Cariou v. Prince

Filing 139

AMICUS BRIEF, on behalf of, The Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc., FILED. Service date 11/03/2011 by CM/ECF. [438092] [11-1197]--[Edited 11/03/2011 by HT]

11-1197-cv
IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

PATRICK CARIOU
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
RICHARD PRINCE,
Defendant-Appellant,
GAGOSIAN GALLERY, INC., LAWRENCE GAGOSIAN,
Defendants-Appellants.

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE THE ANDY WARHOL FOUNDATION FOR THE
VISUAL ARTS, INC. IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS AND URGING
REVERSAL
Anthony T. Falzone
Julie A. Ahrens
Daniel K. Nazer
Stanford Law School
Center for Internet and Society
559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305
[phone]

Virginia Rutledge
414 W. 145th Street
New York, NY 10031
[phone]

Zachary J. Alinder
John A. Polito
Bingham McCutchen LLP
Three Embarcadero Center
San Francisco, CA 94111
[phone]

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1, counsel for amicus
curiae certifies the following information:
The Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. has no parent
corporation, and no publicly held corporation owns ten percent or more of its
stock.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF INTEREST....................................................................... 1
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 2
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................. 6
I.

The Use Of Existing Imagery Is A Critical Component
Of Artistic Expression ................................................................ 6

II.

The District Court Applied An Inappropriately Narrow
Fair Use Standard That Provides Insufficient Protection
For Public Speech And Expression Interests ........................... 23
A.

Fair Use Is A Critical First Amendment Safeguard
That Provides Breathing Room For Artistic
Expression ...................................................................... 23

B.

The Court Should Apply The Fair Use Standard
With Its First Amendment Function In Mind ................ 26
1.

A Wide Array Of Transformative Meaning
Should Be Recognized In The Expressive
Use Of Existing Images In Visual Art ................ 26

2.

Courts Should Be Cautious In Recognizing
A Right To Control Markets For Expressive,
Artistic Uses Like Prince’s .................................. 34
a.
b.

C.

Substantial Public Benefit ......................... 34
No Cognizable Harm................................. 35

Injunctions Against Expressive Artistic Uses
Should Be Granted Only Upon A Clear Showing
Of Specific And Substantial Irreparable Harm
Sufficient To Outweigh Public Speech And
Expression Interests ....................................................... 38

ii

1.

2.

The District Court’s Injunction Analysis
Ignored Prince’s Speech Interests, His
Economic Interests And His Statutory
Rights ................................................................... 42

3.

III.

The District Court’s Injunction Analysis
Ignored Important Public Speech Interests ......... 39

Only A Clear Showing Of Specific And
Substantial Irreparable Harm Should Be
Sufficient To Overcome The Important
Public And Private Speech Interests An
Injunction Would Impair Here ............................ 45

CONCLUSION ........................................................................ 48

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES
Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1988)......................... 35, 40, 41
Associated Press v. U.S., 326 U.S. 1 (1945)................................................. 40
Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd.,
448 F.3d 605 (2006) ............................................................... 27, 34, 37, 38
Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006) ........................... 22, 27, 28, 36
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903) ................ 33
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984) ........... 39
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S.Ct. 2729 (2011) .............................. 25
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).................... passim
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)................................................ 41, 42
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S 388 (2006) ............ 4, 39, 45, 46
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) ...................................................... 25
Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615 (No. 4,436) (CCD Mass. 1845) .............. 24
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. 539 (1985) ............................................................................ 44, 46
HarperCollins Publishers, L.L.C. v. Gawker Media LLC,
721 F. Supp. 2d 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ....................................................... 46
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston,
515 U.S. 557 (1995) ............................................................................ 32, 42
iv

Lauratex Textile Corp. v. Allton Knitting Mills Inc.,
519 F. Supp. 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ............................................................ 45
Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) .............................................. 40
Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003) ..... 37
Metro. Opera Ass’n, Inc. v. Local 100, 239 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2001) .......... 39
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)................................. 25
New York Times Co, Inc. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001)....................... 38, 46
New York Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713 (1971) ....................................... 42
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal.,
475 U.S. 1 (1986) ................................................................................ 35, 40
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009) ............................... 32
Red Lion Broad. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) ...................................... 34, 40
Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc.,
366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966) ...................................................................... 40
Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2010) ................................................ passim
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417 (1984) ............................................................................ 23, 25
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990) ........................................................ 35
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.,
268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001) ................................................................. 40
Trust Co. Bank v. Putnam Publ’g Group, Inc.,
5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1874 (C.D. Cal 1988) .......................................................... 35
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975) ................... 23
v

Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., Inc., 445 U.S. 308 (1980)................... 39
Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1991) ........................ 34
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8............................................................................ 23
STATUTES
17 U.S.C. § 106A .......................................................................................... 44
17 U.S.C. § 107 ....................................................................................... 26, 34
17 U.S.C. § 504 ............................................................................................. 43
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Richard Dannay, Copyright Injunctions And Fair Use,
55 J. COPY. SOC’Y 449 (2008) ................................................................... 45
Douglas Eklund, The Pictures Generation, 1974-1984 (2009) .................... 19
Richard Flood, Laura Hoptman and Massimiliano Gioni,
Collage: The Unmonumental Picture (2007).............................................. 6
Marvin Heiferman, Lisa Phillips and John G. Hanhardt,
Image World: Art and Media Culture (1989) ........................................... 19
Rudolf E. Kuenzli and Francis M. Naumann,
Marcel Duchamp: Artist of the Century 76 (1989) ..................................... 9
Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard,
103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990) ................................................................ 24
Neil W. Netanel, Copyright’s Paradox (2008)............................................. 24
vi

Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright (2001) ....... 41
Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination:
Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 Yale L.J. 1 (2002) ............................. 43
Brandon Taylor, Collage: The Making of Modern Art (2004) ....................... 6

vii

STATEMENT OF INTEREST
The district court’s judgment and the sweeping injunction it issued
implicate important rights of free speech and artistic expression. The Andy
Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. has an especially strong interest
in making sure that copyright law provides sufficient protection for original
works of authorship, while preserving the freedom to use those works to
create new forms of artistic expression.1
Founded upon Mr. Warhol’s death, the Foundation advances the
visual arts by promoting the creation, presentation and documentation of
contemporary art. It has made grants totaling more than $200 million to fund
individual artists, scholars, researchers, museums and other organizations,
including The Andy Warhol Museum. All of its work is premised upon the
belief that art reflects an important cultural dialogue, and that freedom of
artistic expression is fundamental to a democratic society.
That commitment is evident in the Foundation’s approach to the
intellectual property it owns. The Foundation charges licensing fees for the
use of Mr. Warhol’s work in connection with commercial goods and

1

All parties consented to the filing of this brief. No party’s counsel
authored this brief in whole or in part, and no party or its counsel contributed
money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting this brief. Nor did
any other person (besides the Warhol Foundation or its counsel) contribute
money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting this brief.
1

services, and those fees provide important support for its funding activities.
Like any copyright owner, the Foundation reserves the right to assess on a
case-by-case basis whether any particular use might infringe upon its rights.
But it makes that assessment with careful consideration of the free speech
and expressive interests that are at stake when it comes to the creation of art.
The Foundation therefore does not object to other artists building freely on
Mr. Warhol’s work in the creation of new art, because it recognizes that such
freedom is essential to fulfilling copyright’s goal of promoting creativity and
artistic expression. In short, it applies the same balanced respect for
copyright owners and new creators that it urges in the pages below.
INTRODUCTION
Thirty paintings (and a book about them) have been declared
unlawful; most have been impounded and stand subject to destruction. Each
is a highly expressive work in the Canal Zone series by the renowned and
controversial artist Richard Prince. The reason these paintings were declared
unlawful is because they use imagery from photographs of Rastafarians
taken by the artist Patrick Cariou. Some of Prince’s paintings use a
substantial amount of imagery from Cariou’s photographs:

2

Richard Prince, It’s All Over (2008) at A-257
Collage, inkjet, and acrylic on canvas; 80 x 120 1/4"
In others, Cariou’s work is almost undetectable:

Richard Prince, Pumpsie Green (2008) at A-265
Collage, inkjet, and acrylic on canvas; 77 x 100 1/2"
3

Prince’s appropriation is part of a long and important tradition in
visual art. For centuries, artists have used existing images to create new
works of original expression. These works convey meaning that may be easy
or difficult to describe but is nonetheless different than the meaning of the
individual elements they incorporate.
The district court’s decision in this case threatens this artistic tradition
by applying a fair use standard that is contrary to controlling law. It refuses
to recognize any expressive interest or transformative meaning other than
parody or direct commentary, and adopts the mistaken premise that the
meaning of art can be defined strictly by the intent of the artist, or ignored
altogether based on the artist’s failure to verbalize that meaning to a court’s
satisfaction. The district court compounded these errors when it enjoined and
impounded Prince’s work. It ignored the controlling injunction standard set
forth by the Supreme Court in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange and all of the
equitable factors that account for the important speech and expression
interests this injunction implicates.
Serious as they are, these errors conceal a bigger problem. The fair
use doctrine is the principal mechanism by which copyright balances the
need for strong incentives with the need to leave room for new creativity. It
is, in the words of the Supreme Court, a “First Amendment safeguard” that

4

protects important public speech interests and ensures copyright will not
stifle the creativity it is supposed to encourage. In order to fulfill its First
Amendment function, fair use analysis must protect expressive interests that
go beyond parody or direct commentary, and must acknowledge the
meaning of art cannot be determined solely by the opinions of the artist. It
must provide enough breathing space for artists to use the images that
surround us to say something about the world, or to imagine a different one
– even if some think it displeasing or depraved. It should recognize that
expressive artistic uses create new meaning that is often difficult to describe,
or uncomfortable to view. It should recognize that automatically reserving to
copyright owners the market for expressive artistic uses of their work
presents the same danger as reserving the market for criticism and parody:
copyright owners will often try to censor expression they do not like.
When a court is asked to determine the lawfulness of artistic
expression, and forever enjoin its distribution or display, it is especially
important to get the standard right. This Court should correct the district
court’s errors, and clarify the proper application of the fair use analysis and
the injunction standard to expressive artistic uses of visual images.

5

ARGUMENT
I.

