Angela Robinson v. USA, et al
Filing
Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Angela Robinson. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.
Case: 16-14514
Date Filed: 04/03/2017
Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 16-14514
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D.C. Docket No. 4:15-cv-00268-RH-CAS
ANGELA ROBINSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
WALTER JOHN CASSIDY,
Defendants - Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
________________________
(April 3, 2017)
Case: 16-14514
Date Filed: 04/03/2017
Page: 2 of 4
Before ROSENBAUM, JULIE CARNES, and GILMAN,∗ Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) grants the federal district courts
exclusive jurisdiction over damages claims against the United States arising out of
personal injury “caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1); see also id. § 2674. Although the FTCA
waives the United States’s sovereign immunity for these types of claims, see JBP
Acquisitions, LP v. United States ex rel. FDIC, 224 F.3d 1260, 1263 (11th Cir.
2000), this waiver is subject to an exception: the United States cannot be held
liable for harm resulting from its “discretionary function[s].” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
If the discretionary-function exception applies to a claim, a federal court
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim. See Swafford v. United States, 839
F.3d 1365, 1369 (11th Cir. 2016). In this case, the district court found that the
United States was entitled to discretionary-function immunity, and the court
therefore dismissed Plaintiff-Appellant Angela Robinson’s negligence claim
against the United States. Robinson appeals the court’s dismissal of that claim.
We have thoroughly reviewed the parties’ briefs, the record, and the law,
and we have heard oral argument. After careful consideration, we find no clear
∗
Honorable Ronald Lee Gilman, United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by
designation.
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error in the district court’s findings of fact or in its application of the law on
discretionary-function immunity. 1 Because the district court correctly found that
the United States was entitled to discretionary-function immunity, we affirm the
district court’s dismissal of Robinson’s claim against the United States.
Robinson also appeals the district court’s denial of her two motions to
compel the government to comply with her discovery requests. The “district court
has broad discretion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 to compel or deny
discovery,” and we review the lower court’s discovery ruling under the abuse-ofdiscretion standard. Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d
1292, 1306 (11th Cir. 2011). Although the government’s nonresponse would
typically lead to an order compelling discovery, the motions were moot because
the United States was dismissed from the suit and because the requested discovery,
1
At the time that the district court dismissed Robinson’s claim, both the government’s
motion to dismiss and the government’s motion for summary judgment were pending. “When a
court must dismiss a case for lack of jurisdiction, the court should not adjudicate the merits of the
claim.” Stanley v. C.I.A., 639 F.2d 1146, 1157 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981). And “[s]ince the granting
of summary judgment is a disposition on the merits of the case, a motion for summary judgment
is not the appropriate procedure for raising the defense of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Id.
Here, the briefing on the motion for summary judgment was supported by a more fully
developed factual record, so we construe the United States’s motion for summary judgment,
insofar as it asked for a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, as a renewed motion to
dismiss. As a result, the standards for resolving factual attacks on subject-matter jurisdiction
applied. So the court was allowed to consider extrinsic evidence, such as deposition testimony
and affidavits, in addition to the complaint’s allegations. See Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown &
Root Servs., Inc., 572 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009). And since the district court was
required to weigh the facts instead of construing them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, on appeal, we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its
legal determinations de novo. See id.
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even if compelled, would not affect Robinson’s claims under the FTCA. The
district court’s ruling was therefore not an abuse of discretion.
AFFIRMED.
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