USA v. Adrian Stephens

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Adrian Stephens. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

Case: 16-14990

Date Filed: 01/23/2017

Page: 1 of 5

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 16-14990
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cr-00115-SCJ-LTW-2

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ADRIAN STEPHENS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(January 23, 2017)
Before MARCUS, WILSON, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

Case: 16-14990

Date Filed: 01/23/2017

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Adrian Stephens appeals the district court’s modification of the conditions of
his supervised release to require that he stay at a halfway house for six months.
Stephens contends that this requirement involved a greater deprivation of liberty
than was reasonably necessary. After careful review, we affirm.
We review the modification of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)
for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Serrapio, 754 F.3d 1312, 1318
(11th Cir. 2014) (reviewing modification of conditions of probation, under 18
U.S.C. § 3563, for an abuse of discretion); United States v. Moran, 573 F.3d 1132,
1137 (11th Cir. 2009) (“We review the imposition of special conditions of
supervised release for abuse of discretion.”). When reviewing for an abuse of
discretion, we generally will reverse only if we are left with a definite and firm
conviction that the district court has made a clear error in judgment. Moran, 573
F.3d at 1137.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2), district courts have the authority to “modify,
reduce, or enlarge the conditions of supervised release, at any time prior to the
expiration or termination of the term of supervised release,” after considering
certain factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

The § 3553(a) factors to be

considered include (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense; (2) the
defendant’s history and characteristics; (3) the need to provide adequate
deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant
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with educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment; (6) the kinds of sentences and the sentencing range established for the
defendant’s offense, (7) any pertinent policy statements; (8) the need to avoid
unwarranted sentence disparities; and (9) the need to provide restitution. See id.;
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)–(D), (a)(4)–(7).
In modifying a defendant’s supervised-release conditions, a district court
may impose a special condition to the extent it is (1) is reasonably related to the
nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the
defendant, and the sentencing goals of deterrence, protection of the public, and
rehabilitation; (2) involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably
necessary to accomplish the goals of deterrence, protection of the public, and
rehabilitation; and (3) is consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by
the Sentencing Commission.

18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(l)–(3); see 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(e)(2) (modifications may be made pursuant to “the provisions applicable to
the initial setting of the terms and conditions of post-release supervision” in
§ 3583(d)). To extent that those three conditions are met, the court may impose
“any condition set forth as a discretionary condition of probation in § 3563(b).” 18
U.S.C. § 3583(d). Section 3563(b) allows a court, in its discretion, to require that a
defendant “reside at, or participate in the program of, a community corrections
facility,” such as a halfway house. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(11).
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Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in modifying Stephens’s
conditions of supervised release to require that he spend six months at a halfway
house. See Moran, 573 F.3d at 1139–40. Stephens does not dispute that the
condition is reasonably related to the pertinent § 3553(a) factors, but he argues that
the requirement was not reasonably necessary to accomplish the purposes of
sentencing. The court reasonably could have required more intensive counseling
and treatment, Stephens contends, but placing him in a halfway house is
unreasonable because it will make it more difficult for him to receive outpatient
treatment for alcohol abuse and to maintain full-time employment.
However, the district court reasonably concluded, in light of Stephens’s
history and characteristics, that requiring him to spend some time in a halfway
house was necessary to accomplish the goals of rehabilitation and protection of the
public. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2). Although Stephens was employed and was
participating in counseling, he also had a number of supervised-release violations
involving the use or abuse of alcohol. Two prior violations involved the use of
alcohol in connection with driving, which plainly poses a threat to the public.
Later, Stephens was found lying in his driveway, intoxicated and asleep, and the
violation giving rise to this appeal likewise involved the use of alcohol. The court

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reasoned that, based on these prior violations, Stephens was at risk of ending up
back in prison and that he would benefit from a more controlled environment.1
Moreover, the district court took into account Stephens’s concerns when
imposing the special condition. Specifically, the court based its modification
decision on assurances from the government and the Probation Office that the
halfway house was willing to work with Stephens to ensure that he was able to
continue his group therapy and maintain his employment. The record therefore
does not indicate that the court committed a clear error of judgment in modifying
the conditions of his supervised release.

See Moran, 573 F.3d at 1137.

Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion, and we affirm.
AFFIRMED.

1

Stephens does not argue that rehabilitation was an improper factor for the court to
consider in ordering him to reside at the halfway house, so we do not reach any issue in that
regard. Cf. United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1309–10 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that
the district court erred in considering rehabilitation when it sentenced the defendant to 24
months’ imprisonment upon the revocation of supervised release).
5