The Use Of Existing Imagery Is A Critical Component Of
Artistic Expression.
Artists have used existing imagery to create new meaning since long

before photography was invented. Museums around the world preserve and
display treasured works that appropriate a wide array of imagery from
myriad sources, depending upon the artist’s need to communicate. These
works may pay homage to other artists, engage other art or images, or refer
to subjects and ideas represented by other imagery. The author or specific
source of the imagery may be easy to identify; in other cases imagery may
be used because it is representative of a type or genre, such as documentary
photography or advertising. Regardless, audiences attribute distinct new
meaning and assign independent value to these creative uses of existing
imagery.
Prince’s artistic strategy of appropriating and collaging photographic
images has origins dating back more than a century. See Brandon Taylor,
Collage: The Making of Modern Art (2004); Richard Flood, Laura Hoptman
and Massimiliano Gioni, Collage: The Unmonumental Picture (2007). In the
early 1900’s, artists began incorporating physical material bearing images
(and text) into their work to more directly reference the world around them,
communicate awareness of burgeoning popular media and explore new
6

methods for creative expression. The combination – and often the collision –
of these disparate images and materials generated new meaning quite
different from that attached to the individual elements used, as illustrated by
the now canonical examples of Cubist and Dada collage below:

Pablo Picasso, Guitar, Sheet Music and Glass (1912)
Collage with gouache on paper; 18 7/8 x 14 3/8"

7

Hanna Hoch, Cut With the Kitchen Knife through the Last
Weimar Beer-Belly Cultural Epoch in Germany (1919-20)
Collage with watercolor on paper; 44 7/8 x 35 7/16"

8

Around the same time, artists developed strategies that took existing
“readymade” and “found” objects from everyday or natural contexts, and
used them to create new works of art, often with minimal alteration. Marcel
Duchamp described this as creating a “new thought for [the] object.” See
Rudolf E. Kuenzli and Francis M. Naumann, Marcel Duchamp: Artist of the
Century 76 (1989). This practice furthered the understanding of existing
images as raw material available for new expression.

Marcel Duchamp, L.H.O.O.Q. (1919)
Pencil on postcard reproduction; 7 3/4 x 4 7/8"
9

Over the course of the twentieth century, strategies of collage and
appropriation of existing imagery evolved. As photo-based imagery and
technologies of reproduction became ubiquitous, artists increasingly
employed the techniques as well as the imagery of mass media. Max Ernst
and John Heartfield created collages that appear to “seamlessly” join
numerous images from existing print sources in works intended to be
reproduced and distributed in mass publication format. Robert Rauschenberg
and Andy Warhol used processes like silk-screening to create repetition both
within individual works and within series, adding other dimensions of
meaning. Collage and other forms of appropriation have also become
prevalent in art using film, video and digital media.
While its history cannot be reduced to neat categories, the enormous
range of art that uses existing imagery demonstrates the centrality of this
practice in so many strikingly different movements, from Surrealism to
“photomontage” to Pop Art, just to mention several well-known examples:

10

Max Ernst, from Une semaine de bonté (1934)
Published as a graphic novel

11

John Heartfield, Hurrah, die Butter ist alle! (1935)
Published in the Arbeiter-Illustrierte-Zeitung

12

Eduardo Paolozzi, Dr. Pepper (1948)
Collage on paper; 14 1/8 x 9 3/8"

13

Richard Hamilton, Just what is it that makes today’s
homes so different, so appealing? (1956)
Collage on paper; 10 1/4 x 9 3/4"

14

Robert Rauschenberg, Skyway (1964)
Oil and silkscreen on canvas; 216 x 192"

15

Andy Warhol, Orange Car Crash (1964)
Silkscreen ink and synthetic polymer paint on
two canvases; 105 7/8 x 164 1/8"

16

Martha Rosler, from Bringing the War Home:
House Beautiful (Balloons) (1967-72)
Photomontage; 24 x 20"

17

Romare Bearden, The Calabash (1970)
Collage of mixed media on paper; 8 7/16 x 7 2/8"

18

These examples demonstrate that collage and other appropriation
strategies may communicate a wide array of messages, subject to multiple
and varying interpretations. These works may be understood to address a
particular political agenda, question consumerism, oppose war, investigate
the function of popular media, or explore gender or racial identity – often
simultaneously.
In the late 1970’s (and with precursors too numerous to detail here)
artists like Richard Prince began using existing imagery to create work
which has itself become highly influential, now commonly (though loosely)
known as “Appropriation Art.” See Marvin Heiferman, Lisa Phillips and
John G. Hanhardt, Image World: Art and Media Culture (1989); Douglas
Eklund, The Pictures Generation, 1974-1984 (2009). As many had done
before, these artists used existing imagery from both “high” art and mass
media, and frequently employed collage techniques. They also carried
forward the readymade strategy, sometimes re-presenting imagery with little
or no visual alteration other than the work’s appearance in an entirely new
cultural frame, creating new meaning precisely by focusing viewers’
attention on the social context of the borrowed imagery.

19

These works have been understood to question the status of
authorship, originality and authenticity in our culture. Whether their
meaning is apparent to all or not, their place in art history is well established.

Sherrie Levine, After Walker Evans (1981)
Gelatin silver print; image 10 x 8"

20

Richard Prince, Untitled (cowboy) (1989)
Ektacolor photograph; 50 x 70"

In still more recent years, artists have continued to appropriate
imagery, often to ends that may not be immediately discernible to every
viewer. That does not make these works any less meaningful to the
significant audiences that do apprehend their new meanings, any more than a
particular viewer’s failure to understand Goya or Manet meant those artists
had nothing to express.

21

Jeff Koons, Niagara (2000)
Oil on canvas; 120 x 168"
Prince’s work, and his use of Cariou’s photographs, must be evaluated
with this long and living tradition in mind. See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d
244, 251 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he determination of fair use is an open-ended
and context-sensitive inquiry.”). A fair use standard that threatens an artist’s
freedom to use existing images imperils this tradition and the important
forms of artistic expression it embodies.

