USA v. Aaron Reynolds

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Aaron Keith Reynolds. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

Case: 16-16392

Date Filed: 06/20/2017

Page: 1 of 3

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 16-16392
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:14-cr-00432-AKK-WC-9

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
AARON KEITH REYNOLDS,
a.k.a. Key,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
________________________
(June 20, 2017)
Before WILSON, MARTIN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

Case: 16-16392

Date Filed: 06/20/2017

Page: 2 of 3

Aaron Reynolds appeals his 48-month sentence, imposed after a jury found
him guilty of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1). At the time of his sentencing, Reynolds’s trial judge was unavailable,
so the judge transferred his case to a different judge (the sentencing judge). On
appeal, Reynolds argues that (1) the trial judge’s decision to reassign his case was
improper and (2) the sentencing judge should have transferred the case back to the
trial judge because the sentencing judge was not familiar with the trial record.
After careful consideration of the record and the parties’ briefs, we find both
arguments unavailing.
I
The trial judge did not err in reassigning Reynolds’s case. Under the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, “[a]fter a verdict or finding of guilty, any judge
regularly sitting in or assigned to a court may complete the court’s duties if the
judge who presided at trial cannot perform those duties because of absence, death,
sickness, or other disability.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 25(b)(1). “Because [the trial judge]
became absent at the time of sentencing, reassignment of the case to [the
sentencing judge] was proper under Rule 25.” See United States v. Dowd, 451
F.3d 1244, 1256 (11th Cir. 2006).

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Case: 16-16392

Date Filed: 06/20/2017

Page: 3 of 3

II
The sentencing judge did not err in presiding over Reynolds’s sentencing.
The judge “was sufficiently familiar with [Reynolds’]s trial to sentence him.” See
id. First, prior to Reynolds’s sentencing hearing, testimony from his trial was filed
with the district court for consideration by the sentencing judge, and the sentencing
judge conducted sentencing hearings for several of Reynolds’s co-defendants.
Second, at the sentencing hearing, the sentencing judge (1) heard testimony from
multiple witnesses, including testimony from a key trial witness which overlapped
with the witness’s trial testimony; (2) noted that he reviewed both Reynolds’s
Presentence Investigation Report and Reynolds’s sentencing memorandum; and (3)
engaged in colloquy with counsel about Reynolds’s trial. Finally, the sentencing
judge, during the colloquys with counsel, demonstrated familiarity with relevant
trial issues and indicated that Reynolds’s sentencing memorandum assisted him in
familiarizing himself with the case. “[T]his record contains ample evidence that
[the sentencing judge] was familiar enough with the trial to impose [a] sentence.
See United States v. Caraza, 843 F.2d 432, 437 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam).
III
Because neither the trial judge nor the sentencing judge erred, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.

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