Juan Vicente-Pu v. U.S. Attorney General

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Petitioner Juan Vicente-Pu. Decision: Affirmed. Petition Denied. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

Case: 16-15963

Date Filed: 07/10/2017

Page: 1 of 5

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 16-15963
Non-Argument Calendar
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Agency No. A208-266-485

JUAN VICENTE-PU,
Petitioner,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
________________________
(July 10, 2017)
Before JULIE CARNES, JILL PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

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Juan Vicente-Pu and Elida Vicente-Lopez (“E.V.L.”), his minor daughter,
petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) final order
affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of their asylum claim1 based on the
BIA’s conclusions that they did not meet the particular social group requirement
and, even assuming they did, they did not establish a causal nexus between that
particular social group and the harm they suffered. Vicente-Pu and E.V.L. argue
that they had a well-founded fear of future persecution based on a reasonable
possibility that they would be killed or that E.V.L. would be raped if Vicente-Pu
did not meet the demands of unknown extortionists. They also claim that they are
members of a particular social group defined as fathers and daughters who are
victims of extortion under threat of rape.
We review only the BIA’s decision as the final judgment, except to the
extent that it expressly adopts the IJ’s opinion. Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d
1262, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001). If the BIA adopts the IJ’s reasoning, we will review
the IJ’s decision as well. Id. Because the BIA conducted an independent analysis
of the issues in its written opinion, we review the BIA’s opinion as the final
judgment. Id.

1

Vicente-Pu and E.V.L. have abandoned any challenge to the BIA’s denial of their
withholding of removal or CAT relief claims because they do not present an argument regarding
those claims on review; rather, they argue only that they are eligible for asylum. Lapaix v.
United States Att’y Gen., 605 F.3d 1138, 1145 (11th Cir. 2010).
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We review de novo the BIA’s legal conclusions, including whether an
alleged group qualifies as a “particular social group” under the INA. Gonzalez v.
United States Att’y Gen., 820 F.3d 399, 403 (11th Cir. 2016). The BIA,
interpreting the INA, has held that a “particular social group” must be
(1) composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic,
(2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in
question. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 227, 237 et seq. (BIA 2014). The
BIA has also held that an overly broad social group cannot be made a particular
social group by adding the alleged harm that its members suffered to the definition.
See Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 579, 584 (BIA 2008) (holding that the alleged
social group—“youth who have been targeted for recruitment by, and resisted,
criminal gangs”—could not be defined by the harm that its members suffered).
Our review of the BIA’s statutory interpretation employs the deferential treatment
articulated in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984). Gonzalez, 820 F.3d at 403 et seq. In that context, we may
not substitute our own construction for the BIA’s reasonable interpretation of an
ambiguous term in the INA, such as the meaning of “particular social group.” Id.
at 404.
An applicant for asylum must meet the INA’s definition of a refugee. INA §
208(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1). The definition of “refugee” includes:
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any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality . . .
and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling
to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of
[1] persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution [2] on account of
[3] race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion.
INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Thus, in order to meet the
definition of a refugee, the applicant must, “with specific and credible evidence,
demonstrate (1) past persecution on account of a statutorily listed factor, or (2) a
well-founded fear that the statutorily listed factor will cause future persecution.”
Ruiz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 440 F.3d 1247, 1257 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted).
When an appellant fails to offer an argument on an issue, that issue is
deemed abandoned. Lapaix, 605 F.3d at 1145. Passing references to issues are
insufficient to raise a claim on appeal. Id.
Vicente-Pu and E.V.L. have abandoned any argument that the BIA erred in
concluding that, even assuming they could prove membership in a “particular
social group,” there was no causal nexus between their membership in that group
and the extortion under threat of rape or murder, because they failed to raise such
an argument in their brief on appeal. Id. In any event, Vicente-Pu and E.V.L. fail
to show their membership in a particular social group because their alleged social
group—“fathers and daughters who are victims of extortion under threat of
rape”—is impermissibly defined by the harm that its members allegedly suffered.

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See Gonzalez, 820 F.3d at 404; Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I&N Dec. at 584.
Accordingly, we deny their petition.
PETITION DENIED. 2

2

This panel previously granted a temporary stay of removal (although we did so only
because of the Attorney General’s non-opposition), which by its terms would expire
automatically upon the issuance of the panel’s decision on the merits. Accordingly, that
temporary stay is hereby lifted.
5