22

II.

The District Court Applied An Inappropriately Narrow
Fair Use Standard That Provides Insufficient Protection
For Public Speech And Expression Interests.
The fair use standard employed by the district court poses exactly that

threat. It is not only wrong as a matter of controlling law, but undermines the
shared goals of copyright and the First Amendment by calling into question
established modes of artistic expression and chilling future creativity.
A.

Fair Use Is A Critical First Amendment Safeguard
That Provides Breathing Room For Artistic
Expression.

Copyright’s ultimate goal is to benefit society by stimulating
creativity and assuring wide access to its products. See Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); Twentieth Century
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8
(empowering Congress to grant authors exclusive rights in their works “to
promote the Progress of Science”). It advances that goal by granting authors
a specific set of exclusive rights in their original works. See id. Those
exclusive rights provide economic incentives to create new works, but they
also restrict a wide array of speech and expression. See Campbell v. AcuffRose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575-76 (1994) (need to protect authors
while allowing others to build on their work is an “inherent tension” as old
as the Statute of Anne).

23

Without appropriate limitations, the exclusive rights and restrictions
copyright creates have the potential to impede, not advance, creativity.
Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105,
1108-09 (1990). That is because creativity and free expression do not occur
in a vacuum; they build on the past. “[A]ll intellectual creative activity is in
part derivative. There is no such thing as a wholly original thought or
invention. Each advance stands on building blocks fashioned by prior
thinkers.” Id. at 1109. The process of referencing, borrowing from and
transforming existing works is essential to expressive and creative activity
because “[i]n truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be,
few, if any, things, which in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original
throughout.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575 (quoting Emerson v. Davies, 8 F.
Cas. 615, 619 (No. 4,436) (CCD Mass. 1845)).
The capacity of people to participate in culture and express
themselves resides squarely in their ability to reference, change, modify,
dissect and criticize existing expression. See Neil W. Netanel, Copyright’s
Paradox 43 (2008). For that reason, copyright law must be construed to
support the First Amendment’s core values of freedom of speech and
expression.

24

The fair use doctrine is the primary mechanism that balances the
tension between copyright protection and creative expression. It is a critical
“First Amendment safeguard” that helps ensure “copyright’s limited
monopolies [will remain] compatible with free speech principles,” Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-20 (2003), by providing “breathing space” for
new expression that incorporates existing works. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at
579.
Breathing space is especially important in the First Amendment
context because uncertainty chills speech. That is the reason the First
Amendment demands an actual malice rule. See New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). It is also the reason excessively
vague regulations of speech are invalid. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs.
Ass’n, 131 S.Ct. 2729, 2743 (2011) (“Vague laws force potential speakers to
‘steer far wider of the unlawful zone’ ... than if the boundaries of the
forbidden areas were clearly marked.”).
While fair use may be an “equitable rule of reason,” Sony, 464 U.S. at
448, it is a rule of reason that marks the boundary between lawful and
unlawful speech. Like other First Amendment doctrines, fair use should be
interpreted to minimize uncertainties that may chill expressive speech and
artistic creativity.

25

B.

The Court Should Apply The Fair Use Standard With
Its First Amendment Function In Mind.

A proper fair use analysis must account for its First Amendment
function. The standard applied by the district court in this case ignored that
function, as well as the controlling law. The Court should take this
opportunity to assure the necessary breathing room for the expressive,
artistic use of visual images in paintings and other mediums by clarifying the
manner in which a court should assess the first and fourth factors.
1.

A Wide Array Of Transformative Meaning
Should Be Recognized In The Expressive Use
Of Existing Images In Visual Art.

The first fair use factor is the purpose and character of the defendant’s
use, with special emphasis on whether the use is transformative. See
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-579; 17 U.S.C. § 107. The district court
committed two important errors in its first factor analysis. First, it held that
“Prince’s [p]aintings are transformative only to the extent they comment on”
Cariou’s photographs. SPA-18. Second, it assessed the meaning of Prince’s
work based entirely on Prince’s testimony, not the reasonable perceptions of
the viewer. SPA-18-20. Both aspects of the Court’s analysis are contrary to
controlling law, and narrow the fair use analysis in ways that undermine its
First Amendment function.

26

In Campbell, the Supreme Court drew a critical distinction between
superseding and transformative uses. 510 U.S. at 578-79. It recognized
works that add new meaning and expression tend to promote copyright’s
speech-enhancing purpose. Id. While Campbell involved parody, it did not
hold or even suggest that transformativeness is limited to new works that
parody the original or comment on it directly. It recognized that parody was
but one example of a new work that provided “social benefit.” Id. at 579. In
that case, the benefit was shedding new light on the subject of the parody by
criticizing it. See id. at 580. There is, of course, a wide array of other uses
that provide similarly substantial social benefits without criticizing or
commenting on the original work. See Google Br. at 4-17.
This Court has expressly “disagree[d]” with the suggestion that
“comment or criticism” is required to show transformative use. Bill Graham
Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 609 (2006). That
conclusion is plainly correct under Campbell, because commentary is not the
only “new expression, meaning, or message” a new work might deliver, and
commentary is not the only way a second work may “add[] value to the
original.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579; See also Blanch, 467 F.3d at 251. Nor
is physical alteration required. See Bill Graham, 448 F.3d at 610-11 (use of
unaltered concert posters found transformative). Accordingly, it was not

