Rodney Buckles v. USA

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Rodney Buckles. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

Case: 16-14936

Date Filed: 08/24/2017

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 16-14936
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket Nos. 1:15-cv-22360-KMM
1:12-cr-20396-KMM-2
RODNEY BUCKLES,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(August 24, 2017)
Before WILSON, JULIE CARNES, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

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Rodney Buckles, a pro se federal prisoner, appeals the district court’s denial
of his motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence, filed pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2255. A certificate of appealability (COA) was granted on the
following issue:
Whether the district court erred in denying Buckles’s challenge to his
career-offender enhanced sentence on the ground that Johnson v.
United States, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), does not apply to
the Sentencing Guidelines, in light of Beckles v. United States, 580
U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2510 (2016).
On appeal, Buckles argues that, under Johnson, the residual clause of the careeroffender guideline, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2), is unconstitutional, and therefore, his
previous state-court convictions for fleeing or attempting to elude and escape do
not qualify as crimes of violence.1 After a careful review, we affirm the district
court’s ruling.
I.
Under § 2255, a federal prisoner seeking post-conviction relief may “move
the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence”
on the basis “that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws
of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). In considering an appeal from the
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Buckles also contends that fleeing or attempting to elude is not a crime of violence, that
the district court failed to determine whether escape is a crime of violence, that Amendment 798
to the Sentencing Guidelines eliminated the residual clause of the career-offender guideline in
August 2016, and that Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), impacts
our analysis of his prior convictions. However, those issues are outside the scope of the COA
and we lack jurisdiction to consider them. Murray v. United States, 145 F.3d 1249, 1250–51
(11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
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denial a § 2255 motion, we review findings of fact for clear error and questions of
law de novo. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998)
(per curiam). We liberally construe pro se pleadings, which we hold to a less
stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys. Id.
II.
The Sentencing Guidelines provide for a sentencing enhancement for
defendants who are “career offenders.” See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. A defendant is
considered a “career offender” if three conditions are met: (1) the defendant was at
least 18 years old at the time of the conviction; (2) the offense of the conviction is
a felony that is either a “crime of violence” or a controlled substance offense; and
(3) the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of
violence or a controlled substance offense. Id. § 4B1.1(a). Under the 2012
Guidelines used to calculate Buckles’s sentence, a “crime of violence” is:
any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year, that––
(1)

has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of another, or

(2)

is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another.

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1)-(2). Subsection (a)(1) of § 4B1.2 is referred to as the
“elements clause,” while subsection (b)(2) contains enumerated crimes and the
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“residual clause.” See United States v. Lockley, 632 F.3d 1238, 1240–41 (11th Cir.
2011).
On the other hand, the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) also provides
for enhanced penalties, but only for offenders with three previous convictions for a
“violent felony” or a serious drug offense. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The definition
of a “violent felony” under the ACCA is nearly identical to the definition of a
“crime of violence” under the Guidelines, including its incorporation of a residual
clause encompassing crimes that “involve[ ] conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another.” Id. § 924(e)(2)(B).
III.
The district court did not err in denying Buckles’s challenge to his careeroffender enhanced sentence because Johnson does not apply to the Sentencing
Guidelines. In Johnson, the Supreme Court held that only the residual clause of
the ACCA is unconstitutionally vague, it did not extend its holding to the similar
provision in the Sentencing Guidelines. See 576 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2563.
However, following that, our court held that Johnson did not render the residual
clause of the career-offender guideline unconstitutional because “the vagueness
doctrine applies only to laws that prohibit conduct and fix punishments, not
advisory guidelines.” United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185, 1189 (11th Cir.
2015), cert. denied, 580 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1344 (2017).
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Then on March 6, 2017, the Supreme Court reviewed the issue that was
presented to us in Matchett and reached the same conclusion, holding that the
vagueness doctrine does not apply to the residual clause of the career-offender
guideline because, “[u]nlike the ACCA . . . the advisory [Sentencing] Guidelines
do not fix the permissible range of sentences . . . they merely guide the exercise of
a court’s discretion in choosing an appropriate sentence within a statutory range.”
Beckles, 580 U.S. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 892. And because we have held, and the
Supreme Court has now confirmed, that the residual clause of the career-offender
guideline is not void for vagueness, the district court did not err. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court’s denial of Buckles’s motion to vacate, set aside, or correct
his sentence.
AFFIRMED.

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