Suzanne Steele v. Sears Roebuck And Co.

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Suzanne Steele. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

Case: 16-11814

Date Filed: 04/07/2017

Page: 1 of 3

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 16-11814
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cv-01544-AT

SUZANNE STEELE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus

SEARS ROEBUCK AND CO.,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(April 7, 2017)
Before WILSON, JULIE CARNES, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

Case: 16-11814

Date Filed: 04/07/2017

Page: 2 of 3

Suzanne Steele was an employee of Sears Roebuck and Co. for several
years. She was terminated in 2009 and filed this lawsuit in 2013. Steele raised a
number of claims in her complaint, including a claim that Sears terminated her
based on her age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA). The district court granted summary judgment to Sears on all of Steele’s
claims, except for her ADEA claim. The court held a two-day bench trial on the
ADEA claim, after which the court issued a final judgment in Sears’s favor.
Steele, now proceeding pro se, appeals the final judgment.1 She argues that the
district court erred in (1) finding that Sears terminated her for a reason other than
age and (2) excluding the testimony of her proposed expert.
After careful consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record, we find that
the district court committed no reversible error. First, taking into account all the
evidence, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Sears terminated
Steele for a reason other than age.2 See Crystal Entm’t & Filmworks, Inc. v.
Jurado, 643 F.3d 1313, 1319 (11th Cir. 2011) (“After a bench trial, we review the
district court’s . . . factual findings for clear error.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Second, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion
1

Even construing Steele’s pro se brief liberally, see Tannenbaum v. United States, 148
F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam), the brief does not contest the findings upon which
the district court’s summary judgment decision was based. Steele has therefore abandoned any
challenge to the decision. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681–83
(11th Cir. 2014).
2
To the extent that Steele challenges any of the district court’s other factual findings, we
conclude that such findings were not clearly erroneous.
2

Case: 16-11814

Date Filed: 04/07/2017

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in excluding the testimony of Steele’s proposed expert. See General Elec. Co. v.
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141, 118 S. Ct. 512, 515 (1997) (holding that the abuse-ofdiscretion standard is the appropriate standard for reviewing a district court’s
decision to exclude expert testimony). The proposed testimony was not relevant
given that it concerned damages for emotional distress—damages that are not
available under the ADEA. See Munoz v. Oceanside Resorts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1340,
1348 (11th Cir. 2000).
AFFIRMED.

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