Floyd v. City of New York
Filing
108
MOTION, to modify the stay order, on behalf of Appellant City of New York in 13-3088, 13-3524, FILED. Service date 11/09/2013 by CM/ECF. [1088562] [13-3088, 13-3461, 13-3524]--[Edited 11/12/2013 by JW]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
MOTION INFORMATION STATEMENT
Caption [use short title]
Docket Number(s):
Motion for:
13-3088 (L)
David Floyd, et al.,
Modification of the Stay Order dated Oct. 31, 2013 To
The Extent of Vacating the District Court’s Orders
Dated Aug. 12, 2013
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
-againstCity of New York
Set forth below precise, complete statement of relief sought:
Defendant-Appellant.
A modification of this Court’s stay order dated Oct. 31, 2013 to the
extent of vacating the District Court’s Orders dated Aug. 12, 2013.
MOVING PARTY:
City of New York et al.
Plaintiff
Defendant
Appellant/Petitioner
Appellee/Respondent
MOVING ATTORNEY:
Michael A. Cardozo,
Corporation Counsel, City of N.Y.
[name of attorney, with firm, address, phone number, and email]
New York City Law Department
Office of the Corporation Counsel
100 Church St.
New York, NY 10007
Darius Charney
666 Broadway
7th Floor
New York, NY 10012
212-614-6464
DCharney@ccrjustice.org
By: Michael A. Cardozo
212-356-2300
ckoeleve@law.nyc.gov
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Scheindlin, D.J.)
FOR EMERGENCY MOTIONS, MOTIONS FOR STAYS:
AND INJUNCTIONS PENDING APPEAL:
Has movant notified opposing counsel (required by Local Rule 27.1):
Yes
No
A. been sought?
B. been obtained
Yes
No
this Court?
Yes
No
Yes
No
If yes, enter date
Yes
No
Yes
No
Requested returned date and explanation of emergency:
[At the Court’s discretion]
(request for oral argument will not necessarily be granted)
Has argument date of appeal been set:
Has request for relief been made below?
Has this relief been previously sought in
Plaintiffs plan to submit an opposition.
Is oral argument requested?
Plaintiffs-Appellees
OPPOSING ATTORNEY:
[name of attorney, with firm, address, phone number, and email]
Court-Judge/Agency appealed from:
Please check appropriate boxes:
OPPOSING PARTY:
David Floyd, et al.
Requested motion schedule:
Opposition due: November 13, 2013.
Reply due: November 15, 2013.
Appellants request the schedule to coincide with the en banc
motions filed by plaintiffs and the Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin.
Signature of Moving Attorney:
Date: 11/08/2013
Has service been effected?
Yes
No
[Attach proof of service] via ECF
ORDER
Leave this space blank.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is:
granted
denied.
FOR THE COURT:
CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, Clerk
Date:
Form T-1080
By:
(Revised 12/12/01)
RULES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 2ND CIRCUIT
supplementing
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
INSTRUCTIONS
INTERIM LOCAL RULE 27.
(a) Form of Motion and Supporting Papers for Motion and Opposition Statement.
1.
Form of Motion. A motion must be in writing, unless the court otherwise directs, and must conform to
paragraphs (A) through (C) below.
(A)
The front page of the motion must follow the form of the Motion Information Statement approved
by the Court (T-1080 revised as of 12/12/01 and printed on the reverse side) and contain all
information required by the form.
(B)
The body of the motion, following the Motion Information Statement, must set forth the
information and legal argument necessary to support the motion, and, if emergency relief is sought,
an explanation of the emergency.
(C)
Formal requirements.
(i)
8-½ x 11 inch paper;
(ii)
Text double spaced, except for quotations, headings and footnotes;
(iii)
Margins of one inch on all sides;
(iv)
Pages sequentially numbered (page numbers may be placed in the margins);
(v)
Bound or stapled in a secure manner that does not obscure text;
(vi)
Length: no more than 20 pages, not including attachments and the Motion Information
Statement;
(vii)
Number of copies: original plus four copies;
(viii)
Required attachments to motion:
a.
b.
An affidavit (containing only statements of fact, not legal argument);
If the motion seeks substantive relief, a copy of lower court opinion or agency
decision;
Any exhibits necessary to determine the motion;
Affidavit of service.
c.
d.
2.
Non-Compliance Sanctions. If the moving party has not complied with this rule, the motion may be
dismissed by the clerk without prejudice to renew upon proper papers. If application is promptly made, the
action of the clerk may be reviewed by a single judge. The court may impose costs and an appropriate fine
against either party for failure to comply with this rule.
MOTION INFORMATION FORM
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Floyd v. City of New York
DOCKET NO. 13-3088
Michael A. Cardozo
Attorney for Defendants-Appellants
Office & Post Office Address & Telephone Number:
Form T-1080
(Revised 12/12/01)
New York City Law Department
Office of the Corporation Counsel
100 Church St., New York, NY 10007
212-356-2300
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
––––––––––––––––––––––––––– X
DAVID FLOYD, et. al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
Docket No. 13-3088(L)
DECLARATION
SUPPORT
-against-
IN
THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
Defendant-Appellant.
––––––––––––––––––––––––––– X
MICHAEL A. CARDOZO, declares under penalty of perjury, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1746, that the following is true and correct:
1.
I am the Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, attorney for
defendants-appellant the City of New York (“the City”), in the above-captioned
appeal.
2.
This declaration, the annexed memorandum of law, and the exhibits
annexed hereto are submitted in support of the City’s motion for an order
modifying the stay order dated October 31, 2013 to the extent of vacating the
District Court’s Remedies Order dated August 12, 2013, and its Liability Order
dated August 12, 2013.
3.
For all the reasons set forth herein, an expeditious resolution of this
application will serve the public interest.
The City respectfully proposes the
following schedule: plaintiffs to respond by November 13, 2013; and the City’s
reply to be submitted by November 15, 2013.
4.
Annexed hereto as Exhibit A is the District Court’s Remedial Order in
Floyd v. City of New York and Ligon v. City of New York, entered August 12, 2013.
5.
Annexed hereto as Exhibit B is the District Court’s decision and order
in Floyd v. City of New York, entered August 12, 2013, finding that the City had a
pattern and practice of violating the plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights.
6.
Annexed hereto as Exhibit C is the District Court’s decision and order
in Ligon v. City of New York, entered February 14, 2013, finding that plaintiffs
were entitled to a preliminary injunction based on their allegations that the City
had a pattern and practice of violating the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights.
7.
Annexed hereto as Exhibit D is the Second Circuit’s decision in Floyd
v. City of New York and Ligon v. City of New York, entered October 31, 2013,
granting the City’s motion for a stay pending appeal.
8.
Annexed hereto as Exhibit E are relevant excerpts of the transcripts of
the trial held in Floyd v. City of New York, between March 28, 2013 and May 20,
2013.
9.
Annexed hereto as Exhibit F are relevant excerpts of the transcripts of
the preliminary injunction hearing held in Ligon v. City of New York, between
October 15, 2012 and November 7, 2012.
10.
Annexed hereto as Exhibit G is the District Court’s order in Ligon v.
City of New York, dated November 26, 2012.
-2-
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, the Court should grant the relief
requested.
______________________________
MICHAEL A. CARDOZO
-3-
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
––––––––––––––––––––––––––– X
DAVID FLOYD, et. al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
Docket No. 13-3088(L)
-againstTHE CITY OF NEW YORK,
MEMORANDUM
SUPPORT
IN
Defendant-Appellant.
––––––––––––––––––––––––––– X
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
By Corrected Mandate dated October 31, 2013, annexed hereto as Exhibit D,
this Court ordered the Floyd and Ligon cases assigned to a new district judge “in
the interest, and appearance, of fair and impartial administration of justice,” citing
(1) the District Judge’s “improper application of the Court’s ‘related case rule’” in
accepting Floyd as related to Daniels, after inviting the Floyd plaintiffs to mark
Floyd as related to Daniels, and (2) the District Judge’s participation in “a series of
media interviews and public statements purporting to respond publicly to criticism
of the District Court.” That same “interest, and appearance, of fair and impartial
administration of justice” leads defendant-appellant City of New York to move to
vacate the District Court’s orders in Floyd and Ligon, which continue unfairly and
improperly to cloud the public’s perception of the NYPD.
The violations of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges identified by
the Court permeate, and indeed predate, these proceedings. Factual findings and
evidentiary rulings have been made, and novel legal theories propounded in the
Orders, annexed hereto as Exhibits A, B, and C, by a District Judge whose public
remarks may reasonably be interpreted as demonstrating partiality against the City.
The firestorm surrounding this Court’s Corrected Mandate – including the District
Judge’s own recent responsive public comments – confirm that the Orders should
be vacated, just as the partiality of the District Judge who made those rulings is
being reasonably questioned.
THE CORRECTED MANDATE
The Corrected Mandate directs all applications regarding its scope directly
to the Panel (Exh. D, at 3):
In the interest of judicial economy, any question, application, or
further appeal regarding the scope of this Order or its implementation shall
be directed to this panel, which will hear the case on the merits in due
course.
After staying the proceedings in the District Court and setting a briefing
schedule for the merits appeal, the Corrected Mandate made specific findings of
judicial misconduct before ordering the district court reassignment “in the interest,
and appearance of fair and impartial administration of justice” (Exh. D, at 2-3):
The case is REMANDED to the District Court for the sole purpose of
implementation of this Order, and the mandate shall otherwise remain with
this Court until completion of the appeals process.
-2-
Upon review of the record in these cases, we conclude that the District
Judge ran afoul of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, Canon 2
(“A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
activities.”); see also Canon 3(C)(1) (“A judge shall disqualify himself or
herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be
questioned ….”), and that the appearance of impartiality surrounding this
litigation was compromised by the District Judge’s improper application of
the Court’s “related case rule,” see Transfer of Related Cases, S.D.N.Y. &
E.D.N.Y. Local Rule 13(a) [footnote omitted], and by a series of media
interviews and public statements to respond publicly to criticism of the
District Court.
ARGUMENT
“Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify
himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.” 28 U.S.C. §455(a). Beyond disqualification of the district judge,
violation of 28 U.S.C. §455 can properly result in relief from a judgment, order or
proceeding. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847
(1988) (reversing denial of vacatur of judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6) for §
455(a) violation).
Preliminarily, while it is clear that a Circuit Court may vacate a judgment on
appeal of a district court’s denial of a Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion, Appellant
recognizes that the instant application does not follow this procedure. However,
Appellant respectfully reads the Corrected Mandate’s direction to address to this
Panel all applications regarding its the scope and implementation to encompass the
instant application for vacatur.
-3-
THE DISTRICT COURT'S COMPROMISE OF THE APPEARANCE OF
IMPARTIALITY WARRANTS VACATUR OF ITS ORDERS
The very nature of the judicial misconduct found by this Court in the District
Court’s acceptance of Floyd outside of the random assignment system has
necessarily created a situation where the District Court’s impartiality throughout
the litigation might reasonably be questioned, at a minimum.
The Corrected Mandate cites three grounds for the District Judge’s removal
stemming from the District Court’s improper application of the related case rule1:
failure to avoid impropriety in all activities; failure to avoid the appearance of
impropriety in all activities, and acting in a proceeding such that the judge’s
1
The District Judge accepted Floyd as related to Daniels v. City of New York, 99 Civ. 01695
(SAS) (HBP) (S.D.N.Y.), a case that “terminated” on the District Court’s docket in 2005, after
the parties entered into a settlement agreement. Floyd was filed on January 31, 2008, one month
after the December 31, 2007 sunset of that settlement agreement. Local Rule 13 of the Southern
District Rules for the Division of Business Among Judges (formerly Local Rule 15) sets forth the
standard by which cases may be deemed related, and the procedure for doing so. A plain reading
of Section 13(a) of the rule provides that a case may only be deemed related to another pending
case. For example, 13(a)(ii) refers specifically to “efficient and economical conduct of the
litigations.” The rule goes on to state that “the likelihood of a consolidated or joint trial or joint
pre-trial discovery” may be relevant to determining whether two cases should be deemed
related. Moreover, Section 13(c)(ii) directs that “[a] case designated as related shall be
forwarded to the judge before whom the earlier-filed case is then pending...” Recent decisions
involving Local Rule 13 are based on motions to deem a case related to another pending
litigation, not a closed one. See, e.g., Pace v. Quintanilla, 13 Civ. 91 (RJS), 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 139601 at *14-15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2013); Tutor Time Learning Ctrs., LLC v. GKO
Group, Inc., 13 Civ. 2980 (JMF), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148316 at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15,
2013). Further, the Local Civ. R. 1.6(a) for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York,
which imposes responsibilities on attorneys with respect to potentially related cases, refer to
“pending” cases only: “[i]t shall be the continuing duty of each attorney appearing in any civil
or criminal case to bring promptly to the attention of the Court all facts … relevant to a
determination that said case and one or more pending civil or criminal cases should be heard by
the same Judge…” (emphasis added).
-4-
impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Exh. D, at 2; Code of Conduct for
United States Judges, Canons 22 & 3(C)(1). The acts surrounding the improprieties
involved conduct not only at the inception of the Floyd lawsuit but predating it.
See Exh. D at 2 n. 1 (citing the District Court’s sua sponte statement during a prior
litigation no longer pending on the District Court’s docket that she would accept a
new lawsuit as related to that prior litigation). The District Judge’s improper
extrajudicial comments during and after the bench trial confirm that the taint of
partiality, or appearance of a lack of impartiality, carried through the entire Floyd
and Ligon proceedings.
At a minimum, the District Court’s misconduct makes it reasonable to
question the impartiality of the District Court Orders, and at a maximum represents
a violation of Appellant’s Due Process rights to a neutral arbiter and to present a
defense. In either case, the District Court Orders must be vacated.
To determine “whether a judgment should be vacated for a violation of 28
U.S.C. § 455 (a), it is appropriate to consider the risk of injustice to the parties in
the particular case, the risk that the denial of relief will produce injustice in other
cases, and the risk of undermining the public’s confidence in the judicial process.”
Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. at 864.
2
A most significant
2A Commentary to Canon 2: “Actual improprieties under this standard include violations of
law, court rules or other specific provisions of this Code.” The related case rule is a court rule of
the Southern District of New York.
-5-
consideration in these highly publicized cases is that the public confidence in the
judicial process must already be severely undermined by the District Judge’s
wrongful application of the related case rule, now brought to light by the Corrected
Mandate.
The risk of injustice to Appellant if the District Court Orders are allowed to
stand is incomparably acute and unique. The District Court’s Orders lend credence
to the notion that the NYPD unfairly targets minorities for stops and frisks,
undermining its ability to carry out its mission effectively. As this Court has
observed:
The effectiveness of a city’s police department depends importantly
on the respect and trust of the community and on the perception in the
community that it enforces the law fairly, even-handedly, and without
bias. If the police department treats a segment of the population of any
race, religion, gender, national origin, or sexual preference, etc., with
contempt, so that the particular minority comes to regard the police as
oppressor rather than protector, respect for law enforcement is eroded
and the ability of the police to do its work in that community is
impaired. Members of the minority will be less likely to report crimes,
to offer testimony as witnesses, and to rely on the police for their
protection. When the police make arrests in that community, its
members are likely to assume that the arrests are a product of bias,
rather than well-founded, protective law enforcement. And the
department’s ability to recruit and train personnel from that
community will be damaged.
Locurto v. Giuliani, 447 F.3d 159, 178-179 (2d Cir. 2006), quoting Pappas v.
Giuliani, 290 F.3d 143, 147 (2d Cir. 2002). Public perception of the NYPD has
been clouded by the District Court’s condemnatory ruling and the immense
-6-
attention paid to it, compromising confidence in the integrity of law enforcement.
As the Corrected Mandate has now revealed the partiality of all of the Floyd and
Ligon proceedings and the resulting orders, vacatur is appropriate to stem the tide
of diluted trust and confidence in the NYPD that the mere existence of the District
Court Orders fosters, even with the stay currently in effect.
Wrongly labeling the NYPD – and the City – a racial profiling entity and
flouter of the Fourth Amendment should be sufficient injustice to vacate the Orders
now, but add to that the injustice that would be produced by the potential collateral
estoppel effect of the Liability Order on future cases, and the onerous burden on
the taxpayers in following the Remedies Order. It will also send the clear message
to all district court judges to apply the related case rule properly in future cases.3
Moreover, vacating the District Court Orders will send a necessary message
to the bar that “judge-shopping” by exploiting the improper application of the
related case rule will not be countenanced. Following the plaintiffs’ filing of Floyd
as “related” to Daniels, litigants (including Floyd plaintiffs’ counsel on multiple
occasions) repeatedly applied the related case rule in an attempt to funnel
additional cases to Judge Scheindlin. In total, seven subsequent cases were marked
3
On November 8, 2013, counsel on behalf of the District Judge filed in this Court a Request for
Leave to File Motion to Address Order of Disqualification (“District Judge Motion”). Frederick
A. O. Schwartz, Jr. is one of the attorneys who submitted the District Judge Motion. Upon
information and belief, Mr. Schwartz is a trustee of the Vera Institute; the District Judge
appointed Nicholas Turner, President and Director of the Vera Institute, as the Facilitator under
the Remedies Order.
-7-
related to Floyd (or a case related to Floyd); and on five occasions,4 Judge
Scheindlin continued the improper application of the related case rule and accepted
the cases, even when the City objected.5
4
The five cases Judge Scheindlin accepted as “related” to Floyd are: (1) Blair v. City of New
York, 08 Civ. 04303 (alleging a single unlawful stop-and-frisk and demanding that NYPD
records of such stops be sealed), filed May 7, 2008 by Ligon plaintiffs’ counsel, the New York
Civil Liberties Union (Christopher Dunn); (2) Davis, et al. v. City of New York, 10 Civ. 699
(alleging Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations in NYPD trespass enforcement policies
in public housing), filed on January 28, 2010 by NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund,
Inc., The Legal Aid Society, and Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP; (3) Provost v.
City of New York, 10 Civ. 5672 (alleging a single unlawful stop-and-frisk), filed July 26, 2010 by
Floyd plaintiffs’ counsel, Beldock Levine & Hoffman LLP (Jennifer Borchetta and Jonathan C.
Moore); (4) Almonor, et al. v. City of New York, 11 Civ. 4121 (alleging a single unlawful stopand-frisk, along with claims of wrongful arrest and prosecution by other plaintiffs), filed on June
17, 2011 by Floyd plaintiffs’ counsel, Beldock Levine & Hoffman LLP (Jennifer Borchetta and
Jonathan C. Moore) and Law Offices of Joel Rudin; and (5) Ligon, et al. v. City of New York, 12
Civ. 2274 (alleging Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations in NYPD trespass enforcement
policies in privately-owned buildings), filed on March 28, 2012 as related to Davis by the New
York Civil Liberties Union (Christopher Dunn), Shearman & Sterling LLP, The Bronx
Defenders, and LatinoJustice PRLDEF.
Notwithstanding the findings in the Court's Corrected Mandate, Davis remains pending
before Judge Scheindlin because Davis has not yet gone to trial and therefore was not before this
Court on the City's stay motion. On November 4, 2013, the City requested Judge Scheindlin
recuse herself from Davis for the reasons set forth in the Court's Corrected Mandate, but to date
the District Court has not responded to the City's request.
5
On only two occasions did Judge Scheindlin decline to accept as related cases identified as such
by plaintiffs; both occurred after the New York Times questioned how she became assigned to
Floyd. See Joseph Goldstein, A Court Rule Directs Cases Over Friskings to One Judge, N.Y.
Times, May 5, 2013. The first case, Felix v. City of New York, 13 Civ. 2941 (alleging violations
of Fourth Amendment rights in connection with marijuana arrests), filed May 2, 2013 by Emery
Celli Brinckerhoff & Abady, LLP, and marked as related to Floyd during trial, was returned to
the wheel after the City objected, among other reasons, because the related case rule could not
possibly apply to a new case filed while the other case is being tried. Judge Scheindlin did not
return the case to the wheel until May 20, 2013. The other case, Oumou Bah v. City of New York
(challenging NYPD’s treatment of emotionally disturbed persons), filed September 23, 2013 by
Young and Bartlett, LLP, Newman Ferrara LLP, and Sichenzia Ross Friedman Ference, LLP,
was marked related to Floyd following the issuance of the liability and remedial decisions in
Floyd and declined as unrelated on September 30, 2013.
-8-
A.
The Improprieties Cited in the Corrected Mandate Alone Warrant
Vacatur.
The extrajudicial actions by the District Court, which this Court found to
create at least the appearance of impropriety, warrant vacatur of the Orders. It is
rare that adverse rulings and mistreatment of parties’ counsel and witnesses during
a case will warrant vacatur. See In re IBM Corp., 618 F.2d 923, 930-933 (2d Cir.
1980) (“IBM I”) (no extrajudicial bias found); In re IBM Corp., 45 F.3d 641, 644
(2d Cir. N.Y. 1995) (“IBM II”) (“‘in the rarest circumstances’ judicial rulings alone
can warrant recusal, and can surely do so when accompanied by extrajudicial
actions.”). However, where a judge exhibits extrajudicial bias coupled with
questionable acts during the litigation, impartiality may be questioned and require
remedy apart from disqualification. See IBM II, 45 F.3d at 644 (mandamus of
district court judge after consideration of judicial and extrajudicial bias, including
newspaper interviews); see also Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (U.S.
1994) (the ultimate inquiry is whether circumstances create an objectively
Perpetuating the appearance of impropriety generated by this blatant forum shopping,
plaintiffs have also strained to mark cases as related to other cases pending before Judge
Scheindlin, in an apparent effort to have the case heard by a judge they view as sympathetic to
their claims. For example, in 2011, attorneys Emery Celli Brinckerhoff & Abady filed Joshua
Long v. City of New York, 11 Civ. 5125, alleging that Long had been unlawfully arrested in
Times Square and charged with disorderly conduct for blocking the sidewalk. The case was
marked related to Brown v. Kelly, 05 Civ. 5442, a long-running class action before Judge
Scheindlin concerning unlawful arrests for loitering with the purpose of begging, which Judge
Scheindlin previously accepted as related the class action Casale v. Kelly, 08 Civ. 2173,
although it involved different loitering statutes. Judge Scheindlin accepted the Long case as
related over the City’s objection. Long had not been arrested for loitering.
-9-
reasonable basis for questioning a judge’s impartiality, by showing “a deep-seated
favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.”)
A violation of Section 455(a) can surely rise to the level of a Due Process
Violation, jeopardizing the appearance of justice. Aetna v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813,
825 (1986) (holding that due process was violated when appellate judge refused to
recuse himself in light of his own similar pending lawsuits against a different
insurance company, without deciding whether he was actually influenced by his
potential interest in the outcome of the case under review); In re Murchison, 349
U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (“A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due
process. Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases.
But our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of
unfairness.”); but see Hardy v. United States, 878 F.2d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 1989) (in a
habeas corpus petition, expressing “doubt” that an appearance of impropriety,
without more, “constitutes the type of ‘fundamental defect’ that would justify
vacating an otherwise lawful sentence under section 2255.”). As the Supreme
Court has reiterated, the Due Process Clause “may sometimes bar trial by judges
who have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of
justice equally between contending parties” because “to perform its high function
in the best way, justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.” Aetna, 475 U.S. at
825, citing Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136 (internal quotation marks omitted).
- 10 -
The District Court’s appropriation of Floyd as a case related to a closed case,
on the heels of repeated explicit invitations to bring the action, implicates more
than a mere error interpreting court rules.6 The effect of this misconduct derogated
the very appearance of justice from the outset, and the district court’s extrajudicial
interviews at the end of the litigation confirmed the ongoing taint. These factors
provide more than ample reason to question her impartiality throughout the
proceedings.7
6
In fact, in the explanation made on behalf of the District Judge in the District Judge Motion, no
acknowledgment whatsoever is made of the requirement that a case be related to a pending case.
See, e.g., ¶33 at p. 11 (“Instead, the District Court brought Local Rule 13 to the attention of
counsel as an alternative that would achieve the desired result without wasting judicial
resources. The District Judge’s observation that she would accept a new case that would enable
consideration of the newly-discovered evidence applied clearly established principles designed to
achieve judicial economy.”) Nor was any acknowledgment made in her other public comments
made after the Corrected Mandate. See, e.g., Mark Hamblett, Circuit Rebuffs Scheindlin on
Stop/Frisk, N.Y.L.J. November 1, 2013 (“On the related case issue: the plaintiffs originally
wished to bring a contempt proceeding against the City in the Daniels case, which I had handled
for many years. The City opposed the plaintiffs’ application, asserting that a contempt
proceeding would violate the protective order in Daniels. I sided with the City and directed the
plaintiffs to bring a new action rather than a contempt proceeding. I said I would take the case as
related because the plaintiffs charged that the City had violated my order in Daniels.”) That
aside, the reasons now being offered for taking Floyd as related to Daniels are incorrect. In fact,
Judge Scheindlin ruled against the City on the protective order at issue in Daniels, permitting the
plaintiffs to retain certain documents that the City insisted be returned, and the Floyd plaintiffs
then used those documents in support of their complaint. Moreover, just as she invited plaintiffs
to mark Floyd related to Daniels, Judge Scheindlin assured them that she would order the City to
produce the documents at issue in Floyd, in effect making a ruling on a potential discovery
dispute even before the case was actually before her. Finally, Floyd is plainly not a breach of
contract action alleging that the City violated Daniels, so it simply cannot be said that Floyd is
related to Daniels on this basis, either.
7
That Appellant did not raise the District Judge’s misconduct before now in no way mitigates the
effect of the impropriety. At a minimum, the findings in the Corrected Mandate themselves give
rise now to a situation in which the impartiality of the District Judge throughout the proceedings
might be reasonably questioned.
- 11 -
Equally supportive of this motion are the media interviews and public
statements made by the District Judge during and after the Floyd trial. To be sure,
reasonable minds may differ as to whether those statements directly pertained to
the Floyd case. Still, the comments must be considered “in the context in which
they were issued.” In re Boston's Children First, 244 F.3d 164, 168 (1st Cir. 2001)
It cannot be denied that, under a headline directing the public’s attention to the
stop-and-frisk litigation, the District Judge characterized herself as unique among
Southern District judges because she is “not afraid to rule against the government.”
See Jeffrey Toobin, A Judge Takes on Stop-and-Frisk, The New Yorker, May 27,
2013. Moreover, the District Judge responded to a study made public of her
opinions, based on Lexis research, that showed that she had ruled against law
enforcement in 60% of the cases in which she had published a written decision; the
next judge on the list was 30%, and the rest of the judges trailed significantly after
that. Judge Scheindlin called that challenge to her impartiality a “below-the-beltattack.” See Larry Neumeister, NY “Frisk” Judge Calls Criticism “Below-theBelt,” The Associated Press, May 19, 2013; Jeffrey Toobin, A Judge Takes on
Stop-and-Frisk, The New Yorker, May 27, 2013.
Whatever the merits of the
Lexis research,8 the District Judge’s choice to grant such interviews during the trial
8
Judge Scheindlin also responded that the Lexis research failed to take into account rulings from
the bench, but of course rulings from the bench by other judges on the list were also not
considered. In any event, these public statements went beyond correcting any purported
- 12 -
would likely cause a reasonable person to question her impartiality.
Such
comments, during a highly publicized case involving a matter of great national
concern, as well as recent public statements in response to the Corrected Mandate,9
are not so different from those which have resulted in the removal of judges in
other cases10 of violations of 28 U.S.C §455(a). See, e.g., U.S. v. Microsoft Corp.,
253 F.3d 34, 112-14 (D.C. Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985 (10th Cir. 1993).
B.
The District Judge’s Rulings Further Warrant Vacatur
Further, during the Floyd and Ligon proceedings, the District Court certainly
made unorthodox rulings against the City, which, fly in the face of established
precedent and are now even more questionable when viewed in light of this
Court’s findings. The Judge ruled against the City on the Fourth Amendment
claim by relying on checkboxes on UF-250 forms, rather than the totality of the
circumstances, to conclude that hundreds of thousands of stops were unlawful in
misrepresentations. See, e.g., In re Boston’s Children First, 244 F.3d 164,170 (1st Cir. 2001)
(finding that “[t]he fact that [the district judge’s] comments were made in response to what could
be characterized as an attack by counsel on the procedures of her court did not justify any
comment by [the district judge] beyond an explanation of those procedures” and noting that
“[w]hether counsel for petitioners misrepresented the facts or not is irrelevant.”).
9
See, e.g. Mark Hamblett, Circuit Rebuffs Scheindlin on Stop/Frisk, N.Y.L.J. November 1,
2013.
10
See, e.g. In re Boston’s Children First, 244 F.3d 164 (holding that it was an abuse of discretion
for the district judge not to recuse herself based on an appearance of partiality following her
public comments in the news media); U.S. v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 955 (10th Cir. 1993)(holding
that the district judge’s expressive conduct in deliberately making televised remarks regarding
defendants who had violated an injunction he had issued were grounds for disqualification, as his
messages conveyed an uncommon interest and degree of personal involvement in the subject
matter); IBM II, 45 F.3d at 642-646 (granting petitioner corporation's request for the writ of
mandamus and ordered the judge to recuse himself and that the case be reassigned following,
inter alia, numerous judicial interviews in The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal).
- 13 -
one stroke; and by coining a new type of Equal Protection violation – “indirect
racial profiling” – where no existing basis for proving such a violation was
established at trial. In fact, in light of the Corrected Mandate, a reasonable person
might conclude that the District Judge effectively denied the City the neutral
arbiter guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. Appellant in no way seeks to have
this Panel adjudicate the merits of the appeal at this juncture; indeed, full review is
not needed to make this determination.11
As another example, on the Equal Protection claim, the District Court
precluded Appellant from adducing evidence of the effectiveness of NYPD’s stop,
question and frisk activity in bringing down crime to historic lows as a defense to
the charge of intentional discrimination. Exh. B, at 2 (“I emphasize at the outset,
as I have throughout the litigation, that this case is not about the effectiveness of
stop and frisk in deterring or combating crime.”); id. at 38. The preclusion of this
evidence plainly disregards the law, as evidence of nondiscriminatory reasons for
challenged actions under the Fourteenth Amendment are integral to determining
the viability of such a claim. Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 163 n.11 (2d Cir.
2010); cf. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 360 n.46 (1977).
11
The District Court’s pattern of tainted decisions included many other significant rulings, not
limited to: denial of admission of the demographics of the police department (Exh. E, at
5407:24-5408:13), denial of admission of the most recent stop statistics at the Floyd trial (Exh.
E, at 1803-1811) and the 2012 stop statistics at the Ligon preliminary injunction hearing (Exh. F,
at 1283-1292); and the Court's November 26, 2012 order requring the City to redact 2012 stop
statistics, annexed hereto as Exhibit G.
- 14 -
On the Fourth Amendment claim, the District Court used statistical expert
reports as an inadequate surrogate for the totality of the circumstances analysis
required to assess reasonable suspicion, despite the City’s repeated strong
objections.12 Exh. B at 7 (“…I begin by noting the inherent difficulty in making
findings and conclusions regarding 4.4 million stops. Because it is impossible to
individually analyze each of those stops, plaintiffs’ case was based on the
imperfect information contained in the NYPD’s database of forms (“UF-250s”)
that officers are required to prepare after each stop.”). This same flawed analysis
infected the District Court’s analysis on the existence of a policy or pattern for
municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658
(1978). Another illustration was the Court’s preclusion of testimony by a live
12
It can hardly be clearer that the validity of a Terry stop may only be determined upon
consideration of “the totality of the circumstances – the whole picture,” which cannot be
“readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” United States v. Sokolow, 490
U.S. 1, 7-8 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted), quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S.
411, 417 (1981), and Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983); accord, Florida v. Harris, 133
S. Ct. 1050, 1055 (2013).
While Appellant on appeal challenges the reliability of the expert reports and the
methodology used therein, no resolution of these issues is needed at this juncture to conclude that
the District Court’s eschewing of the proper constitutional standard was result-driven and
necessarily violated Appellant’s Due Process rights. Suffice to say that, while expert witnesses
may not present evidence in the form of legal conclusions (e.g., Cameron v. City of New York,
598 F.3d 50, 62 [2d Cir. 2010]), plaintiffs’ expert was permitted to expound at length as to
whether the City’s Terry stops were “apparently unjustified” by reasonable suspicion. See Exh.
B, at 8; 41-43; 47-48.
- 15 -
officer witness to explain the reasons for his stops.13 (Floyd Trial Tr., annexed
hereto as Exhibit E, at 6416:19 -6424:24).
Perhaps the simplest examples raising the specter of result-oriented analysis
are the citations in Liability and Remedies Orders to treatises and studies, instead
of to record evidence, to support what amounts to her own speculation. For
example, Judge Scheindlin cited to sociological studies and research about how
individuals rely upon race in decision-making, even though such information was
not in the trial record, and precluded the City from even exploring this topic
through officer testimony. See, e.g., Exh. B, at p. 44, fn. 157;14 p. 45, fn. 158;15 cf.
Exh. E at p. 5407:24-5408:13.16 Indeed, as a frame of reference in each of her
13
Fourth Amendment analysis requires a court to consider an officer’s “experience and
specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information
available to [him] that might well elude an untrained person.” U.S. v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273
(2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); accord, United States v. Singh, 415 F.3d
288, 295 (2d Cir. 2005); People v. Batista, 88 N.Y.2d 650, 654-55 (1996). Also, reasonable
suspicion must be “weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by
those versed in the field of law enforcement.” Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418; United States v.
McCargo, 464 F.3d 192, 197 (2d Cir. 2006).
14
Citing “Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of
‘Affirmative Action,’ 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063 (2006), which, according to the Court, ‘illustrat[ed]
relevance of implicit social cognition studies to issues of discrimination.’”
15
Citing “Geoffrey P. Alpert et al., Police Suspicion and Discretionary Decision Making During
Citizen Stops, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 407, 417–19 (2005) for the proposition that “minority
suspects were more likely than white suspects to be viewed suspiciously by the officers for
nonbehavioral reasons — even when the officers knew they were being closely observed by
social scientists while on patrol.” (emphasis in original).
