USA v. Darrel Gibbs

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Darrel Prenell Gibbs. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 16-16215
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cr-20050-DPG-15
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DARREL PRENELL GIBBS,
a.k.a. G,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(June 16, 2017)
Before ROSENBAUM, JULIE CARNES, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Darrel Gibbs appeals his 120-month sentence after pleading guilty
to one count of conspiring to possess with the intent to distribute at least 100 grams

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of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(B)(i). He argues that the
court failed to consider his health condition and all 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors
other than his criminal history.
The sole issue this appeal raises is whether Gibbs’s sentence is substantively
unreasonable. We find that it is not and affirm the district court’s decision.
I.
A grand jury indicted Gibbs and nineteen codefendants in a twelve-count
indictment for various drug-trafficking crimes. Gibbs was charged in only Count
3, which alleged conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute at least 100
grams of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(B)(i). He pled
guilty.
At sentencing, the district court determined Gibbs’s offense level to be 21,
after accounting for acceptance of responsibility. It found Gibbs’s criminal history
to fall within Category III. As a result, Gibbs’s guideline range was 46 to 57
months. But the minimum term of imprisonment for Gibbs’s crime was five years.
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). So under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b), Gibbs’s guideline range
became 60 months’ imprisonment.
The government recommended the mandatory minimum sentence of 60
months’ imprisonment. After hearing arguments from both sides, the district court
sentenced Gibbs to 120 months’ imprisonment. It noted that it had considered the
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presentence investigation report (“PSR”), the statements of the parties, the
advisory guideline range, and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. In explaining the
basis for the sentence it imposed, the court noted that it was deeply concerned
about Gibbs’s criminal history.

In the court’s view, Gibbs’s criminal-history

category did not adequately represent the number of prior felony convictions he
had sustained, the severity of the crimes involved in those cases, and the short
period of time between convictions.
The court also accounted for Gibbs’s health conditions in its sentence.
Gibbs was wheelchair bound, received dialysis three times per week, had a history
of drug addiction, and had a number of medical complications while incarcerated
pending trial. So at the request of Gibbs’s attorney, the district court recommended
that Gibbs be permitted to participate in a drug-treatment program and that he be
housed in Springfield, Missouri, one of the only two federal facilities that take
prisoners with dialysis issues.
II.
We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence, regardless of
whether the sentence imposed falls inside or outside the guideline range, under a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41
(2007). When the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as
improperly calculating the guideline range or inadequately explaining the chosen
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sentence, we examine whether, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the
sentence imposed was substantively reasonable. Id. at 51. The appellant bears the
burden of establishing that the sentence is unreasonable in light of the record and
the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir.
2010).
We defer to the district court because it sees and hears firsthand from the
defendant and the government. So it is well positioned to fashion an appropriate
sentence. See United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir.
2015). As a result, when the ultimate sentence is reasonable in light of all the
circumstances, we will not second-guess the weight the district court placed on a
particular factor or factors. United States v. Snipes, 611 F.3d 855, 872 (11th Cir.
2010). We need not deem the district court’s sentence the most appropriate one
possible, as long as the sentence is reasonable. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d
1160, 1191 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). But a court abuses its discretion if it (1)
fails to consider relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives an
improper or irrelevant factor significant weight, or (3) balances the proper factors
unreasonably and so commits a clear error of judgment. Id. at 1189.
The district court’s task is to impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater
than necessary” to (1) “reflect the seriousness of the offense,” (2) “promote respect
for the law,” (3) “provide just punishment for the offense,” (4) deter criminal
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conduct, (5) “protect the public from the defendant’s future criminal conduct,” and
(6) provide the defendant with any training and medical treatment in the most
effective manner. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2); Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1253–54.
In imposing a particular sentence, the court must consider (1) the nature and
circumstances of the offense, (2) the history and characteristics of the defendant,
(3) the kinds of sentences available, (4) the applicable guideline range, (5) the
pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, (6) the need to avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities, and (7) the need to provide restitution to
victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
III.
Gibbs contends that the trial court erred in imposing a 100% upward
variance from the high end of the guidelines range. In particular, Gibbs complains
that the court placed too much weight on his criminal history and totally excluded
all other § 3553(a) factors, including his medical condition. We are not persuaded.
The Sentencing Guidelines are advisory. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220, 245 (2005). After the sentencing court has correctly calculated the guideline
range, it must seriously consider the Sentencing Guidelines, but it can also tailor
the sentence in light of other § 3553(a) factors, with proper explanation. Gall, 552
U.S. at 46.

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Criminal history is an appropriate and relevant factor to consider under 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a). Despite the express consideration of criminal history in the
Sentencing Guidelines, district courts have considerable latitude in deciding how to
weigh a defendant’s prior crimes. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1261.
In Rosales-Bruno, for example, the district court placed particular emphasis
on Rosales-Bruno’s criminal history.

Id. at 1253.

We upheld the 87-month

sentence, which was 60 months above the high end of the guideline range, and
involved, as a percentage, a variance significantly greater than the one at issue
here. Id. at 1251.
In Gibbs’s case, the district court similarly held that Gibbs’s criminal
category did not adequately represent his criminal history. Contrary to what Gibbs
argues, the district court focused on the “individualized, particularized, specific
facts” in sentencing Gibbs. Id. at 1260. It expressly considered the “very serious
offenses” of which Gibbs had been convicted. And it accounted for Gibbs’s
“almost complete[] noncomplian[ce]” with his supervised-release conditions
following his release from earlier imprisonment. While Gibbs takes issue with his
longer sentence in comparison to those of his codefendants who shared the same
criminal-history category, the district court explained that “no[t] one of [the
codefendants] have these priors [that Gibbs had]. I mean, not even close.” That’s
a permissible basis for distinction between otherwise-similarly situated defendants.
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Nor did the district court consider only Gibbs’s criminal history. Rather, the
court expressly stated that it has considered all the § 3553(a) factors and statements
of the parties.

And though the district need only acknowledge that it has

considered the defendant's arguments and the § 3553(a) factors instead of explicitly
discussing each factor, United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir.
2008), here, the court highlighted several § 3553(a) factors other than the criminal
history, including the need to protect the public and the characteristics of the
defendant.
The district judge also was fully aware of and considered Gibbs’s health
condition. Indeed, at the request of the defendant, the court recommended to the
Bureau of Prisons that Gibbs be permitted to participate in the intensive drugtreatment program and be sent to Springfield, Missouri, which is one of two
facilities that take prisoners with dialysis issues. We cannot say that the district
court was unreasonable in determining that, even accounting for Gibbs’s medical
impairments, the sentence was necessary to further the goals of § 3553(a). See
United States v. Hayes, 762 F.3d 1300, 1308 (11th Cir. 2014) (noting that age and
health are not overwhelming factors to support the defendant’s sentence of
probation).

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IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the sentence of the district court.
AFFIRMED.

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