USA v. Daniel Arroyo

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Daniel Arroyo. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

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Date Filed: 04/18/2017

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 16-14247
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:11-cr-00530-VMC
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus

DANIEL ARROYO,
a.k.a. King Tweet,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(April 18, 2017)
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, JORDAN and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

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This is the second occasion that Daniel Arroyo has appealed his sentence for
being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). We affirmed the
enhancement of Arroyo’s sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, United
States v. Arroyo, 562 F. App’x 889 (11th Cir. 2015), but after the Supreme Court
vacated our judgment and remanded for reconsideration in the light of Johnson v.
United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), we vacated Arroyo’s sentence and
remanded for resentencing. On remand, the district court varied upward from the
guideline range and sentenced Arroyo to the statutory maximum penalty of 120
months of imprisonment. Arroyo argues that his sentence is unreasonable. Because
the district court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Arroyo’s criminal history spans almost two decades. On February 23, 1994,
he fired a gun from inside a vehicle that was within 1,000 feet of a person, and four
days later, he forcibly stole a car from a person and went to a McDonald’s
restaurant, where he thrice shot another person at close range. In 2007, while
Arroyo was serving his sentences for discharging a firearm, criminal mischief,
robbery, attempted murder, and aggravated battery, he punched a prison officer in
the face and attempted to wrap the chain of his handcuffs around the officer’s neck.
In 2008, when Arroyo’s charge of battering a law enforcement officer was
pending, he was arrested carrying a concealed weapon. In 2011, shortly after
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Arroyo was released from prison, he was charged for grand theft of a
semiautomatic firearm, carrying a concealed weapon, loitering, and domestic
violence for battering his girlfriend in the face and upper body. Although the state
court dismissed the charges against him, Arroyo’s theft of the semiautomatic
handgun led to his present conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm.
Arroyo’s mayhem continued while he was awaiting resentencing. Arroyo’s
presentence investigation report stated that Arroyo “had numerous disciplinary
infractions.” His misdeeds included refusing to obey orders, “breaking a
showerhead in his cell,” “being involved in a large-scale fight in the housing unit
involving weapons and refusing to stop,” threatening “to kill a staff member,
“cursing and threatening [a] staff chaplain,” and cursing at prison staff.
Arroyo’s revised presentence report provided a total offense level of 23 that,
with a criminal history of IV, resulted in an advisory sentencing range of 70 to 87
months of imprisonment. Arroyo objected to the calculation of his sentence, and
the district court decreased his base offense level to 20, see United States
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) (Nov. 2012), which after adding
two levels for stealing the firearm he possessed, id. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A), and
subtracting three levels for his acceptance of responsibility, id. § 3E1.1, resulted in
a total offense level of 19. Based on Arroyo’s criminal history, the district court
calculated a revised sentencing range of 46 to 57 months of imprisonment.
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The district court continued Arroyo’s sentencing hearing for him to gather
evidence to respond to the request of the government (and of Arroyo’s former
girlfriend) to vary upward and sentence Arroyo to the statutory maximum penalty
of 120 months. When the hearing resumed, Arroyo presented testimony from Dr.
Valerie McClain, a licensed psychologist, that Arroyo had a brain impairment due
to oxygen deprivation at birth and a head injury from a car accident when he was
four years old. Dr. McClain opined that Arroyo knew the difference between right
and wrong, but “he was more vulnerable to hooking up with the wrong peer group”
and was not “able to process things through, rationally looking at potential
consequences.” Dr. McClain described Arroyo as being “psychiatrically impaired
with [a] schizoaffective disorder,” which resulted in a failure to respect and trust
people, including authority figures, and required treatment with medication,
“behavior management, [and a] structured type of intervention,” for him to avoid
reoffending. Dr. McClain recommended a “balance between punishment and
rehabilitation” to “stabiliz[e] Arroyo on medication, . . . help[] him to understand
his mental illness . . . and be able to concentrate and focus on positive movements
toward . . . re-entry” and to provide education, job training, and counseling, and
anger management and substance abuse classes. At the end of the hearing, Arroyo
requested a sentence of 84 months of imprisonment.