27

even necessary that appropriated images be collaged, as many were in this
case, in order to be transformative. All that is required is a meaning,
message or purpose that is “separate and distinct” from the original. Id. at
610; see Blanch, 467 F.3d at 252. This requirement is met where an artist
uses an image as “fodder” for social commentary, or “raw material” with
which to pursue “distinct creative or communicative objectives.” Blanch,
467 F.3d at 253.
Prince passes that test easily. Cariou’s objective was “classical …
portraiture.” A-1550 at 187:8-15. His photographs of Rastafarians appear to
celebrate the Rastafarians by depicting them respectfully in their actual
environment:

28

See A-Ex. 2.
Whatever Prince’s purpose was, it was not that. Prince uses elements
of Cariou’s utopian images to depict a post-apocalyptic world that exists
only in Prince’s imagination. See A-747 at ¶ 16; A-750 at ¶ 22. He has
transported the Rastafarians to a foreign realm that is distinctly unlike the
one depicted in Cariou’s photographs. Prince turns the Rastafarians
themselves into something unnatural using double imagery and garish overpainting, and surrounds them with an array of nude women in highly
sexualized and conventionalized poses that invoke still other realms ranging
from the canon of modernism (with references to Picasso and DeKooning) to

29

amateur erotica, and pornography. See A-751 at ¶ 27. Cariou’s photographs
suggest an Eden of natural purity. Prince has debauched it. The contrast in
expression could hardly be more striking:

Richard Prince, Naked Confessions (2008), at A-259
Collage, inkjet, and acrylic on canvas; 45 1/4 x 46"

30

Richard Prince, The Other Side of the Island (2008), at A-260
Acrylic, collage, oil crayon, charcoal, and inkjet on canvas; 82 x 132"

That the precise meaning of Prince’s works may not be immediately
clear to all does not mean his work is not transformative. See Campbell, 510
U.S. at 582-83 (“novelty” can make new works “repulsive until the public
[has] learned the new language in which the[] author spoke”). However that
meaning is defined, Prince’s message and creative objective are plainly
different than Cariou’s.
The district court found Prince’s work was not transformative based
entirely on Prince’s apparent inability to verbalize the meaning of it to the
court’s satisfaction, and the court’s own conclusions about Prince’s

31

subjective intent. See SPA-17-20. But transformative meaning must be
assessed first and foremost by observation of the work itself, and whether
new meaning and expression may be reasonably perceived from it. See
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 582-83. In Campbell, the Court did not demand
testimony from 2 Live Crew, or speculate about their subjective intentions. It
concluded that elements of parody could reasonably be perceived from the
work itself, and that was enough to establish its new meaning and
expression. See id.
There is a good reason for that. Ultimately, the meaning of art is
defined by the viewer, not a judge, or even the artist himself. A viewer’s
reaction to a work of art is shaped by the viewer’s personality, emotions,
values, experience and knowledge. So while it is plainly dangerous for those
trained in the law to judge the worth or meaning of art, see Campbell, 510
U.S. at 582-83, it is equally dangerous to pretend the meaning of art can be
defined solely by the intention of the artist herself, much less her ability to
articulate that intention to the satisfaction of judges and lawyers. See
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 476 (2009) (recognizing “it
frequently is not possible to identify a single ‘message’ that is conveyed” by
a government monument, and the sentiments it expresses “may be quite
different from those of . . . its creator”); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay Lesbian &

32

Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) (“a narrow, succinctly
articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection” for
expressive speech).
That is not to say the testimony of the artist is irrelevant. If, as in
Blanch, the artist can explain the intended meaning of his work and how it
differs from the work he borrowed, that testimony may be quite informative.
But the failure to provide an explanation as polished as the one Jeff Koons
provided in Blanch cannot be fatal. If it were, then every artist who works
within this tradition will be forced to concoct a narrative that appeals to legal
sensibilities, and the law will succeed in protecting only those artists who are
scripted by counsel.
Other rules that protect First Amendment interests do not ask the
speaker to demonstrate the value of her speech, or require her to persuade a
judge of its worth. Neither does copyright. See Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (Holmes, J.) (“It may be more
than doubted, for instance, whether the etchings of Goya or the paintings of
Manet would have been sure of protection when seen for the first time.”).
The long tradition of appropriating existing images in the context of collage
and other expressive practices described in Section I clearly demonstrates
the important new meaning and expression these uses deliver. The Court

33

should recognize that the use of existing images in visual art may convey a
wide array of transformative meaning that goes far beyond direct
commentary on the original and is not limited by the expressed intentions of
the artist.
2.

Courts Should Be Cautious In Recognizing A
Right To Control Markets For Expressive,
Artistic Uses Like Prince’s.

The fourth factor is “the effect of the use upon the potential market for
or value of the copyrighted work.” 17 U.S.C. § 107(4). Analysis of it
“requires a balancing of the benefit the public will derive if the use is
permitted” versus “the personal gain the copyright owner will receive if the
use is denied.” Bill Graham, 448 F.3d at 613; see Wright v. Warner Books,
Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 739 (2d Cir. 1991).
a.

