USA v. Christopher Gill

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Christopher James Gill. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

Case: 16-11306

Date Filed: 07/27/2017

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[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 16-11306
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D.C. Docket No. 2:15-cr-00075-SPC-MRM-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CHRISTOPHER JAMES GILL,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(July 27, 2017)
Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, WILLIAM PRYOR, and DUBINA, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Christopher Gill pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, 18

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Date Filed: 07/27/2017

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U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and was sentenced to 80 months in prison followed by three
years supervised release. That sentence was within his guidelines range. He
contends that the district court erred in calculating his guidelines range because,
according to Gill, the government failed to show that his possession of one of the
eight firearms he possessed was unlawful.
Section 2K2.1(b)(1)(B) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines directs
district courts to increase by four levels the offense level of a defendant convicted
of unlawful possession of a firearm if the offense involved eight to twenty-four
firearms. If the offense involved three to seven firearms, the district court is to
increase the offense level by only two levels. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A). A twolevel enhancement instead of a four-level one would have lowered Gill’s
guidelines range. As to whether a firearm is to be counted for enhancement
purposes, one of the application notes to § 2K2.1 explains that the district court
should “count only those firearms that were unlawfully sought to be obtained,
unlawfully possessed, or unlawfully distributed . . . .” Id. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.5.
When the police searched Gill’s home in April 2015, they found eight
firearms. He does not dispute that the government proved that his possession was
unlawful as to seven of the firearms, but he does contend that it failed to prove the
unlawfulness of the eighth one. Gill argues that the government failed to show
unlawfulness as to that firearm because it was manufactured in Florida and there
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was no evidence that it had moved in interstate or foreign commerce. His position
is that a firearm must have a nexus with interstate or foreign commerce in order for
possession of it by a felon to be unlawful under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). That is true,
but by its terms application note 5 to § 2K2.1 requires only that Gill’s possession
of each pistol be “unlawful,” not that it be unlawful under federal law. We agree
with the Seventh Circuit that a firearm may be counted under § 2K2.1(b)(1) if state
law prohibited the defendant from possessing it, even if federal law did not. See
United States v. Jones, 635 F.3d 909, 919–20 (7th Cir. 2011); cf. United States v.
Griffith, 584 F.3d 1004, 1013 (10th Cir. 2009) (agreeing with four other circuits
that conduct can be counted as relevant conduct under the sentencing guidelines if
it is criminalized by state law). A firearm that is illegal only under state law does
not count for § 922(g) purposes, but it does count for sentencing purposes.
Florida law clearly prohibited Gill from possessing the eighth firearm
(which was a Intratec pistol manufactured in Florida). Fla. Stat. § 790.23(1)
(prohibiting any person convicted of a felony to “own or to have in his or her care,
custody, possession, or control any firearm”) (emphasis added). While it is true
that the government did not argue in the district court that Gill’s possession of the
firearm was unlawful under Florida law, we can affirm the district court’s
judgment on any ground supported by the record — even if that ground was not
considered or advanced in the district court. Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506
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F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007).
Gill protests that the government was required to prove that he violated
Florida law. But Gill already admitted that he did by failing to object to the factual
assertions in the PSR stating that he had a prior felony conviction and showing that
he possessed eight weapons, including the Intratec pistol. See United States v.
Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 2005). As a result, everything necessary
to support a determination that Gill’s possession of the Intratec pistol was unlawful
under Florida law was before the district court, except the Florida statute itself.
And the government was not required to prove the contents of Florida law. See
Gardner v. Collector of Customs, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 499, 508 (1867) (“The statute
under consideration is a public statute . . . . It is one of which the courts take
judicial notice, without proof . . . .”); Thornton v. United States, 2 F.2d 561, 562
(5th Cir. 1924) (“It was not necessary that the indictment should plead the Georgia
statutes, as it was the duty of the trial court to take judicial notice of them.”). The
presence in the record of evidence showing Gill possessed the eighth firearm
distinguishes this case from United States v. Washington, 714 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir.
2013) and United States v. Campbell, 372 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2004). In those
cases, the factual record on appeal did not support the district court’s decision to
apply an enhancement. Washington, 714 F.3d at 1362–63; Campbell, 372 F.3d. at
1182–83 & n.2. Here it does.
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On June 15, 2017, Gill filed a letter with the Court purporting to provide us
with supplemental authority. In that letter, Gill belatedly argues that the
government has not shown that his possession of the eighth firearm was unlawful
under Florida law because, under Florida law, the facts alleged in the PSR were not
sufficient to show that he possessed that firearm. We are not persuaded by Gill’s
new argument. There was more that linked Gill to the eighth firearm in this case
than joint custody of the safe in which the gun was found. In the safe with the
firearm in question were drugs that Gill admitted belonged to him, as well as six
other firearms that Gill does not deny he possessed. Those facts distinguish this
case from the Florida authorities cited by Gill in his supplemental letter brief and
support the conclusion that he possessed the eighth firearm.
AFFIRMED.

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