrine would have provided this court, upon
review, with an alternative basis to affirm the district court’s grant of a preliminary
injunction. Hence, this court’s prior decision in AEA III “implicitly” rejected the
AEA’s unconstitutional conditions argument. See id. On appeal, the AEA does
not contend that either exception to the law of the case doctrine applies, and we
discern no exception. Accordingly, we conclude that the law of the case doctrine
applies, and we therefore affirm the district court’s judgment of dismissal.
AFFIRMED.

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