16
In sustaining an objection to the City’s attempt to elicit the demographic statistics of the
NYPD, the District Judge said: “I don't think that's fair to make any inference that one race is
more sensitive to another race or their own race or anybody else. So I am not going to allow that.
That would require him to draw an inference about race, which I don't think is appropriate.”
- 16 -
decisions in Floyd and Ligon, respectively, Judge Scheindlin repeatedly cites to
Michelle Alexander’s controversial book, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration
in the Age of Colorblindness, (2010), which argues that the U.S. criminal justice
system functions as a contemporary system of racial control against communities
of color. See Exh C, at 82 fn. 270; Exh. B, at 56, fn. 190; Exh. A, at 4, fn. 6.
Similar evidence of this practice is found in repeated citations to the wholly
unrelated Trayvon Martin shooting by a non-police officer (See Exh. B, at 57, fn.
191; 192; p. 19217), references to public opinion polls, news articles, editorials, and
scholarly works that were never part of the trial record (See, e.g., Exh. B, at 19091, fn. 776; p. 192, fn. 782;18 Exh. A, at 5 fn. 8;19 fn. 10;20 8 fn. 22;21 11 fn. 32;22
17
“I conclude with a particularly apt quote: ‘The idea of universal suspicion without individual
evidence is what Americans find abhorrent and what black men in America must constantly
fight. It is pervasive in policing policies — like stop-and-frisk, and . . . neighborhood watch regardless of the collateral damage done to the majority of innocents. It's like burning down a
house to rid it of mice.’”
18
Citing “Quinnipiac University, New Yorkers Back Ban on Take-Out Foam More Than 2-1, at 8
(Feb. 28, 2013) for the proposition that “76% of black voters disapprove of stop and frisk”
(emphasis in original).”
19
Citing “Tamer El-Ghobashy & Michael Howard Saul, New York Police Use of Stop-and-Frisk
Drops: Plummet in Disputed Tactic Tracks Overall Decrease in Crime, WALL ST. J., May 6,
2013 (while noting “however, that the number of unrecorded stops may have increased over the
same period as a result of misleading training at the NYPD’s new stop and frisk refresher course
at Rodman’s Neck.”
20
Citing “Kevin Flynn, Ex-Police Head Criticizes Strategies, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2000 for the
proposition that “[e]ven NYPD Commissioner Raymond Kelly has recognized that the misuse of
stop and frisk can contribute to community mistrust.”
21
Citing “Jill Colvin, Bloomberg Says Interpretation of Constitution Will “Have to Change”
After Boston Bombing, POLITICKER (Apr. 22, 2013).”
22
Citing “Quinnipiac University, New Yorkers Back Ban on Take-Out Foam More Than 2-1, at 8
(Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.quinnipiac.edu/images/polling/nyc/nyc02282013.pdf/, for the
- 17 -
28 fn. 6823), and citations to advocacy studies from the NYCLU, which represents
plaintiffs in Ligon (See Exh. B, at 36-37 fn. 13124). Finally, Judge Scheindlin went
outside the record and cited to the practices of other jurisdictions to find that the
UF-250 form must be revised to include a narrative section where the officer must
record, in her own words, the basis for the stop. See Exh. A, at 19-20; p. 20, fn.
4625. The trial record was completely devoid of any such references, and plaintiffs'
own experts were unfamiliar with such forms in other jurisdictions. See Exh. E at
7592:14 - 7593:2. Ultimately, Judge Scheindlin’s supplemental actions in relying
on sources outside the factual record display her advocacy on behalf of the
plaintiffs. Cf. Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 75 fn. 1 (2d Cir. 2012)
(noting that Court is limited to factual record and cannot consider press reports,
investigations or extra-record incidents not presented at trial to establish a Monell
claim).
proposition that “19% of blacks approve and 76% disapprove of “a police practice known as stop
and frisk, where police stop and question a person they suspect of wrongdoing and, if necessary,
search that person.”
23
Citing “Randall Stross, Wearing a Badge, and a Video Camera, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2013, at
BU4.”
24
Citing “NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, NYPD STOP-AND-FRISK ACTIVITY IN
2012, at 17 (2013) (“noting that 16% of total arrests following stops are for marijuana
possession, making marijuana the most common arrest offense arising out of stops”).
25
Citing “SUSAN HUTSON, INDEPENDENT POLICE MONITOR, REVIEW OF THE NEW
ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT’S FIELD INTERVIEW POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND
DATA: FINAL REPORT 45 (Mar. 12, 2013) (footnote omitted).”
- 18 -
CONCLUSION
APPELLANT’S MOTION TO VACATE THE
DISTRICT COURT ORDERS SHOULD BE GRANTED.
Respectfully Submitted,
_____________________________
MICHAEL A. CARDOZO
Corporation Counsel of the
City of New York
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
- 19 -
EXHIBIT A
Case 1:08-cv-01034-SAS-HBP Document 372
Filed 08/12/13 Page 1 of 39
UNITED STATES DISTRlCT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------------------------,-------------------------------------------------------
)(
DAVID FLOYD, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
OPINION AND ORDER
- against
08 Civ. 1034 (SAS)
CITY OF NEW YORK,
Defendant.
--------------------------------------------------------
)(
JAENEAN LIGON, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
12 Civ. 2274 (SAS)
- against
CITY OF NEW YORK, et al.,
Defendants.
--------------------------------------------------------
)(
$HIRA A. SCHEINDLIN, U.S.D.J.:
I.
INTRODUCTION
In an Opinion issued today 1 found the City of New York liable in the Floyd case
for violating the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the plaintiff class because of the
way
:way the New York City Police Department ("NYPD") has conducted stops and frisks over the
2013
" Liability
past decade (the "Liability Opinion"). In an Opinion issued in January 2013,, I found that the
participating
Ligon plaintiffs, representing a putative class of people stopped outside buildings paIticipating in
1
Case 1:08-cv-01034-SAS-HBP Document 372
Filed 08/12/13 Page 2 of 39
the Trespass Affidavit Program (“TAP”) in the Bronx, were entitled to preliminary injunctive
relief based on violations of their Fourth Amendment rights.
The purpose of this Opinion (the “Remedies Opinion”) is to determine what
remedies are appropriate in these cases. I address both cases in one Opinion because the
remedies necessarily overlap. Each requires that the NYPD reform practices and policies related
to stop and frisk to conform with the requirements of the United States Constitution. I stress, at
the outset, that the remedies imposed in this Opinion are as narrow and targeted as possible. To
be very clear: I am not ordering an end to the practice of stop and frisk. The purpose of the
remedies addressed in this Opinion is to ensure that the practice is carried out in a manner that
protects the rights and liberties of all New Yorkers, while still providing much needed police
protection.
II.
REMEDIES IN FLOYD
A.
The Court Has the Power to Order Broad Equitable Relief
1.
Plaintiffs Satisfied the Requirements for a Permanent Injunction
Plaintiffs seeking a permanent injunction must demonstrate: (1) that they have
suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are
inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between
the plaintiffs and the defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest
would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.1 Plaintiffs may satisfy the first two factors by
demonstrating that they are likely to be deprived of their constitutional rights in the future by the
1
See World Wide Polymers, Inc. v. Shinkong Synthetic Fibers Corp., 694 F.3d 155,
160–61 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)).
2
Case 1:08-cv-01034-SAS-HBP Document 372
Filed 08/12/13 Page 3 of 39
acts they seek to have enjoined.2 The evidence discussed in the Liability Opinion shows that
plaintiffs have suffered violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and that the
prevalence of the practices leading to those violations creates a likelihood of future injury.3
Thus, plaintiffs have satisfied the first two requirements for obtaining permanent injunctive
relief.
The balance of hardships tilts strongly in favor of granting a permanent injunction
in Floyd. That is, the burden on the plaintiff class of continued unconstitutional stops and frisks
far outweighs the administrative hardships that the NYPD will face in correcting its
unconstitutional practices.4
The right to physical liberty has long been at the core of our nation’s
commitment to respecting the autonomy and dignity of each person: “No
right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law,
than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own
person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law.”5
2
See New York State Nat’l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1362 (2d Cir.
1989) (deprivation of constitutional rights “cannot be compensated by money damages”); New
York Magazine v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 136 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 1998) (the “‘loss of
First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes
irreparable injury’” (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976))).
3
See Liability Opinion at Part V (conclusions of law); Floyd v. City of New York,
283 F.R.D. 153, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing National Cong. for Puerto Rican Rights, by Perez
v. City of New York, 75 F. Supp. 2d 154, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (later renamed Daniels)). See also
Floyd, 283 F.R.D. at 160, 178 (certifying plaintiffs’ class).
4
See Association of Surrogates & Supreme Court Reporters Within City of New
York v. State of New York, 966 F.2d 75, 79, modified on reh’g, 969 F.2d 1416 (2d Cir. 1992)
(noting that “state budgetary processes may not trump court-ordered measures necessary to undo
a federal constitutional violation,” provided that the equitable relief is proportional to the
constitutional infraction).
5
Floyd, 283 F.R.D. at 158–59 (quoting Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S.
250, 251 (1891)).
3
Case 1:08-cv-01034-SAS-HBP Document 372
Filed 08/12/13 Page 4 of 39
Ensuring that people are not seized and searched by the police on the streets of New York City
without a legal basis is an important interest meriting judicial protection.
Eliminating the threat that blacks and Hispanics will be targeted for stops and
frisks is also an important interest. In addition to the significant intrusion on liberty that results
from any stop, increased contact with the police leads to increased opportunities for arrest, even
when the reason for the arrest was not the reason for the stop. As a result, targeting racially
defined groups for stops — even when there is reasonable suspicion — perpetuates the
stubborn racial disparities in our criminal justice system.6 Although the costs of complying with
the permanent injunction in Floyd will be significant, they are clearly outweighed by the urgent
need to curb the constitutional abuses described in the Liability Opinion.
With regard to the public interest, the City has expressed concern that interference
in the NYPD’s stop and frisk practices may have a detrimental effect on crime control.7
However, as previously noted, I am not ordering an end to stop and frisk. Moreover, it has been
widely reported that as the number of recorded stops has decreased over the past year, the crime
6
See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 6–7 (2010) (“No other
country in the world imprisons so many of its racial or ethnic minorities. . . . In Washington,
D.C., . . . it is estimated that three out of four young black men (and nearly all those in the
poorest neighborhoods) can expect to serve time in prison.”). Another collateral consequence of
stops was highlighted in the recently settled case of Lino v. City of New York, No. 106579/10,
2011 WL 2610501 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. June 24, 2011), in which the NYPD agreed to purge
personal information from its stop database. Plaintiffs — including named plaintiff Clive Lino
— had alleged that the NYPD was using personal information from the stop database to conduct
criminal investigations. See John Caher, NYPD Agrees to Purge Stop-Frisk Databank, N.Y. L.J.,
August 8, 2013.
7
See 4/11/13 Defendant[’s] Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’
Requested Injunctive Relief (“Def. Inj. Mem.”) at 17–18.
4
Case 1:08-cv-01034-SAS-HBP Document 372
Filed 08/12/13 Page 5 of 39
rate has continued to fall.8 The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has pointed out that
“there is significant evidence that unlawfully aggressive police tactics are not only unnecessary
for effective policing, but are in fact detrimental to the mission of crime reduction.”9 By strictly
adhering to the rule of law, the NYPD will achieve greater cooperation between police officers
and the communities they serve. Fostering trust in the police will “promote, rather than hinder,
[the] NYPD’s mission of safely and effectively fighting crime.”10
Furthermore, as in Ligon, it is “‘clear and plain’” that the public interest in liberty
and dignity under the Fourth Amendment, and the public interest in equality under the
Fourteenth Amendment, trumps whatever modicum of added safety might theoretically be
gained by the NYPD making unconstitutional stops and frisks.11 This Opinion does not call for
the NYPD to abandon proactive policing and return to an earlier era of less effective police
practices. Rather, the relief ordered below requires the NYPD to be even more proactive:
8
See, e.g., Tamer El-Ghobashy & Michael Howard Saul, New York Police Use of
Stop-and-Frisk Drops: Plummet in Disputed Tactic Tracks Overall Decrease in Crime, WALL
ST . J., May 6, 2013 (noting that UF-250s fell 51% in the first three months of 2013 compared to
2012, while crime fell 2.7% and murders fell 30% through April 28 compared to 2012). I note,
however, that the number of unrecorded stops may have increased over the same period as a
result of misleading training at the NYPD’s new stop and frisk refresher course at Rodman’s
Neck. See Liability Opinion at Part IV.C.5 (citing, inter alia, 4/25 Trial Transcript (“Tr.”) at
5119–5124 (Shea)); Ligon v. City of New York, No. 12 Civ. 2274, 2013 WL 628534, at *38
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2013).
9
6/12/13 Statement of Interest of the United States (“DOJ Inj. Mem.”) at 10. See
id. at 10–11 (collecting sources).
10
Id. at 10. Even NYPD Commissioner Raymond Kelly has recognized that the
misuse of stop and frisk can contribute to community mistrust. In 2000, he criticized “dubious
stop-and-frisk tactics” instituted after his first period as Police Commissioner that had “sowed
new seeds of community mistrust.” Kevin Flynn, Ex-Police Head Criticizes Strategies, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 5, 2000.
11
Cf. Ligon, 2013 WL 628534, at *40–41.
5
Case 1:08-cv-01034-SAS-HBP Document 372
Filed 08/12/13 Page 6 of 39
proactive not only about crime control and prevention, but also about protecting the
constitutional rights of the people the NYPD serves. The public interest will not be harmed by a
permanent injunction requiring the NYPD to conform its practices to the Constitution.
2.
The Court’s Broad Authority to Enter Injunctive Relief
“[T]he scope of a district court’s equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is
broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.”12 At the same time, it is
“‘the essence of equity jurisdiction’ that a court is only empowered ‘to grant relief no broader
than necessary to cure the effects of the harm caused by the violation.’”13 “Discretion to frame
equitable relief is limited by considerations of federalism, and remedies that intrude
unnecessarily on a state’s governance of its own affairs should be avoided.”14
Nevertheless, as the DOJ notes, “courts have long recognized — across a wide
range of institutional settings — that equity often requires the implementation of injunctive relief
to correct unconstitutional conduct, even where that relief relates to a state’s administrative
practices.”15 “Courts . . . must not shrink from their obligation to enforce the constitutional
12
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971). Accord
Association of Surrogates, 966 F.2d at 79 (“[F]ederal courts have broad discretion in fashioning
equitable remedies for . . . constitutional violations.”).
13
City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 144 (2d Cir. 2011)
(quoting Forschner Grp., Inc. v. Arrow Trading Co., 124 F.3d 402, 406 (2d Cir. 1997)).
14
Association of Surrogates, 966 F.2d at 79.
15
DOJ Inj. Mem. at 7 (citing Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011); Brown v.
Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955)). See also id. at 7 n.3 (criticizing the City’s citation of
inapposite cases “for the proposition that federal courts should decline to enter injunctive relief
that requires operational changes to a State’s institutions”).
6
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Filed 08/12/13 Page 7 of 39
rights of all persons.”16 This duty is not curtailed when constitutional violations arise in the
context of law enforcement. Rather, where “there is a persistent pattern of police misconduct,
injunctive relief is appropriate.”17
I have always recognized the need for caution in ordering remedies that affect the
internal operations of the NYPD,18 the nation’s largest municipal police force and an
organization with over 35,000 members.19 I would have preferred that the City cooperate in a
joint undertaking to develop some of the remedies ordered in this Opinion.20 Instead, the City
declined to participate, and argued that “the NYPD systems already in place” — perhaps with
unspecified “minor adjustments” — would suffice to address any constitutional wrongs that
16
Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1928 (citing Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) (per
curiam)) (quotation marks omitted). Accord Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48, 53–54 (2d Cir. 1977)
(“‘[A] policy of judicial restraint cannot encompass any failure to take cognizance of valid
constitutional claims whether arising in a federal or state institution.’” (quoting Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974))).
17
Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 815 (1974). Accord DOJ Inj. Mem. at 8–9
(collecting cases and noting that pursuant to statutory authorities “the United States has itself
sought and secured the implementation of remedial measures to reform police misconduct in
dozens of law enforcement agencies,” including measures that “directly address systemic
deficiencies in the way officers conduct stops and searches”).
18
See, e.g., Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n of City of New York, Inc. v. City of New
York, No. 97 Civ. 7895 (SAS), 2000 WL 1538608, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2000) (declining
to impose injunction on the NYPD where doing so would have been “an undue intrusion into a
matter of state sovereignty”).
19
See Def. Inj. Mem. at 1.
20
See 1/31 Tr. at 101; 1/28/13 Letter from Jonathan C. Moore et al., Counsel for
Plaintiffs, to the Court (proposing collaborative procedure involving all the parties in Floyd,
Ligon, and Davis, a court-appointed facilitator, and the views of major stakeholders). The City
rejected this proposal. See 1/31 Tr. at 9–10.
7
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Filed 08/12/13 Page 8 of 39
might be found.21 I note that the City’s refusal to engage in a joint attempt to craft remedies
contrasts with the many municipalities that have reached settlement agreements or consent
decrees when confronted with evidence of police misconduct.22
B.
Equitable Relief
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d) requires that “[e]very order granting an
injunction . . . must: (A) state the reasons why it issued; (B) state its terms specifically; and (C)
describe in reasonable detail — and not by referring to the complaint or other document — the
act or acts restrained or required.”23 These specificity provisions are “‘no mere technical
requirements,’” but were “‘designed to prevent uncertainty and confusion on the part of those
faced with injunctive orders, and to avoid the possible founding of a contempt citation on a
21
6/12/13 Defendant’s Post-Trial Memorandum of Law (“Def. Mem.”) at 24–25.
Accord Def. Inj. Mem. at 7–18. The City also argues that no remedy is required because
improper stops can be addressed by individual suits for damages. See Def. Inj. Mem. at 6. The
DOJ counters that if individual suits were an effective remedy for police misconduct, courts
would not have found it necessary to impose injunctive relief in so many police misconduct
cases. See DOJ Inj. Mem. at 9 & n.5 (also citing arguments from Daryl J. Levinson, Making
Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L.
REV . 345, 354–57 (2000)). I note that individual suits for damages are particularly ineffective as
a remedy for unconstitutional stops, where individuals often do not know what the basis for their
stop was, and thus cannot know whether the stop lacked a legal basis or was influenced
improperly by race. In addition, while the indignity of an unconstitutional stop is a serious harm,
few of those stopped will be motivated to dedicate their time and resources to filing a lawsuit —
especially where the standard for recovery may require proof of Monell liability.
22
See, e.g., Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No. 10 Civ. 5952 (E.D. Pa. June 21,
2011) (consent decree in class action alleging unconstitutional stops and frisks of black and
Hispanic men); DOJ Inj. Mem. at 9 (noting DOJ settlement agreements and consent decrees with
dozens of law enforcement agencies nationwide). The City’s resistance to reform in this case
may reflect a more general skepticism toward judicial interpretation of the Constitution and the
limits it imposes on municipalities. See, e.g., Jill Colvin, Bloomberg Says Interpretation of
Constitution Will “Have to Change” After Boston Bombing, POLITICKER (Apr. 22, 2013).
23
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1).
8
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decree too vague to be understood.’”24 The specificity provisions also ensure “‘that the appellate
court knows precisely what it is reviewing.’”25
Compliance with the prohibition on the incorporation of extrinsic documents is
“‘essential,’ unless the enjoined party acquiesces to the extrinsic reference.”26 The City has not
acquiesced to any extrinsic reference. Thus, while the sections below refer to NYPD documents
that must be revised, the ordered relief is contained entirely within the four corners of this
Opinion.27
1.
Appointment of a Monitor to Oversee Reforms
Because of the complexity of the reforms that will be required to bring the
NYPD’s stop and frisk practices into compliance with the Constitution, it would be impractical
for this Court to engage in direct oversight of the reforms. As a more effective and flexible
alternative, I am appointing an independent monitor (the “Monitor”) to oversee the reform
process. I have chosen Peter L. Zimroth to serve as Monitor.
Mr. Zimroth, a partner in the New York office of Arnold & Porter, LLP, is a
24
Mickalis Pawn Shop, 645 F.3d at 143 (quoting Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473,
476 (1974)).
25
Id. at 144 (quoting S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Clorox Co., 241 F.3d 232, 241 (2d
Cir. 2001)).
26
Eyewonder, Inc. v. Abraham, 293 Fed. App’x 818, 820 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting
Lau v. Meddaugh, 229 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 2000), and citing Perfect Fit Indus., Inc. v. Acme
Quilting Co., 646 F.2d 800, 809 (2d Cir. 1981)). Accord Petrello v. White, 533 F.3d 110, 114
(2d Cir. 2008) (“Rule 65(d) ‘is satisfied only if the enjoined party can ascertain from the four
corners of the order precisely what acts are forbidden’ or required.” (quoting Fonar Corp. v.
Deccaid Servs., Inc., 983 F.2d 427, 430 (2d Cir. 1993))).
27
The remedies ordered below are largely drawn from submissions by plaintiffs and
the DOJ.
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former Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, and the former Chief Assistant District
Attorney of New York County. In both of these roles, Mr. Zimroth worked closely with the
NYPD. A graduate of Columbia University and Yale Law School — where he served as Editor
in Chief of the Yale Law Journal — he also served as a law clerk on the Supreme Court of the
United States and a federal prosecutor. He taught criminal law and criminal procedure as a
tenured professor at the New York University School of Law.
Mr. Zimroth has also been appointed to many positions in public service. The
Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals appointed him as one of three directors of New
York’s Capital Defender Office. He has also served on the Mayor’s Committee on the Judiciary,
and on the boards of two schools for children with special needs. He has been a member of the
House of Delegates of the American Bar Association, the Executive Committee of the New York
City Bar Association, and the Board of Directors of the Legal Aid Society.
It is within the power of a district court to order the appointment of a monitor to
oversee judicially ordered reforms.28 The DOJ recommended the appointment of a monitor in
this case, in the event that the Court found the City liable. Based on “decades of police reform
efforts across the country,” the DOJ concluded that “the appointment of a monitor to guide
implementation of . . . injunctive relief may provide substantial assistance to the Court and the
parties and can reduce unnecessary delays and litigation over disputes regarding compliance.”29
In addition, the DOJ noted:
28
See, e.g., United States v. City of New York, 717 F.3d 72, 97 (2d Cir. 2013).
29
DOJ Inj. Mem. at 11. Accord 5/15 Tr. at 7435 (plaintiffs’ remedies expert
Professor Samuel Walker testifying that if liability is found, the appointment of an independent
monitor is “necessary”).
10
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[T]he experience of the United States in enforcing police reform injunctions
teaches that the appointment of an independent monitor is a critically
important asset to the court, the parties, and the community in cases
involving patterns or practices of unlawful conduct by law enforcement
officials. A court-appointed monitor in this case would help the Court ensure
that . . . any pattern or practice . . . is effectively and sustainably remedied.30
The appointment of a monitor will serve the interests of all stakeholders, including the City, by
facilitating the early and unbiased detection of non-compliance or barriers to compliance. By
identifying problems promptly, the Monitor will save the City time and resources.31
I also note that the Monitor will have a distinct function from the other oversight
entities identified by the City, such as the NYPD’s Internal Affairs Bureau, federal prosecutors,
the Civilian Complaint Review Board, and “the public electorate.”32 The Monitor will be
specifically and narrowly focused on the City’s compliance with reforming the NYPD’s use of
stop and frisk — although this will inevitably touch on issues of training, supervision,
monitoring, and discipline. Finally, the Monitor will operate in close coordination with this
30
DOJ Inj. Mem. at 5.
31
See id. at 16 (“Without an independent monitor, the Court will be forced to
depend on motions practice between the parties to assess progress; a costly, contentious,
inefficient, and time-consuming process.”).
32
Id. at 18 (citing Def. Inj. Mem. at 13). In particular, as the DOJ notes, “it is not
realistic to ask ‘the public electorate’ to monitor the police department to ensure that the
department’s stop-and-frisk practices are consistent with the Constitution.” Id. at 20 (citing
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)). If it is true that 76%
percent of black voters in New York City disapprove of stop and frisk, as found in a recent
Quinnipiac University poll, then the persistence of this policy in heavily black communities
might indicate the failure “of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities,” and thus might justify “more searching judicial inquiry.” Carolene Prods., 304 U.S.
at 152 n.4; Quinnipiac University, New Yorkers Back Ban on Take-Out Foam More Than 2-1, at
8 (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.quinnipiac.edu/images/polling/nyc/nyc02282013.pdf/ (19% of
blacks approve and 76% disapprove of “a police practice known as stop and frisk, where police
stop and question a person they suspect of wrongdoing and, if necessary, search that person”).
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Court, which retains jurisdiction to issue orders as necessary to remedy the constitutional
violations described in the Liability Opinion.33
I now specify the Monitor’s role and functions:
1.
The Monitor will be subject to the supervision and orders of the Court.
2.
The Monitor will not, and is not intended to, replace or assume the role or duties of any
City or NYPD staff or officials, including the Commissioner. The Monitor’s duties,
responsibilities, and authority will be no broader than necessary to end the constitutional
violations in the NYPD’s stop and frisk practices described in the Liability Opinion.
3.
The Monitor’s initial responsibility will be to develop, based on consultation with the
parties, a set of reforms of the NYPD’s policies, training, supervision, monitoring, and
discipline regarding stop and frisk. These reforms (the “Immediate Reforms”) are
outlined below in Part II.A.2. They will be developed as soon as practicable and
implemented when they are approved by the Court.
4.
After the completion of the Joint Remedial Process, described below in Part II.A.4, the
Monitor will work with the Facilitator and the parties to develop any further reforms
necessary to ending the constitutional violations described in the Liability Opinion.
These reforms (“Joint Process Reforms”) will be implemented upon approval by the
Court.
5.
The Monitor will inform the City of the milestones the City must achieve in order to
demonstrate compliance and bring the monitoring process to an end.
6.
The Monitor will regularly conduct compliance and progress reviews to assess the extent
33
The Monitor’s role will also be distinct from the broad advisory role of the NYPD
Inspector General envisioned in N.Y. City Council Introductory No. 1079 of 2013.
12
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to which the NYPD has implemented and complied with the Immediate and Joint Process
Reforms.
7.
The Monitor will issue public reports every six months detailing the NYPD’s compliance
with the Immediate and Joint Process Reforms. The Monitor will also file these reports
with the Court.
8.
The Monitor will work with the parties to address any barriers to compliance. To the
extent possible, the Monitor should strive to develop a collaborative rather than
adversarial relationship with the City.
9.
The Monitor may request the Court to modify the Immediate and Joint Process Reforms,
if evidence shows that such modifications are warranted.
10.
The Monitor may request technical assistance from outside experts. He may also employ
staff assistance as he finds reasonable and necessary.
11.
The City will be responsible for the reasonable costs and fees of the Monitor, his staff,
and any experts he retains.
12.
The Monitor’s position will come to an end when the City has achieved compliance with
the Immediate and Joint Process Reforms.
2.
Immediate Reforms Regarding Stop and Frisk
Ending the constitutional violations inherent in the NYPD’s current use of stop
and frisk will require reforms to a number of NYPD policies and practices. It would be unwise
and impractical for this Court to impose such reforms at this time, prior to input from the
Monitor and the participants in the Joint Remedial Process ordered below.34 Instead, as noted
34
In particular, the City has not yet provided input regarding specific reforms. See
Def. Inj. Mem. at 18 (declining to offer a remedy “other than to respectfully direct the Court to
13
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above, the development of reforms will take place in two stages. First, the Monitor will
develop, in consultation with the parties, an initial set of reforms to the NYPD’s policies,
training, supervision, monitoring, and discipline regarding stop and frisk (the “Immediate
Reforms”). These reforms will be developed and submitted to the Court as soon as practicable,
and implemented when they are approved. Second, the Facilitator will work with the parties and
other stakeholders to develop, through the Joint Remedial Process, a more thorough set of
reforms (the “Joint Process Reforms”) to supplement, as necessary, the Immediate Reforms.
The development of the Joint Process Reforms is discussed below in Part II.A.4.
If the parties, together with the Monitor, are unable to develop agreed-upon
Immediate Reforms, the Court will order the parties to draft proposed revisions to specific
policies and training materials, as the parties have already done quite effectively in Ligon.35
Indeed, the remedies proposed in Ligon may provide a useful model for some aspects of the
Immediate Reforms.36
Based on the liability and remedies evidence presented at trial, the Immediate
Reforms must include the following elements:
a.
Revisions to Policies and Training Materials Relating to Stop
and Frisk and to Racial Profiling
First, the NYPD should revise its policies and training regarding stop and frisk to
adhere to constitutional standards as well as New York state law. The constitutional standards
the trial record for an assessment of the remedies evidence”); 6/12/13 Defendant’s Post-Trial
Memorandum of Law at 24–25 (declining to propose remedies).
35
See 7/8/13 Defendants’ Proposed Remedial Relief (“Ligon Def. Rem.”).
36
See Ligon, 2013 WL 628534, at *41–44.
14
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include the standards for: what constitutes a stop, when a stop may be conducted, when a frisk
may be conducted, and when a search into clothing or into any object found during a search may
be conducted.37 Although the standards may sometimes require the informed use of discretion,
they are not complicated and should be stated in policies and training as clearly and simply as
possible.
To summarize: an encounter between a police officer and a civilian constitutes a
stop whenever a reasonable person would not feel free to disregard the officer and walk away.
The threat or use of force is not a necessary or even typical element of stops. Encounters
involving nothing more than commands or accusatory questions can and routinely do rise to the
level of stops, provided that the commands and questions would lead a reasonable person to
conclude that he was not free to terminate the encounter.38
In order to conduct a stop, an officer must have individualized, reasonable
suspicion that the person stopped has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.
The officer must be able to articulate facts establishing a minimal level of objective justification
37
See Liability Opinion at Part III.B; Ligon, 2013 WL 628534, at *41–42.
38
There could be a simple way to ensure that officers do not unintentionally violate
the Fourth Amendment rights of pedestrians by approaching them without reasonable suspicion
and then inadvertently treating them in such a way that a reasonable person would not feel free
to leave. Officers could, for example, begin De Bour Level 1 and 2 encounters by informing the
person that he or she is free to leave. There is no constitutional requirement for officers to
inform people that they are free to leave. Cf. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 35 (1996) (holding
that the Fourth Amendment does not require “that a lawfully seized defendant must be advised
that he is ‘free to go’ before his consent to search will be recognized as voluntary”); Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (“While knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one
factor to be taken into account, the government need not establish such knowledge as the sine
qua non of an effective consent.”). Nevertheless, the Constitution does not prohibit a police
department from adopting this policy or a court from ordering it as a means of avoiding
unconstitutional stops, where — as here — officers have been incorrectly trained on the
definition of a stop.
15
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for making the stop, which means more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
hunch. “Furtive movements” are an insufficient basis for a stop or frisk if the officer cannot
articulate anything more specific about the suspicious nature of the movement. The same is true
of merely being present in a “high crime area.” Moreover, no person may be stopped solely
because he matches a vague or generalized description — such as young black male 18 to 24 —
without further detail or indicia of reliability.
To proceed from a stop to a frisk, the police officer must reasonably suspect that
the person stopped is armed and dangerous. The purpose of a frisk is not to discover evidence
of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence. Thus, the
frisk must be strictly limited to whatever is necessary to uncover weapons that could harm the
officer or others nearby. When an officer lawfully pats down a suspect’s outer clothing and feels
an object whose contour or mass makes its identity as contraband immediately apparent, the
officer may seize the contraband. If an officer reasonably suspects that a felt object in the
clothing of a suspect is a weapon, then the officer may take whatever action is necessary to
examine the object and protect himself, including removing the object from the clothing of the
stopped person.
The erroneous or misleading training materials identified in the Liability Opinion
must be corrected, including the Police Student Guide’s overbroad definition of “furtive
behavior;” the misleading training on “unusual firearms” implying that the presence of a wallet,
cell phone, or pen could justify a frisk, or search; the complete lack of training on the
constitutional standard for a frisk — reasonable suspicion that a stopped person is “armed and
dangerous;” and the failure to include self-initiated stops (which make up 78% of street stops) in
16
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the role-playing at Rodman’s Neck.39 These training reforms will be in addition to those
discussed below in the section of this Opinion relating to Ligon.40
Second, the NYPD should revise its policies and training regarding racial
profiling to make clear that targeting “the right people” for stops, as described in the Liability
Opinion, is a form of racial profiling and violates the Constitution.41 Racially defined groups
may not be targeted for stops in general simply because they appear more frequently in local
crime suspect data. Race may only be considered where the stop is based on a specific and
reliable suspect description. When an officer carries out a stop based on reasonable suspicion
that a person fits such a description, the officer may consider the race of the suspect, just as the
officer may consider the suspect’s height or hair color. When a stop is not based on a specific
suspect description, however, race may not be either a motivation or a justification for the stop.
In particular, officers must cease the targeting of young black and Hispanic males for stops
based on the appearance of these groups in crime complaints. It may also be appropriate to
conduct training for officers on the effect of unconscious racial bias.
Third, it is unclear at this stage whether Operations Order 52 (“OO 52”), which
describes the use of performance objectives to motivate officers, requires revision in order to
bring the NYPD’s use of stop and frisk into compliance with the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The evidence at trial showed that OO 52’s use of “performance goals” created
pressure to carry out stops, without any system for monitoring the constitutionality of those
39
See Liability Opinion at Part IV.C.5.
40
See infra Part III.
41
See Liability Opinion at Parts IV.C.3, V.B.1.
17
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stops. However, the use of performance goals in relation to stops may be appropriate, once an
effective system for ensuring constitutionality is in place.42 Because the perspective of police
officers and police organizations will be particularly valuable to clarifying the role of
performance goals in the reform of stop and frisk, these issues should be addressed as part of the
Joint Remedial Process rather than the Immediate Reforms.