Substantial Public Benefit

The public benefits of permitting uses like Prince’s are obvious and
well-established, yet the district court ignored them entirely. The public has
a strong and substantial interest in encouraging the production of expressive
works of art, and in receiving the benefits of artistic expression. See Salinger
v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 82 (2010) (“The public’s interest in free expression
. . . is significant and is distinct from the parties’ speech interests.”). The
public’s First Amendment interest in access to expressive works is rooted in

34

the “public’s interest in receiving information” and the need to preserve the
free and open exchange of ideas. Id. (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub.
Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)); see, e.g., Red Lion Broad. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (recognizing “the right of the public to
receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas”);
Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1479 (9th Cir. 1988) (recognizing the
public interest in seeing a feature film), aff’d on other grounds sub nom.
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990); Trust Co. Bank v. Putnam Publ’g
Group, Inc., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1874, 1877 (C.D. Cal 1988) (recognizing the
“strong public interest favoring the publication of books and novels”).
b.

No Cognizable Harm

The district court concluded the fourth factor weighed against Prince
because his use (1) damaged the market for Cariou’s photographs, and (2)
denied Cariou revenue from derivative uses in new works of art like
Prince’s. See SPA-28-30. The first conclusion is wrong because Cariou
admitted he took his photographs to publish them in a book, and to the
extent he has ever sold them individually it was only sporadically to
acquaintances in private. See A-583 at 157:4-158:11; A-607-08; A-858 at ¶
136; A-1525-26 at 88:11-89:20. There is no evidence Cariou lost a single
sale of his work, or that the value of it diminished in any way. See id. The

35

real impact of Prince’s use has been to make more people aware of Cariou’s
work as result of Cariou’s lawsuit.
This is not a case involving the reproduction of copyrighted images in
retail goods (such as totebags and keychains), or in the promotion of other
products or services. Those uses could present very different questions of
market harm, especially where a defendant’s goods are plausible substitutes
for the plaintiff’s work, or a defendant uses the copyrighted work to
advertise, sell or promote goods or services. The use of an image in these
contexts might also implicate trademark or copyright protection, or publicity
rights. None of those concerns is present here, where Prince’s use was
confined to his art. In short, what was true in Blanch v. Koons is true here:
[Prince’s] use of [Cariou’s] photograph[s] did not cause any
harm to [his] career or upset any plans [he] had for [the Yes,
Rasta photographs] or any other photograph, and . . . the value
of [Cariou’s photographs] did not decrease as the result of
[Prince’s] alleged infringement.
Blanch, 467 F.3d at 258.
The Court’s conclusion about harm to derivative markets is equally
flawed, because it assumes that harm to all derivative markets is protectable.
The Supreme Court recognized, for instance, that “there is no protectable
derivative market for criticism.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592. That market is
not reserved to copyright owners because they would be expected to censor

36

a substantial part of that speech market. See id. Similarly, this Court has
recognized that the market for transformative uses is not reserved to
copyright owners. See Bill Graham, 448 F.3d at 615 (“Copyright owners
may not preempt exploitation of transformative markets” by charging
licenses for what would otherwise be fair use). That principle is especially
important here, because reserving to copyright owners like Cariou the
market for expressive artistic uses of visual images in mediums like collage
presents the same censorship problem. It enables copyright owners to
prevent the expressive use of their images in new works of art they happen
not to like. There is every reason to believe that concern is relevant here,
where Prince has debased the images of the Rastafarians that Cariou
represented as pure, noble and idyllic. See Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain
Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 805 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding it unlikely that Mattel
would ever license denigrating pictures of the Barbie doll).
In addition, recognizing a market for expressive artistic uses of visual
images in mediums like collage would often impose substantial costs on the
creation of original artistic expression. In many situations, artists who wish
to use existing imagery to work in the medium of collage would need to
consult a lawyer, and often obtain a license. While commercially successful
artists like Prince may be able to bear that expense, many others would not.

37

The total magnitude of these costs overwhelm any marginal impact that
recognizing this licensing market might have on the incentive to create
anything new. The possibility that a visual artist might one day license a
given photograph (or other visual image) for use in a painting, collage or
other expressive work of art is simply too remote to have a substantial
impact on the decision of whether to create new photographs (or other visual
images) or not.
Artists should not need to hire lawyers to make art. If copyright
owners “may not preempt exploitation of transformative markets,” Bill
Graham, 448 F.3d at 615, they certainly should not be allowed to claim the
market for expressive, artistic uses of visual images. If they are, it will result
in substantial expressive harm without providing any corresponding increase
in economic incentives to create new works.
C.

Injunctions Against Expressive Artistic Uses Should
Be Granted Only Upon A Clear Showing Of Specific
And Substantial Irreparable Harm Sufficient To
Outweigh Public Speech And Expression Interests.

A permanent injunction may not be granted automatically upon a
finding of infringement. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S
388, 392-93 (2006); New York Times Co, Inc. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 505
(2001) (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578 n.10). In order to obtain one, it is
the plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate:
38

(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies
available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to
compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in
equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be
disserved by a permanent injunction.
eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. In deciding whether to grant or deny an injunction,
the court must consider each of these factors. See id. Here, the district court
failed to consider any of these factors, so its injunction must be vacated. See
id. at 394; Salinger, 607 F.3d at 79-80.
Where a court is asked to issue an injunction against an artistic
expressive use like this one, the speech and expression interests of the public
and the artist are especially compelling, and it is especially important to
demand clear evidence of specific irreparable harm sufficient to overcome
these interests. The Court should therefore clarify the appropriate injunction
standard to be applied on remand.
1.