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The district court sentenced Arroyo to 120 months of imprisonment. That
decision, the district court explained, “really . . . [required] think[ing]” and was not
made “lightly.” The district court stated that Dr. McClain’s testimony was “very
helpful” and provided “additional insight.” The district court found troubling
Arroyo’s abuse of his girlfriend and his “numerous interactions with the criminal
justice system,” particularly because his “violations [were] of a dangerous and
violent nature.” Arroyo’s “violent criminal history and continued violence while
incarcerated,” the district court explained, “demonstate[d] a need to protect the
community from future crimes from [Arroyo] and justifie[d] a sentence at the
statutory maximum.”
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of
discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). When the sentence
imposed is “outside the Guidelines range, [we] may not apply a presumption of
unreasonableness. [We] may consider the extent of the deviation, but must give
due deference to the district court’s decision that the [statutory sentencing] factors,
on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Id.; see United States v. Croteau,
819 F.3d 1293, 1309 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 254 (2016). That we
“might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is
insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
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III. DISCUSSION
Arroyo argues that his sentence is procedurally and substantively
unreasonable. He contends the district court committed procedural error by failing
to “afford []sufficient weight to [his] intellectual and mental health deficits.”
Arroyo also argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the
district court “afforded undue weight to an alleged domestic violence charge” that
was dismissed and to Arroyo’s criminal history and prison disciplinary record.
These arguments fail.
No procedural error occurred. Procedural error occurs when the district court
fails to comply with the rules that govern sentencing, “such as [by] failing to
calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines
as mandatory, failing to consider the [statutory sentencing] factors, selecting a
sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the
chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines
range.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. But Arroyo does not fault the district court for failing
to consider a sentencing factor or relying on an impermissible factor. Arroyo takes
issue with the weight assigned to particular sentencing factors, which falls under
the ambit of substantive reasonableness. See United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160,
1194 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).

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The district court did not “commit[] a clear error of judgment in weighing”
the sentencing factors. See id. at 1190. To determine an appropriate sentence, the
district court must consider the “nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant,” and the need for the sentence to
reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just
punishment for the offense, deter criminal conduct, protect the public, and provide
the defendant with needed training, medical care, or treatment. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). The district court took into account Arroyo’s mental impairments and
found “helpful” his expert witness’s recommendation to incarcerate Arroyo and
that he receive medical treatment and mental and vocational counseling. And the
district court reasonably attached great weight to Arroyo’s violent criminal history,
which “fits squarely into one of the § 3553(a) factors, the history and
characteristics of the offender,” United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312, 1324
(11th Cir. 2008), and the need to protect the public from future similar crimes.
Gall, 552 U.S. at 56–57 (holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion
because it “attached great weight” to one factor). “[T]he weight accorded to any of
the § 3553(a) factors is committed to the sound discretion of the district court,”
United States v. Dougherty, 754 F.3d 1353, 1361 (11th Cir. 2014), which did not
assign undue weight to any particular sentencing factor.

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Arroyo argues that a sentence 63 months above the high end of his advisory
sentencing range of 46 to 57 months is unreasonable, but we have affirmed equally
large upward variances based on a defendant’s violent criminal history. In United
States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2009), we upheld the decision to vary
upward from the defendant’s sentencing range of 30 to 37 months to his maximum
statutory sentence of 120 months because his 26 prior offenses revealed an
“unwavering desire to commit crimes.” Id. at 1241. And in United States v.
Osorio-Moreno, 814 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2016), we upheld an upward variance
from a sentencing range of 51 to 63 months to the defendant’s maximum penalty
of 120 months when the defendant had “engaged in a life of crime, with a
staggering 20 convictions,” and he had committed “repeated acts of violence
against women and law-enforcement officers.” Id. at 1288.
Arroyo’s sentence of 120 months is reasonable. He amassed convictions for
robbery, attempted first degree murder, aggravated battery, and the possession and
use of firearms, and he unleashed his brutality equally on companions, law
enforcement, and strangers. Arroyo’s lengthy and serious criminal history reveals a
penchant for violence. And his conduct reflects an attitude, in the words of the
district court, that he “[doesn’t] have to follow the rules.” The district court
reasonably determined that the statutory purposes of sentencing would be best
served by imposing the maximum penalty for his crime. Even Arroyo, who
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requested a sentence “of say seven years,” admitted the propriety of imposing a
sentence above the recommended sentencing range. The district court did not
abuse its discretion.
IV. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM Arroyo’s sentence.

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