Finally, I note that where legitimate uncertainty exists regarding the most
efficient means of reform, and the parties have differing views, it may be feasible for the
Monitor to test the alternatives by applying them in different precincts and studying the results.
In some contexts, the size of the NYPD makes it possible, and desirable, to resolve practical
disagreements through the rigorous testing and analysis of alternatives at the precinct level
before applying these reforms to the department as a whole.
b. Changes to Stop and Frisk Documentation
Both the trial record and the Liability Opinion document, in detail, the inadequacy
of the NYPD’s methods of recording Terry stops. The UF-250, used by officers in the field to
42
Plaintiffs’ policing expert Lou Reiter testified that “there are circumstances where
productivity goals are consistent with generally accepted [police] practices.” 4/24 Tr. at 4917.
The City’s policing expert, James K. Stewart, testified that performance goals are a necessary
part of monitoring and supervision:
In policing, there are disincentives to engaging in some activities, because
they are dangerous, they are in unsterile conditions and chaotic conditions,
and the officers may not engage in that but yet spend their time on random
patrol. They are not out there doing what the department wants them to do,
but they do show up and they show up in uniform. The reason that . . . you
have to count the activities is to ensure that those officers do respond . . . to
the calls for assistance of help, they do address the community issues . . . .
5/17 Tr. at 7756.
18
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record the basis for stops, is flawed and must be revised.43 Officers are also required to record
stop and frisk activity in memo books, otherwise known as activity logs. Quarterly audits of
these memo book entries have revealed significant deficiencies in record keeping practices in
virtually every precinct throughout the City.44 The proper use of activity logs to record stop and
frisk activity must be emphasized in training, as well as enforced through supervision and
discipline. I first address the UF-250 and then the activity logs.
i.
UF-250
As described in the Liability Opinion, the current UF-250 consists mainly of
checkboxes that officers can and often do check by rote,45 thus facilitating post-hoc justifications
for stops where none may have existed at the time of the stop. The UF-250 must be revised to
include a narrative section where the officer must record, in her own words, the basis for the
stop. The narrative will enable meaningful supervisory oversight of the officer’s decision to
conduct the stop, as well as create a record for a later review of constitutionality.
As an independent monitor of the New Orleans Police Department (“NOPD”)
recently noted, “the overwhelming belief of experts [is] that a narrative field in which the
officers describe the circumstances for each stop would be the best way to gather information
that will be used to analyze reasonable suspicion” and, relatedly, “prevent[] racially biased
43
See 5/16 Tr. at 7457 (Walker).
44
See Pl. Findings ¶ 197 (citing Plaintiffs’ Trial Exhibit (“PX”) 450; Defendant’s
Trial Exhibit (“DX”) G6).
45
See, e.g., Liability Opinion at Part IV.B.2.
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policing.”46 The NOPD monitor noted that the City of Oakland recently revised its data
collection system to include “a narrative field in which officers are required to state, in their own
words, their basis for having reasonable suspicion for a stop.”47 The Oakland Police Department
added this narrative field “because it was the best way to evaluate whether individual officers
possessed the requisite reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop.”48 The Philadelphia Police
Department has also included a narrative field in its stop form.49 Similarly, Professor Walker, a
nationally recognized authority on police accountability, opined that a form for recording stops
must contain a sufficiently detailed narrative that a reviewer can determine from the narrative
alone whether the stop was based on reasonable suspicion.50
The UF-250 should also be revised to require a separate explanation of why a patdown, frisk, or search was performed. The evidence at trial revealed that people were routinely
subjected to these intrusions when no objective facts supported reasonable suspicion that they
were armed and dangerous. It is apparent that some officers consider frisks to be a routine part
of a stop. Because this misconception is contrary to law, the revised UF-250 should include a
separate section requiring officers to explain why the stopped person was suspected of being
46
SUSAN HUTSON , INDEPENDENT POLICE MONITOR, REVIEW OF THE NEW ORLEANS
POLICE DEPARTMENT ’S FIELD INTERVIEW POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND DATA : FINAL REPORT 45
(Mar. 12, 2013) (footnote omitted).
47
Id. at 46.
48
Id.
49
See id.
50
See 5/16 Tr. at 7456–7458 (Walker). Professor Walker testified that a description
of reasonable suspicion for a stop will generally require no more than three lines of text. See id.
at 7458.
20
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armed and dangerous.
Furthermore, both the DOJ and plaintiffs recommend that the UF-250 contain a
tear-off portion stating the reason for the stop, which can be given to each stopped person at the
end of the encounter.51 A 2007 RAND report, commissioned by the NYPD, similarly
recommended that “[f]or a trial period in select precincts, the NYPD could require that officers
give an information card to those stopped pedestrians who are neither arrested nor issued a
summons.”52 Any form or card given to stopped persons should provide the stated reasons for
the stop, the badge numbers of the stopping officers, and information on how to file a complaint.
Finally, the UF-250 should be revised to simplify and improve the checkbox
system used to indicate common stop justifications. It may also be necessary to reduce the
number of “stop factor” boxes in order to permit easier analyses of patterns in the
constitutionality of stops.53
In addition to changing the UF-250, officers should be further trained in its use.
As discussed in the Liability Opinion, some officers check certain boxes (or combinations of
boxes) reflexively as part of “scripts,” including “Furtive Movements” and “Area Has High
51
See Pl. Rem. Br. at 19 (citing Deborah Ramirez, Jack McDevitt & Amy Farrell, A
Resource Guide on Racial Profiling Data Collection Systems: Promising Practices and Lessons
Learned 38 (United States Department of Justice 2000), and noting that a tear-off form has been
used in Great Britain for more than a decade).
52
GREG RIDGEWAY , RAND, ANALYSIS OF RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE NEW YORK
POLICE DEPARTMENT ’S STOP, QUESTION , AND FRISK PRACTICES 44 (2007), DX K6.
53
See Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D. (Oct. 15, 2010), PX 411 (“Fagan Rpt.”) at 49
(describing the analytical difficulties created by the number of possible combinations of stop
factors and suspected crimes).
21
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Incidence of Reported Offense of Type Under Investigation.”54 Officers must understand that if
a stop is based on these factors, the officer must provide additional detail in the narrative field —
for example, what was the specific nature of the furtive movement, and why was it suspicious?
What was the geographic scope of the “high crime area,” and what was the officer’s specific
basis for believing it has a high incidence of the suspected crime?
ii.
Activity Logs
All uniformed officers are required to provide narrative descriptions of stops in
their activity logs whenever a UF-250 is prepared.55 In practice, this does not take place.
Evidence at trial showed that throughout the class period, officers consistently failed to record
stops in their logs, or provided insufficient detail for a supervisor to meaningfully review the
constitutionality of the stop. This problem is best addressed through training, supervision, and
monitoring.56
54
Suspicious Bulge is another factor — albeit less often used than Furtive
Movements and High Crime Area — that should require greater specificity or a narrative
description.
55
See Operations Order 44 (9/11/08), PX 96. In addition, the Chief of Patrol
recently directed all officers in the patrol borough to include nine categories of information in
every activity log entry for a stop. The categories include: the date, time and location of the
stop; the name and pedigree of the person stopped; the suspected felony or penal law
misdemeanor; an explanation of the suspicion that led to the stop (such as “looking into
windows,” or “pulling on doorknobs”); whether the suspect was frisked; the sprint or job
number, if applicable; and the disposition of the stop. The Chief of Patrol’s memo also requires
officers to elaborate the basis for a stop in the “Additional Circumstances/Factors” section of the
UF-250, to photocopy every activity log entry for a stop, and to attach the photocopy to the UF250 before submitting it to a supervisor. See DX J13.
56
See infra Part II.B.2.c. I recognize the risk of inefficiency if officers record the
same information on UF-250s and in their activity logs. Professor Walker argued in favor of
requiring both, but also expressed concerns regarding inefficiencies. See 5/16 Tr. at 7458, 7480.
If the parties can agree upon an improved procedure during the Joint Remedial Process described
below, those improvements can be included in the Joint Process Reforms.
22
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iii.
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Specific Relief Ordered
The NYPD, with the assistance of the Monitor, is directed to revise the UF-250 to
address the criticisms expressed in the Liability Opinion and the direction given in this Opinion,
and to provide training with respect to the new form. The NYPD is further ordered, again with
the assistance of the Monitor, to ensure that activity logs are completed with the required
specificity, and to implement measures to adequately discipline officers who fail to comply with
these requirements.
c.
Changes to Supervision, Monitoring, and Discipline
An essential aspect of the Joint Process Reforms will be the development of an
improved system for monitoring, supervision, and discipline. Professor Walker testified that
comprehensive reforms may be necessary to ensure the constitutionality of stops, including
revisions to written policies and training materials, improved documentation of stops and frisks,
direct supervision and review of stop documentation by sergeants, indirect supervision and
review by more senior supervisors and managers, improved citizen complaint procedures,
improved disciplinary procedures, department-wide audits, and perhaps even an early
intervention system based on a centralized source of information regarding officer misconduct.
According to Professor Walker, “[a] comprehensive approach is absolutely essential, because if
any one of the components is absent or weak and ineffective, the entire accountability system
begins to collapse.”57
57
5/15 Tr. at 7440. The National Institute of Justice, which the City’s policing
expert, James K. Stewart, directed from 1982 to 1990, notes that “the management and culture of
a department are the most important factors influencing police behavior.” National Institute of
Justice, Police Integrity, available at http://www.nij.gov/topics/lawenforcement/legitimacy/integrity.htm#note2. Ultimately, ending unconstitutionality in stop and
frisk may require changing the culture of the NYPD so that officials and officers view their
23
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In light of the complexity of the supervision, monitoring, and disciplinary reforms
that will be required to bring the NYPD’s use of stop and frisk into compliance with the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments, it may be appropriate to incorporate these reforms into the Joint
Remedial Process negotiations described below. However, to the extent that the Monitor can
work with the parties to develop reforms that can be implemented immediately, the Monitor is
encouraged to include those reforms in the proposed Immediate Reforms.
For example, based on the findings in the Liability Opinion, there is an urgent
need for the NYPD to institute policies specifically requiring sergeants who witness, review, or
discuss stops to address not only the effectiveness but also the constitutionality of those stops,
and to do so in a thorough and comprehensive manner.58 To the extent that Integrity Control
Officers witness or review stops, they too must be instructed to review for constitutionality.59
The Department Advocate’s Office must improve its procedures for imposing discipline in
response to the Civilian Complaint Review Board’s (“CCRB”) findings of substantiated
misconduct during stops. This improvement must include increased deference to credibility
determinations by the CCRB, an evidentiary standard that is neutral between the claims of
complainants and officers, and no general requirement of corroborating physical evidence.
Finally, the Office of the Chief of Department must begin tracking and investigating complaints
purpose not only as policing effectively, but policing constitutionally as well. If so, the NIJ’s
first recommendation for improving the integrity of a department is to “[a]ddress and discipline
minor offenses so officers learn that major offenses will be disciplined too.” Id.
58
See Liability Opinion at Part IV.C.4.b.
59
See id.
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it receives related to racial profiling.60
d.
FINEST Message
As soon as practicable, the NYPD should transmit a FINEST message explaining
the outcome of the Floyd litigation and the need for the reforms described above.61 The FINEST
message should summarize in simple and clear terms the basic constitutional standards
governing stop and frisk, the constitutional standard prohibiting racial profiling, and the relation
between these standards and New York state law. The message should order all NYPD
personnel to comply immediately with those standards.
3.
Body-Worn Cameras
The subject of police officers wearing “body-worn cameras” was inadvertently
raised during the testimony of the City’s policing expert, James K. Stewart. The following
discussion took place:
A. . . . But what happens is the departments a lot of times may not have . . .
expertise and they may need some technical assistance like body worn
cameras is an example and how much technology and where you store the
information and stuff like that. They may not have it. And there may be
other issues like psychological ideas about —
THE COURT: What do you think of body worn cameras?
THE WITNESS: I think it’s a good idea. We recommended it in Las Vegas.
And we’re doing it in Phoenix as well.
THE COURT: Thank you.
...
A. But I have no opinion in this case with respect to body worn cameras.62
60
See id. at Part IV.C.6.
61
The NYPD’s “FINEST” messaging system allows the transmission of legal
directives to the NYPD’s commands. See, e.g., 5/10/12 Finest Message Regarding Taxi/Livery
Robbery Inspection Program, Ex. 1 to 7/24/13 Plaintiffs’ Brief Concerning Defendants’
Remedial Proposals (“Ligon Pl. Rem.”).
62
5/17 Tr. at 7817–7818.
25
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The use of body-worn cameras by NYPD officers would address a number of the
issues raised in the Liability Opinion. In evaluating the constitutionality of individual stops, I
explained the difficulty of judging in hindsight what happened during an encounter between a
civilian and the police.63 The only contemporaneous records of the stops in this case were UF250s and short memo book entries — which were sometimes not prepared directly after a stop,
and which are inherently one-sided. Thus, I was forced to analyze the constitutionality of the
stops based on testimony given years after the encounter, at a time when the participants’
memories were likely colored by their interest in the outcome of the case and the passage of
time. The NYPD’s duty to monitor stop and frisk activity is similarly hamstrung by supervisors’
inability to review an objective representation of what occurred.64
Video recordings will serve a variety of useful functions. First, they will provide
a contemporaneous, objective record of stops and frisks, allowing for the review of officer
conduct by supervisors and the courts. The recordings may either confirm or refute the belief of
some minorities that they have been stopped simply as a result of their race, or based on the
clothes they wore, such as baggy pants or a hoodie.65 Second, the knowledge that an exchange is
being recorded will encourage lawful and respectful interactions on the part of both parties.66
Third, the recordings will diminish the sense on the part of those who file complaints that it is
63
See Liability Opinion at Part IV.D.
64
See id. at Part IV.C.4.
65
By creating an irrefutable record of what occurred during stops, video recordings
may help lay to rest disagreements that would otherwise remain unresolved.
66
If, in fact, the police do, on occasion, use offensive language — including racial
slurs — or act with more force than necessary, the use of body-worn cameras will inevitably
reduce such behavior.
26
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their word against the police, and that the authorities are more likely to believe the police.67
Thus, the recordings should also alleviate some of the mistrust that has developed between the
police and the black and Hispanic communities, based on the belief that stops and frisks are
overwhelmingly and unjustifiably directed at members of these communities. Video recordings
will be equally helpful to members of the NYPD who are wrongly accused of inappropriate
behavior.
Because body-worn cameras are uniquely suited to addressing the constitutional
harms at issue in this case, I am ordering the NYPD to institute a pilot project in which bodyworn cameras will be worn for a one-year period by officers on patrol in one precinct per
borough — specifically the precinct with the highest number of stops during 2012. The Monitor
will establish procedures for the review of stop recordings by supervisors and, as appropriate,
more senior managers. The Monitor will also establish procedures for the preservation of stop
recordings for use in verifying complaints in a manner that protects the privacy of those stopped.
Finally, the Monitor will establish procedures for measuring the effectiveness of body-worn
cameras in reducing unconstitutional stops and frisks. At the end of the year, the Monitor will
work with the parties to determine whether the benefits of the cameras outweigh their financial,
administrative, and other costs, and whether the program should be terminated or expanded. The
City will be responsible for the costs of the pilot project.
It would have been preferable for this remedy to have originated with the NYPD,
which has been a leader and innovator in the application of technology to policing, as Compstat
illustrates. Nevertheless, there is reason to hope that not only civilians but also officers will
67
See Liability Opinion at Part IV.C.6.
27
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benefit from the use of cameras. When a small police department in Rialto, California
introduced body-worn cameras, “[t]he results from the first 12 months [were] striking. Even
with only half of the 54 uniformed patrol officers wearing cameras at any given time, the
department over all had an 88 percent decline in the number of complaints filed against officers,
compared with the 12 months before the study.”68 While the logistical difficulties of using bodyworn cameras will be greater in a larger police force, the potential for avoiding constitutional
violations will be greater as well.
4.
Joint Remedial Process for Developing Supplemental Reforms
A community input component is increasingly common in consent decrees and
settlements directed at police reform.69 The DOJ has recognized the importance of community
input in its recent consent decrees and other agreements with police departments.70 The
landmark Collaborative Agreement approved in 2002 by Judge Susan J. Dlott of the Southern
District of Ohio as the settlement of class claims against the Cincinnati Police Department has
been widely recognized as a successful model for other police reform.71
Although the remedies in this Opinion are not issued on consent and do not arise
68
Randall Stross, Wearing a Badge, and a Video Camera, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7,
2013, at BU4.
69
See 5/16 Tr. at 7521 (Walker).
70
See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Request for Injunctive Relief
(“Pl. Inj. Mem.”) at 15 (collecting agreements).
71
See In re Cincinnati Policing, 209 F.R.D. 395, 397 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (discussing
development of Collaborative Agreement through a collaborative procedure); Tyehimba v. City
of Cincinnati, No. C-1-99-317, 2001 WL 1842470 (S.D. Ohio May 3, 2001) (“Order
Establishing Collaborative Procedure”); Pl. Inj. Mem. at 14; GREG RIDGEWAY ET AL., POLICE COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN CINCINNATI (2009).
28
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from a settlement, community input is perhaps an even more vital part of a sustainable remedy in
this case. The communities most affected by the NYPD’s use of stop and frisk have a distinct
perspective that is highly relevant to crafting effective reforms. No amount of legal or policing
expertise can replace a community’s understanding of the likely practical consequences of
reforms in terms of both liberty and safety.
It is important that a wide array of stakeholders be offered the opportunity to be
heard in the reform process: members of the communities where stops most often take place;
representatives of religious, advocacy, and grassroots organizations; NYPD personnel and
representatives of police organizations; the District Attorneys’ offices; the CCRB;
representatives of groups concerned with public schooling, public housing, and other local
institutions; local elected officials and community leaders; representatives of the parties, such as
the Mayor’s office, the NYPD, and the lawyers in this case; and the non-parties that submitted
briefs: the Civil Rights Division of the DOJ, Communities United for Police Reform, and the
Black, Latino, and Asian Caucus of the New York City Council.
If the reforms to stop and frisk are not perceived as legitimate by those most
affected, the reforms are unlikely to be successful.72 Neither an independent Monitor, nor a
municipal administration, nor this Court can speak for those who have been and will be most
affected by the NYPD’s use of stop and frisk.73 The 2007 RAND report, relied on by the City at
72
Cf. 5/16 Tr. at 7522 (Professor Walker discussing the legitimacy of reforms). As
a general matter, police departments “depend upon public confidence, public trust, and public
cooperation.” Id. at 7520. This principle applies no less in the context of stop and frisk.
73
Cf. United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391, 404 (9th Cir. 2002)
(remanding to the district court for a hearing on the permissive intervention of community
groups in a DOJ lawsuit against the Los Angeles Police Department, and emphasizing the
importance of not “marginalizing those . . . who have some of the strongest interests in the
29
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trial, recognized the importance of “ongoing communication and negotiation with the
community about [stop and frisk] activities” to “maintaining good police-community
relations.”74 It is surely in everyone’s interest to prevent another round of protests, litigation,
and divisive public conflicts over stop and frisk.
Drawing on this Court’s broad equitable powers to remedy the wrongs in this
case,75 I am ordering that all parties participate in a joint remedial process, under the guidance of
a Facilitator to be named by the Court. I hereby order the following specific relief:
1.
All parties shall participate in the Joint Remedial Process for a period of six to nine
months to develop proposed remedial measures (the “Joint Process Reforms”) that will
supplement the Immediate Reforms discussed above. The Joint Process Reforms must be
no broader than necessary to bring the NYPD’s use of stop and frisk into compliance
with the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
2.
The Joint Remedial Process will be guided by the Facilitator, with such assistance as the
Facilitator deems necessary and in consultation with the Monitor.
3.
The initial responsibility of the Facilitator will be to work with the parties to develop a
time line, ground rules, and concrete milestones for the Joint Remedial Process. The
Cincinnati Collaborative Procedure and subsequent DOJ consent decrees and letters of
outcome”).
74
RAND Report at 44.
75
The equitable power of district courts to order processes involving community
input is well-established. See, e.g., United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 635 F. Supp. 1538,
1545 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff’d, 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987) (ordering the Yonkers public school
system to organize “community meetings with minority groups and organizations to solicit
support and assistance in the dissemination of magnet program availability”); Pl. Inj. Mem. at
11–13 (collecting cases and scholarship).
30
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intent may be used as models.76
4.
At the center of the Joint Remedial Process will be input from those who are most
affected by the NYPD’s use of stop and frisk, including but not limited to the people and
organizations noted above. Input from academic and other experts in police practices
may also be requested.
5.
The Facilitator will convene “town hall” type meetings in each of the five boroughs in
order to provide a forum in which all stakeholders may be heard. It may be necessary to
hold multiple meetings in the larger boroughs in order to ensure that everyone will have
an opportunity to participate. The Facilitator will endeavor to prepare an agenda for such
meetings, through consultation with the various interested groups prior to the meeting.
The Monitor will also attend these meetings to the extent possible.
6.
The NYPD will appoint a representative or representatives to serve as a liaison to the
Facilitator during the Joint Remedial Process.
7.
The Facilitator may receive anonymous information from NYPD officers or officials,
subject to procedures to be determined by the parties.
8.
When the parties and the Facilitator have finished drafting the Joint Process Reforms,
they will be submitted to the Court and the Monitor. The Monitor will recommend that
the Court consider those Reforms he deems appropriate, and will then oversee their
implementation once approved by the Court.
76
See Tyehimba, 2001 WL 1842470; Pl. Inj. Mem. at 15. In the interests of
conserving resources and speeding the development of the Joint Process Reforms, the Joint
Remedial Process will not involve the development of an independent analysis by a panel of paid
experts, as proposed by plaintiffs in Pl. Inj. Mem. at 10. The participants in the Joint Remedial
Process may rely on any sources of facts deemed useful by the Facilitator, including this Court’s
findings in the Liability Opinion.
31
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9.
Filed 08/12/13 Page 32 of 39
In the event that the parties are unable to agree on Joint Process Reforms, the Facilitator
will prepare a report stating the Facilitator’s findings and recommendations based on the
Joint Remedial Process, to be submitted to the parties, the Monitor, and the Court. The
parties will have the opportunity to comment on the report and recommendations.
10.
The City will be responsible for the reasonable costs and fees of the Facilitator and the
Joint Remedial Process.
III.
REMEDIES IN LIGON
In a January 8, 2013 Opinion and Order, amended on February 14, 2013, I
granted the Ligon plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, and proposed entering several
forms of preliminary relief.77 I postponed ordering that relief until after a consolidated remedies
hearing could be held in Ligon and Floyd.78 That hearing has now concluded. The defendants in
Ligon have submitted drafts of the documents discussed in the proposed relief section of the
February 14 Opinion, the Ligon plaintiffs have proposed revisions to those drafts, and the
defendants have responded to the proposed revisions.79
Having reviewed the parties’ submissions, I am now imposing the final order of
preliminary injunctive relief in Ligon. The reasons for the ordered relief, which must be stated
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(1)(A), are the reasons stated in the February
77
See Ligon, 2013 WL 628534, at *41–44; Ligon v. City of New York, No. 12 Civ.
2274, 2013 WL 227654 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2013) (staying the sole immediate relief ordered in
the January 8 Opinion).
78
See Ligon, 2013 WL 628534, at *42.
79
See 7/8/13 Defendants’ Proposed Remedial Relief (“Ligon Def. Rem.”); Ligon Pl.
Rem.; 8/2/13 Defendants’ Reply Memorandum of Proposed Remedial Relief (“Ligon Def.
Reply”).
32
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14 Opinion.
As set forth in the February 14 Opinion, the relief falls into four categories:
policies and procedures; supervision; training; and attorney’s fees. Attorney’s fees and costs
will be rewarded as appropriate on application. With regard to policies and procedures, I am
ordering the proposed relief from the February 14 Opinion as elaborated below.
With regard to the remaining two categories of relief — supervision and training
— I am ordering the proposed relief from the February 14 Opinion, as restated below, and I am
also appointing the Monitor from Floyd, Mr. Zimroth, to oversee the detailed implementation of
these orders. I am delegating the oversight of the Ligon remedies regarding supervision and
training to the Monitor because there is substantial overlap between these remedies and the
injunctive relief concerning supervision and training in Floyd. For example, both sets of
remedies will require alterations to supervisory procedures for reviewing stops, as well as the
revision of the NYPD Legal Bureau’s slide show at Rodman’s Neck.
The purpose of consolidating the remedies hearings in Ligon and Floyd was to
avoid inefficiencies, redundancies, and inconsistencies in the remedies process.80 This purpose
can best be fulfilled by placing both the preliminary injunctive relief in Ligon and the permanent
injunctive relief in Floyd under the direction and supervision of the Monitor.
For the foregoing reasons, the Monitor is directed to oversee the City’s
compliance with the following orders.
A.
Policies and Procedures
First, as proposed in the February 14 Opinion, the NYPD is ordered to adopt a
80
Ligon, 2013 WL 227654, at *4.
33
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formal written policy specifying the limited circumstances in which it is legally permissible to
stop a person outside a TAP building on a suspicion of trespass. Specifically, the NYPD is
ordered to amend Interim Order 22 of 2012 (“IO 22”) by deleting the paragraph labeled “NOTE”
on page 2 of IO 22,81 and inserting the following paragraphs in its place:
A uniformed member of the service may approach and ask questions of a
person (that is, conduct a Level 1 request for information under DeBour) if
the uniformed member has an objective credible reason to do so. However,
mere presence in or outside a building enrolled in the Trespass Affidavit
Program is not an “objective credible reason” to approach. A uniformed
member of the service may not approach a person merely because the person
has entered or exited or is present near a building enrolled in the Trespass
Affidavit Program.
Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a person is
stopped (temporarily detained) if under the circumstances a reasonable
person would not feel free to disregard the police and walk away. A
uniformed member of the service may not stop a person on suspicion of
trespass unless the uniformed member reasonably suspects that the person
was in or is in the building without authorization.
Mere presence near, entry into, or exit out of a building enrolled in the
Trespass Affidavit Program, without more, is not sufficient to establish
reasonable suspicion for a stop on suspicion of trespass.
The NYPD is ordered to draft a FINEST message explaining the revisions to IO
22 and the need for those revisions. The FINEST message attached as Exhibit 1 to the Ligon
Plaintiffs’ Brief Concerning Defendants’ Remedial Proposals will serve as a model. The draft
will be provided to the Monitor and then to the Court for approval prior to transmission, with a
copy to plaintiffs’ counsel.
B.
Remaining Relief
The Monitor is directed to oversee the City’s compliance with the remaining
81
See Exhibit A to Ligon Def. Rem.
34
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orders discussed below. Plaintiffs do not object to many of the draft revisions submitted by the
City in response to the proposed orders.82 Where the parties disagree, the Monitor is authorized
to resolve the dispute by submitting a proposed order for the Court’s approval.
As a model for resolving the parties’ disputes, the Monitor may use this Court’s
revision of IO 22, as presented above.83 In arriving at a compromise between the parties’
proposed language, I aimed to articulate the relevant legal standards as simply and clearly as
possible. The goal must be to communicate the law to officers in a way that will be understood,
remembered, and followed. In general, plaintiffs’ proposed revisions to the City’s draft
materials make the achievement of this goal more likely.84 I note that the Monitor may depart
from the City’s draft materials even when they do not contain legally erroneous language, if
doing so would decrease the likelihood of constitutional violations.
1.
Supervision
First, the City is ordered to develop procedures for ensuring that UF-250s are
completed for every trespass stop outside a TAP building in the Bronx. A “stop” is defined as
any police encounter in which a reasonable person would not feel free to terminate the
encounter.
Second, the City is ordered to develop and implement a system for reviewing the
constitutionality of stops outside TAP buildings in the Bronx. Needless to say, any system
82
See Ligon Def. Rem. at Exs. B–F; Ligon Pl. Rem. at 4–16.
83
For the materials used in drafting the Court’s revision, see Ligon Def. Rem. at Ex.
A; Ligon Pl. Rem. at 1–4; Ligon Def. Reply at 2–4.
84
See, e.g., Ligon Pl. Rem. at 7–8 (proposing revisions to the City’s draft slide show
for officer training at Rodman’s Neck to emphasize the “free to leave” standard, where
confusion might otherwise arise).
35
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developed must not conflict with the supervisory reforms ordered in Floyd. To the extent that
supervisory review reveals that a stop has not conformed with the revised version of IO 22
described above, the supervisor will ensure that the officer has a proper understanding of what
constitutes a stop and when it is legitimate to make a stop. Copies of all reviewed UF-250s shall
be provided to plaintiffs’ counsel.
2.
Training
The City is ordered to revise the NYPD’s training materials and training programs
to conform with the law as set forth in the February 14 Opinion. The instruction must be
sufficient to uproot the longstanding misconceptions that have affected stops outside of TAP
buildings in the Bronx. It must include, but need not be limited to, the following reforms:
(1) The revised version of IO 22 described above must be distributed to each Bronx NYPD
member, and then redistributed two additional times at six-month intervals. (2) The stop and
frisk refresher course at Rodman’s Neck must be altered to incorporate instruction specifically
targeting the problem of unconstitutional trespass stops outside TAP buildings. Training
regarding stops outside TAP buildings must also be provided to new recruits, as well as any
officers who have already attended the Rodman’s Neck refresher course and are not scheduled to
do so again. (3) Chapter 16 of the Chief of Patrol Field Training Guide must be revised to
reflect the formal written policy governing trespass stops outside TAP buildings described
above. (4) SQF Training Video No. 5 must be revised to conform with the law set forth in the
February 14 Opinion and must be coordinated with the relief ordered in Floyd. The revised
video must state that the information contained in the earlier video was incorrect and explain
why it was incorrect.
36
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IV.
Filed 08/12/13 Page 37 of 39
CONCLUSION
The defendant in Floyd and the defendants in Ligon are ordered to comply with
the remedial orders described above. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close the Ligon
defendants' motion regarding proposed remedies. [No. 12 Civ. 2274, Dkt. No. 112]
Dated:
August 12, 2013
12,2013
New York, New York
37
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Filed 08/12/13 Page 38 of 39
- Appearances For Ligon Plaintiffs:
For Floyd Plaintiffs:
Christopher Dunn, Esq.
Alexis Karteron, Esq.
Taylor Pendergrass, Esq.
Daniel Mullkoff, Esq.
New York Civil Liberties Union
125 Broad Street, 19th floor
New York, NY 10004
(212) 607-3300
Darius Charney, Esq.
Sunita Patel, Esq.
Baher Azmy, Esq.
Rachel Lopez, Esq.
Ghita Schwarz, Esq.
Chauniqua Young, Esq.
Center for Constitutional Rights
666 Broadway, 7th Floor
New York, NY 10012
(212) 614-6439
Mariana Kovel, Esq.
The Bronx Defenders
860 Courtlandt Avenue
Bronx, NY 10451
(718) 508-3421
Philip I. Irwin, Esq.
Eric Hellerman, Esq.
Gretchen Hoff Varner, Esq.
Kasey Martini, Esq.
Bruce Corey, Jr., Esq.
Covington & Burling LLP
620 Eighth Avenue
New York, NY 10018
(212) 841-1000
Juan Cartagena, Esq.
Foster Maer, Esq.
Roberto Concepcion, Jr., Esq.
LatinoJustice PRLDEF
99 Hudson Street, 14th Floor
New York, NY 10013
(212) 219-3360
Jonathan Moore, Esq.
Jenn Rolnick Borchetta, Esq.
Beldock Levine & Hoffman LLP
99 Park Avenue, Suite 1600
New York, NY 10016
(212) 490-0900
John A. Nathanson, Esq.
Tiana Peterson, Esq.
Mayer Grashin, Esq.
Shearman & Sterling LLP
599 Lexington Avenue
New York, NY 10022
(212) 848-5222
38
Case 1:08-cv-01034-SAS-HBP Document 372
For Ligon and Floyd Defendants:
Brenda Cooke
Linda Donahue
Heidi Grossman
Morgan Kunz
Joseph Marutollo
Suzanna Publicker
Lisa Richardson
Cecilia Silver
Judson Vickers
Richard Weingarten
Mark Zuckerman
Assistant Corporation Counsel
New York City Law Department
100 Church Street
New York, NY 10007
(212) 788-1300
39
Filed 08/12/13 Page 39 of 39
Exhibit B
Case 1:08-cv-01034-SAS-HBP Document 373
Filed 08/12/13 Page 1 of 198
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
--------------------------------------------------------
)(
DAVID FLOYD, LALIT CLARKSON, DEON
DENNIS, and DAVID OURLICHT, individually and
on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated,
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs,
08 Civ. 1034 (SAS)
- againstTHE CITY OF NEW YORK,
Defendant.
--------------------------------------------------------
)(
I.
INTRODUCTION ...................................................... 1
II.
E)(ECUTIVE SUMMARy ............................................... 4
III.
APPLICABLE LAW ....... " .......................................... 15
A.
Monell Liability ................................................. 15
B.
Stops, Frisks, and Searches Under the Fourth Amendment ............. 18
1.
The Definition of a Stop ..................................... 19
2.
Stops Must Be Based on Reasonable Suspicion ................. 22
Protective Frisks for Weapons ............................... 23
3.
4.
Searching into Clothing for Weapons ......................... 25
5.
De Bour and the Fourth Amendment .......................... 26
C.
Equal Protection Under the Fourteenth Amendment .................. 26
IV.
FINDINGS OF FACT .................................................. 30
A.
Overview of Uncontested Statistics ................................. 30
B.
Expert Testimony ................................................ 37
1.
The Liability Experts ....................................... 37
2.
The Fourth Amendment Claim .............................. 40
a.
Overview of Key Issues ............................... 40
b.
Dr. Fagan's Method of Classifying Stops ................ 41
c.
Unreliable Stop Factors ............................... 43
d.
