Antonio Woodson v. Warden, et al

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Antonio Damarcus Woodson. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

Case: 16-13278

Date Filed: 12/20/2016

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 16-13278
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 3:16-cv-00470-HES-JRK
ANTONIO DAMARCUS WOODSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BRAD WHITEHEAD,
Assistant Warden,
WARDEN,
MICHAEL A. HONOUR,
JOHN R. MCSPADDEN,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(December 20, 2016)
Before TJOFLAT, HULL and WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

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Antonio Woodson, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal
of his civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against four employees of the
Florida State Prison (“FSP”)—Captain Michael A. Honour, Lieutenant John R.
McSpadden, Warden John Palmer, and Assistant Warden Brad Whitehead—
alleging Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations as frivolous under
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). On appeal, Woodson argues that the district court erred
in dismissing his complaint for Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations
because the factual allegations made in the complaint had arguable merit.
We review a district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a complaint as frivolous
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for an abuse of discretion. Miller v. Donald,
541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008). A court abuses its discretion by making a
clear error of judgment or by applying an incorrect legal standard. Josendis v.
Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1307 (11th Cir. 2011).
I.
To determine whether confinement conditions violate the Eighth
Amendment, we conduct a two-part analysis. Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278,
1289–90 (11th Cir. 2004). First, under the objective component, a prisoner must
show the confinement conditions are sufficiently serious to violate the Eighth
Amendment. Id. at 1289. Second, under the subjective component, a prisoner
must show prison officials acted with “deliberate indifference” to the serious
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conditions. Id. at 1289–90. The plaintiff must satisfy the objective component by
showing the challenged conditions are extreme and “‘pose[] an unreasonable risk
of serious damage to his future health’ or safety.” Id. at 1289. In determining the
seriousness of confinement conditions, we assess the severity and duration of the
conditions. Id. at 1295. The plaintiff must satisfy the subjective deliberate
indifference component by showing that prison officials knew of and disregarded
an excessive risk of harm to the prisoner. Id. at 1289–90 (citing Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). Prison officials must “be aware of the facts
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exists, and [they] must also draw the inference.” Id. at 1290.
Woodson’s complaint fails to allege facts to satisfy either the objective
“substantial risk of serious harm” component or the subjective “deliberate
indifference” component for showing an Eighth Amendment violation.
Confinement without clothing (other than boxers), bedding, or hygienic materials
for 72 hours during the months of April and August in Florida is not the type of
extreme prison conditions that create a substantial risk of serious harm. See id. at
1289, 1297–98. Additionally, the fact that Warden Palmer saw the conditions in
which Woodson was held during his disciplinary confinement is not enough to
show that any of the defendants believed Woodson’s health or safety to be at risk.
Woodson failed to show that any of the defendants had subjective knowledge of a
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substantial risk of serious harm to Woodson. Id. at 1289–90. Thus, the district
court did not err in dismissing Woodson’s complaint as frivolous as to his Eighth
Amendment claim.
II.
We recognize two situations in which a prisoner is deprived of his liberty
such that due process is required. Kirby v. Siegelman, 195 F.3d 1285, 1290–91
(11th Cir. 1999). First, a prisoner is entitled to due process when a change in his
condition of confinement “is so severe that it essentially exceeds the sentence
imposed by the court.” Id. at 1291. Second, a prisoner has a liberty interest where
the state has consistently provided a benefit to a prisoner and deprivation of that
benefit imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to
the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. (quotation omitted); see also Sandin v.
Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484–86 (1995). The Due Process Clause does not create an
enforceable liberty interest in freedom from restrictive confinement while a
prisoner is incarcerated. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983), modified
on other grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. at 482–84; Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484–87. Nor
does it create a liberty interest in the “mandatory” language of prison rules and
regulations. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 482–84.
Woodson’s complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to show a Fourteenth
Amendment violation. Woodson’s placement in the more restrictive disciplinary
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confinement at FSP is not the kind of change in condition that exceeds the sentence
already imposed or that imposes an atypical or significant hardship on a plaintiff.
See Kirby, 195 F.3d at 1291; Sandin, 515 U.S. at 482–86. FSP’s rules and
regulations on disciplinary confinement also did not implicate a protected liberty
interest under the Due Process Clause. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 482–84. Based on
the facts as alleged, Woodson failed to show a constitutional violation, and so, the
district court did not err in dismissing Woodson’s complaint as frivolous as to his
Fourteenth Amendment claim.
Accordingly, upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the
district court’s sua sponte dismissal of Woodson’s complaint as frivolous under
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
AFFIRMED.

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