The District Court’s Injunction Analysis
Ignored Important Public Speech Interests.

There are profound First Amendment interests involved when a court
is asked to enjoin the distribution or display of expressive or creative works.
See, e.g., Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., Inc., 445 U.S. 308, 315-16
(1980); see also Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485
(1984); Metro. Opera Ass’n, Inc. v. Local 100, 239 F.3d 172, 176 (2d Cir.

39

2001). Those interests are not limited to the author or speaker. See Salinger,
607 F.3d at 82. The public itself has an important First Amendment interest
in access to expressive works. See id. (citing Pac. Gas & Elec., 475 U.S. at
8); Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390; Abend, 863 F.2d at 1479 (recognizing the
public interest in seeing a feature film); p. 34, above. That interest is rooted
in the fundamental public interest in the free and open exchange of ideas and
information. See, e.g., Associated Press v. U.S., 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945);
Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938).
The public’s interest in access to expressive works is not diminished
where a copyright has been asserted. Where a defendant’s work contains
additional expression, there is still a “strong public interest in the publication
of [that] work.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578 n.10; accord Rosemont Enters.,
Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966) (reversing
preliminary injunction against biography of Howard Hughes and
recognizing copyright injunctions pose the same dangers as other restraints
on speech); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1276
(11th Cir. 2001) (reversing preliminary injunction against publication of The
Wind Done Gone and recognizing public interest in access to expressive
works).

40

That remains true even where the defendant’s work is found to
infringe. See Abend, 863 F.2d at 1479 (“injunction [against an infringing
derivative work] could cause public injury by denying the public the
opportunity to view a classic film”); 3 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Nimmer
on Copyright §14.06[B] (2001) (“The interest in dissemination of an
infringing work may justify a confinement of the remedy to a money
recovery.”).
Infringing or not, the Prince’s Canal Zone paintings are expressive
and creative. Cariou’s photographs fed Prince’s imagination, and Prince
used those photographs to help construct his vision of an “artificial reality”
and explore themes of sexual equality – or what he called “the three
relationships in the world, which are men and women, men and men, and
women and women.” A-1244 at 283:21-284:2; A-1258 at 337:23-338:9;
SPA-18. Whether Prince was effective in exploring these themes or not, the
public has an important First Amendment interest in receiving the
expression and imagination contained in Prince’s work. See Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (“[W]holly neutral futilities come under
the protection of free speech as fully as do Keats’ poems or Donne’s
sermons.”) (internal quotations omitted); see also Campbell, 510 U.S. at

41

582. This public interest must be an important factor in the injunction
analysis.
2.

The District Court’s Injunction Analysis
Ignored Prince’s Speech Interests, His
Economic Interests And His Statutory Rights.

Personal expression is a core speech right. See, e.g., Cohen, 403 U.S.
at 25. The fact Prince chose to express himself in a visual medium does not
diminish his speech and expression interests. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569
(recognizing the paintings of Jackson Pollock are “unquestionably shielded”
by the First Amendment because “the Constitution looks beyond written or
spoken words as mediums of expression”). The fact that the meaning or
message of Prince’s work may be difficult to discern does not diminish his
expressive interest, either. See id. at 569-70 (“a narrow, succinctly
articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection”). Nor
does the fact Prince chose to express himself in part by using elements of
Cariou’s photographs: “First Amendment protection [does not] require a
speaker to generate, as an original matter, each item featured in the
communication.” Id. at 570; accord New York Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S.
713 (1971) (per curiam) (recognizing newspaper’s First Amendment interest
in publishing work authored by government employees).

42

What is at stake here is Prince’s right to share his imagination, and to
express the visions that Cariou’s photographs helped create in Prince’s mind.
The freedom to imagine, and to express what is imagined, is critical to art
and free expression itself. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination:
Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 38 (2002) (it is the freedom
to imagine – “to conceive as far as one is able how the world might be, or
might have been, or could never be” – that best explains the reason the First
Amendment protects high art as well as low). While that freedom may or
may not outweigh the competing interests of the copyright owner, it must
also be an important part of the injunction analysis.
In addition to ignoring Prince’s First Amendment interests, the district
court ignored Prince’s economic interests. The combined value of his thirty
paintings currently totals millions of dollars. See A-1254-55 at 323:8325:10. There can be little dispute that a substantial, if not overwhelming,
portion of that value is due to the creativity and expression Prince added and
his artistic reputation. By forcing Prince to forfeit his works in their entirety,
or turn them over to Cariou, the district court’s injunction delivers to Cariou
the entire value of Prince’s work – an economic windfall that goes well
beyond the monetary remedies authorized by the Copyright Act. See 17
U.S.C. § 504 (limiting monetary remedies to statutory damages, or actual

43

damages and “any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the
infringement”) (emphasis added). By subjecting Prince’s work to
destruction, the injunction also violates Prince’s statutory right to prevent the
destruction of his work. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (author of work of
visual art shall have the right “to prevent any destruction of a work of
recognized stature”).
Here, Cariou provides no evidence of any hardship comparable to
Prince’s. Cariou’s speech rights are unaffected, because he spoke freely
when he created and published his photographs, and he remains free to
publish, show, sell and distribute them.2 There is no evidence that one
gallery’s temporary reluctance to show his work caused the loss of a single
sale. Nor is there any evidence that Prince’s paintings diminished the value
of Cariou’s photographs, or interfered with sales of Cariou’s book. (Pp. 3536, above.) In the absence of an injunction, Cariou will not suffer any
discernable or specific harm. Yet under the present injunction, Prince suffers
profound First Amendment harm and forfeits millions of dollars to which

2

A plaintiff who has not yet published a work may have an interest in
not speaking. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 559 (1985); see Salinger, 607 F.3d at 81. That interest is not present
here because Cariou chose to speak when he published his work.
44

Cariou has no legal claim. The balance of hardships therefore tilts strongly
against an injunction.
3.