Quantifying the Magnitude of Apparently Unjustified Stops
Based on UF-250 Stop Factors ......................... 47
UF -250
The Fourteenth Amendment Claim ........................... 48
3.
Case 1:08-cv-01034-SAS-HBP Document 373
C.
D.
Filed 08/12/13 Page 2 of 198
a.
Overview of Key Issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
b.
Competing Benchmarks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
c.
Findings Based on Dr. Fagan’s Analyses.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Institutional Evidence of Deliberate Indifference.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
1.
Early Notice: the 1999 AG Report.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.
Pressure to Increase Stops.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
a.
Compstat: Pressure on Commanders.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
b.
Evidence of Pressure in Survey Data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
c.
Further Evidence of Pressure on Officers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
i.
Pressure Before the 2010 Quota Law.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
ii.
Pressure After 2010 Quota Law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
d.
Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.
Targeting “the Right People”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.
Inadequate Monitoring and Supervision.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
a.
Inadequate Documentation and Document Review. . . . . . . . . 89
b.
Inadequate Supervision.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.
Partially Inadequate Training. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
6.
Inadequate Discipline. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
7.
Ongoing Notice of Constitutional Violations.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Individual Stops. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
1.
Unconstitutional Stop and Frisk.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
a.
Leroy Downs.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
i.
Findings of Fact. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
ii.
Mixed Findings of Fact and Law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
b.
Devin Almonor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
i.
Findings of Fact. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
ii.
Mixed Findings of Fact and Law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
c.
Cornelio McDonald. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
i.
Findings of Fact. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
ii.
Mixed Findings of Fact and Law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
d.
Nicholas Peart — August 5, 2006. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
i.
Findings of Fact. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
ii.
Mixed Findings of Fact and Law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
e.
Nicholas Peart — April 13, 2011 Stop. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
i.
Findings of Fact. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
ii.
Mixed Findings of Fact and Law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
f.
Ian Provost. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
i.
Findings of Fact. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
ii.
Mixed Findings of Fact and Law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
g.
David Ourlicht — January 30, 2008 Stop. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
i.
Findings of Fact. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
ii.
Mixed Findings of Fact and Law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
h.
Clive Lino — February 5, 2008 Stop. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
i.
Findings of Fact. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
ii.
Mixed Findings of Fact and Law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
ii
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i.
2.
3.
Lalit Clarkson. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
i.
Findings of Fact. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
ii.
Mixed Findings of Fact and Law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
Unconstitutional Frisk Only. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
a.
Dominique Sindayiganza.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
i.
Findings of Fact. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
ii.
Mixed Findings of Law and Fact. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
b.
David Floyd — April 20, 2007 Stop. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
i.
Findings of Fact. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
ii.
Mixed Finding of Fact and Law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
c.
David Floyd — February 27, 2008 Stop.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
i.
Findings of Fact. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
ii.
Mixed Findings of Fact and Law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
d.
Clive Lino — February 24, 2011 Stop. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
i.
Findings of Fact. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
ii.
Mixed Findings of Fact and Law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
e.
Deon Dennis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
i.
Findings of Fact. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
ii.
Mixed Findings of Fact and Law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
Failure of Proof. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
a.
John Doe Stops of Nicholas Peart in Spring 2008 and February
2010 and David Ourlicht in February and June 2008. . . . . . 174
b.
Kristianna Acevedo Stop.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
c.
Clive Lino — August 3, 2008. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
V.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
A.
The City Is Liable for Violations of Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment Rights
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
1.
Deliberate Indifference. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
2.
Widespread Practice. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
B.
The City Is Liable for Violations of Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment
Rights. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
1.
Policy of Indirect Racial Profiling. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
a.
Intentionally Discriminatory Application of a Facially Neutral Policy
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
b.
Express Classification. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
c.
Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
2.
Deliberate Indifference. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
VI.
CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
iii
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SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN, U.S.D.J.:
Courts can take no better measure to assure that laws will be just than to
require that laws be equal in operation.
—
Railway Express Agency v. People of State of New York, 336 U.S.
106, 112–13 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)
It is simply fantastic to urge that [a frisk] performed in public by a policeman
while the citizen stands helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his hands raised,
is a ‘petty indignity.’
—
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1968)
Whether you stand still or move, drive above, below, or at the speed limit,
you will be described by the police as acting suspiciously should they wish
to stop or arrest you. Such subjective, promiscuous appeals to an ineffable
intuition should not be credited.
—
I.
United States v. Broomfield, 417 F.3d 654, 655 (7th Cir. 2005) (Posner, J.)
INTRODUCTION
New Yorkers are rightly proud of their city and seek to make it as safe as the
largest city in America can be. New Yorkers also treasure their liberty. Countless individuals
have come to New York in pursuit of that liberty. The goals of liberty and safety may be in
tension, but they can coexist — indeed the Constitution mandates it.
This case is about the tension between liberty and public safety in the use of a
proactive policing tool called “stop and frisk.” The New York City Police Department
(“NYPD”) made 4.4 million stops between January 2004 and June 2012. Over 80% of these 4.4
million stops were of blacks or Hispanics. In each of these stops a person’s life was interrupted.
The person was detained and questioned, often on a public street. More than half of the time the
police subjected the person to a frisk.
Plaintiffs — blacks and Hispanics who were stopped — argue that the NYPD’s
1
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use of stop and frisk violated their constitutional rights in two ways: (1) they were stopped
without a legal basis in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and (2) they were targeted for stops
because of their race in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs do not seek to end the
use of stop and frisk. Rather, they argue that it must be reformed to comply with constitutional
limits. Two such limits are paramount here: first, that all stops be based on “reasonable
suspicion” as defined by the Supreme Court of the United States;1 and second, that stops be
conducted in a racially neutral manner.2
I emphasize at the outset, as I have throughout the litigation, that this case is not
about the effectiveness of stop and frisk in deterring or combating crime. This Court’s mandate
is solely to judge the constitutionality of police behavior, not its effectiveness as a law
enforcement tool. Many police practices may be useful for fighting crime — preventive
detention or coerced confessions, for example — but because they are unconstitutional they
cannot be used, no matter how effective. “The enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily
takes certain policy choices off the table.”3
This case is also not primarily about the nineteen individual stops that were the
subject of testimony at trial.4 Rather, this case is about whether the City has a policy or custom
1
See generally U.S. CONST . amend. IV; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
2
See generally U.S. CONST . amend. XIV § 1; Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.
806, 813 (1996).
3
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008).
4
The law requires plaintiffs to produce evidence that at least some class members
have been victims of unconstitutional stops. See U.S. CONST . art. III.
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of violating the Constitution by making unlawful stops and conducting unlawful frisks.5
The Supreme Court has recognized that “the degree of community resentment
aroused by particular practices is clearly relevant to an assessment of the quality of the intrusion
upon reasonable expectations of personal security.”6 In light of the very active and public debate
on the issues addressed in this Opinion — and the passionate positions taken by both sides — it
is important to recognize the human toll of unconstitutional stops. While it is true that any one
stop is a limited intrusion in duration and deprivation of liberty, each stop is also a demeaning
and humiliating experience. No one should live in fear of being stopped whenever he leaves his
home to go about the activities of daily life. Those who are routinely subjected to stops are
overwhelmingly people of color, and they are justifiably troubled to be singled out when many
of them have done nothing to attract the unwanted attention. Some plaintiffs testified that stops
make them feel unwelcome in some parts of the City, and distrustful of the police. This
alienation cannot be good for the police, the community, or its leaders. Fostering trust and
confidence between the police and the community would be an improvement for everyone.
Plaintiffs requested that this case be tried to the Court without a jury. Because
plaintiffs seek only injunctive relief, not damages, the City had no right to demand a jury. As a
result, I must both find the facts and articulate the governing law. I have endeavored to exercise
my judgment faithfully and impartially in making my findings of fact and conclusions of law
based on the nine-week trial held from March through May of this year.
5
See Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)
(establishing the standards under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for municipal liability for constitutional torts
by employees).
6
Terry, 392 U.S. at 14 n.11.
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I begin with an Executive Summary of the most important points in the Opinion.
Next, I address the legal standards governing the ability of police to conduct stops and frisks. I
provide a statistical overview of the 4.4 million stops made between January 2004 and June
2012, followed by a discussion of the expert analyses of those stops. I then address the question
of whether the City had notice of allegations of racial profiling in the conduct of stops and frisks,
and the institutional response to that notice in terms of monitoring, supervision, training, and
discipline. After addressing these big picture issues, I make findings of fact with respect to each
of the nineteen stops of the twelve class members who provided testimony at trial.
Finally, I present my conclusions of law based on my findings of fact. I will
address the question of remedies in a separate opinion, because the remedies overlap with a
different case involving stop and frisk in which I have already found that preliminary injunctive
relief is warranted.7
It is important that this Opinion be read synergistically. Each section of the
Opinion is only a piece of the overall picture. Some will quarrel with the findings in one section
or another. But, when read as a whole, with an understanding of the interplay between each
section, I hope that this Opinion will bring more clarity and less disagreement to this complex
and sensitive issue.
II.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Plaintiffs assert that the City, and its agent the NYPD, violated both the Fourth
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. In order to hold a municipality liable for the violation of a constitutional right,
7
See Ligon v. City of New York, No. 12 Civ. 2274, 2013 WL 628534 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 14, 2013).
4
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plaintiffs “must prove that ‘action pursuant to official municipal policy’ caused the alleged
constitutional injury.”8 “Official municipal policy includes the decisions of a government’s
lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as
to practically have the force of law.”9
The Fourth Amendment protects all individuals against unreasonable searches or
seizures.10 The Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment permits the police to “stop
and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion
supported by articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot,’ even if the officer lacks
probable cause.”11 “Reasonable suspicion is an objective standard; hence, the subjective
intentions or motives of the officer making the stop are irrelevant.”12 The test for whether a stop
has taken place in the context of a police encounter is whether a reasonable person would have
felt free to terminate the encounter.13 “‘[T]o proceed from a stop to a frisk, the police officer
must reasonably suspect that the person stopped is armed and dangerous.’”14
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees to every
8
Cash v. County of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
1741 (2012) (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011)).
9
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1359.
10
See infra Part III.B.
11
United States v. Swindle, 407 F.3d 562, 566 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting United States
v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)) (some quotation marks omitted).
12
United States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 116, 133 (2d Cir. 2000).
13
See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
14
United States v. Lopez, 321 Fed. App’x 65, 67 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Arizona v.
Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326–27 (2009)).
5
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person the equal protection of the laws. It prohibits intentional discrimination based on race.
Intentional discrimination can be proved in several ways, two of which are relevant here. A
plaintiff can show: (1) that a facially neutral law or policy has been applied in an intentionally
discriminatory manner; or (2) that a law or policy expressly classifies persons on the basis of
race, and that the classification does not survive strict scrutiny. Because there is rarely direct
proof of discriminatory intent, circumstantial evidence of such intent is permitted. “The impact
of the official action — whether it bears more heavily on one race than another — may provide
an important starting point.”15
The following facts, discussed in greater detail below, are uncontested:16
•
Between January 2004 and June 2012, the NYPD conducted over 4.4 million
Terry stops.
•
The number of stops per year rose sharply from 314,000 in 2004 to a high of
686,000 in 2011.
•
52% of all stops were followed by a protective frisk for weapons. A weapon was
found after 1.5% of these frisks. In other words, in 98.5% of the 2.3 million
frisks, no weapon was found.
•
8% of all stops led to a search into the stopped person’s clothing, ostensibly based
on the officer feeling an object during the frisk that he suspected to be a weapon,
or immediately perceived to be contraband other than a weapon. In 9% of these
searches, the felt object was in fact a weapon. 91% of the time, it was not. In
14% of these searches, the felt object was in fact contraband. 86% of the time it
was not.
•
6% of all stops resulted in an arrest, and 6% resulted in a summons. The
remaining 88% of the 4.4 million stops resulted in no further law enforcement
action.
•
In 52% of the 4.4 million stops, the person stopped was black, in 31% the person
15
Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 163 (2d Cir. 2010).
16
See infra Part IV.A.
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was Hispanic, and in 10% the person was white.
•
In 2010, New York City’s resident population was roughly 23% black, 29%
Hispanic, and 33% white.
•
In 23% of the stops of blacks, and 24% of the stops of Hispanics, the officer
recorded using force. The number for whites was 17%.
•
Weapons were seized in 1.0% of the stops of blacks, 1.1% of the stops of
Hispanics, and 1.4% of the stops of whites.
•
Contraband other than weapons was seized in 1.8% of the stops of blacks, 1.7%
of the stops of Hispanics, and 2.3% of the stops of whites.
•
Between 2004 and 2009, the percentage of stops where the officer failed to state a
specific suspected crime rose from 1% to 36%.
Both parties provided extensive expert submissions and testimony that is also
discussed in detail below.17 Based on that testimony and the uncontested facts, I have made the
following findings with respect to the expert testimony.
With respect to plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim,18 I begin by noting the
inherent difficulty in making findings and conclusions regarding 4.4 million stops. Because it is
impossible to individually analyze each of those stops, plaintiffs’ case was based on the
imperfect information contained in the NYPD’s database of forms (“UF-250s”) that officers are
required to prepare after each stop. The central flaws in this database all skew toward
underestimating the number of unconstitutional stops that occur: the database is incomplete, in
that officers do not prepare a UF-250 for every stop they make; it is one-sided, in that the UF250 only records the officer’s version of the story; the UF-250 permits the officer to merely
check a series of boxes, rather than requiring the officer to explain the basis for her suspicion;
17
See infra Part IV.B.
18
See infra Part IV.B.2.
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and many of the boxes on the form are inherently subjective and vague (such as “furtive
movements”). Nonetheless, the analysis of the UF-250 database reveals that at least 200,000
stops were made without reasonable suspicion.
The actual number of stops lacking reasonable suspicion was likely far higher,
based on the reasons stated above, and the following points: (1) Dr. Fagan was unnecessarily
conservative in classifying stops as “apparently unjustified.” For example, a UF-250 on which
the officer checked only Furtive Movements (used on roughly 42% of forms) and High Crime
Area (used on roughly 55% of forms) is not classified as “apparently unjustified.” The same is
true when only Furtive Movements and Suspicious Bulge (used on roughly 10% of forms) are
checked. Finally, if an officer checked only the box marked “other” on either side of the form
(used on roughly 26% of forms), Dr. Fagan categorized this as “ungeneralizable” rather than
“apparently unjustified.” (2) Many UF-250s did not identify any suspected crime (36% of all
UF-250s in 2009). (3) The rate of arrests arising from stops is low (roughly 6%), and the yield
of seizures of guns or other contraband is even lower (roughly 0.1% and 1.8% respectively). (4)
“Furtive Movements,” “High Crime Area,” and “Suspicious Bulge” are vague and subjective
terms. Without an accompanying narrative explanation for the stop, these checkmarks cannot
reliably demonstrate individualized reasonable suspicion.
With respect to plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim,19 I reject the testimony
of the City’s experts that the race of crime suspects is the appropriate benchmark for measuring
racial bias in stops. The City and its highest officials believe that blacks and Hispanics should
be stopped at the same rate as their proportion of the local criminal suspect population. But this
19
See infra Part IV.B.3.
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reasoning is flawed because the stopped population is overwhelmingly innocent — not criminal.
There is no basis for assuming that an innocent population shares the same characteristics as the
criminal suspect population in the same area. Instead, I conclude that the benchmark used by
plaintiffs’ expert — a combination of local population demographics and local crime rates (to
account for police deployment) is the most sensible.
Based on the expert testimony I find the following: (1) The NYPD carries out
more stops where there are more black and Hispanic residents, even when other relevant
variables are held constant. The racial composition of a precinct or census tract predicts the stop
rate above and beyond the crime rate. (2) Blacks and Hispanics are more likely than whites to be
stopped within precincts and census tracts, even after controlling for other relevant variables.
This is so even in areas with low crime rates, racially heterogenous populations, or
predominately white populations. (3) For the period 2004 through 2009, when any law
enforcement action was taken following a stop, blacks were 30% more likely to be arrested (as
opposed to receiving a summons) than whites, for the same suspected crime. (4) For the period
2004 through 2009, after controlling for suspected crime and precinct characteristics, blacks who
were stopped were about 14% more likely — and Hispanics 9% more likely — than whites to be
subjected to the use of force. (5) For the period 2004 through 2009, all else being equal, the
odds of a stop resulting in any further enforcement action were 8% lower if the person stopped
was black than if the person stopped was white. In addition, the greater the black population in a
precinct, the less likely that a stop would result in a sanction. Together, these results show that
blacks are likely targeted for stops based on a lesser degree of objectively founded suspicion
than whites.
With respect to both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims, one way to
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prove that the City has a custom of conducting unconstitutional stops and frisks is to show that it
acted with deliberate indifference to constitutional deprivations caused by its employees — here,
the NYPD. The evidence at trial revealed significant evidence that the NYPD acted with
deliberate indifference.20
As early as 1999, a report from New York’s Attorney General placed the City on
notice that stops and frisks were being conducted in a racially skewed manner. Nothing was
done in response. In the years following this report, pressure was placed on supervisors to
increase the number of stops. Evidence at trial revealed that officers have been pressured to
make a certain number of stops and risk negative consequences if they fail to achieve the goal.21
Without a system to ensure that stops are justified, such pressure is a predictable formula for
producing unconstitutional stops. As one high ranking police official noted in 2010, this
pressure, without a comparable emphasis on ensuring that the activities are legally justified,
“could result in an officer taking enforcement action for the purpose of meeting a quota rather
than because a violation of the law has occurred.”22
In addition, the evidence at trial revealed that the NYPD has an unwritten policy
of targeting “the right people” for stops. In practice, the policy encourages the targeting of
young black and Hispanic men based on their prevalence in local crime complaints.23 This is a
form of racial profiling. While a person’s race may be important if it fits the description of a
20
See infra Part IV.C.
21
See infra Part IV.C.2.
22
2010 Memorandum of Chief of Patrol James Hall, Plaintiffs’ Trial Exhibit (“PX”)
290 at *0096.
23
See infra Part IV.C.3.
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particular crime suspect, it is impermissible to subject all members of a racially defined group to
heightened police enforcement because some members of that group are criminals. The Equal
Protection Clause does not permit race-based suspicion.
Much evidence was introduced regarding inadequate monitoring and supervision
of unconstitutional stops. Supervisors routinely review the productivity of officers, but do not
review the facts of a stop to determine whether it was legally warranted. Nor do supervisors
ensure that an officer has made a proper record of a stop so that it can be reviewed for
constitutionality. Deficiencies were also shown in the training of officers with respect to stop
and frisk and in the disciplining of officers when they were found to have made a bad stop or
frisk. Despite the mounting evidence that many bad stops were made, that officers failed to
make adequate records of stops, and that discipline was spotty or non-existent, little has been
done to improve the situation.
One example of poor training is particularly telling. Two officers testified to their
understanding of the term “furtive movements.” One explained that “furtive movement is a very
broad concept,” and could include a person “changing direction,” “walking in a certain way,”
“[a]cting a little suspicious,” “making a movement that is not regular,” being “very fidgety,”
“going in and out of his pocket,” “going in and out of a location,” “looking back and forth
constantly,” “looking over their shoulder,” “adjusting their hip or their belt,” “moving in and out
of a car too quickly,” “[t]urning a part of their body away from you,” “[g]rabbing at a certain
pocket or something at their waist,” “getting a little nervous, maybe shaking,” and
“stutter[ing].”24 Another officer explained that “usually” a furtive movement is someone
24
4/18 Trial Transcript (“Tr.”) at 4047–4049 (emphasis added).
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“hanging out in front of [a] building, sitting on the benches or something like that” and then
making a “quick movement,” such as “bending down and quickly standing back up,” “going
inside the lobby . . . and then quickly coming back out,” or “all of a sudden becom[ing] very
nervous, very aware.”25 If officers believe that the behavior described above constitutes furtive
movement that justifies a stop, then it is no surprise that stops so rarely produce evidence of
criminal activity.
I now summarize my findings with respect to the individual stops that were the
subject of testimony at trial.26 Twelve plaintiffs testified regarding nineteen stops. In twelve of
those stops, both the plaintiffs and the officers testified. In seven stops no officer testified, either
because the officers could not be identified or because the officers dispute that the stop ever
occurred. I find that nine of the stops and frisks were unconstitutional — that is, they were not
based on reasonable suspicion. I also find that while five other stops were constitutional, the
frisks following those stops were unconstitutional. Finally, I find that plaintiffs have failed to
prove an unconstitutional stop (or frisk) in five of the nineteen stops. The individual stop
testimony corroborated much of the evidence about the NYPD’s policies and practices with
respect to carrying out and monitoring stops and frisks.
In making these decisions I note that evaluating a stop in hindsight is an imperfect
procedure. Because there is no contemporaneous recording of the stop (such as could be
achieved through the use of a body-worn camera), I am relegated to finding facts based on the
often conflicting testimony of eyewitnesses. This task is not easy, as every witness has an
25
5/9 Tr. at 6431–6433.
26
See infra Part IV.D.
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interest in the outcome of the case, which may consciously or unconsciously affect the veracity
of his or her testimony. Nonetheless, a judge is tasked with making decisions and I judged the
evidence of each stop to the best of my ability. I am also aware that a judge deciding whether a
stop is constitutional, with the time to reflect and consider all of the evidence, is in a far different
position than officers on the street who must make split-second decisions in situations that may
pose a danger to themselves or others. I respect that police officers have chosen a profession of
public service involving dangers and challenges with few parallels in civilian life.27
In conclusion, I find that the City is liable for violating plaintiffs’ Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. The City acted with deliberate indifference toward the NYPD’s
practice of making unconstitutional stops and conducting unconstitutional frisks. Even if the
City had not been deliberately indifferent, the NYPD’s unconstitutional practices were
sufficiently widespread as to have the force of law. In addition, the City adopted a policy of
indirect racial profiling by targeting racially defined groups for stops based on local crime
suspect data. This has resulted in the disproportionate and discriminatory stopping of blacks and
Hispanics in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Both statistical and anecdotal evidence
showed that minorities are indeed treated differently than whites. For example, once a stop is
made, blacks and Hispanics are more likely to be subjected to the use of force than whites,
despite the fact that whites are more likely to be found with weapons or contraband. I also
conclude that the City’s highest officials have turned a blind eye to the evidence that officers are
27
“Throughout the country, police work diligently every day trying to prevent
crime, arrest those who are responsible, and protect victims from crimes that undermine their
dignity and threaten their safety. They work for relatively low pay for the risks that they take,
and although in some communities their role is respected and admired, in other communities
they are vilified and treated as outcasts.” CHARLES OGLETREE , THE PRESUMPTION OF GUILT 125
(2012).
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conducting stops in a racially discriminatory manner. In their zeal to defend a policy that they
believe to be effective, they have willfully ignored overwhelming proof that the policy of
targeting “the right people” is racially discriminatory and therefore violates the United States
Constitution. One NYPD official has even suggested that it is permissible to stop racially
defined groups just to instill fear in them that they are subject to being stopped at any time for
any reason — in the hope that this fear will deter them from carrying guns in the streets. The
goal of deterring crime is laudable, but this method of doing so is unconstitutional.
I recognize that the police will deploy their limited resources to high crime areas.
This benefits the communities where the need for policing is greatest. But the police are not
permitted to target people for stops based on their race. Some may worry about the implications
of this decision. They may wonder: if the police believe that a particular group of people is
disproportionately responsible for crime in one area, why should the police not target that group
with increased stops? Why should it matter if the group is defined in part by race?28 Indeed,
there are contexts in which the Constitution permits considerations of race in law enforcement
operations.29 What is clear, however, is that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the practices
described in this case. A police department may not target a racially defined group for stops in
general — that is, for stops based on suspicions of general criminal wrongdoing — simply
28
I note again that based on the uncontested statistics, see infra Part IV.A, the
NYPD’s current use of stop and frisk has not been particularly successful in producing arrests or
seizures of weapons or other contraband.
29
For example, as discussed at length in this Opinion, race is a permissible
consideration where there is a specific suspect description that includes race. See, e.g., Brown v.
City of Oneonta, New York, 221 F.3d 329, 340 (2d Cir. 2000).
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because members of that group appear frequently in the police department’s suspect data.30 The
Equal Protection Clause does not permit the police to target a racially defined group as a whole
because of the misdeeds of some of its members.
To address the violations that I have found, I shall order various remedies
including, but not limited to, an immediate change to certain policies and activities of the NYPD,
a trial program requiring the use of body-worn cameras in one precinct per borough, a
community-based joint remedial process to be conducted by a court-appointed facilitator, and the
appointment of an independent monitor to ensure that the NYPD’s conduct of stops and frisks is
carried out in accordance with the Constitution and the principles enunciated in this Opinion, and
to monitor the NYPD’s compliance with the ordered remedies.
III.
APPLICABLE LAW
A.
Monell Liability
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code (“section 1983”) creates “‘a
species of tort liability’” for, among other things, certain violations of constitutional rights.31 As
the Supreme Court established in Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services,32 in
30
Cf. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41–42 (2000) (holding that
while suspicionless stops at a highway checkpoint may be constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment when “designed primarily to serve purposes closely related to the problems of
policing the border or the necessity of ensuring roadway safety,” highway stops that lack “some
measure of individualized suspicion” and “whose primary purpose [is] to detect evidence of
ordinary criminal wrongdoing” contravene the Fourth Amendment).
31
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483 (1994) (quoting Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist.
v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305 (1986)).
32
Interpreting the language of section 1983 and the legislative history surrounding
its passage in the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the Court in Monell held that local governing bodies
could be held liable either on the basis of formally approved policies or on the basis of
“‘customs’” or “‘usages.’” Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978) (quoting Adickes v. S. H. Kress
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order to have recourse against a municipality or other local government under section 1983,
plaintiffs “must prove that ‘action pursuant to official municipal policy’ caused the alleged
constitutional injury.”33 “In other words, municipalities are ‘responsible only for their own
illegal acts,’ and cannot be held ‘vicariously liable under § 1983 for their employees’ actions.’”34
In general, “[o]fficial municipal policy includes the decisions of a government’s lawmakers, the
acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically
have the force of law.”35 Such policies “may be pronounced or tacit and reflected in either action
or inaction.”36
One way to establish the existence of a municipal policy or custom is through a
showing of “deliberate indifference” by high-level officials. “‘[W]here a policymaking official
exhibits deliberate indifference to constitutional deprivations caused by subordinates, such that
the official’s inaction constitutes a deliberate choice, that acquiescence may be properly thought
of as a city policy or custom that is actionable under § 1983.’”37 Deliberate indifference requires
& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167–68 (1970)).
33
Cash, 654 F.3d at 333 (quoting Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1359, in turn quoting
Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (quotation marks omitted)). Cases after Monell “considerably
broadened the concept of official municipal action.” Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361
F.3d 113, 125 (2d Cir. 2004) (Sotomayor, J.).
34
Cash, 654 F.3d at 333 (quoting Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1359) (some quotation
marks omitted).
35
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1359 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Pembaur v.
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986); Adickes, 398 U.S. at 167–68).
36
Cash, 654 F.3d at 334.
37
Id. (quoting Amnesty, 361 F.3d at 126).
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“‘proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.’”38
Recognizing that deliberate indifference is “a stringent standard of fault,” the Second Circuit
requires “that the policymaker’s inaction was the result of ‘conscious choice’ and not ‘mere
negligence.’”39
A municipality may incur Monell liability based on deliberate indifference
through its training and supervision practices. “[D]eliberate indifference may be inferred where
‘the need for more or better supervision to protect against constitutional violations was obvious,’
but the policymaker ‘fail[ed] to make meaningful efforts to address the risk of harm to
plaintiffs[.]’”40 Although “[a] municipality’s culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most
tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train,”41 the Supreme Court has held that “[w]hen city
policymakers are on actual or constructive notice that a particular omission in their training
program causes city employees to violate citizens’ constitutional rights, the city may be deemed
deliberately indifferent if the policymakers choose to retain that program.”42
In Walker v. City of New York, the Second Circuit framed the deliberate
indifference inquiry in three parts:
38
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1359 (quoting Board of Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown,
520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997)).
39
Cash, 654 F.3d at 334 (quoting Connick, 131 S.Ct at 1360; Amnesty, 361 F.3d at
128).
40
Id. (quoting Vann v. City of New York, 72 F.3d 1040, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995);
Reynolds v. Giuliani, 506 F.3d 183, 192 (2d Cir. 2007)).
41
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1359 (citing Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808,
822–23 (1985) (plurality opinion)).
42
Id. (citing Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 407).
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(1) [the] policymaker knows “to a moral certainty” that its employees will
confront a given situation; (2) either [the] situation presents employees with
[a] difficult choice that will be made less so by training or supervision, or
there is a record of employees mishandling [the] situation; and (3) [a] wrong
choice by employees will frequently cause [the] deprivation of constitutional
rights.43
“Where the plaintiff establishes all three elements, then . . . the policymaker should have known
that inadequate training or supervision was ‘so likely to result in the violation of constitutional
rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately
indifferent to the need.’”44 “A pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained
employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure
to train.”45
B.
Stops, Frisks, and Searches Under the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment,46 states: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
43
Cash, 654 F.3d at 334 (citing Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 297–98
(2d Cir. 1992)).
44
Walker, 974 F.2d at 298 (quoting City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,
390 (1989)). In order to establish Monell liability based on the Walker test, plaintiffs must also,
of course, show that the training or supervision was in fact inadequate and that this inadequacy
caused plaintiffs’ constitutional injuries. See Reynolds, 506 F.3d at 193.
45
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1360 (quoting Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 409). By contrast,
“once a municipal policy is established, ‘it requires only one application . . . to satisfy fully
Monell’s requirement that a municipal corporation be held liable only for constitutional
violations resulting from the municipality’s official policy.’” Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 478 n.6
(quoting Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 822) (emphasis added).
46
See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 369 (2003) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961)).
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effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”47 The Supreme
Court of the United States has repeatedly affirmed that “the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’”48 The Supreme Court has held that under the Fourth
Amendment, it is constitutionally reasonable for the police to “stop and briefly detain a person
for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts
that criminal activity ‘may be afoot,’ even if the officer lacks probable cause.”49 This form of
investigative detention is now known as a Terry stop.50
1.
The Definition of a Stop
As the Supreme Court reaffirmed in Florida v. Bostick, the test for determining
whether a Terry stop is taking place “is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline
the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.”51 Whether a stop has taken place
depends on “whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the
47
U.S. CONST . amend. IV.
48
Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). Accord Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108–09 (1977) (per curiam) (“The touchstone of our analysis under the
Fourth Amendment is always ‘the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular
governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.’” (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19)).
49
Swindle, 407 F.3d at 566 (quoting Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7) (some quotation marks
omitted).
50
See Davis v. City of New York, 902 F. Supp. 2d 405, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing
Terry, 392 U.S. at 88).
51
501 U.S. at 436. The “free to terminate the encounter” standard is a more general
formulation of Justice Potter Stewart’s “free to leave” standard in United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (“[A] person has been ‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable
person would have believed that he was not free to leave.”). See also Terry, 392 U.S. at 16 (“It
must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his
freedom to walk away, he has ‘seized’ that person.”).
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police conduct would ‘have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to
ignore the police presence and go about his business.’”52
While the Supreme Court explicitly refrained from determining whether a seizure
occurred in Bostick,53 it noted several types of police encounters that were not necessarily
stops.54 However, the Court confirmed that even in these cases, the “free to terminate the
encounter” standard applies: “[E]ven when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular
individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual; ask to examine the individual’s
identification; and request consent to search his or her luggage — as long as the police do not
convey a message that compliance with their requests is required.”55 The Bostick majority
emphasized that police officers may not “demand of passengers their ‘voluntary’ cooperation”
through “‘an intimidating show of authority.’”56
52
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437 (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 569
(1988)). Bostick also notes that “the ‘reasonable person’ test presupposes an innocent person.”
Id. at 438. For a comprehensive summary of the “free to leave” test as it has been interpreted
and applied, see 4 WAYNE R. LA FAVE , SEARCH & SEIZURE § 9.4(a) (5th ed. 2012) (“LA FAVE ”).
53
See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437.
54
See id. at 434–35.
55
Id. (collecting cases) (emphasis added and citations omitted). Accord INS v.
Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984) (“[P]olice questioning, by itself, is unlikely to result in a
Fourth Amendment violation . . . [u]nless the circumstances of the encounter are so intimidating
as to demonstrate that a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave if he had
not responded.” (emphasis added)). These cases confirm that the manner and context of police
conduct are relevant to the inquiry into whether a reasonable person would have felt free to
terminate the encounter. As the Second Circuit has noted, this inquiry is essentially “an
objective assessment of the overall coercive effect of the police conduct.” United States v. Lee,
916 F.2d 814, 819 (2d Cir. 1990) (citing Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 573–74).
56
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 438 (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 447 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting)) (emphasis omitted).
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The Second Circuit has held that the following factors are indicative of a
“seizure,” a term that encompasses both Terry stops and arrests:
the threatening presence of several officers; the display of a weapon; the
physical touching of the person by the officer; language or tone indicating
that compliance with the officer was compulsory; prolonged retention of a
person’s personal effects, such as airplane tickets or identification; and a
request by the officer to accompany him to the police station or a police
room.57
The following summarizes two examples of police encounters that the Second Circuit held to be
Terry stops, despite their arguably low level of coercion:
The Second Circuit has held . . . that a stop took place where an officer twice
ordered a person to “hold on a second,” and after the second order the person
stopped. The Second Circuit also held that a stop occurred where an officer
pointing a spotlight at a person said, “What, are you stupid? Come here. I
want to talk to you,” and then told the person to show his hands.58
By contrast, the Second Circuit held that no Terry stop took place “where a person encountered
two officers in his dorm lobby, and the officers asked him to show them his hands.”59
In sum, the test for whether a Terry stop has taken place in the context of a police
encounter is whether a reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the encounter. The
Second Circuit has further held: “[a] seizure occurs when (1) a person obeys a police officer’s
57
United States v. Glover, 957 F.2d 1004, 1008 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing Lee, 916 F.2d
at 819). Accord United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 203–04 (2002) (concluding, under
Bostick framework, that a reasonable passenger on a bus would feel free to leave, where
“officers gave the passengers no reason to believe that they were required to answer the officers’
questions,” and the officer asking questions of passengers “did not brandish a weapon or make
any intimidating movements,” “left the aisle free so that respondents could exit,” and “spoke to
passengers one by one and in a polite, quiet voice”).
