USA v. Troy Gordon

Filing

Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Troy Mandell Gordon. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Non-Published. Opinion method: Per Curiam. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions.

Case: 17-11214

Date Filed: 08/21/2017

Page: 1 of 5

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 17-11214
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 3:09-cr-00098-MMH-JBT-3

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TROY MANDELL GORDON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(August 21, 2017)
Before MARCUS, JULIE CARNES and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Troy Gordon appeals the district court’s imposition of a 12-month and 1-day
sentence, imposed after the revocation of his supervised release, pursuant to 18

Case: 17-11214

Date Filed: 08/21/2017

Page: 2 of 5

U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). On appeal, he challenges the substantive reasonableness of
his sentence. After thorough review, we affirm.
We review a sentence imposed upon the revocation of supervised release for
reasonableness, United States v. Velasquez, 524 F.3d 1248, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008),
which “merely asks whether the trial court abused its discretion,” United States v.
Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1189 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Rita v. United States, 551
U.S. 338, 351 (2007)). In reviewing the substantive reasonableness of a sentence
for abuse of discretion, we consider the “‘totality of the circumstances.’” Id. at
1190 (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)).
When revoking a defendant’s term of supervised release, Title 18 U.S.C. §
3583(e) instructs a sentencing court to consider certain 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors
in determining an appropriate sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). In part,
sentencing courts must consider (1) “the nature and circumstances of the offense
and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” (2) the need to adequately
deter criminal conduct, (3) the need “to protect the public from further crimes of
the defendant,” (4) the applicable sentencing range, and (5) any pertinent policy
statements of the Sentencing Commission. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(e), 3553(a)(1),
(a)(2)(B)-(C), (a)(4)-(5). The district court must impose a sentence “sufficient, but
not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes” listed in § 3553(a)(2).
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The party challenging the sentence bears the burden of
2

Case: 17-11214

Date Filed: 08/21/2017

Page: 3 of 5

showing that the sentence is unreasonable in light of the record and the applicable
§ 3553(a) factors. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010).
We will reverse only if we are “left with the definite and firm conviction that the
district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors
by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated
by the facts of the case.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir.
2010) (en banc) (quotation omitted).
The sentencing court need not weigh each factor equally, but instead may
give great weight to one factor over the others. United States v. Rosales-Bruno,
789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2015). The decision about how much weight to
assign a particular factor is committed to the discretion of the district court. Id.
However, a district court should not focus on one factor “single-mindedly” to the
detriment of other factors, and a court’s unjustified reliance on any one § 3553(a)
factor may be a symptom of an unreasonable sentence. United States v. Crisp, 454
F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir. 2006). A district court can abuse its discretion when it
(1) fails to consider relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives an
improper or irrelevant factor significant weight, or (3) commits a clear error of
judgment by balancing the proper factors unreasonably. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189.
We ordinarily expect a sentence within the advisory guideline range to be
reasonable. United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191, 1220 (11th Cir. 2009).
3

Case: 17-11214

Date Filed: 08/21/2017

Page: 4 of 5

Here, Gordon has not met his burden of showing that his sentence, imposed
upon the revocation of his supervised release, was substantively unreasonable. See
Tome, 611 F.3d at 1378. For starters, because Gordon’s 12-month and 1-day
sentence was within the undisputed 7-to-13-month guideline range, it is expected
to be reasonable. See Sarras, 575 F.3d at 1220. In addition, there is no indication
that the district court relied on one factor “single-mindedly” to the detriment of
other factors in crafting Gordon’s sentence. See Crisp, 454 F.3d at 1292. While
Gordon argues on appeal that his drug addiction should have mitigated his
sentence, it was within the district court’s discretion to place more weight on
Gordon’s history and characteristics -- specifically, the fact that he did not appear
for almost a year. See Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1254.
Moreover, Gordon’s argument in the district court focused on potential
disparities between his sentence and that of his codefendant, Larry Martin. But, as
the record reveals, the district court correctly distinguished between the nature of
Gordon’s violation and Martin’s violation -- among other things, there was no
evidence that Martin, like Gordon, had failed to appear for almost a year after a
petition for a summons was issued for violating supervised release. See United
States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091, 1101 (11th Cir. 2009) (“A well-founded claim
of disparity, however, assumes that apples are being compared to apples.”)
(quotation omitted). As a result, Gordon’s sentence was well within the range of
4

Case: 17-11214

Date Filed: 08/21/2017

Page: 5 of 5

reasonable sentences and was within the district court’s discretion. See Irey, 612
F.3d at 1190. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.

5