Only A Clear Showing Of Specific And
Substantial Irreparable Harm Should Be
Sufficient To Overcome The Important Public
And Private Speech Interests An Injunction
Would Impair Here.

In order to obtain a permanent injunction, a plaintiff must show that
he has suffered an irreparable injury and that legal remedies such as money
damages are not adequate to compensate for that injury. See eBay, 574 U.S.
at 391; Salinger, 607 F.3d at 78, 80. In other words, a plaintiff seeking
injunctive relief in a copyright case must demonstrate irreparable injury, not
simply “presume” it. See id.; Richard Dannay, Copyright Injunctions And
Fair Use, 55 J. COPY. SOC’Y 449, 460 (2008).
Some courts have suggested the fact a defendant will continue to
infringe absent a permanent injunction is by itself sufficient to show
irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal remedies. See, e.g., Lauratex
Textile Corp. v. Allton Knitting Mills Inc., 519 F. Supp. 730, 732 (S.D.N.Y.
1981). That is plainly improper, because it means irreparable harm follows
automatically from infringement, which is precisely the presumption that
controlling law prohibits. See eBay, 547 U.S at 392; Tasini, 533 U.S. at 505
(citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578 n.10); Salinger, 607 F.3d at 78, 80.

45

Irreparable harm may exist where a defendant seeks to “scoop” the
copyright owner by publishing a close substitute for the plaintiff’s work
prior to first publication. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 569; HarperCollins
Publishers, L.L.C. v. Gawker Media LLC, 721 F. Supp. 2d 303, 307
(S.D.N.Y. 2010). It may also exist where a defendant continues to
manufacture works that are ready substitutes in function and appearance to
plaintiff’s work. See Salinger, 607 F.3d at 81. Neither harm exists here
because Cariou published his work long ago and there is no evidence that
Prince’s one-of-a-kind art works selling for hundreds of thousands of dollars
are plausible substitutes for Cariou’s photographs or his book.
Here, the only plausible harm to Cariou the district court identified
was the temporary inability to show his work at one gallery – which appears
to have been Cariou’s choice in any event (A-1528-29 at 100:20 to 104:6; A1608 at 123:9-25) and lost revenue from selling or licensing his
photographs. Yet an injunction could not force any gallery to show Cariou’s
work. As for lost sales or licensing revenue, Cariou has not proved any, or
explained why money damages would be insufficient to compensate him for
lost revenue. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 391 (“A plaintiff [seeking a permanent
injunction] must demonstrate . . . that remedies available at law, such as
monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury”). Insofar as

46

Cariou simply does not like Prince’s paintings, that is precisely the
censorship problem that highlights the important speech rights at stake here.
Where a court is asked to enjoin an expressive artistic use like this
one, a plaintiff should be required to make a clear showing of specific
irreparable harm that cannot be cured by money damages and is substantial
enough to overcome the important public and private speech interest the
permanent injunction would impair. Even where such an injunction is
appropriate, these speech and expression interests should inform its scope. It
should be narrowly tailored and should not impose any greater burdens on
speech and expression rights than those necessary to address the specific,
irreparable harm a plaintiff demonstrates. Here, the supposed harm that
Cariou would suffer absent an injunction is neither concrete nor irreparable,
and does not outweigh the important speech interests this injunction
destroys. It certainly does not justify the sweeping injunction the district
court issued, much less the destruction of thirty paintings by a renowned
artist.

47

III.

CONCLUSION
The Court should reverse the district court’s summary judgment in

favor of Cariou and vacate the injunction.
DATED: November 2, 2011

/s/ Anthony T. Falzone
Anthony T. Falzone
Julie A. Ahrens
Daniel K. Nazer
Stanford Law School
Center for Internet and Society
559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305
[phone]
Virginia Rutledge
414 W. 145th Street
New York, NY 10031
[phone]
Zachary J. Alinder
John A. Polito
Bingham McCutchen LLP
Three Embarcadero Center
San Francisco, CA 94111
[phone]
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
The Andy Warhol Foundation
for the Visual Arts, Inc.

48

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(7)(C), I certify
that this brief complies with the typeface requirements of Rule 32(a)(5)(A),
because it is written in 14-pt Times New Roman font, and with the typevolume limitations of Rule 32(a)(7)(B), because it contains 6986 words,
excluding the portions excluded under Rule 32(a)(7)(A)(iii). This count is
based on the word-count feature of Microsoft Word.
DATED: November 2, 2011

/s/ Anthony T. Falzone
Anthony T. Falzone
Julie A. Ahrens
Daniel K. Nazer
Stanford Law School
Center for Internet and Society
559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305
[phone]
Virginia Rutledge
414 W. 145th Street
New York, NY 10031
[phone]
Zachary J. Alinder
John A. Polito
Bingham McCutchen LLP
Three Embarcadero Center
San Francisco, CA 94111
[phone]
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
The Andy Warhol Foundation
for the Visual Arts, Inc.

49