58
Ligon, 2013 WL 628534, at *36 (citing United States v. Simmons, 560 F.3d 98,
101, 105–06 (2d Cir. 2009); Brown, 221 F.3d at 340).
59
Id. at *36 n.410 (citing Brown, 221 F.3d at 341).
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order to stop or (2) a person that does not submit to an officer’s show of authority is physically
restrained.”60
2.
Stops Must Be Based on Reasonable Suspicion
In order for a Terry stop to comply with the Fourth Amendment, it must be based
on a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity “may be afoot.”61 That is, the police may make a
Terry stop “when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or
is about to be engaged in criminal activity.”62 At minimum, “‘[t]he officer [making a Terry stop]
. . . must be able to articulate something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
hunch.’”63 That is, “[p]olice ‘must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion [on a
citizen’s liberty interest].’”64 “Reasonable suspicion is an objective standard; hence, the
subjective intentions or motives of the officer making the stop are irrelevant.”65
60
Simmons, 560 F.3d at 105 (citing Swindle, 407 F.3d at 572).
61
Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
62
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702 (1983) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 22).
Although the Court in Terry did not explicitly refer to crimes that are “about to be” committed,
the stop upheld in Terry was based on a police officer’s suspicion that two men were about to
carry out a “stick-up.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 6. It has long been recognized that arrests may be
based on probable cause to believe that a crime is about to be committed. The New York stop
and frisk statute, New York Criminal Procedure Law (“CPL”) § 140.50(1), allows stops when an
officer “reasonably suspects that such person is committing, has committed or is about to
commit either (a) a felony or (b) a misdemeanor defined in the penal law.”
63
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990) (quoting Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7)
(some quotation marks omitted). Courts are divided over whether reasonable suspicion must be
of a particular crime, or may be of criminality in general. See 4 LA FAVE § 9.5(c).
64
United States v. Elmore, 482 F.3d 172, 178–79 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Terry, 392
U.S. at 21).
65
Bayless, 201 F.3d at 133.
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In general, reasonable suspicion requires an individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing.66 While the Supreme Court has recognized certain narrow exceptions to this
requirement, there is no exception for stops of pedestrians for the general purpose of controlling
crime.67
Courts reviewing stops for reasonable suspicion “must look at ‘the totality of the
circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and
objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.”68 “[T]he proper inquiry is not whether each
fact considered in isolation denotes unlawful behavior, but whether all the facts taken together
support a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing.”69 “While ‘reasonable suspicion’ is a less
demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than
preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of
objective justification for making the stop.”70
3.
Protective Frisks for Weapons
The Supreme Court has recognized that a police officer making an investigatory
66
See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37 (citing Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308
(1997)).
67
See id. at 37–40 (summarizing exceptions); id. at 34, 41–44 (distinguishing
between suspicionless stops at highway checkpoints “for the purposes of combating drunk
driving and intercepting illegal immigrants,” which are constitutional; and suspicionless stops at
checkpoints that primarily aim to advance “‘the general interest in crime control,’” which are
unconstitutional (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 n.18 (1979))).
68
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quoting United States v.
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981)).
69
Lee, 916 F.2d at 819.
70
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000).
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stop “should not be denied the opportunity to protect himself from attack by a hostile suspect.”71
As a result, “a law enforcement officer, for his own protection and safety, may conduct a
patdown to find weapons that he reasonably believes or suspects are then in the possession of the
person he has accosted.”72 “‘[T]o proceed from a stop to a frisk, the police officer must
reasonably suspect that the person stopped is armed and dangerous.’”73 “The test is an objective
rather than a subjective one, . . . and thus it is not essential that the officer actually have been in
fear.”74
“The purpose of [a frisk for weapons] is not to discover evidence of crime, but to
71
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 24).
72
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93 (1979) (citing Adams, 407 U.S. at 146).
73
Lopez, 321 Fed. App’x at 67 (quoting Johnson, 555 U.S. at 326–27 ) (holding that
the following behavior provided reasonable suspicion that a suspect was carrying a weapon:
“[w]hen [the suspect] saw [the officer] approaching him, [the suspect] transferred [a] cup from
his right to his left hand and dropped his right hand to his right side”). Accord 4 LA FAVE §
9.6(a) (noting that “assuming a proper stopping for investigation, a protective search is
permissible when, at the time the frisk itself is commenced, there is reason to believe that the
suspect may be armed and dangerous”).
74
4 LA FAVE § 9.6(a) (citing United States v. Tharpe, 536 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir.
1976)). Trial courts “have been inclined to view the right to frisk as being ‘automatic’ whenever
the suspect has been stopped upon the suspicion [of a criminal activity] for which the offender
would likely be armed,” such as “robbery, burglary, rape, assault with weapons, car theft,
homicide, and dealing in large quantities of narcotics.” Id.
I note that the New York stop and frisk statute authorizes an officer to conduct a
frisk whenever, after a stop, he “reasonably suspects that he is in danger of physical injury.”
CPL § 140.50(3). This standard is not the constitutional standard. It would allow an officer to
conduct a frisk even when she lacks reasonable suspicion that the stopped person is armed and
dangerous. As the Supreme Court has made clear, New York “may not . . . authorize police
conduct which trenches upon Fourth Amendment rights.” Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 61
(1968). The Fourth Amendment, and not New York law, establishes the requirements for a
constitutional frisk in this case.
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allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence.”75 Thus, the frisk must be
“limited in scope to this protective purpose,”76 and “strictly ‘limited to that which is necessary
for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby.’”77
However, when an officer “lawfully pats down a suspect’s outer clothing and feels an object
whose contour or mass makes its identity [as contraband] immediately apparent,” the officer may
seize the contraband without a warrant.78 In sum, “[n]othing in Terry can be understood to allow
a generalized ‘cursory search for weapons’ or indeed, any search whatever for anything but
weapons.”79
4.
Searching into Clothing for Weapons
Just as reasonableness is the touchstone for the Fourth Amendment generally,
reasonable suspicion provides the standard at each stage of a Terry stop. Once an officer has
lawfully stopped someone based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the officer may
lawfully frisk the stopped person based on reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and
dangerous. If the frisk gives rise to reasonable suspicion that an object in the clothing of the
stopped person is a weapon that could be used to harm the officer, then the officer may take
whatever action is necessary to examine the object and protect himself — including removing
75
Adams, 407 U.S. at 146.
76
Id.
77
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at
78
Id. at 375 (emphasis added).
79
Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 93–94.
26).
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the object from the clothing of the stopped person.80
5.
De Bour and the Fourth Amendment
The NYPD’s training materials place great importance on the New York state
common law of stops, as articulated in People v. De Bour and its progeny.81 Because De Bour
and the Fourth Amendment draw the line between permissible and impermissible police
encounters in different ways, De Bour is in some respects more protective of liberty from
governmental intrusion than the Fourth Amendment, and in other respects less.82 The Supreme
Court has held that although states may impose greater restrictions on police conduct than those
established by the Fourth Amendment, a state “may not . . . authorize police conduct which
trenches upon Fourth Amendment rights, regardless of the labels which it attaches to such
conduct.”83 Thus, even where a police encounter would be permissible under De Bour, it
remains unlawful if it violates the Fourth Amendment.
C.
Equal Protection Under the Fourteenth Amendment
80
See People v. Collins, 463 P.2d 403, 406 (Cal. 1970) (holding “that an officer
who exceeds a pat-down without first discovering an object which feels reasonably like a knife,
gun, or club must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which reasonably support a
suspicion that the particular suspect is armed with an atypical weapon which would feel like the
object felt during the pat-down”).
81
People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976). See, e.g., Ligon, 2013 WL 628534, at
*35–39. I note that the NYPD’s policies and training materials also draw from New York’s stop
and frisk statute. Compare, e.g., Patrol Guide 212-11: Stop and Frisk, PX 98, at 1, with CPL
§ 140.50. As noted earlier, the New York statutory standard for a frisk is not the Fourth
Amendment standard as defined by the Supreme Court.
82
See Davis v. City of New York, No. 10 Civ. 0699, 2013 WL 1288176, at *6 n.75
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2013).
83
Sibron, 392 U.S. at 61 (reversing conviction for failure to suppress evidence
seized in an unlawful stop).
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The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause declares that “[n]o State
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”84 The
Clause “is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”85 It
prohibits intentional discrimination on the basis of race, but not government action that merely
has a disproportionate racial impact.86
The Second Circuit has outlined “several ways for a plaintiff to plead intentional
discrimination that violates the Equal Protection Clause.”87 First, “[a] plaintiff could point to a
84
U.S. CONST . amend. XIV § 1.
85
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
86
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–40 (1976). I note that the parties
sometimes use the phrase “pattern and practice” in referring to plaintiffs’ constitutional claims.
See, e.g., 6/12/13 Post-Trial Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Claims (“Pl. Mem.”)
at i–ii; 6/12/13 Defendant’s Post-Trial Memorandum of Law (“Def. Mem.”) at 6 n.11. However,
pattern or practice analysis does not govern equal protection claims. See Chavez v. Illinois State
Police, 251 F.3d 612, 638 n.8 (7th Cir. 2001). Rather, the term “pattern or practice” appears in
civil rights statutes such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as well as several “statutes
authorizing the Attorney General to bring suits to remedy discrimination.” Marshall Miller,
Police Brutality, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV . 149–151, 169 & n.124 (1998) (discussing Title XXI
of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14141,
which allows the Attorney General to sue law enforcement agencies that “engage in a pattern or
practice” of unconstitutional conduct).
I also note that despite the occasional use of the terms “disparate treatment” and
“disparate impact” by the parties’ experts, see infra Part IV.B.3, these terms of art are generally
applied to Title VII and other statutory claims, not equal protection claims. See, e.g., Ricci v.
DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009) (“Title VII prohibits both intentional discrimination
(known as ‘disparate treatment’) as well as, in some cases, practices that are not intended to
discriminate but in fact have a disproportionately adverse effect on minorities (known as
‘disparate impact’).”). The New York City Council recently passed a bill that would create a
private right of action for claims of “bias-based profiling” based on discriminatory intent or
disparate impact. See N.Y. City Council Introductory No. 1080 of 2013 § 2.
87
Brown, 221 F.3d at 337. Accord Pyke v. Cuomo (“Pyke II”), 567 F.3d 74, 76 (2d
Cir. 2009) (citing Pyke v. Cuomo (“Pyke I”), 258 F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 2001)).
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law or policy that ‘expressly classifies persons on the basis of race.’”88 Second, “a plaintiff
could identify a facially neutral law or policy that has been applied in an intentionally
discriminatory manner.”89 Third, “[a] plaintiff could also allege that a facially neutral statute or
policy has an adverse effect and that it was motivated by discriminatory animus.”90 In none of
these three cases is a plaintiff “obligated to show a better treated, similarly situated group of
individuals of a different race in order to establish a claim of denial of equal protection.”91
In order to show intentional discrimination under the second and third models of
pleading above, plaintiffs need not prove that the “‘challenged action rested solely on racially
discriminatory purposes,’”92 or even that a discriminatory purpose “was the ‘dominant’ or
88
Brown, 221 F.3d at 337 (quoting Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 48
(2d Cir. 1999)). An express racial classification is “subject to strict judicial scrutiny.” Pyke II,
567 F.3d at 77 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); Johnson v. California, 543 U.S.
499, 505 (2005) (holding that “all racial classification” imposed by government “must be
analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny”)). Accord Fisher v. University of Texas at
Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013) (“[A]ny official action that treats a person differently on
account of his race or ethnic origin is inherently suspect.” (quotation marks and citation omitted,
and emphasis added)). “In order to satisfy strict scrutiny, a classification must further a
compelling state interest and be narrowly tailored to accomplish the purpose.” Pyke II, 567 F.3d
at 77 (citing Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908 (1996)).
89
Brown, 221 F.3d at 337 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74
(1886)).
90
Id. (citing Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 264–65 (1977); Johnson v. Wing, 178 F.3d 611, 615 (2d Cir. 1999)).
91
Pyke I, 258 F.3d at 110. An exception exists for plaintiffs alleging a selective
prosecution in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. In order to prevail on this claim,
plaintiffs “must plead and establish the existence of similarly situated individuals who were not
prosecuted; that is because courts grant special deference to the executive branch in the
performance of the ‘core’ executive function of deciding whether to prosecute.” Pyke I, 258
F.3d at 109 (citing United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996)).
92
Paterson, 594 F.3d at 163 (quoting Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265).
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‘primary’ one.”93 Rather, plaintiffs must prove that “a discriminatory purpose has been a
motivating factor” in the challenged action.94 That is, plaintiffs must show that those who
carried out the challenged action “selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in
part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”95 As
the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit have explained:
Because discriminatory intent is rarely susceptible to direct proof, litigants
may make “a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence
of intent as may be available. The impact of the official action — whether
it bears more heavily on one race than another — may provide an important
starting point.”96
The consequences of government action are sometimes evidence of the government’s intent:
“proof of discriminatory intent must necessarily usually rely on objective factors . . . . The
inquiry is practical. What a legislature or any official entity is ‘up to’ may be plain from the
results its actions achieve, or the results they avoid.”97 “‘Once it is shown that a decision was
motivated at least in part by a racially discriminatory purpose, the burden shifts to the defendant
to show that the same result would have been reached even without consideration of race.’”98
93
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265.
94
Id. at 265–66 (emphasis added). Accord Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256, 277 (1979) (“Discriminatory intent is simply not amenable to calibration. It either
is a factor that has influenced the [governmental action] or it is not.”).
95
Paterson, 594 F.3d at 163 (quoting Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279 (citation and footnote
omitted)) (some quotation marks omitted).
96
Id. (quoting Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266).
97
Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279 n.24. “An invidious discriminatory purpose may often
be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the
[practice] bears more heavily on one race than another.” Washington, 426 U.S. at 242.
98
United States v. City of Yonkers, 96 F.3d 600, 612 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting United
States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1217 (2d Cir. 1987)).
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“‘If the defendant comes forward with no such proof or if the trier of fact is unpersuaded that
race did not contribute to the outcome of the decision, the equal protection claim is
established.’”99
IV.
FINDINGS OF FACT
A non-jury trial on liability and remedies was held between March 18 and May
20, 2013.100 Based on the preponderance of the credible evidence,101 as well as the parties’ posttrial submissions, the following are my findings of fact pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(a).102
A.
Overview of Uncontested Statistics
Officers are required to complete a UF-250 form, also known as a “Stop,
99
Id. (quoting Yonkers, 837 F.2d at 1217).
100
Plaintiffs filed the case on January 31, 2008. On August 31, 2011, I granted in
part and denied in part defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment. See Floyd v. City of
New York, 813 F. Supp. 2d 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), partial reconsideration granted, 813 F. Supp.
2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). On April 14, 2012, I granted in part and denied in part defendants’
motion to exclude the testimony of plaintiffs’ liability expert. See Floyd v. City of New York,
861 F. Supp. 2d 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). On May 16, 2012, I granted plaintiffs’ motion to be
certified as a class. See Floyd v. City of New York, 283 F.R.D. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). In an order
entered March 8, 2013, I approved the parties’ stipulation withdrawing plaintiffs’ damages
claims, dismissing plaintiffs’ claims against individual officers, and altering the caption to reflect
the remaining parties. See Stipulation and Order of Withdrawal of Individual Damage Claims
(3/8/13). Plaintiffs have not pursued the state law claims in their Second Amended Complaint.
See Second Amended Complaint (10/20/08); Pl. Mem. at i–ii; Def. Mem. at 2 n.2. Plaintiffs’
only claims are section 1983 claims against the City for Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
violations.
101
“To establish by a preponderance of the evidence means very simply to prove that
something is more likely than not so.” Duke Labs., Inc. v. United States, 222 F. Supp. 400, 406
(D. Conn. 1963), aff’d, 337 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1964).
102
“In an action tried on the facts without a jury . . . , the court must find the facts
specially and state its conclusions of law separately.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1).
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Question and Frisk Report Worksheet,” after each Terry stop. Each side of the form contains
checkboxes and fields in which officers are required to indicate the nature of the stop and the
circumstances that led to and justified the stop (the “stop factors”). A copy of a blank UF-250
appears as Appendix A to this Opinion.103
Plaintiffs’ liability expert, Dr. Jeffrey Fagan, conducted various statistical
analyses of UF-250s based on an electronic database containing the information on the forms.104
The more complicated and contested statistical analyses will be discussed below.105 In this
section, I summarize the most relevant uncontested statistics culled from the UF-250 database:106
•
Between January 2004 and June 2012,107 the NYPD conducted over 4.4 million Terry
103
See infra App. A (“Blank UF-250”).
104
See Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D. (Oct. 15, 2010), PX 411 (“Fagan Rpt.”);
Supplemental Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D. (Dec. 3, 2010), PX 412 (“Fagan Supp. Rpt.”);
Second Supplemental Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D. (Nov. 29, 2012), PX 417 (“Fagan 2d Supp.
Rpt.”).
105
See infra Part IV.B. The City’s liability experts concede that Dr. Fagan’s
“descriptive statistics are not a source of contention.” Report of Dennis C. Smith, Ph.D. and
Robert M. Purtell, Ph.D. in Response to the Second Supplemental Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D.
(Feb. 1, 2013), Defendant’s Trial Exhibit (“DX”) H13, at 7 (“Smith Rpt.”). I rely on the Smith
Report for most of my citations to Dr. Smith’s and Dr. Purtell’s written opinions, although they
had prepared prior written opinions. See, e.g., Report of Dennis C. Smith, Ph.D. (Nov. 15,
2010), DX T8; Declaration of Dennis C. Smith (Dec. 19, 2011), DX O8.
106
Of course, if an officer decides that he has not made a Terry stop, or simply fails
to complete a UF-250 after a stop, then the encounter will not be reflected in the UF-250
database. See infra Part IV.C.4–5 (evidence of inadequate training regarding what constitutes a
Terry stop, and of failures to fill out UF-250s).
107
These dates are the class period in this case. Dr. Fagan’s October 2010 and
December 2010 reports analyzed data from January 1, 2004 through December 31, 2009, while
his November 2012 report analyzed data from January 1, 2010 through June 30, 2012. See
Fagan 2d Supp. Rpt. at 1.
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stops.108
•
The number of stops per year rose sharply from 314,000 in 2004 to a high of 686,000
in 2011.109
•
52% of all stops were followed by a protective frisk for weapons. A weapon was
found after 1.5% of these frisks. In other words, in 98.5% of the 2.3 million frisks,
no weapon was found.110
•
8% of all stops led to a search into the stopped person’s clothing, ostensibly based
on the officer feeling an object during the frisk that he suspected to be a weapon, or
immediately perceived to be contraband other than a weapon. In 9% of these
searches, the felt object was in fact a weapon. 91% of the time, it was not. In 14%
of these searches, the felt object was in fact contraband. 86% of the time it was
not.111
•
6% of all stops resulted in an arrest, and 6% resulted in a summons. The remaining
88% of the 4.4 million stops resulted in no further law enforcement action.112
108
The City counts a total of 4,431,414 UF-250s, while plaintiffs count a total of
4,430,140. See DX V14-A; PX 417D; Fagan 2d Supp. Rpt. at 10 tbl. 1. While I use the 4.4
million figure throughout this Opinion, the actual number of stops during the class period is
likely higher, because officers do not always prepare a UF-250 after a stop. See, e.g., infra Part
IV.D.1.a (no UF-250 for Leroy Downs stop); infra Part IV.D.1.h (no UF-250 for Clive Lino
stop); Ligon, 2013 WL 628534, at *11 (noting that the officer who stopped named plaintiff
Charles Bradley failed to fill out a UF-250); id. at *20 & n.241 (noting that the CCRB has
reported on a systematic problem with officers failing to complete UF-250s after stops). It is
impossible to determine how often officers fail to fill out UF-250s for Terry stops, because the
NYPD has no reliable mechanism for monitoring this failure. See infra Part IV.C.4.
109
See DX V14-A.
110
See id. (2,284,246 total frisks); DX V14-C (33,882 weapons found). This
assumes that weapons were only found in stops that involved frisks. If weapons were found in
stops that did not involve frisks, the percentage of frisks leading to the discovery of weapons
would be even lower.
111
See DX V14-B; DX V14-C; DX V14-D; Fagan Rpt. at 63 (defining contraband).
112
These statistics are sometimes referred to as “hit rates.” See Fagan Rpt. at 64 tbls.
14 & 15 (5.37% of stops resulted in arrest and 6.26% of stops resulted in a summons between
2004 and 2009); Fagan 2d Supp. Rpt. at 34 tbl. 14 (6.26% of stops resulted in arrest and 6.25%
of stops resulted in a summons between 2010 and June 2012).
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•
In 52% of the 4.4 million stops, the person stopped was black.113
•
In 31% of the stops, the person stopped was Hispanic.114
•
In 10% of the stops, the person stopped was white.115
•
In 2010, New York City’s resident population was roughly 23% black, 29%
Hispanic, and 33% white.116
•
In 23% of the stops of blacks, and 24% of the stops of Hispanics, the officer recorded
using force. The number for whites was 17%.117
•
Weapons were seized in 1.0% of the stops of blacks, 1.1% of the stops of Hispanics,
and 1.4% of the stops of whites.118
113
See Fagan Rpt. at 22 tbl. 3 (1,445,472 stops of blacks between 2004 and 2009);
Fagan 2d Supp. Rpt. at 11 tbl. 3 (843,684 stops of blacks between January 2010 and June 2012).
In Dr. Fagan’s studies, the category “black” encompasses two checkboxes in the “Race” section
on the UF-250, “Black” and “Black Hispanic.” See Fagan Rpt. at 20; Blank UF-250. The term
black is used throughout this opinion rather than African-American as that term is used on the
UF-250 form.
114
See Fagan Rpt. at 22 tbl. 3 (841,755 stops of Hispanics between 2004 and 2009);
Fagan 2d Supp. Rpt. at 11 tbl. 3 (520,171 stops of Hispanics between January 2010 and June
2012). As in Dr. Fagan’s studies, when the term “Hispanic” appears in this Opinion, it refers
only to the “White Hispanic” checkbox on the UF-250. See Fagan Rpt. at 20; Blank UF-250.
“Hispanic” is an imperfect and contested term, like most racial and ethnic classifications. The
term “Hispanic” is used rather than “Latino” because “Hispanic” appears on the UF-250. See
Blank UF-250. It is unfortunately necessary to reduce New York’s rich demographic diversity
to a few simple racial categories for the purposes of this case.
115
See Fagan Rpt. at 22 tbl. 3 (286,753 stops of whites between 2004 and 2009);
Fagan 2d Supp. Rpt. at 11 tbl. 3 (148,283 stops of whites between January 2010 and June 2012).
90% of all stops were of men, and 69% were of people between the ages of 16 and 34. See
Fagan Rpt. at 22 tbl. 3; Fagan 2d Supp. Rpt. at 11 tbl. 3.
116
See RAYMOND W. KELLY , POLICE COMMISSIONER, NYPD, CRIME AND
ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY IN NEW YORK CITY (JAN [.] 1–DEC[.] 31, 2012) app. B (citing 2010
census).
117
See Fagan Rpt. at 64 tbl. 14; Fagan 2d Supp. Rpt. at 34 tbl. 14.
118
See Fagan Rpt. at 64 tbl. 15; Fagan 2d Supp. Rpt. at 35 tbl. 15. Because guns
were seized in only 0.1% of stops, it is difficult to draw meaningful inferences from the statistics
regarding gun seizures. See Fagan Rpt. at 63–64 & tbls. 14–15; Fagan 2d Supp. Rpt. at 35 & tbl.
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•
Contraband other than weapons was seized in 1.8% of the stops of blacks, 1.7% of
the stops of Hispanics, and 2.3% of the stops of whites.119
•
For the years 2004 to 2009,120 the two most commonly checked boxes indicating the
reasons for a stop were “Furtive Movements” and “Area Has Incidence Of Reported
Offense Of Type Under Investigation” (“High Crime Area”). Setting aside stops
based on radio runs, officers marked “Furtive Movements” as a basis for the stop on
42% of the forms, and “High Crime Area” on 55% of the forms. In 2009, officers
indicated “Furtive Movements” as a basis for the stop nearly 60% of the time.121
•
Both “Furtive Movements” and “High Crime Area” are weak indicators of criminal
activity. For the years 2004 to 2009, stops were 22% more likely to result in arrest
if “High Crime Area” was not checked, and 18% more likely to result in arrest if
“Furtive Movements” was not checked.122
•
Between 2004 and 2009, as the number of stops per year soared from 314,000 to
576,000, the percentage of UF-250s on which the officer failed to state a specific
suspected crime rose from 1% to 36%.123
119
See Fagan Rpt. at 64 tbl. 15; Fagan 2d Supp. Rpt. at 35 tbl. 15.
120
Dr. Fagan did not update the following statistics for the years 2010 through 2012.
15.
121
See Fagan Rpt. at 51–52 & tbl. 11; Fagan Supp. Rpt. at 41. In a stop based on a
radio run, as opposed to a self-initiated stop, the suspicion leading to the stop involves
information received by the officer over the radio. See Fagan Rpt. at 50. 78% of stops during
the class period were self-initiated. See PX 417D.
I also note that the number of stop factors indicated on UF-250s increased from
2004 to 2009. In 2004, the average was 1.01 factors on the front of the form (“What Were
Circumstances Which Led To Stop?”) and 1.53 factors on the back (“Additional
Circumstances/Factors”). By 2009, the average was 1.47 factors on the front of the form and
1.93 factors on the back. “Furtive Movements” appears on the front, and “High Crime Area” on
the back. See Fagan Supp. Rpt. at 40 tbl. S6; Blank UF-250.
122
See Fagan Rpt. at 52.
123
See Fagan Supp. Rpt. at 39; DX V14-A. On the forms without a specific
suspected crime, the “Specify Which Felony/P.L. Misdemeanor Suspected” field was either left
empty, contained a text string that does not describe a penal law category or a violation, or
contained the following generic text strings: “FEL,” “FELONY,” “MISD,” or
“MISDEMEANOR.” See Fagan Supp. Rpt. at 39 n.89.
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Finally, I note that the City’s attempt to account for the low rate of arrests and
summonses following stops was not persuasive. The City states that “[v]arious witnesses
testified, including former Chief of Department Joseph Esposito, that many stops interrupt a
crime from occurring, for example an individual casing a location or stalking an individual late
at night.”124 No evidence was offered at trial, however, of a single stop that was: (1) based on
reasonable suspicion, and (2) prevented the commission of a crime, but (3) did not result in
probable cause for an arrest. While I have no doubt that such a stop has taken place at some
time, it is highly implausible that successful “preventive” stops take place frequently enough to
affect the conclusion that in at least 88% of the NYPD’s 4.4 million stops between January 2004
and June 2012, the suspicion giving rise to the stop turned out to be misplaced.
Indeed, for several reasons, the 12% “hit rate” likely overstates the percentage of
stops in which an officer’s suspicions turn out to be well-founded. First, officers are trained to
prepare UF-250s only for stops based on suspicion of a misdemeanor or felony. The UF-250
itself states: “Specify Which Felony/P.L. Misdemeanor Suspected.”125 By contrast, a summons
may be issued for offenses less serious than a misdemeanor, such as violations.126 Although the
parties did not offer evidence on the types of summonses recorded in the UF-250 database, it is
124
6/12/13 Defendant’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (“Def.
Findings”) ¶ 88.
125
Blank UF-250. See also Patrol Guide 212-11: Stop and Frisk (7/18/13) (“Patrol
Guide: Stop and Frisk”), PX 98, at 1.
126
In fact, by far the most commonly charged summons offenses in the City are
public consumption of alcohol, a violation under New York City Administrative Code § 10125(b), and disorderly conduct, a violation under N.Y. Penal Law (“PL”) § 240.20. See, e.g.,
HON . FERN A. FISHER, DEPUTY CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE , CRIMINAL COURT OF THE CITY
OF NEW YORK : ANNUAL REPORT 2010, at 35 (recording 140,425 summonses for public
consumption and 81,036 summonses for disorderly conduct in 2010).
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likely that many of these summonses were for violations rather than misdemeanors or felonies.127
In these cases, the issuance of the summons provides no evidence that the suspicion giving rise
to the stop was well-founded, because if the officer was following NYPD procedures, the stop
cannot have been initiated based on suspicion of the summonsed offense. Similarly, when a
stopped person provides identification and is then arrested for an unrelated open warrant, the
arrest does not prove that the suspicion leading to the stop was well-founded.128
Second, the fact that many post-stop summonses are dismissed further
undermines the reliability of the 6% post-stop summons rate as a true “hit rate,” that is, a
measure of validated suspicions.129 The same argument applies to post-stop arrests that were not
charged.130
Third, both summonses and arrests may be unrelated to the suspected crime for
which a person was stopped. For example, it has been reported that the most common arrest
after a stop is for marijuana possession.131 The NYPD has recognized concerns that some
127
See, e.g., infra Part IV.D.1.g (David Ourlicht’s post-stop summons for disorderly
conduct based on conduct beginning after the stop).
128
See, e.g., infra Part IV.D.2.e (stop in which officers approached Deon Dennis for
drinking in public, then arrested him based on an active warrant).
129
See, e.g., infra Part IV.D.1.g (Ourlicht’s post-stop summons was dismissed);
FISHER, CRIMINAL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK: ANNUAL REPORT 2010, at 16 (stating that
42% of all summonses in 2010 resulted in either dismissal or adjournment in contemplation of
dismissal).
130
See, e.g., Ligon, 2013 WL 628534, at *6–8 (discussing the Bronx ADA’s decision
to decline prosecution of some trespass arrests based on stops outside Clean Halls buildings).
131
See NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION , NYPD STOP -AND -FRISK ACTIVITY IN
2012, at 17 (2013) (noting that 16% of total arrests following stops are for marijuana possession,
making marijuana the most common arrest offense arising out of stops). However, marijuana
possession can only lead to arrest when the marijuana is “in a public place . . . burning or open to
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marijuana arrests are based, improperly, on “occasions when the officers recover marihuana
pursuant to a search of the subject’s person or upon direction of the subject to surrender the
contents of his/her pockets.”132 If it is true that officers sometimes carry out arrests for
marijuana possession following stops that were based on suspicion of another crime, then these
arrests do not provide evidence that the officers’ initial suspicions were well-founded.133
B.
Expert Testimony
Both parties offered expert testimony about whether the NYPD’s stop and frisk
practices violate the Constitution. After describing the qualifications of the competing experts
and discussing their differing views on the central issues in dispute here, I first determine which
expert I find more reliable and the basis for that decision. I then make certain findings based on
the credible expert testimony with respect to both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims.
1.
The Liability Experts
Dr. Fagan is a Professor of Law at Columbia Law School and Professor of
Epidemiology at the Mailman School of Public Health at Columbia University. He has been
studying the policies at issue in this case for over a decade.134 Dr. Fagan’s honors, academic and
professional appointments, and publications, make him an expert in criminology, with special
public view.” PL § 221.10(1).
132
NYPD, Operations Order 49 (9/19/11), ¶ 2.
133
The NYPD’s marijuana possession arrest practices recently became the subject of
a separate lawsuit filed by the Bronx Defenders. See Felix v. City of New York, No. 13 Civ. 2941
(JMF).
134
See Floyd v. City of New York, 861 F. Supp. 2d 274, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(summarizing Dr. Fagan’s qualifications, including his role in the production of the 1999 report
from the New York State Office of the Attorney General on the NYPD’s stop and frisk
practices).
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expertise in the statistical study of racial disparities in police enforcement activities.135
The City’s liability experts are Dr. Dennis Smith, an Associate Professor of
Public Administration at the Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service at New York
University; and Dr. Robert Purtell, an Assistant Professor of Finance at the University of
Albany’s Nelson A. Rockefeller College of Public Affairs and Policy.136 Dr. Smith has a Ph.D.
in political science and is an expert at evaluating the effectiveness of police organizations.
However, Dr. Smith is not a statistician. For this reason, Dr. Smith collaborated with Dr. Purtell,
a statistical expert.137 Dr. Purtell has a BS in Mathematics, an MBA with an emphasis on finance
and economics, and a Ph.D. in Public Administration; began his career as a research
mathematician writing code used to run regression analyses; spent over thirty years working in
finance and management; and now teaches finance.138 Dr. Purtell is not an expert in the study of
policing, criminology, or racial discrimination.139
I find Dr. Fagan a more reliable expert than Drs. Smith and Purtell. While Dr.
Smith’s research makes him specially qualified to opine on the effectiveness of the NYPD’s
practices in controlling crime, the effectiveness of stop and frisk is not at issue in this case, as I
have repeatedly explained. Unlike Dr. Fagan, Dr. Smith had never worked on a statistical study
135
See Curriculum Vitae of Jeffrey Fagan (Oct. 2012), PX 417A.
136
See Smith Rpt. at 3, 5.
137
See Floyd v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 1034, 2012 WL 3561594, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2012) (summarizing Dr. Smith’s and Dr. Purtell’s qualifications).
138
See Smith Rpt. at 5–6; 5/2 Tr. at 5724, 5728–5729, 5839.
139
Indeed, Dr. Purtell testified that he had never read a study of racial disparities in
police stops other than Dr. Fagan’s study in this case. See 5/2 Tr. at 5861.
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of racial disparities in any context until he became the City’s expert.
In addition, while both parties’ experts made errors in the course of their analyses
that were later corrected,140 one error by Dr. Purtell called into question the general reliability of
his interpretations of Dr. Fagan’s statistical analyses. Dr. Purtell conflated Tables 5 and 7 in
Fagan’s Reports, which are at the center of Dr. Fagan’s conclusions regarding racial disparities
in the NYPD’s stop practices. Table 5 deals with the effect of the racial composition of a
geographic area on the number of stops that take place there — without reference to the race of
the individuals being stopped. Table 7 deals with the races of individuals who are stopped.141
Yet, in his testimony, Dr. Purtell described how the numbers in Dr. Fagan’s Table 5 “are
comparing the probability of a black person being stopped to the chances of a white person being
stopped,”142 and persisted in defending that analysis even after plaintiffs’ counsel explicitly
pointed out the error.143
140
To take two examples: First, in his October 2010 report, Dr. Fagan made a
coding error, later corrected, that resulted in the mis-classification of a large number of
“apparently unjustified” stops as “indeterminate.” See 4/4 Tr. at 2295–2296; 4/5 Tr. at
2445–2448. Second, table 10 in the Smith Report contains a partly mislabeled column of data
that was later corrected. See 5/13 Tr. at 6839; Smith Rpt. at 70 tbl. 10; PX 574 (corrected and
expanded table 10).
141
See Fagan Rpt. at 33 tbl. 5, 42 tbl. 7; Fagan 2d Supp. Rpt. at 18 tbl. 5, 20 tbl. 7.
142
5/2 Tr. at 5764. Based on this assumption, Dr. Purtell claimed that Dr. Fagan’s
Table 5 showed that “the chance of a black person over a white person being stopped is . . .
[0.22%] above random chance.” Id.
143
In response to Dr. Purtell’s testimony, plaintiffs’ counsel objected that “nowhere
in table 5 is there anything about the likelihood of a black or a white person being stopped.” Id.
at 5765. Dr. Purtell defended his analysis of the numbers in Table 5, stating: “This is a standard
interpretation of these numbers.” Id. at 5767. The following day, the City and Dr. Purtell
conceded plaintiffs’ objection. Dr. Purtell stated that his exhibit had been mistitled, and
explained that he “wrote that the night before,” while he had another of Dr. Fagan’s tables on his
mind. 5/3 Tr. at 5903.
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Finally, while the “battle of the experts” between Dr. Purtell and Dr. Fagan
showed that Dr. Purtell has a sophisticated understanding of the purely mathematical aspects of
statistics, Dr. Fagan has a deeper understanding of the practical, real-world meaning and
implications of the statistical analyses in this case. Given a choice between relying on highly
sophisticated mathematical analysis but limited practical understanding, or deep practical
understanding informed by established statistical expertise, I favor the latter.
2.
The Fourth Amendment Claim
a.
Overview of Key Issues
Dr. Fagan performed an analysis of the NYPD’s UF-250 database in order to
evaluate how often the NYPD’s stops lack reasonable suspicion. Before delving into Dr.
Fagan’s Fourth Amendment analysis and my findings, I highlight several general points.
First, it is impossible to assess individually whether each of the 4.4 million stops
at issue in this case was based on an officer’s reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal
activity was afoot. It took weeks of testimony to try nineteen stops. It would take multiple
lifetimes of many judges to try each of the 4.4 million stops.144 The best available information
for assessing those stops comes from the UF-250s prepared by officers shortly after the stops.
Second, while the UF-250 database is the best available source of information, it
is highly flawed for the following reasons: (1) Officers do not always prepare a UF-250, either
because the officer does not believe she made a Terry stop or because the officer failed to
prepare the form. (2) A UF-250 is one-sided, in that the UF-250 only records the officer’s
version of the story. (3) Even NYPD commanders and supervisors have acknowledged that UF-
144
Even if there were no time constraints, after-the-fact testimony from interested
parties is an imperfect source of information, as the individual stop testimony in this case shows.
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250s do not provide enough information to determine whether reasonable suspicion existed for a
stop.145 (4) Many of the checkboxes on the UF-250 that officers use to indicate the basis for a
stop are problematic. “Furtive Movements” is vague and subjective. In fact, an officer’s
impression of whether a movement was “furtive” may be affected by unconscious racial biases.
“Fits Description” is a troubling basis for a stop if the description is so general that it fits a large
portion of the population in the area, such as black males between the ages of 18 and 24. “High
Crime Area” is also of questionable value when it encompasses a large area or an entire borough,
such as Queens or Staten Island.
Third, Dr. Fagan was extremely conservative in characterizing stops as lacking
reasonable suspicion. He categorized each stop as “apparently justified,” “apparently
unjustified,” or “ungeneralizable.” The City argued that because Dr. Fagan characterized only
6% of the stops as “apparently unjustified,” that is, lacking reasonable suspicion, the plaintiffs
have failed to demonstrate that the City has a policy or custom of carrying out stops without
reasonable suspicion. However, in light of Dr. Fagan’s very generous assumptions in
categorizing the stops, his analysis can best be understood as providing a very rough minimum
number of unjustified stops. The actual number of unjustified stops was likely far higher.
Moreover, even if I were to accept that Dr. Fagan’s 6% figure accurately reflects the number of
stops lacking reasonable suspicion — which I do not for the reasons stated here and below —
that relatively small percentage still represents 200,000 individuals who were stopped without
reasonable suspicion. Even this number of wrongful stops produces a significant human toll.
b.
145
Dr. Fagan’s Method of Classifying Stops
See, e.g., 4/10 Tr. at 3207 (McHugh); Pl. Findings ¶ 118. Accord Def. Mem. at
7.
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Dr. Fagan estimated the number of stops apparently lacking reasonable suspicion
by analyzing the UF-250 database. He began with the assumption that all the forms had been
filled out accurately and completely, then distinguished the stop factors on Side 1 of the UF-250
from the stop factors on Side 2.146 Dr. Fagan identified the following Side 1 boxes as providing
a sufficient basis for a Terry stop, standing alone: (1) “Actions Indicative Of ‘Casing’ Victims
Or Location” (“Casing”), (2) “Actions Indicative Of Engaging In Drug Transaction” (“Drug
Transaction”), and (3) “Actions Indicative Of Engaging In Violent Crimes” (“Violent Crime”).
Dr. Fagan defined the remaining Side 1 stop factors — except the “Other” box — as
“conditionally justified,” that is, contributing to reasonable suspicion, but not generally
providing an independently sufficient basis for a Terry stop: (4) “Carrying Objects In Plain View
Used In Commission Of Crime e.g., Slim Jim/Pry Bar, etc.,” (5) “Suspicious Bulge/Object
(Describe),” (6) “Actions Indicative Of Acting As A Lookout,” (7) “Fits Description,” (8)
“Furtive Movements,” and (9) “Wearing Clothes/Disguises Commonly Used In Commission Of
Crime.”147
Based on these classifications, Dr. Fagan categorized the stops recorded in the
UF-250 database as (a) “apparently justified,” that is, based on reasonable suspicion; (b)
“apparently unjustified,” that is, lacking reasonable suspicion; or (c) “ungeneralizable,” meaning
that the UF-250 contains insufficient information to make a determination without further
146
See Fagan Rpt. at 48–50; 2/2/12 Declaration of Jeffrey Fagan, PX 415, ¶¶ 14–18;
Floyd, 861 F. Supp. 2d at 283–84; Blank UF-250.
147
See Fagan Rpt. at 48–50; Blank UF-250.
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analysis.148 All stops in which officers checked the “Other” box are categorized as either
ungeneralizable or apparently justified.149 A stop is “apparently unjustified” in Dr. Fagan’s
analysis if: (a) no Side 1 stop circumstances are indicated, and only one Side 2 additional
circumstance is indicated — unless the Side 2 additional circumstance is “Other (Describe),” in
which case the stop is ungeneralizable; or (b) only one Side 1 stop circumstance is indicated, that
stop circumstance is only “conditionally justified,” and no Side 2 additional circumstances are
indicated — unless the Side 1 stop circumstance is the “Other” box, in which case the stop is
ungeneralizable.150
c.
Unreliable Stop Factors
Dr. Fagan thoroughly undermined the assumption that the two most frequently
checked stop factors provide a reliable basis for suspecting criminality: Furtive Movements on
Side 1, and High Crime Area on Side 2.151 Part of Dr. Fagan’s argument against the reliability of
these factors rested on the uncontested statistics cited above,152 including that stops were more
likely to result in arrest when Furtive Movements and High Crime Area were not checked than
148
See Fagan 2d Supp. Rpt. at 24–25. The revised version of the October 2010
report uses different language to describe these three categories, see Fagan Rpt. at 50, but I use
the updated language in the Fagan 2d Supp. Rpt. for the sake of simplicity.
149
See Fagan Rpt. at 50; Fagan 2d Supp. Rpt. at 25.
150
See id. at 50–52, 56 tbl. 12.
151
The parties have generally referred to the latter factor as “High Crime Area” and I
do the same, although everyone agrees that the abbreviation is not a perfect reflection of the full
label, “Area Has High Incidence of Reported Offense Of Type Under Investigation.” The same
applies to the shorthand for other stop factors, including “Time of Day” for “Time Of Day, Day
Of Week, Season Corresponding To Reports Of Criminal Activity,” on Side 2 of the UF-250.
See Blank UF-250.
152
See supra Part IV.A.
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when they were. Courts have also recognized that furtive movements, standing alone, are a
vague and unreliable indicator of criminality.153 As Judge Richard Posner has stated in a related
context: “Whether you stand still or move, drive above, below, or at the speed limit, you will be
described by the police as acting suspiciously should they wish to stop or arrest you. Such
subjective, promiscuous appeals to an ineffable intuition should not be credited.”154 Recent
psychological research has also provided evidence that officers may be more likely to perceive a
movement as indicative of criminality if the officer has been primed to look for signs that “crime
is afoot.”155 As I stated in Ligon, “[g]iven the nature of their work on patrol, officers may have a
systematic tendency to see and report furtive movements where none objectively exist.”156
Other recent psychological research has shown that unconscious racial bias
continues to play an objectively measurable role in many people’s decision processes.157 It
153
The Supreme Court has “recognized that nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent
factor in determining reasonable suspicion.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (emphasis added) (citing
numerous cases). But “furtive behavior absent additional indicia of suspicion generally does not
suffice to establish reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Bellamy, 592 F. Supp. 2d 308,
318–19 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (collecting cases). Accord Ligon, 2013 WL 628534, at *33.
154
United States v. Broomfield, 417 F.3d 654, 655 (7th Cir. 2005).
155
See Ligon, 2013 WL 628534, at *33.
156
Id. (footnote omitted).
157
See, e.g., Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist
Revision of “Affirmative Action”, 94 CAL. L. REV . 1063 (2006) (illustrating relevance of implicit
social cognition studies to issues of discrimination). Kang and Banaji quote the following apt
observation from a dissent by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: “Bias both conscious and
unconscious, reflecting traditional and unexamined habits of thought, keeps up barriers that must
come down if equal opportunity and nondiscrimination are ever genuinely to become the
country’s law and practice.” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 274 (1995)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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would not be surprising if many police officers share the latent biases that pervade our society.158
If so, such biases could provide a further source of unreliability in officers’ rapid, intuitive
impressions of whether an individual’s movements are furtive and indicate criminality.
Unconscious bias could help explain the otherwise puzzling fact that NYPD officers check
“Furtive Movements” in 48% of the stops of blacks and 45% of the stops of Hispanics, but only
40% of the stops of whites.159 There is no evidence that black people’s movements are
objectively more furtive than the movements of white people.
The High Crime Area stop factor is likewise problematic. Presence in an area
with high rates of crime is not a sufficient basis for a stop, although it may contribute to
reasonable suspicion.160 Plaintiffs offered evidence that the High Crime Area checkbox has been
interpreted so broadly by at least some officers that it would contribute very little to the
justification for a stop.161 In addition, Dr. Fagan has shown that the rate at which officers check
158
As I noted in a related context in Ligon, “this is an area in which further training
may be highly beneficial.” Ligon, 2013 WL 628534, at *33 n.374. A study of police officers in
Savannah, Georgia found evidence that minority suspects were more likely than white suspects
to be viewed suspiciously by the officers for nonbehavioral reasons — even when the officers
knew they were being closely observed by social scientists while on patrol. See Geoffrey P.
Alpert et al., Police Suspicion and Discretionary Decision Making During Citizen Stops, 43
CRIMINOLOGY 407, 417–19 (2005).
159
See Fagan 2d Supp. Rpt. at 23 app. tbl. D1. These are the numbers for 2010
through June 2012. In 2004 through 2009, the numbers were 46% for stops of black people,
42% for stops of Hispanics, and 37% for stops of white people. See Fagan Rpt. app. D tbl. D1.
160
See, e.g., Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99
(1979); Adams, 407 U.S. at 144, 147–48).
161
See, e.g., 4/1 Tr. at 1687 (Officer Fernando Guimaraes testifying that when he
worked in the 43rd Precinct, the entire precinct was a “high crime area”); 4/17 Tr. at 3717–3721
(Officer Edward French testifying that “two robberies with similar circumstances in Queens
could constitute a robbery pattern,” and that this pattern could “encompass all of Queens,” and
that when he was in the anticrime unit, there was a crime pattern that encompassed all of
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High Crime Area in a precinct or census tract is roughly 55%, regardless of the amount of crime
in the precinct or census tract as measured by crime complaints.162
Dr. Fagan also showed that over time, officers increasingly developed “scripts”
for checking off stop factors.163 Not only did the average number of stop factors checked on UF250s increase, but this increase reflected a growing use of several of the more subjective stop
factors, such as Furtive Movements, Evasive Response, High Crime Area, and “Actions
Indicative Of Engaging In Violent Crimes.”164 There was also credible evidence of scripting in
the UF-250s of officers who testified at trial. During a sample quarter in 2009, Officer Edgar
Queens).
162
See Fagan Rpt. at 53–54 & fig. 13 (summarizing data for 2004 through 2009);
Fagan 2d Supp. Rpt. at 32–34 & fig. 13 (summarizing data for 2010 through June 2012). The
former analysis was based on precincts, and the latter on census tracts. The fact that the results
of the analysis were unchanged despite a change in specifications and time period indicates the
robustness of the results.
In otherwise low-crime areas, there may be small areas of concentrated
criminality where the NYPD often deploys officers. The City appropriately notes that a
particular building where a stop takes place might have a high incidence of the suspected crime
for which the stop is made. See 4/5 Tr. at 2359–2361. But, as Dr. Fagan noted at trial, see id. at
2360–2361, it is simply not plausible that 55% of all stops take place in an “area” whose
particular crime characteristics objectively justified checking the High Crime Area box,
regardless of the crime rate of the census tract or the precinct where the stop takes place. The
unvarying rate of checking High Crime Area across locations and times is more likely a product
of reflexive box-checking that is unrelated to any defined crime condition.
163
This reveals the fallacy of the critique by Drs. Smith and Purtell that Fagan’s
analysis failed to address the “steady improvement in NYPD use of ‘Terry stops.’” Smith Rpt.
at 49. It may well be that officers simply learned how to fill out the UF-250s to better indicate
reasonable suspicion — even when it did not exist.
164
See Fagan Supp. Rpt. at 39–47. “Evasive, False Or Inconsistent Response To
Officer’s Questions” (“Evasive Response”) is a Side 2 additional circumstance. See Blank UF250. In theory, High Crime Area could be checked based on an analysis of crime data. In
practice, however, it is often checked based on inconsistent, subjective impressions or scripts, as
discussed above.
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Gonzalez — who carried out a notably high number of stops — checked the same four boxes on
99% of his UF-250s: Fits Description, Casing, High Crime Area, and Time of Day.165 Officer
Kha Dang — another aberrantly high stopper — checked an average of 4.2 boxes on the UF250s he prepared during a sample quarter, and checked both High Crime Area and Time of Day
on 75% of the forms, despite the stops being widely geographically and temporally dispersed.166
d.
Quantifying the Magnitude of Apparently Unjustified Stops
Based on UF-250 Stop Factors
Dr. Fagan’s extremely conservative definition of “apparently unjustified” almost
guarantees that the roughly 200,000 stops he placed in that category underestimate the true
number of stops lacking legal justification.167 For example, a UF-250 on which the officer
checked only Furtive Movements on Side 1, and only High Crime Area on Side 2, is not
classified as “apparently unjustified” according to Dr. Fagan’s definition. Similarly, a UF-250
on which the officer checked only Furtive Movements and Suspicious Bulge on Side 1, and no
boxes on Side 2, is not classified as “apparently unjustified.” While some stops in which an
officer checked only these factors might be based on reasonable suspicion, there is little doubt
that many others would not be. In addition, any UF-250 on which an officer checked only the
165
See PX 557, 557-D.
166
See DX L12, L14; 6/12/13 Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law (“Pl. Findings”) ¶ 8.
167
Without analyzing the “Other” text strings, 198,000 or 5.7% of the non-radio-run
stops between 2004 and June 2012 were “apparently unjustified” according to Dr. Fagan’s
definition. See PX 417B (updating Fagan Rpt. at 56 tbl. 12 to show 6.45% of 2,233,027 nonradio-run stops between 2004 and 2009 to be “apparently unjustified”); Fagan 2d Supp. Rpt. at
26 tbl. 12 (categorizing 4.43% of 1,215,846 non-radio-run stops between 2010 and June 2012 as
“apparently unjustified”). The summary numbers in PX 417D appear to include the results of
the “Other” text string analysis. PX 417D states that 219,814 or 6.4% of the 3,448,873 nonradio-run stops between 2004 and June 2012 were “apparently unjustified.”
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“Other” box on Side 1, or only the “other” additional circumstances box on Side 2, is not
classified by Dr. Fagan as “apparently unjustified.”
The finding that Dr. Fagan’s stop factor analysis likely significantly undercounts
the number of unjustified stops is corroborated by evidence in this case, as well as in Ligon,
showing that officers sometimes fail to fill out UF-250s for stops that lack reasonable suspicion,
or fail to fill out UF-250s because they misunderstand when an encounter evolves into a Terry
stop, or fill out UF-250s inaccurately and in a way that increases the apparent justification for a
stop.168 In addition, several of the uncontested statistics suggest that far more than 6% of stops
are “apparently unjustified,” including: the number of UF-250s that do not identify a suspected
crime (36% of all forms in 2009), the fact that the two most commonly checked stop factors
(Furtive Movements and High Crime Area) are negatively correlated with a summons or arrest,
and the fact that only 12% of all stops result in an arrest or summons.169
The problems with Dr. Fagan’s Fourth Amendment analysis of the UF-250s result
not from analytical failures but from the inadequacy of the NYPD’s systems for identifying
unjustified stops when they occur. As a result, the magnitude of Fourth Amendment violations
that have taken place in this case — beyond the rough minimum indicated by Dr. Fagan’s
statistics — will almost certainly never be known.
3.
The Fourteenth Amendment Claim
168
See, e.g., infra Part IV.D.1.a (Downs); infra Part IV.D.1.h (Lino); Ligon, 2013
WL 628534, at *11; id. at *20 & n.241. It remains likely that there are “‘many unlawful
searches . . . of innocent people which turn up nothing incriminating, in which no arrest is made,
about which courts do nothing, and about which we never hear.’” Washington v. Lambert, 98
F.3d 1181, 1193 n.1 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181
(1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)).
169
In fact, as discussed supra in Part IV.A, the true “hit rate” is likely below 12%.
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Overview of Key Issues
The crux of plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim is that blacks and Hispanics
are stopped more frequently than they would be if police officers did not discriminate based on
race when deciding whom to stop. Assessing this claim required comparing statistics about rates
of stops of blacks and Hispanics to “[a] standard, or point of reference, against which [those
statistics] can be compared, assessed, measured or judged” — what is known in statistics as a
“benchmark.”170 In this case, the benchmark was meant to capture “what the racial distribution
of the stopped pedestrians would have been if officers’ stop decisions had been racially
unbiased.”171
Conclusions regarding racial bias drawn from statistics “may vary drastically
based on which benchmark is used.”172 As such, a central dispute between the experts regarding
the Fourteenth Amendment claim was the appropriate benchmark for measuring racial bias in
stops.
b.
Competing Benchmarks
Each expert submitted voluminous reports and testified at trial in support of his
choice of benchmark. Of necessity, I must simplify their very detailed and complex submissions
170
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Statistical Glossary,
available at http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=7228. Accord BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (defining benchmark as “a standard unit used as a basis for comparison”).
171
GREG RIDGEWAY , RAND, ANALYSIS OF RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE NEW YORK
POLICE DEPARTMENT ’S STOP, QUESTION , AND FRISK PRACTICES xi (2007) (“RAND REPORT ”),
DX K6. See also Smith Rpt. at 11 (“Benchmarks help social scientists demonstrate statistically
if there is an unjustifiable cause-and-effect relationship between membership in a group . . . and
a particular practice . . . .”).
172
RAND REPORT at 19.
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and testimony to focus on the question at the heart of the parties’ dispute: is there statistical
evidence of racial discrimination in the NYPD’s stop practices? With that caveat, I endeavor to
summarize their differing benchmarks.
Dr. Fagan explained his choice of benchmark as follows:
[A] valid benchmark requires estimates of the supply of individuals of each
racial or ethnic group who are engaged in the targeted behaviors and who are
available to the police as potential targets for the exercise of their stop
authority. Since police often target resources to the places where crime rates
and risks are highest, and where populations are highest, some measure of
population that is conditioned on crime rates is an optimal candidate for
inclusion as a benchmark.173
Accordingly, Dr. Fagan’s “analyses use both population and reported crime as benchmarks for
understanding the racial distribution of police-citizen contacts.”174 While there is scholarly
disagreement regarding the best benchmark to use in such measurements, none of the sources
Drs. Smith and Purtell cited criticized the benchmark used by Dr. Fagan. In addition, at least
one other study of a police department’s stop patterns — a study of stop patterns in Los Angeles
by Dr. Ian Ayres, the William K. Townsend Professor of Law at Yale Law School — used an
“[a]lmost identical” benchmark to Dr. Fagan’s.175
173
Fagan Rpt. at 16–17.
174
Id. at 17. See also Fagan Rpt. at 33 tbl. 5; Pl. Mem. ¶ 22. To be clear: Dr. Fagan
includes local crime rate data because the police are more likely to be deployed to places with
higher crime rates, and stops are more likely to take place in areas where the police are more
heavily deployed.
175
See 5/6 Tr. at 6121, 6135–6139 (Smith). Dr. Ayres’ report on the LAPD is
discussed in 3/4/13 Amicus Curiae Brief of Communities United for Police Reform at 6. Drs.
Smith and Purtell cited Dr. Fagan’s and Dr. Ayres’ scholarship in a short list of “[n]otable
articles” in the literature on benchmarking in disparate treatment claims. See Smith Rpt. at 11
n.5. The City concedes that “[t]here is no prevailing benchmark for racial disparity regression
analysis.” Def. Findings ¶ 69.
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The City’s experts, by contrast, used a benchmark consisting of the rates at which
various races appear in suspect descriptions from crime victims — in other words, “suspect race
description data.”176 The City’s experts assumed that if officers’ stop decisions were racially
unbiased, then the racial distribution of stopped pedestrians would be the same as the racial
distribution of the criminal suspects in the area.177
I conclude that Dr. Fagan’s benchmark is the better choice. The reason is simple
and reveals a serious flaw in the logic applied by the City’s experts: there is no basis for
assuming that the racial distribution of stopped pedestrians will resemble the racial distribution
of the local criminal population if the people stopped are not criminals. The City defends the
fact that blacks and Hispanics represent 87% of the persons stopped in 2011 and 2012 by noting
that “approximately 83% of all known crime suspects and approximately 90% of all violent
crime suspects were Black and Hispanic.”178 This might be a valid comparison if the people
stopped were criminals, or if they were stopped based on fitting a specific suspect description.
But there was insufficient evidence to support either conclusion. To the contrary, nearly 90% of
the people stopped are released without the officer finding any basis for a summons or arrest,179
176
Smith Rpt. at 19 (quotation marks omitted).
177
Because crime victims are often unable to provide race information — especially
for non-violent crimes — the City’s experts eventually attempted to supplement their crime
suspect race data with data showing the races of arrestees. Dr. Fagan offered persuasive
criticisms of the resulting “Merge File” — such as its reliance on arrestee data that may obscure
rather than reveal racial bias — as well as of the City’s experts’ earlier reliance on extrapolations
from incomplete crime suspect data. See Pl. Findings ¶ 20 (collecting sources).
178
Def. Findings ¶ 70 (citations and emphasis omitted).
179
See supra Part IV.A.
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and only 13% of stops are based on fitting a specific suspect description.180 There is no reason to
believe that the nearly 90% of people who are stopped and then subject to no further
enforcement action are criminals. As a result, there is no reason to believe that their racial
distribution should resemble that of the local criminal population, as opposed to that of the local
population in general. If the police are stopping people in a race-neutral way, then the racial
composition of innocent people stopped should more or less mirror the racial composition of the
areas where they are stopped, all other things being equal. Dr. Fagan’s benchmark captures what
the NYPD’s stops would look like in the absence of racial discrimination: his use of local
population data reflects who is available to be stopped in an area (assuming, as the evidence
shows, that the overwhelming majority of stops are not of criminals), and his use of local crime
rates reflects the fact that stops are more likely to take place in areas with higher crime rates.
By contrast, Dr. Smith rejected the assumption that 88% of those stopped were
innocent. “[H]ow do we know . . . [i]f they were utterly innocent[?]” Dr. Smith asked at trial.
He then proposed a “hypothetical” in which “the stop prevents a crime.”181 If one assumes that
those stopped with no further enforcement action are nevertheless criminals, then it is natural to
conclude, as Dr. Smith did, that a valid benchmark for measuring racial disparities in stops must
180
See Fagan 2d Supp. Rpt. at 23 app. tbl. D1; Fagan Rpt. app. D tbl. D1. The City’s
speculation that the low hit rate for stops overall could be explained by “multiple people [being]
stopped in connection with the description provided in a single radio run” neglects the fact that
only 13% of stops are based on matching a suspect description. Def. Findings ¶ 90. In addition,
the City’s theory is weakened by its failure to collect evidence from the UF-250 database
concerning how often multiple stops are made in connection with a single event or a single
suspect description. See id.
181
5/6 Tr. at 6155–6156.
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“enable us to know who is committing the crime in [an] area.”182 Thus, he concludes that the
best benchmark for the population of people who will be stopped in the absence of racial
discrimination is the local criminal population. As Dr. Smith testified, “the best proxy for the
share of the population by race engaged in the targeted behaviors that lead officers to make
Terry stops” is the percentage of each racial category that appears in crime suspect data, or more
precisely a combination of crime suspect data and arrestee data, because “[t]hat’s what we know
about who is committing crime.”183
Based on this analysis, Dr. Smith concludes that the disproportionate stopping of
black people can be explained by the disproportionately black composition of the pool of
criminals.184 But even if all stops by the NYPD were based on reasonable suspicion — which is
highly unlikely for reasons already stated — the low hit rate would undermine the assumption
182
Id. at 6114.
183
Id. at 6151, 6154. Accord Def. Findings ¶ 70 (“Crime suspect description data
estimates the available pool of persons exhibiting suspicious behavior that could be observed by
the police — while population merely estimates the potential number of persons in a given
area.” (citations omitted)).
184
Drs. Smith and Purtell state:
Obviously, if particular racial or ethnic groups in New York City participate
in crime at a rate disproportionate to their share of the population, we would
expect officers to conduct Terry stops for such groups at rates higher than
each groups’ respective share of the City’s population. The benchmark of
suspect race description allows us to measure if [the] NYPD’s officers are
stopping minorities at a rate over and above what could be explained by the
racial composition of the criminally active population in New York.
Smith Rpt. at 20. Accord id. at 14–15 (suggesting that criminal participation of various races
must be incorporated into benchmark, because certain races may commit crimes at a higher rate
than others, “and so are more likely to be observed by police engaging in suspicious activity that
would justify a Terry stop” (emphasis added)).
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that the stopped people were in fact engaged in criminal activity, and thus members of the
criminal population. The City failed to establish that a significant number of the approximately
3.9 million stops that resulted in no further enforcement action were stops of people who were
about to commit, but were prevented from committing, a crime.185 Dr. Smith’s theory that a
significant number of these stops resulted in the prevention of the suspected crime is pure
speculation and not reliable.
Crime suspect data may serve as a reliable proxy for the pool of criminals
exhibiting suspicious behavior. But there is no reason to believe that crime suspect data
provides a reliable proxy for the pool of non-criminals exhibiting suspicious behavior. Because
the overwhelming majority of people stopped fell into the latter category, there is no support for
the City’s position that crime suspect data provides a reliable proxy for the pool of people
exhibiting suspicious behavior. Moreover, given my finding that a significant number of stops
were not based on reasonable suspicion — and thus were stops drawn from the pool of noncriminals not exhibiting suspicious behavior — the use of crime suspect data as a benchmark for
the pool of people that would have been stopped in the absence of racial bias is even less
appropriate.186
185
See 4/19 Tr. at 4310–4314 (Assistant Commissioner Philip McGuire stating that
“nobody knows” what portion of people who are stopped but not arrested or summonsed “were
probably about to or might have committed a crime,” and that “the number could be zero to fifty
percent,” but that he does not know); 4/9 Tr. at 2915–2916, 2983–2984 (Chief Esposito stating
“we’re not really able to tell” how often a stop prevents a crime, then imagining what such a stop
might look like). I also note that none of the testifying plaintiffs — even those whose stops were
based on reasonable suspicion — were engaged in criminal activity.
186
Of course, if the real purpose of the stops is not to investigate suspected criminal
activity based on individualized suspicion, but instead to deter criminals from carrying weapons
or contraband by stopping people who fit a general profile of criminal suspects in an area, then
criminal suspect data would in a sense be the appropriate benchmark for measuring racial
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When confronted by plaintiffs’ counsel with similar reasoning, Dr. Smith
ultimately appeared willing to entertain the possibility that black people, even when they are
law-abiding, might simply be more likely to engage in suspicious behavior than white people:
Q. So is it your testimony that law-abiding black people in New York City
are more likely to engage in suspicious behavior than law-abiding white
people?
A. I’m only saying that that’s the evidence from the stop patterns, which we
have said, according to Professor Fagan, are ninety percent apparently
justified.187
Dr. Smith’s position, while surprising, is not illogical once his premises are
accepted. Dr. Smith apparently does not find it plausible that officers’ decisions regarding
whether to stop a person may be swayed by conscious or unconscious racial bias.188 If a
researcher begins with this premise, he will attempt to find a credible, race-neutral explanation
for the NYPD’s stopping of blacks and Hispanics out of proportion to their share of the
population. For example, the researcher may seek to explain the disproportionate stopping of
disparities in stops. But the City does not make this argument, and if it did, the argument would
fail for reasons related to plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. First, to the
extent that such “deterrence” stops were based solely on a person’s resemblance to a general
profile of the criminals in an area, the stop would not be based on individualized reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity. Second, to the extent that “the general profile of criminal suspects
in an area” contains a racial description, the use of that description as a basis for stops would
constitute racial profiling. On the issue of racial profiling, see infra Part V.B.1.
187
5/6 Tr. at 6158.
188
See Smith Rpt. at 9 (asking rhetorically: “In view of the tens or even hundreds of
thousand[s] of persons an officer observes in the course of each month on duty, when the
overwhelming majority are Blacks and Hispanics, is it plausible to believe that the several
persons actually stopped were selected based on their race?”). Plaintiffs and the City dispute the
average number of stops per officer per month, with the City claiming it is “only” two to three,
and the plaintiffs claiming it is far higher. A review of the numerous monthly activity reports in
the record suggests that most officers who are actively making stops conduct between 10 and 20
per month. See, e.g., PX 15, 178, 219, 229, 236, 309, 310. But the number of stops is not
particularly relevant. It is the quality of the stops that is at issue here — that is, whether the
stops were based on reasonable suspicion and free of racial discrimination.
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minorities as the result of the characteristics of the criminal population. However, as already
explained, there is no evidence that 88% of the people stopped are, in fact, members of the
criminal population. Next, the researcher may analyze the deployment of police to high crime
areas or “hot spots.” If these areas happen to be disproportionately minority, then heavy
deployment to these areas will provide a race-neutral basis for the disproportionate stopping of
minorities. But Dr. Fagan’s “Table 5” analysis showed that blacks and Hispanics are
overstopped even after controlling for police deployment to high crime areas.189 In the end, if
the researcher cannot think of any relevant race-neutral factors for which Dr. Fagan did not
control, the only remaining race-neutral explanation for the NYPD’s stop patterns may be that
members of the overstopped racial groups have a greater tendency to appear suspicious than
members of other racial groups, even when they are not breaking the law.
Rather than being a defense against the charge of racial profiling, however, this
reasoning is a defense of racial profiling. To say that black people in general are somehow more
suspicious-looking, or criminal in appearance, than white people is not a race-neutral
explanation for racial disparities in NYPD stops: it is itself a racially biased explanation. This
explanation is especially troubling because it echoes the stereotype that black men are more
likely to engage in criminal conduct than others.190 In a recent speech responding to the public
controversy surrounding the shooting of a black teenager, President Obama noted his personal
experience with this stereotype:
There are very few African-American men in this country who haven’t had
189
Similarly, by controlling for various other factors, such as patrol strength,
socioeconomic factors, and other local characteristics, Dr. Fagan persuasively undermined a
number of other potential race-neutral explanations for the racial disparities in stops.
190
For an analysis touching on the prevalence of this stereotype, and the
consequences related to it, see generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW : MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010).
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the experience of being followed when they were shopping in a department
store. That includes me. There are very few African-American men who
haven’t had the experience of walking across the street and hearing the locks
click on the doors of cars. That happens to me, at least before I was a
senator. There are very few African-Americans who haven’t had the
experience of getting on an elevator and a woman clutching her purse
nervously and holding her breath until she had a chance to get off. That
happens often.191
Another commentator observed in even starker terms:
What is reasonable to do, especially in the dark of night, is defined by
preconceived social roles that paint young black men as potential criminals
and predators. Black men, the narrative dictates, are dangerous, to be
watched and put down at the first false move. This pain is one all black men
know; putting away the tie you wear to the office means peeling off the
assumption that you are owed equal respect. Mr. Martin’s hoodie struck the
deepest chord because we know that daring to wear jeans and a hooded
sweatshirt too often means that the police or other citizens are judged to be
reasonable in fearing you.192
No doubt many people have heard similar fears and stereotypes expressed, whether intentionally
or unintentionally. But race alone is not an objective basis for suspicion by the police. Because
there is no evidence that law-abiding blacks or Hispanics are more likely to behave objectively
more suspiciously than law-abiding whites, Dr. Smith’s — and the City’s — refuge in this
unsupported notion is no refuge at all. It is effectively an admission that there is no explanation
for the NYPD’s disproportionate stopping of blacks and Hispanics other than the NYPD’s stop
practices having become infected, somewhere along the chain of command, by racial bias.
Why would the people stopped by the NYPD, both criminal and law-abiding, so
closely resemble the criminal population — or, more precisely, the NYPD’s understanding of the
191
7/19/13 Remarks by President Barack Obama on Trayvon Martin, White House
Press Briefing Room.
192
Ekow N. Yankah, Op-Ed., The Truth About Trayvon, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2013,
at A23.
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criminal population, based on its limited suspect data?193 A simple explanation exists: the racial
composition of the people stopped by the NYPD resembles what the NYPD perceives to be the
racial composition of the criminal population because that is why they were stopped. Evidence
discussed later in this Opinion shows that the NYPD has an unwritten policy of targeting racially
defined groups for stops, based on the appearance of members of those groups in crime suspect
data.194 A strong correlation between the races of people stopped and the known races of
criminal suspects is the natural result.
In short, the correlation highlighted by the City and its experts in their attempt to
refute the allegation of racial profiling in fact provides evidence of racial profiling. Rather than
revealing a valid race-neutral variable that explains the NYPD’s disproportionate stopping of
blacks and Hispanics, the correlation highlighted by the City’s experts suggests how the racial
disparities identified by Dr. Fagan might have come about — namely, through a widespread
practice of racial profiling based on local criminal suspect data.
c.
Findings Based on Dr. Fagan’s Analyses
Because I accept Dr. Fagan’s benchmark for measuring racial disparity and find
his statistical analyses generally reliable, I make the following findings.
193
The suspect’s race was unknown in 70% of crime complaints in 2005 and 2006.
See Fagan Rpt. at 76 tbl. 18. Even after merging crime suspect data and arrestee data, the race of
the perpetrator is only known for roughly 63% of crimes. See Fagan 2d Supp. Rpt. app. B tbl.
1–2 (using data from 2010 to 2011); Smith Rpt. at 34. In addition, based on this “merged” data,
while the suspect’s race is known for a high percentage of certain types of crime — such as
felony violent crimes (86%), weapons crimes (98%), and drug offenses (99%) — race is known
in only 22% of felony property crimes, which are the basis for 25% of all stops. See id. app. B
tbl. 2. Dr. Fagan persuasively showed that using data where almost 40% of the information is
missing would introduce sample selection bias, and is not a reliable approach to drawing
conclusions about the criminal suspect population. See id.; 4/3 Tr. at 2148–2150 (Fagan); 5/6
Tr. at 6160–6161 (Dr. Smith acknowledging that he had not found any scholarly support for
estimating the demographics of crime suspects based on data that is nearly 40% incomplete).
194
See infra Part IV.C.3.
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First, as reflected in Dr. Fagan’s Table 5, the NYPD carries out more stops in
areas with more black and Hispanic residents, even when other relevant variables are held
constant. The best predictor for the rate of stops in a geographic unit — be it precinct or census
tract — is the racial composition of that unit rather than the known crime rate.195 These findings
are “robust,” in the sense that the results persist even when the units of analysis are changed
from precincts to census tracts, or from calendar quarters to months.
Second, as reflected in Dr. Fagan’s Table 7, within any area, regardless of its
racial composition, blacks and Hispanics are more likely to be stopped than whites. This is
different from the first finding — that the best predictor for the stop rate in a geographic area is
the racial composition of that area. Table 7, by contrast, shows that blacks and Hispanics are
more likely to be stopped than whites within precincts and census tracts, even after controlling
for the racial composition, crime rate, patrol strength, and various socioeconomic characteristics
of the precincts or census tracts where the stops take place. These findings are also robust. They
apply not only when the spatial and temporal units of the analysis are changed, but also when the
analysis is limited to areas with low crime rates, racially heterogenous populations, or
predominately white populations.196
Third, for the period 2004 through 2009, blacks who were subject to law
enforcement action following their stop were about 30% more likely than whites to be arrested
(as opposed to receiving a summons) after a stop for the same suspected crime, even after
controlling for other relevant variables.197
195
See 4/3 Tr. at 2029.
196
See Pl. Findings ¶ 15 (citing, among other sources, Dr. Fagan’s testimony; Fagan
Rpt. at 4, 40–45 & tbls. 7–10; Fagan 2d Supp. Rpt. at 19–21 & tbl. 7). See also 4/3 Tr. at 2030.
197
See 4/3 Tr. at 2031–2032. See also Fagan Rpt. at 66.
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Fourth, for the period 2004 through 2009, after controlling for suspected crime
and precinct characteristics, blacks who were stopped were about 14% more likely — and
Hispanics 9% more likely — than whites to be subjected to the use of force.198
Fifth, for the period 2004 through 2009, all else being equal, the odds of a stop
resulting in any further enforcement action were 8% lower if the person stopped was black than
if the person stopped was white. In addition, the greater the black population in a precinct, the
less likely that a stop would result in a sanction. These results show that blacks are likely
targeted for stops based on a lesser degree of objectively founded suspicion than whites.199
C.
Institutional Evidence of Deliberate Indifference
The previous two sections addressed the statistical evidence of unconstitutional
stops. This section addresses the evidence regarding the NYPD’s awareness of and response to
those unconstitutional stops. In short, I find that the “institutional evidence” — evidence
regarding the actions or inactions of the NYPD — shows that the City has been deliberately
indifferent to violations of the plaintiff class’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
The NYPD has known for more than a decade that its officers were conducting
unjustified stops and frisks and were disproportionately stopping blacks and Hispanics. Despite
this notice, the NYPD expanded its use of stop and frisk by seven-fold between 2002 and 2011.
This increase was achieved by pressuring commanders at Compstat meetings to increase the
numbers of stops. The commanders, in turn, pressured mid-level managers and line officers to
198
See Pl. Findings ¶ 17; Fagan Rpt. at 66, 68 fig. 14. I note two reservations about
this data: First, it is difficult to control reliably for the suspected crime when by 2009, 36% of
UF-250s stated no suspected crime. See Fagan Supp. Rpt. at 39. Second, these “use of force”
figures refer to stops in which any use of force was indicated, including “Hands On Suspect.”
See Fagan Rpt. at 63–69; Blank UF-250.
199
See Pl. Findings ¶ 16 (citing, among other sources, Fagan Rpt. at 66–67 & tbl.
16); 4/3 Tr. at 2123.
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increase stop activity by rewarding high stoppers and denigrating or punishing those with lower
numbers of stops.
This pressure to increase the quantity of stops was not accompanied by attention
to the constitutionality of the stops. No policies were implemented to ensure that officers were
recording each stop with sufficient detail to permit an assessment of the constitutionality of the
stops. Similarly, no study was done to ensure that officers were not reflexively creating a
“script” of checkmarks — especially Furtive Movements and High Crime Area — by searching
the UF-250 database to identify such patterns. No effort was made to identify outliers —
meaning those officers with the highest stop numbers, officers who stopped only or almost only
blacks or Hispanics, or officers who routinely checked the same boxes on the UF-250. No
rewards or punishments turned on the quality of stops conducted. Indeed, when officers were
found to have made “bad” stops, little or no discipline was imposed. The evidence showed that
the NYPD turned a blind eye to its duty to monitor and supervise the constitutionality of the
stops and frisks conducted by its officers.
In addition, I find that the NYPD instituted a policy of indirect racial profiling by
directing its commanders and officers to focus their stop activity on “the right people” — the
demographic groups that appear most often in a precinct’s crime complaints. This policy led
inevitably to impermissibly targeting blacks and Hispanics for stops and frisks at a higher rate
than similarly situated whites.
1.
Early Notice: the 1999 AG Report
In 1999, New York’s Attorney General investigated the constitutionality of the
NYPD’s stop and frisk practices under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The
investigation was prompted in part by the Attorney General’s finding that despite a decade of
falling crime rates, “the climate in many of New York’s minority neighborhoods . . . was one of
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resentment and distrust of the NYPD.” Many of the complaints involved “lower-level police
involvement in the everyday lives of minority residents,” such as stop and frisk encounters.200
The Attorney General sought the assistance of a team of researchers from
Columbia University’s Center for Violence Research and Prevention, led by Dr. Fagan. The
researchers performed statistical analyses of 175,000 UF-250s from January 1, 1998 through
March 31, 1999. The resulting Report was apparently the first-ever quantitative analysis of
pedestrian stop and frisk practices in the United States.201
For their Fourth Amendment investigation, the researchers analyzed and grouped
15,000 UF-250s using a methodology that resolved “every ambiguity of factual or legal
interpretation . . . in favor of a determination that ‘reasonable suspicion’ existed.” Nevertheless,
the researchers found that 15% of the UF-250s contained facts that did not meet the legal test for
reasonable suspicion.202
For their Fourteenth Amendment investigation, the researchers tested then-NYPD
Commissioner Howard Safir’s theory — which largely remains the City’s theory in this case —
that the apparently disproportionate stopping of blacks and Hispanics can be explained on raceneutral grounds by police deployment to high crime areas, and by racial differences in crime
200
The investigation was also prompted by the shooting and killing of Amadou
Diallo, an unarmed twenty-two-year-old West African immigrant, by members of the NYPD’s
now-disbanded Street Crimes Unit. Diallo was shot during an incident that apparently began as
a stop. See THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT ’S STOP AND FRISK PRACTICES: A
REPORT TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK FROM THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL (1999) (“1999 AG Report”), PX 333, at 4–5. The 1999 AG Report was admitted only
for the purpose of showing that the NYPD had notice of various issues raised in this case, not for
the truth of its contents. See 4/19 Tr. at 4283–4284.
201
See 1999 AG Report at v–xv, 1, 12. The UF-250s analyzed in the report were the
old version of the form. See id. at 89; PX 449 (old UF-250).
202
See 1999 AG Report at vii–xv.
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rates.203 The researchers found, however, that “blacks and Hispanics were significantly more
likely than whites to be ‘stopped’ [even] after controlling for race-specific precinct crime rates
and precinct population composition by race.”204 In addition, the Report found that different
crime rates among precincts did not explain the higher overall stop rate in majority-minority
precincts as opposed to majority-white precincts.205
The Report called for a broad, public dialogue among the Office of the Attorney
General, the NYPD, and members of the community.206 This dialogue never occurred. Instead,
senior officials at the NYPD either found pretexts for rejecting the Report’s findings,207 or
ignored the Report entirely — like Chief Esposito, who testified that he had never read it.208
203
The Report quotes Safir as stating: “‘The racial/ethnic distribution of the subjects
of ‘stop’ and frisk reports reflects the demographics of known violent crime suspects as reported
by crime victims. Similarly, the demographics of arrestees in violent crimes also correspond
with the demographics of known violent crime suspects.’” Id. at 120 n.26. The Report also
highlights an issue discussed later in this Opinion: because only 13% of stops resulted from the
stopped person fitting the description of a known criminal suspect, suspect descriptions for
violent criminals cannot be the primary driver for NYPD stop activity, which suggests that such
descriptions cannot provide a race-neutral explanation for racial disparities in stops overall. See
id. at 122 n.30.
204
Id. at 121.
205
See id. at 130–131.
206
“It is now for the [NYPD] and others interested in a constructive dialogue to
review the data and offer their perspectives.” Id. at 175.
207
Assistant Commissioner Philip McGuire, who has been in charge of Crime
Analysis and Program Planning (CAPPS) in the Office of Management, Analysis and Planning
(OMAP) since 1994, disagreed with the Report’s findings because the benchmark it used was the
arrest data from 1997, instead of data from 1998 and 1999, the years in which the UF-250s were
prepared. Deputy Commissioner Michael Farrell has overseen OMAP and the Quality
Assurance Division (QAD) since 2002. He disagreed with the findings in the Report because
Dr. Fagan used arrest data instead of suspect description data as his benchmark. See 5/14 Tr. at
7081–7082, 7090–7091. The use of arrest data rather than suspect data would likely hide rather
than exaggerate the overstopping of minorities.
208
See 4/9 Tr. at 2804.
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Pressure to Increase Stops
Between 2002 and 2011, the number of stops increased from roughly 97,000 to
roughly 686,000 per year.209 How did the NYPD increase its stop activity by roughly 700%,
despite the fact that crime continued to fall during this period?210
Based on numerous, mutually reinforcing sources of evidence at trial including
live testimony, depositions, roll call recordings, internal NYPD documents, and survey results,
the most plausible explanation is that NYPD officers prior to and during the class period
experienced significant pressure to increase their stop activity.211
a.
Compstat: Pressure on Commanders
Introduced in 1994, Compstat is the NYPD’s statistics-based performance
management system.212 The system collects and analyzes statistical and other data about local
crime and enforcement activities, conducts weekly meetings during which senior officials
question local commanders about the data, and holds commanders accountable for addressing
209
See id. at 2807; DX V14-A. The City speculates that this increase may only
reflect increased documentation of stops, but offers no evidence for its speculations. See 4/11/13
Defendant[’s] Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Requested Injunctive Relief
(“Def. Inj. Mem.”) at 1.
210
See, e.g., NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, INDEX
CRIMES REPORTED TO POLICE BY REGION : 2003–2012 (2013) (showing 17% drop in index crime
reports between 2003 and 2012, and 30% drop in reported murders). I emphasize again that this
Opinion takes no position on whether stop and frisk contributed to the decline in crime. The
point here is that the dramatic increase in the number of stops cannot be explained by an increase
in the number of people displaying suspicious behavior on the streets. To the contrary, the fall in
crime reports suggests that stops based on suspicious behavior rose even as the amount of
suspicious behavior declined.
211
See generally Pl. Findings ¶¶ 56–85 (collecting many of the sources discussed
below).
212
See John A. Eterno & Eli B. Silverman, The NYPD’s Compstat: Compare
Statistics or Compose Statistics?, 12 INT ’L J. POLICE SCI. & MGMT . 426–29 (2010). Redacted
versions of two tables from the Eterno and Silverman article were admitted into the record as PX
291 and 292. See 5/31/13 Endorsed Letter [Dkt. No. 306].
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crime conditions and improving the quantitative measures of their performance.
Chief Esposito, who chaired Compstat’s meetings until his retirement earlier this
year, and Assistant Chief Raymond Diaz testified that the amount of UF-250s that a unit has
completed is a factor in evaluating the unit’s performance.213 Excerpts from heavily redacted
minutes of Compstat meetings show Chief Esposito questioning commanders about their low
stop numbers.214 Assistant Chief Diaz also stated that one way of measuring the effectiveness of
impact response teams is to look at the number of UF-250s they generate215 and that “an increase
in the 250s is usually a good sign . . . that the unit that is being reviewed is engaging in more
activity as opposed to less.”216
Chief Esposito and other NYPD officials testified that the quality of UF-250s is
also reviewed at Compstat meetings. Indeed, there was evidence that attention is paid at
213
See 4/9 Tr. at 2868–2869 (Esposito); 3/29 Tr. at 1511 (testimony that Chief
Esposito chaired weekly Compstat meetings). See also 3/22 Tr. at 1030–1031 (Diaz).
214
See, e.g., 2008 Compstat Meeting Notes Part A, PX 281, at *7017 (Chief
Esposito: “Your [enforcement] numbers are way down. . . . If you look at [the] raw [number] of
250s[,] you are down 50%.” An executive officer responds that he “[w]ill look at it.”); id. at
*7026 (Chief Esposito: “How many C summonses are given out per officer on straight time?
What should [the] average be?” A commanding officer responds: “2.3 sir and 2.3 for 250s as
well.”); id. at *7080 (Chief Esposito: “I have to go but 9 robberies compared to none[,] I don’t
think we are doing enough[] in that zone. You have 4 C[’]s and 5 250s in [a] 28 day period.”);
2008 Compstat Meeting Notes Part B, PX 283, at *7959 (Chief Esposito noting that there were
only “1 250 and 4 C [summonses] for [a] whole daytour.” A commanding officer responds:
“I[’]m on top of it[,] I saw it.”); id. at *8045 (Chief Esposito: “Everyone is working hard, just
trouble with the violence, 250s[] down, C[s] down, arrests down. OCCB collars up 16%[,] doing
[a] great job.”); id. at *8144 (Chief Esposito: “In and around housing you are down in C’s,
250s.” A commanding officer responds: “We have called on the [borough] for resources . . . .”).
The quotations come from Compstat meeting notes.
215
See 3/29 Tr. at 1556. Accord Deposition of Chief of Patrol Robert Giannelli
(“Giannelli Dep.”), PX 157, at 268–269 (testifying that at Compstat meetings, Chief Esposito
might criticize an inordinately low number of stops in relation to a crime pattern).
216
3/29 Tr. at 1555.
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Compstat meetings to the quality of enforcement activity in the sense of its effectiveness.217 For
example, Chief Esposito often questions commanders at Compstat about whether enforcement
activity was responding to crime conditions in specific places and times.218 There was no
evidence, however, that the quality of stops in the sense of their constitutionality receives
meaningful review or plays a role in the evaluation of commanders’ performance during
Compstat meetings.
Several NYPD officials conceded in testimony that Compstat focuses on
effectiveness, not constitutionality. For example, Chief Esposito was asked to explain an excerpt
from the Compstat meeting notes in which he is recorded as stating:
Quality on 250s[,] forget the number. 5% enforcement rate off 250s, 102
[Precinct] is the worst with enf[orcement] off 250s. A lot of it is probably
training. But quality of 250 in [Queens] South has a lot to be desired.219
When asked by plaintiffs’ lawyers whether “quality” in this passage could refer to whether stops
were based on reasonable suspicion, Chief Esposito stated: “No. I think we talk more about
where and when. Does it match up with the crime picture? That’s what is paramount.”220 None
217
See, e.g., 4/9 Tr. at 2881 (Chief Esposito testifying that “[i]n the context of
CompStat, we always stress quality”); 3/22 Tr. at 925 (Deputy Chief Michael Marino testifying
that “[t]he main thing that you hear a lot at CompStat is they talk about quality over quantity.
Nobody from the top on down has ever said they want more numbers for numbers’ sake.”); 3/22
Tr. at 1030 (similar testimony from Assistant Chief Diaz).
218
See, e.g., Giannelli Dep. at 268–269; 2008 Compstat Meeting Notes Part B at
*7958 (Chief Esposito considering redistribution of resources, in part based on low number of
UF-250s in area with spike in robberies). Accord 3/22 Tr. at 925 (Deputy Chief Marino
illustrating the emphasis on quality at Compstat meetings by stating: “They can do things like
they can put up the computer maps and show robberies up in this area. And then they will show
a lot of activity in this area. No, it should be here. You’re not taking proper steps to stop the
conditions.”).
219
2008 Compstat Meeting Notes Part B at *8025.
220
4/9 Tr. at 2893–2894. See also 4/9 Tr. at 2879–2881, 2893–2894 (Chief Esposito
credibly clarifying that 2008 Compstat Meeting Notes Part B at *8051–8052 does not question
the constitutionality of stops generating a low hit rate).
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of the excerpts from the Compstat meeting notes regarding UF-250s include a discussion of
racial profiling or use the term reasonable suspicion.221
Similarly, to the extent that Chief of Patrol James Hall and his staff “raise issues
or concerns about the UF-250s with COs at the meetings,”222 these relate to the effectiveness of
stops and officers’ basic compliance with paperwork requirements.223 There was no credible
evidence that Chief Hall or his staff perform regular or meaningful reviews of the
constitutionality of stops before Compstat meetings.224
In sum, Compstat exists to measure the effectiveness of police enforcement
activities, not their constitutionality.
b.
Evidence of Pressure in Survey Data
The evidence discussed in the previous section shows that senior NYPD officials
at Compstat meetings routinely place pressure on commanders to increase their enforcement
activity, including their stop numbers. The survey evidence in this section shows that
subordinate managers in the NYPD have communicated this pressure to the rank and file.
221
See id. at 2895. See also 4/2 Tr. at 1838 (Deputy Inspector Steven Mauriello
stating that he did not recall any discussion at a Compstat meeting of “whether the stops and
frisks that would be recorded in [a commander’s] 250s are . . . legal or constitutional”); 4/16 Tr.
at 3544 (Deputy Inspector Charles Ortiz stating that the review of UF-250s at Compstat
meetings consisted only of aggregate statistics, not the review of individual forms). For further
evidence of NYPD officials’ and managers’ failure to discuss racial profiling at Compstat
meetings, or among themselves, see Pl. Findings ¶¶ 186–190 (collecting sources).
222
Def. Findings ¶ 47 (citing 5/15 Tr. at 7348–7352).
223
See 5/15 Tr. at 7349. See also id. at 7348–7350; 5/16 Tr. at 7623.
224
Chief Hall ultimately conceded that “[p]rimarily,” the purpose of his and his
staff’s reviews of UF-250s “would probably be more related to the crime condition than the
actual stop.” 5/16 Tr. at 7626; id. at 7621–7626. When asked whether there is “ever an analysis
of the circumstances which led to [a] stop” at a Compstat meeting, Assistant Chief Diaz replied
“No”: “The CompStat process is basically to look at criminal activity and to see what strategies
are in place to address that criminal activity, not so much to look at the quality . . . of the stop.”
3/29 Tr. at 1518.
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Dr. Eli Silverman and Dr. John Eterno, a retired NYPD captain, conducted two
surveys of retired members of the NYPD, one in 2008 and the other in 2012.225 The 2008
survey was sent to 1,197 retired NYPD personnel with the rank of captain or above. 41%
responded. The 2012 survey was sent to 4,069 retired NYPD personnel of all ranks who had
listed themselves as “active retirees,” that is, available if needed to serve in an emergency. 48%
responded.226
The 2008 survey asked: “With respect to the following criteria and based on your
personal experience, on a scale of 1 to 10 (with 1 being the least and 10 the most), how much
pressure was there from management/supervisors to . . .” — followed by a list including, among
other items, “Increase summonses,” “Increase arrests,” and “Increase Stop and Frisk Reports.”
The final page of the survey asked: “Did you serve on [the] NYPD after 1994?”227 As noted
above, 1994 was the year in which Compstat was introduced.
The responses to the 2008 survey show that mid-level managers in the NYPD
who served during the Compstat era perceived significantly greater pressure to increase stops,
225
These surveys were pre-tested and approved by the Institutional Review Board of
Molloy College, where Dr. Eterno is an associate dean and professor of criminal justice.
226
See 4/5 Tr. 2470–2481 (Silverman testimony regarding 2008 survey); id. at
2503–2509 (same regarding 2012 survey); PX 300 (blank copy of questionnaire used in 2008
survey). Dr. Silverman testified that the original purpose of the 2008 survey was to determine
whether NYPD personnel were experiencing pressure to misrepresent crime numbers in order to
improve their performance measurements at Compstat meetings. See 4/5 Tr. at 2470. After the
publication of the survey results, Commissioner Kelly appointed a three-person committee,
including two former federal prosecutors, to prepare a report on “whether the NYPD’s internalauditing and quality-control processes are sufficient to ensure the accuracy” of Compstat.
DAVID N. KELLEY & SHARON L. MCCARTHY , THE REPORT OF THE CRIME REPORTING REVIEW
COMMITTEE TO COMMISSIONER RAYMOND W. KELLY CONCERNING COMP STAT AUDITING i (Apr.
8, 2013). The report finds support for Dr. Silverman’s concerns, see id. at 49–50, and
recommends a number of reforms, including officer interviews to complement QAD’s
document-focused audits, more accountability for egregious misclassifications of crimes, and
formalized periodic external assessments of the Compstat audit process. See id. at 55–58.
227
PX 300.
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arrests, and summons than those who retired prior to 1994. Specifically, when asked to rate the
amount of pressure they perceived to increase stops, the mean response of Compstat era
personnel was a statistically significant 2.2 points higher on the scale from 1 to 10 than preCompstat era personnel.228 In addition, between the pre-Compstat and Compstat eras, the
percentage of NYPD personnel who reported low pressure (1 to 3 on the scale) fell from 55% to
23%, while the percentage who reported high pressure (8 to 10 on the scale) rose from 5% to
28%.229
The 2012 survey began by stating: “For all questions, if you retired before 1994,
base your answers on your overall impressions over your entire career; if you retired in 1994 or
after, base your answers on experiences that occurred only in 1994 and after.” The second set of
questions presented a refinement of the question on the first page of the 2008 survey: “With
respect to the following criteria and based on your personal experience/knowledge, on a scale of
1 to 10 (with 1 being the least and 10 the most), how much pressure did precinct (patrol)
personnel receive from management/supervisors to . . .” — followed by a list including “Increase
summonses,” “Increase stop and frisk,” and “Increase arrests,” as well as a new item: “Obey
Legal/Constitutional Rules.” The survey later asked respondents to state the year in which they
retired.230
Dr. Silverman divided the respondents to the 2012 survey into three categories:
228
See PX 291. The mean responses with regard to pressure to increase summonses
and arrests were 1.5 points and 1.8 points higher for Compstat-era personnel, and both of these
results were also statistically significant. See id.
229
The increases in the degrees of reported pressure to increase summonses and
arrests were similarly stark. See PX 443; PX 441 (with regard to summonses, reports of low
pressure fell from 28% to 9%, while reports of high pressure rose from 26% to 45%); PX 442
(with regard to arrests, reports of low pressure fell from 31% to 8%, while reports of high
pressure rose from 17% to 42%); 4/5 Tr. at 2496–2500.
230
See PX 293.
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those who retired in 1994 or earlier (pre-Compstat), those who retired between 1995 and 2001,
and those who retired after 2002 (the year of Mayor Bloomberg’s arrival and his appointment of
Commissioner Kelly). The responses showed that the percentage of NYPD personnel reporting
high pressure to increase stops increased from 9% in the pre-Compstat era, to 19% in the
Compstat era before Mayor Bloomberg, to 35% of all respondents who retired after 2002. The
percentage of personnel reporting low pressure fell from 58% for pre-Compstat retirees to 37%
for pre-Bloomberg retirees to 24% for post-Bloomberg retirees. The increases in reported
pressure to raise summons and arrest numbers was similarly stark.231
Finally, while the 2012 survey showed an increase from 35% to 42% in those
reporting medium pressure to obey legal and constitutional rules, it also showed a significant
post-2002 decrease in those reporting high pressure to do so. 45% of pre-Compstat retirees and
47% of early Compstat era retirees reported high pressure to obey legal and constitutional rules,
while only 36% of post-Bloomberg retirees reported high pressure. Dr. Silverman testified that
this represented a modest but statistically significant decline.232
Although the City attempted to undercut the reliability of the 2008 and 2012
findings,233 I find that the City’s criticisms do not undermine the surveys’ central finding for the
purposes of this case: NYPD personnel experienced or were aware of pressure to increase the
number of stops after the introduction of Compstat, and especially after the arrival of Mayor
Bloomberg and Commissioner Kelly. In addition, this rising pressure for stop numbers was not
231
See PX 446 (stops); PX 444 (summonses); PX 445 (arrests).
232
See PX 292, 447; 4/5 Tr. at 2518–2519.
233
See Def. Findings ¶ 68 (arguing, for example, that the 2008 survey is not
“representative” because it “included only retirees who opted to join [a] union mailing list,”
without offering any grounds for believing that retirees who joined this mailing list are more or
less likely than other retirees to perceive pressure to increase stops).
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accompanied by equivalent pressure to obey constitutional restrictions.
c.
Further Evidence of Pressure on Officers
Additional anecdotal evidence supports plaintiffs’ argument that the NYPD
pressured officers to increase stops without due regard to the constitutionality of those stops.
For convenience, I divide the evidence into two periods: before the enactment of New York’s
Quota Law in 2010, and after.
i.
Pressure Before the 2010 Quota Law
Before 2010, the NYPD had no written policy prohibiting quotas for stops,
arrests, or other enforcement activities.234 There is abundant evidence during this period of
supervisors directing officers to meet numerical enforcement goals, as well as threatening the
officers with negative consequences if they did not achieve those goals. In particular, three
NYPD officers from three precincts made secret recordings revealing institutional pressure to
increase enforcement numbers: Officers Adrian Schoolcraft, Adhyl Polanco, and Pedro
Serrano.235 The three officers’ recordings provide a rare window into how the NYPD’s policies
are actually carried out. I give great weight to the contents of these recordings.
Officer Schoolcraft’s recordings take place at the 81st Precinct in the Bedford
Stuyvesant area of Brooklyn. Many of the recordings are of roll calls, the period before a tour
when officers assemble to receive assignments and training.236 Requests or commands to issue
234
See Chief of Patrol, Memorandum Regarding Quota Bill (Oct. 22, 2010), PX 290,
at *0096 (“Quotas are not addressed as part of any managerial training . . . .”). The lack of
citation to any prior written policy prohibiting quotas strongly suggests that no such policy
existed.
235
To the extent that the officers chose what to record, the recordings may present an
incomplete picture. But for the most part, the context of the recordings and the meaning of the
supervisors’ words were plain.
236
See 3/19 Tr. at 425 (Polanco).
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UF-250s are common on the recordings, though sometimes innocuous.237 The recordings also
show repeated calls for increased “activity,” including summonses, stops, and arrests.
Sometimes supervisors use numerical goals backed by the threat of negative consequences if the
goals are not met. For example, at a June 12, 2008 roll call, Lieutenant Jean Delafuente stated:
[W]e had the CO’s meeting today. . . . First and foremost, we need more
activities, all right? The CO wants more activity. The XO wants more
activity. The borough is monitoring the activity sheets. So, if your activity
falls below par, they’re going to have either you or I or the Sergeant or the
CO have to explain what’s going on, all right? So, let’s not let it get that far,
all right?238
Later, Lieutenant Delafuente states: “The XO was in the other day. . . . He actually laid down a
number, all right?” Lieutenant Delafuente says, perhaps jokingly, that he is not going to quote
the number, then proceeds to say that the Executive Officer “wants at least three seatbelts, one
cellphone, and 11 others.” He also suggests that he has criticized officers whose numbers were
not high enough: “The CO gave me some names. I spoke to you. I’m not going to embarrass
you in front of everyone.”239
The most striking aspect of the Schoolcraft recordings is the contempt and
hostility of supervisors toward the local population. For example, at a roll call on November 8,
2008, Lieutenant Delafuente states:
All right, I went out there [to Howard and Chauncey] yesterday and . . .
we’ve got the old man out there with the grey hairs. A loud mouth. He
thinks since he’s 55 years old he’s not going to get locked up. Well, guess
what? I don’t tolerate shit out there. He went in and two of his pals went in.
All right? So we’ve got to keep the corner clear. . . . Because if you get too
big of a crowd there, you know, . . . they’re going to think that they own the
block. We own the block. They don’t own the block, all right? They might
237
See, e.g., PX 289T (10/30/08 at 4.20–6.30) (“If you see something just do some,
uh, 250’s, get all the fucking riff-raff off the corners.”).
238
Id. (6/12/08 at 7.13–8.10).
239
Id. (6/12/08 at 12.10–13.28).
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live there but we own the block. All right? We own the streets here. You
tell them what to do.240
Similarly, Lieutenant Delafuente reminds the officers at a roll call on November 1, 2008 that
they are “not working in Midtown Manhattan where people are walking around smiling and
happy. You’re working in Bed-Stuy where everyone’s probably got a warrant.”241 Because
Bedford Stuyvesant is a historically black neighborhood and continues to have a majority black
population,242 Lieutenant Delafuente’s comment carries troubling racial overtones.
As further evidence of a culture of hostility in the 81st Precinct, Sergeant
Raymond Stukes said the following at a roll call on March 13, 2009:
If you see guys walking down the street, move ‘em along. Two or three guys
you can move, you can’t move 15, all right? If you want to be a[n] asshole
or whatever you want to call it, make a move. If they won’t move, call me
over and lock them up [for disorderly conduct]. No big deal. We could
leave them there all night. . . . The less people on the street, the easier our
job will be . . . . If you stop them[,] 250, how hard is a 250. I’m not saying
make it up but you can always articulate robbery, burglary, whatever the
case may be. That’s paperwork . . . It’s still a number. It keeps the hounds
off, I’ve been saying that for months.243
240
Id. (11/8/08 at 13.09–14.36).
241
Id. (11/1/08 at 2.12–3.50).
242
See 5/9 Tr. at 6458–6459 (Inspector Juanita Holmes, who became the
Commanding Officer of the 81st Precinct after the release of Officer Schoolcraft’s tapes in 2010,
testifying that the 81st Precinct is “77 percent African-American”); NYC.gov, Community
Snapshot 2011, CD3: Bedford Stuyvesant (2012) (stating that Bedford Stuyvesant as a whole is
59% black).
243
PX 289T (3/13/09 at 4.32–5.20) (emphasis added). “The hounds” apparently is a
reference to superiors, such as commanders, who are monitoring enforcement activity, pushing
for higher activity, and have the power to transfer an officer as punishment for low enforcement
activity. See, e.g., id. (6/12/08 at 14.58–16.40); id. (12/8/08 at 12.20–15.00); 4/2 Tr. at
1897–1898.
For another example of Sergeant Stukes’ directives at roll call, see PX 289T
(1/7/08 at 6.58–8.00) (“Be an asshole. They going to do something, shine a light in their face
whatever the occasion, inconvenience them.”). When asked to explain Sergeant Stukes’
statement “[b]e an asshole,” Deputy Inspector Steven Mauriello offered the following
interpretation: “It means be a police officer. You have a footpost. You walk your footpost.
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Similarly, Sergeant Stukes states at a roll call on November 23, 2008: “If they’re on a corner,
make them move. They don’t want to move, you lock them up. Done deal. You can always
articulate later.”244
In a speech at roll call on Halloween in 2008, Deputy Inspector Mauriello states:
Tonight is zero tolerance. It’s New Years Eve all over again. Everybody
goes. I don’t care. . . . They’re throwing dice? They all go, promote
gambling. I don’t care. Let the DA discuss what they’re going to do
tomorrow. . . . They got [bandanas] on and they’re running like nuts down
the block, chasing people? Grab them. Fuck it. You’re preventing a robbery
. . . . You know that and I know that.245
When asked to explain what he meant in these remarks, Deputy Inspector Mauriello testified that
throwing dice is a quality of life infraction.246
In addition to revealing a virulent precinct culture that the NYPD failed to address
until forced to do so by the publication of the recordings, some of the recorded statements are
directly relevant to plaintiffs’ claims. Sergeant Stukes’ statements on more than one occasion
that “you can always articulate” some basis for a stop after the fact encourages officers to stop
first and develop a justification later.247 The same Sergeant Stukes later directs his officers to
“[s]hake everybody up. Anybody moving, anybody coming out that building, 250, verticals, and
And be omnipresent.” 4/2 Tr. at 1900.
244
PX 289T (11/23/08 at 5.46–6.28) (emphasis added); 4/2 Tr. at 1825. When asked
to interpret the phrase “[y]ou can always articulate later,” Deputy Inspector Mauriello at first
evaded the question by discussing the NYPD’s commitment to “CPR” (Courtesy,
Professionalism, and Respect). Id. at 1903–1904. He eventually responded: “I guess he means
do your paperwork later. Articulate. Online booking sheet.” Id. at 1903.
245
PX 289T (10/31/08 at 9.05–9.50).
246
See 4/2 Tr. at 1912–1913.
247
This tactic, of course, contravenes the requirement that an officer must have
individualized and articulable reasonable suspicion before making a stop.
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give me a couple of community visits. C-summons as well.”248 Because exiting a building —
even in a high crime area — is not a sufficient basis for reasonable suspicion, these words are an
instruction to carry out stops and other enforcement activity without legal justification.
Likewise, the following words by Deputy Inspector Mauriello at a roll call on
November 8, 2008 provide evidence that the rapid escalation in stops between 2002 and 2011
may have been accomplished in part by encouraging stops without reasonable suspicion of any
crime:
I’m tired of bandanas on their waist and I’m tired of these beads. Red and
black beads mean Bloods. Their bandanas — if they’re walking down the
street and they’ve got a bandana sticking out their ass, coming out there —
they’ve got to be stopped. A 250 at least. At least.249
Most significantly, Sergeant Stukes repeatedly instructs the officers that their
careers depend on carrying out high levels of activity, and shows utter disregard for the
requirement that a stop only be made based on a reasonable suspicion that crime is afoot. At a
December 8, 2008 roll call, Sergeant Stukes explained:
This job is so easy. Just keep the hounds off. A parker, a 250, you could
book somebody walking down the street. You know what? I stopped and
asked — so what? I did a 250. What’s the big deal? Let him go. He
doesn’t want to give you no information, who cares? It’s still a 250.250
248
PX 289T (12/8/08 at 1.20–1.38). According to one officer’s testimony, there are
three types of summonses: A summonses for parking violations (“parkers”), B summonses for
moving violations, and C summonses for quality of life offenses (also known as “criminal court
summonses”). See 5/10 Tr. at 6765 (Herran).
249
PX 289T (11/8/08 at 15.34–15.45). Even if it were an effective gang-suppression
strategy to stop every person wearing known gang paraphernalia, it would not be a constitutional
strategy, because neither carrying beads nor flaunting a bandana is a crime.
250
Id. (12/8/08 at 12.20–15.00). Accord id. (12/8/08 at 7.07–7.42) (suggesting that
officers with low activity will be transferred); id. (12/12/18 at 2.20–4.30) (encouraging more
UF-250s and C summonses, and stating “your evaluations are based on your activity”); id.
(1/28/09 at 23.24–24.10) (“[T]hey’re looking at those numbers and people are gonna be
moved.”); id. (1/29/09 at 6.56–9.03) (“You get . . . your numbers, and everybody leaves you
alone.”).
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Officer Polanco’s recordings take place in 2009 at the 41st Precinct in the Bronx,
and reveal similar pressure on officers to achieve enforcement activity numbers regardless of
whether there is a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. In one recording, Officer Polanco’s
union delegate, Officer Angel Herran, refers repeatedly to a requirement that officers complete
“20 and 1,” which Officer Polanco testified meant twenty summonses and one arrest per
month.251 Officer Herran encourages the other officers to “[c]rush the fucking city” and make
the required numbers, because someone who does not is a “zero,” and he will not fight for a
zero.252 Officer Herran confirmed in his testimony that “20 and 1” referred to the goal of 20
summonses and 1 arrest, which patrol officers in the 41st Precinct were expected to achieve (at
least prior to the Quota Law) in approximately 20 to 22 days on patrol.253 Officer Polanco’s
recordings also appear to show Lieutenant Andrew Valenzano instructing officers to stop anyone
on a bike who is carrying a bag near an area where there have been car break-ins.254 “[T]hose are
good stops,” Lieutenant Valenzano states.255
Officer Serrano’s recordings take place at the 40th Precinct in the Bronx, and also
show the pressure for enforcement activity. During a roll call on June 30, 2010, Lieutenant
251
PX 284T track 1; 3/19 Tr. at 423–425.
252
PX 284T track 1–2. See also 3/20 Tr. at 469–470 (Officer Polanco interpreting
Officer Herran as encouraging officers to carry out an arrest on Friday night so that the City will
have to pay overtime the following day); 3/21 Tr. at 734–735 (Officer Serrano describing
distinction between a “zero” with low activity and a “hero” with high activity).
253
See 5/10 Tr. at 6765–6766, 6768.
254
See PX 284T track 5; 3/19 Tr. at 417.
255
PX 284T track 5. Officer Polanco credibly interpreted this as an instruction to
“[s]top and frisk anybody who is on a bike carrying a bag” in the area of the crime pattern. 3/20
Tr. at 487–488.
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Stacy Barrett directs each officer to get five summonses or UF-250s,256 and says it should not be
difficult. She tells the officers to “go crazy” in St. Mary’s Park: “If we get every single
summons in St. Mary’s, I don’t care.” Her primary concern is to “get those numbers.”257
Beyond the recordings, many other officers offered credible, consistent testimony
regarding the pressure to increase enforcement activity and the threat of adverse consequences
for failing to achieve high enough numbers.258
ii.
Pressure After 2010 Quota Law
In 2010, after the Village Voice publicized Officer Schoolcraft’s recordings,259
the State of New York enacted the Quota Law, which prohibits retaliation against officers for
failing to meet quotas for tickets, stops, summonses, and arrests.260
Subsequently, Chief Hall sent a memo to the commanders of every patrol
borough purporting to clarify the NYPD’s position on performance quotas. The memo first
clarifies that “a requirement that a specific number of summonses be issued or arrests be made
over a specific period of time has always been prohibited.” The memo then states that
“[o]fficers who avoid engaging in enforcement activities . . . can be subjected to adverse
consequences.”261 Furthermore, “[a]n obvious way of gauging an officer’s activity level is to
count the number of enforcement encounters that an officer has over time,” and to compare an
256
Lieutenant Barrett credibly testified that “we were looking for fives, that was any
combination of summonses or UF-250s.” 5/7 Tr. at 6272.
257
PX 297.
258
See Pl. Findings ¶¶ 61–62 (collecting sources).
259
See 4/2 Tr. at 1842.
260
Previously, section 215 only addressed quotas for traffic violations. See PX 290
at *0096.
261
Id. at *0097.
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officer’s activity level to that of similarly situated officers. The memo only explicitly prohibits
“discussing specific numerical objectives” or linking “the failure to reach a specific numerical
goal with an adverse employment consequence.”262
In 2011, the NYPD introduced the “Quest for Excellence” program, a set of new
policies for evaluating the performance of officers and encouraging the use of performance
goals.263 One of the central documents in the Quest program is Operations Order 52 (“OO 52”),
which was issued October 17, 2011 and describes officers’ performance objectives. OO 52
made clear that supervisors must evaluate officers based on their activity numbers, with
particular emphasis on summonses, stops, and arrests, and that officers whose numbers are too
low should be subjected to increasingly serious discipline if their low numbers persist.
Specifically, NYPD managers “can and must” set “performance goals” for “proactive
enforcement activities,” with “particular attention” to “self-initiated arrests, issuing summonses,
[and] conducting stops.”264 Deputy Commissioner Beirne testified that “performance goals”
could include “setting a goal of a certain number of stops.”265 Officers who “fail to engage in
proactive activities,” and thus continue to fail in “addressing sector/post conditions,” will
ultimately be referred to the “Performance Monitoring Unit” for potential “transfer,
262
Id. (emphasis added).
263
See 4/15 Tr. at 3364 (Deputy Commissioner of Labor Relations John Beirne, one
of the designers of Quest).
264
OO 52, PX 285 ¶¶ 1, 3. For the many ways of referring to low activity numbers,
see 3/22 Tr. at 966 (Lieutenant Rafael Mascol testifying that he would tell an underperforming
officer: “Listen, you need to be a little more proactive out there, be a little bit busier about doing
your assignments out there, handling the conditions that you have out there, you know, you seem
to have fallen off for a few months there, is there something going on?” (emphases added)).
265
4/15 Tr. at 3368–3369.
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reassignment or other appropriate disciplinary action.”266
In addition, the form used to track officer performance reflects the NYPD’s
emphasis on enforcement activity numbers and effectiveness without attention to the
constitutional justifications for enforcement. An officer is required to tally her activities each
day on the Police Officer’s Monthly Conditions Impact Measurement Report.267 The form
contains columns for a number of activities, including vertical patrols, radio runs, arrests and
summonses, and the preparation of various reports, including UF-250s.268 At the end of the
month, the officer tallies her total activities, and the supervisor provides a brief written
evaluation of whether the officer’s “impact on declared conditions” was “effective.” Each
quarter, the supervisor reviews the officer’s activity over the prior three months and evaluates
the officer’s effectiveness.269
In contrast to this detailed review system for effectiveness, there is no process for
evaluating whether enforcement activities are legally justified.270 For the purposes of
266
OO 52 ¶ 15.
267
See Interim Order 49 (Oct. 24, 2011) (“IO 49”), PX 315 (suspending Patrol Guide
205-57), at 2; Police Officer’s Monthly Conditions Impact Measurement Report, PX 205 (blank
form).
268
See PX 205. The form provides another example of the NYPD systematically
collecting information relevant to evaluating the “quality” of stops in the sense of their
effectiveness, but not in the sense of their constitutionality.
269
See IO 49 at 2–5; PX 205; 3/22 Tr. at 892–893 (Deputy Chief Marino confirming
that officers’ success or failure in meeting performance goals is monitored exclusively through
the monthly, quarterly, and annual reports). The monthly and quarterly evaluations also play a
significant part in an officer’s annual performance evaluation. See, e.g., 4/15 Tr. at 3410
(Beirne).
270
This fact is evident from the form itself, see PX 205, but was also corroborated by
testimony. See, e.g., 3/27 Tr. at 1178 (Lieutenant Jonathan Korabel acknowledging “there’s no
substantive information [on a monthly activity report] about [the] stops and frisks, arrests, or
summonses” tallied on the report).
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performance review, an unconstitutional stop is no less valuable to an officer’s career than a
constitutional one — because the two are indistinguishable. In fact, a review of several monthly
activity reports suggests that in practice, many officers are evaluated almost exclusively based
on the number of stops, arrests, and summonses that they carry out. Based on these reports, as
well as corroborating testimony, an “effective” “impact on declared conditions,” in the context
of performance reviews, is sometimes nothing more than a euphemism for an acceptable number
of stops, arrests, and summonses in targeted locations.271
Officers may be subject to warnings and more severe adverse consequences if
they fail to achieve what their superiors perceive as appropriate enforcement activity numbers.
Deputy Commissioner Beirne acknowledged that an officer’s failure to engage in enough
proactive enforcement activities could result in a negative performance evaluation and
reassignment to a different command, and that both of these steps represent “an adverse
employment action.”272 As noted earlier, the only proactive enforcement activities mentioned in
271
For example, the following are notes from supervisors on the back of officers’
monthly report forms in the field labeled “Officer’s Impact on Declared Conditions,” which
invites supervisors to “[d]escribe in detail why [the officer] was effective/ineffective.” All of the
evaluations are from 2012: “Officer showed improvement from last month and was proactive in
combating conditions which resulted in 24 summonses to address conditions.” PX 234 (marked
“Effective”). “PO . . . was effective for the month with 1 grand larceny . . . arrest and 20 UF250s.” Id. at *1255 (marked “Effective”). “PO . . . was effective for the month [with] 1 arrest
and 20 UF-250s in target areas.” Id. at *1257 (marked “Effective”).
272
4/15 Tr. at 3370–3372. In contrast to Deputy Commissioner Beirne, Chief
Esposito and Deputy Chief Marino evaded plaintiffs’ questions about numerical enforcement
activity goals, and insisted that officers are evaluated on “tak[ing] care of the condition,” 4/9 Tr.
at 2957 (Esposito). Accord 3/22 Tr. at 881 (Marino). Chief Esposito and Deputy Chief Marino
offered this testimony even though the Quest program contains no metrics for measuring
“addressing conditions” other than the tallies of an officer’s activities. I also note that an
arbitration proceeding found that Deputy Chief Marino himself imposed quotas on officers when
he was the Commanding Officer of the 75th Precinct. See 4/9 Tr. at 2954–2955 (Chief Esposito
acknowledging Marino arbitration findings).
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OO 52 are stops, summonses, and arrests.273
It is difficult to see any difference between a performance goal and a quota if
“performance goals” operate as Deputy Commissioner Beirne testified.274 It is not surprising,
then, that since 2010, there have been at least nine grievances filed by police officers against the
NYPD alleging adverse employment action as a result of quotas.275
d.
Conclusion
The foregoing evidence shows that officers are routinely subjected to significant
pressure to increase their stop numbers, without corresponding pressure to ensure that stops are
constitutionally justified. Together with evidence described in the next section, this is a
predictable formula for producing unjustified stops. To paraphrase a statement by Chief Hall
from his 2010 memo, imposing numerical performance goals for enforcement activities, without
providing effective safeguards to ensure the activities are legally justified, “could result in an
officer taking enforcement action for the purpose of meeting a [performance goal] rather than
because a violation of the law has occurred.”276
3.
Targeting “the Right People”
The role of race in stop and frisk has been a source of contention since the
Supreme Court first sanctioned the practice in 1968. In Terry, the Supreme Court recognized
that “‘[i]n many communities, field interrogations are a major source of friction between the
police and minority groups,’” and that friction “‘increases as more police departments
273
See OO 52 ¶¶ 1, 3.
274
4/15 Tr. at 3369 (distinguishing quota and performance goal).
275
See id. at 3399–3400 (Beirne); 5/10 Tr. at 6790–6791 (Herran).
276
PX 290 at *0096. The original includes “quota” rather than “performance goal,”
but the meaning is the same.
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[encourage] officers . . . routinely to stop and question persons on the street.’”277 In 1996, the
Ninth Circuit noted that these stops “are humiliating, damaging to the detainees’ self-esteem, and
reinforce the reality that racism and intolerance are for many African-Americans a regular part
of their daily lives.”278
The NYPD maintains two different policies related to racial profiling in the
practice of stop and frisk: a written policy that prohibits racial profiling and requires reasonable
suspicion for a stop279 — and another, unwritten policy that encourages officers to focus their
reasonable-suspicion-based stops on “the right people, the right time, the right location.”280
Based on the evidence summarized below, I find that the NYPD’s policy of
targeting “the right people” encourages the disproportionate stopping of the members of any
racial group that is heavily represented in the NYPD’s crime suspect data. This is an indirect
form of racial profiling. In practice, it leads NYPD officers to stop blacks and Hispanics who
would not have been stopped if they were white. There is no question that a person’s race, like a
person’s height or weight, is a permissible consideration where a stop is based on a specific
description of a suspect.281 But it is equally clear that it is impermissible to subject all members
277
Terry, 392 U.S. at 14 n.11 (quoting PRESIDENT ’S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE , TASK FORCE REPORT : THE POLICE (1967)).
See also id. at 14–15 (noting the problem of “[t]he wholesale harassment by certain elements of
the police community, of which minority groups, particularly Negroes, frequently complain”).
278
Lambert, 98 F.3d at 1188 (collecting scholarly sources).
279
See, e.g., Interim Order 20 (5/16/12), PX 183 ¶¶ 2–4 (current racial profiling
policy, emphasizing that stops must be based on reasonable suspicion); Operations Order 11
(3/13/02), PX 184 ¶¶ 1–2 (previous racial profiling policy, emphasizing same).
280
PX 332T at 20. NYPD personnel of diverse ranks repeated variations on this
phrase throughout the trial. See Pl. Findings ¶¶ 49–55 (collecting sources); 4/10 Tr. at 3035
(Chief Esposito agreeing that the NYPD looks for “the right people, at the right place, at the
right time”).
281
See infra Part V.B.1 (conclusions of law regarding racial profiling).
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of a racially defined group to heightened police enforcement because some members of that
group appear more frequently in criminal complaints. The Equal Protection Clause does not
permit race-based suspicion.
Chief Esposito, the highest ranking uniformed member of the NYPD throughout
the class period and the chair at Compstat meetings, was especially frank about the NYPD’s
policy of targeting racially defined groups for stops, provided that reasonable suspicion is also
present:
Q. Quality stops are stops that are in the right place at the right time, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And targeting . . . the right people, correct?
A. Among other things.
Q. And the right people would be young black and Hispanic youths 14 to 20,
correct?
A. At times. [pause] You failed to mention reasonable suspicion.282
Chief Esposito conceded that not all stops are based on a specific suspect description from a
crime complaint. In fact, officers check “Fits Description” on only 13% of UF-250s.
Nevertheless, Esposito testified, the NYPD uses criminal suspect data to target certain
individuals for stops even when there is no suspect description:
Q: Do you believe the disparity in stop, question and frisk among black and
Latino men is evidence of racial profiling?
A: No. I don’t believe that. . . . Because the stops are based on complaints
that we get from the public.
...
THE COURT: But there are many street stops that have nothing to do with
complaints, right?
THE WITNESS: Correct.
THE COURT: It’s observed conduct. . . . It’s not based on a complaint of a
victim.
THE WITNESS: It’s based on the totality of, okay, who is committing the
282
4/10 Tr. at 3034. To be clear, there is nothing constitutionally problematic about
targeting “the right place at the right time,” where this means that deployment should “mirror the
time of the crime and the place of the crimes that are being committed.” PX 157 at 268–269
(Giannelli).
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— who is getting shot in a certain area? . . . Well who is doing those
shootings? Well, it’s young men of color in their late teens, early 20s.283
Thus, within the pool of people that an officer could reasonably suspect of criminal activity, the
people who match the general demographics of the local criminal suspect data are “the right
people” to be stopped.284
Other evidence corroborates this interpretation of Chief Esposito’s testimony. On
one of the Serrano recordings, Deputy Inspector Christopher McCormack explained to Officer
Serrano that stopping “the right people, [at] the right time, [in] the right location” meant not
stopping “a 48-year-old lady [who] was walking through St. Mary’s Park when it was closed.”285
He continued as follows:
INSPECTOR: This is about stopping the right people, the right place, the
right location.
SERRANO: Okay.
INSPECTOR: Again, take Mott Haven where we had the most problems.
And the most problems we had, they was robberies and grand larcenies.
SERRANO: And who are those people robbing?
283
4/10 Tr. at 3027–3029 (emphasis added). Chief Esposito later testified that stop
activity targets “the people that are committing the crimes.” Id. at 3029. While I find that the
NYPD has defined “the right people” to be stopped in terms of race, gender, and age, I note that
it would be equally problematic if the NYPD instructed officers to target “the right people” or
“the people that are committing the crimes” without defining these categories. This would invite
officers to fill in the undefined terms with their own stereotypes and biases regarding what a
criminal looks like.
284
Chief Esposito does not view targeting “the right people” as a form of racial
profiling, because in his view, racial profiling cannot exist provided that stops are based on
reasonable suspicion:
As I think about, since this has been going on since ‘08, yeah, I think if you
look at that form, if it’s filled out properly, it gives you reasonable suspicion,
and if you have reasonable suspicion established, then you do not have racial
profiling. It’s as simple as that.
4/9 Tr. at 2824. Of course, it is also erroneous to suggest that properly filling out a UF-250
necessarily establishes reasonable suspicion.
285
PX 332T at 21.
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INSPECTOR: The problem was, what, male blacks. And I told you at roll
call, and I have no problem telling you this, male blacks 14 to 20, 21. I said
this at roll call.286
Deputy Inspector McCormack testified that his statements in the recording were based on
suspect descriptions from victims. But he also acknowledged that the descriptions of the
suspects consisted only of the information stated here: males, black, between 14 and 21.287
Earlier in the recording, when challenged by Officer Serrano, Deputy Inspector
McCormack clarified that he does not believe “every black and Hispanic” is subject to being
stopped based on the crime suspect data.288 Deputy Inspector McCormack, like Chief Esposito,
recognized that reasonable suspicion is required for every stop. But both believe that, within the
pool of people displaying reasonably suspicious behavior, those who fit the general race, gender,
and age profile of the criminal suspects in the area should be particularly targeted for stops.289
The stop of Cornelio McDonald illustrates the NYPD’s policy of indirect racial
profiling based on crime suspect data. Officer Edward French (now a detective) was aware of
crime reports that a black male had been burglarizing residences in Queens, as well as reports of
a black male committing armed robberies of commercial establishments in the borough. The
only information known about the suspects in these robbery patterns was that they were male
286
Id. at 23–24. Mott Haven is a mostly black and Hispanic housing development in
the Mott Haven neighborhood in the Bronx. See id. at 22–23; 5/13 Tr. at 7014 (McCormack).
287
See 5/13 Tr. at 7016–7017.
288
See PX 332T at 23. I also note that Deputy Inspector McCormack does not
display the contempt or hostility toward the local population that appears in many of the
Schoolcraft recordings. To the contrary, Deputy Inspector McCormack emphasizes his belief
“that 99 percent of these people in this community are great, hardworking people,” and makes
clear that he has no interest in targeting blacks or Hispanics as such: his goal is to focus stop
activity on “whatever group” is committing targeted crimes. Id. at 8, 11.
289
Similarly, Deputy Inspector Stephen Cirabisi testified that at Compstat meetings,
attention is paid to whether the people being stopped are the same as “the people that are
suspected of committing the crimes.” 5/2 Tr. at 5696–5697.
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and black — a very general description that would not justify a stop based on “fits
description.”290 Nevertheless, Officer French stopped McDonald in part because he fit the
suspect description. McDonald was a black man crossing the street late on a winter night with
his hands in his pockets, and as a black man he was treated as more suspicious than an
identically situated white man would have been.291 In other words, because two black males
committed crimes in Queens, all black males in that borough were subjected to heightened police
attention.
The UF-250s prepared by Officer Gonzalez, one of the most aggressive stoppers
in 2009, provide a different illustration of an officer responding to the NYPD’s policy of indirect
racial profiling based on crime suspect data. Officer Gonzalez checked “Fits Description” on
132 of his 134 UF-250s, although he also indicated that not a single one of those stops was based
on an ongoing investigation, a report from a victim, or a radio run.292 Nonetheless, Gonzalez’s
supervisor, then-Sergeant Charlton Telford, testified that he was not concerned by this
discrepancy. Telford insisted that Officer Gonzalez’s stops were based on “the race, the height,
[and] the age” of criminal suspects.293 The following were the suspect descriptions that formed
the basis for Officer Gonzalez’s 134 stops:
The burglaries, the description we had was a male Hispanic, between 5’8”,
5’9”, in his 30s. The robberies were male blacks, anywhere from four to five
[in number], between the ages of 14 to 19. And the shooting was a male
290
See 4/17 Tr. at 3743; Def. Findings ¶ 13.
291
See infra Part IV.D.1.c.
292
See PX 557; PX 557-D; 5/7 Tr. at 6327–6328 (Lieutenant Charlton Telford).
“Radio Run/Sprint #” is a field on the front of the UF-250, while “Report From Victim/Witness”
and “Ongoing Investigations, e.g., Robbery Pattern” are boxes in the Additional Circumstances
section on the back of the form. See Blank UF-250.
293
5/7 Tr. at 6327–6328.
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black in his 20s.294
Perhaps as a result of Officer Gonzalez’s reliance on this general suspect data, 128 of the 134
people he stopped were black or Hispanic.295 This is roughly in line with the percentage of
criminal suspects in his precinct who are either black or Hispanic (93%), but far exceeds the
percentage of blacks and Hispanics in the local population (60%).296 Thus, Officer Gonzalez’s
UF-250s provide a perfect example of how racial profiling leads to a correlation between the
racial composition of crime suspects and the racial composition of those who are stopped by the
police. By checking “Fits Description” as a basis for nearly every stop, Officer Gonzalez
documented what appears to be a common practice among NYPD officers — treating generic
crime complaint data specifying little more than race and gender as a basis for heightened
suspicion.
New York State Senator Eric Adams’ testimony provided further evidence of
official acquiescence in racial profiling by NYPD leadership. Senator Adams, a former NYPD
captain, testified about a small meeting he attended at the Governor’s office in Manhattan in July
2010. Former New York Governor David Paterson, Senator Adams, another state senator, a
state assemblyman, and Commissioner Kelly were all present to discuss a bill related to stop and
frisk. Senator Adams raised his concern that a disproportionate number of blacks and Hispanics
were being targeted for stops. Commissioner Kelly responded that he focused on young blacks
and Hispanics “because he wanted to instill fear in them, every time they leave their home, they
294
Id. at 6341.
295
PX 557-D. Similarly, Officer Dang stopped 120 blacks and 0 whites during a
sample quarter in 2009, despite the fact that he was patrolling a 43% black precinct. See DX
L14; RAYMOND W. KELLY , POLICE COMMISSIONER, REASONABLE SUSPICION STOPS: PRECINCT
BASED COMPARISON BY STOP AND SUSPECT DESCRIPTION , DX Y8, at *4974.
296
DX Y8 at *4974.
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could be stopped by the police.”297 Senator Adams testified that he was “amazed” that
Commissioner Kelly was “comfortable enough to say that in the setting.”298
I find Senator Adams’ testimony credible, especially in light of the Senator’s
former affiliation with the NYPD, Commissioner Kelly’s decision not to appear at trial to rebut
the testimony, the City’s failure to offer any rebuttal evidence regarding Commissioner Kelly’s
statement at this meeting, and the other evidence of tolerance toward racial profiling at the
NYPD. In fact, the substance of Commissioner Kelly’s statement is not so distant from the
City’s publicly announced positions. Mayor Bloomberg stated in April that the NYPD’s use of
stop and frisk is necessary “to deter people from carrying guns. . . . [I]f you end stops looking for
guns, . . . there will be more guns in the hands of young people and more people will be getting
killed.”299 At the same time, the City emphasized in its opening arguments that “blacks and
Hispanics account for a disproportionate share of . . . crime perpetrators,”300 and that “90 percent
of all violent crime suspects are black and Hispanic.”301 When these premises are combined —
that the purpose of stop and frisk is to deter people from carrying guns and that blacks and
Hispanics are a disproportionate source of violent crime — it is only a short leap to the
conclusion that blacks and Hispanics should be targeted for stops in order to deter gun violence,
regardless of whether they appear objectively suspicious. Commissioner Kelly simply made
explicit what is readily inferrable from the City’s public positions.
297
4/1 Tr. at 1589. Defendants did not object to this out of court statement.
298
Id. at 1585–1589.
299
Mayor Bloomberg Delivers Address on Public Safety to NYPD Leadership
(4/30/13) (“April 30, 2013 Bloomberg Address”), PX 583 (emphasis added).
300
3/18 Tr. at 44 (Heidi Grossman).
301
Id. at 45.
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Inadequate Monitoring and Supervision
Previous sections have described the institutional pressure on NYPD officers to
make more stops and the reward for high stop activity. The City argues that the NYPD has taken
effective measures to counter the risk that this pressure will lead to legally unjustified stops.
However, after nine weeks of trial, the City failed to establish that the NYPD has any effective
mechanism for identifying or tracking unconstitutional stops.
a.
Inadequate Documentation and Document Review
The City concedes that a UF-250, standing alone, often provides inadequate
information to indicate whether a stop was based on reasonable suspicion.302 An earlier version
of the UF-250 included a large blank space in which officers were required to state the “factors
which caused [the] officer to reasonably suspect [the] person stopped.”303 The current UF-250,
which has been in use since November 2002, does not require the officer to articulate in writing
the facts justifying the stop.304 Instead, officers are directed to record the details of each stop in
their memo books, also known as “activity logs.”305
In practice, however, officers do not in fact record the factors justifying a stop in
302
See Def. Mem. at 7; supra Part IV.B.2 (discussing weaknesses of UF-250s for
verifying constitutionality of stops); Fagan Rpt. at 53–55.
303
Stop and Frisk Report, PX 449. As one supervisor stated on a recording: “We
used to have to write a two-page story on the damn thing. . . . You had to write the whole story.
. . . Now it’s easy. You just check a couple boxes off.” PX 289T (1/29/09 at 6.56–9.03).
304
See Blank UF-250.
305
See Operations Order 44 (9/11/08), PX 96, at 1 (emphasizing the importance of
activity logs, stating that supervisors must inspect subordinates’ activity logs for “accuracy and
completeness at regular and unspecified intervals,” and noting that failure to make required
entries may result in discipline); id. at 2 (stating that “IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT A
DETAILED ENTRY BE MADE AS INDICATED” for each stop, such as: “susp. male
randomly looking in apt. windows”); Patrol Guide: Stop and Frisk at 1 (noting that officer is
required to enter details of stop in activity log); 3/27 Tr. at 1099 (B. Dennis) (stating that all
officers are required to carry a memo book, which is also called an activity log).
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their memo books, and supervisors do not address this deficiency. Officer Dennis testified that
“while it was suggested” that officers record the “time, date, location of the stop, name of the
person stopped, crime suspected, and that a 250 was prepared,” it was not “always” necessary
and he did not always do so.306 Officer Dennis’s memo book entry regarding his stop of Devin
Almonor included only the time of the stop and the following two statements: “2 males
stopped,” “one male refused [illegible mark], UF-250.” With regard to Almonor’s arrest and
transfer to the 30th Precinct, Dennis wrote only “one under to 30.”307 No one ever discussed
these memo book entries with him.308 In fact, throughout his many years as a police officer, no
superior ever told him that his activity log entries concerning stops were insufficient.309
Some supervisors are not even aware that officers are required to record the
factors justifying a stop in their memo books. Sergeant Michael Loria could not remember ever
being told in training that officers should record more information in their memo books than
appears on the UF-250.310 In addition, Chief Esposito openly expressed resistance to the policy
of requiring officers to state the justifications for a stop in their memo books, suggesting that the
practice was “redundant many times” and interfered with an officer’s “ability to do police
306
3/27 Tr. at 1099–1100. Accord id. at 1141–1142 (B. Dennis).
307
Id. at 1101–1102; PX 19 (memo book).
308
See 3/27 Tr. at 1103.
309
See id. at 1100–1101. Similarly, Officer French did not believe he needed to state
the reasons for a stop in his memo book, as long as he noted the suspected crime. See 4/17 Tr. at
3737. For numerous other examples of credible testimony concerning inadequate memo book
entries, supervisors’ failures to discuss these deficiencies, and superiors’ failures to address the
problem, see Pl. Findings ¶¶ 97, 99 (collecting sources).
310
See 4/17 Tr. at 3796–3797.
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work.”311
In fact, the NYPD has been aware for the last decade of a systematic failure by
officers to record the justifications for stops in their memo books. Each month, every
enforcement command is required to perform a self-inspection of a sample of twenty-five of its
UF-250s and corresponding activity log entries. As part of the self-inspection, the reviewer is
required to indicate whether, for each stop, the officer made an activity log entry detailing the
circumstances of the stop.312
According to QAD, which is responsible for ensuring that the NYPD as an
organization complies with its written policies and procedures,313 every patrol borough has failed
every annual audit of activity log entries corresponding to stops for the last decade.314 Numerous
commanders acknowledged that they received QAD audits showing their officers’ failure to
prepare activity log entries for stops, but did not correct the failure.315 Assistant Chief Thomas
Dale, the Commanding Officer of Patrol Borough Queens South, acknowledged that failure to
complete activity log entries for stops is “a serious problem,” but testified that he took no
311
4/9 Tr. at 2912. Accord id. (Chief Esposito testifying that “[i]n a perfect world, I
think this is a hundred percent acceptable. But we’re not in a perfect world out there.”); id. at
2929 (Chief Esposito testifying that memo book entries providing more detail than a UF-250
would be “[f]or the most part” redundant, and that “if an officer checked off furtive movement,”
that would be “enough” for him).
312
See PX 58, 71, 89 (Worksheets 802 and 802-A, and instructions for completing
them). Reviewers are instructed that an activity log entry does not need to include any
information about the reasons for a stop beyond what already appears on the UF-250. See 4/23
Tr. at 4645 (Cronin).
313
See 4/23 Tr. at 4624.
314
See Pl. Findings ¶ 197 (citing PX 450; DX G6); 4/23 Tr. at 4651 (testimony that
any score below a three is considered failing).
315
See, e.g., 4/10 Tr. at 3213–3219 (Inspector Donald McHugh, Commanding
Officer of 41st Precinct); 4/16 Tr. at 3527–3531 (Deputy Inspector Charles Ortiz, Commanding
Officer of 43rd Precinct); Pl. Findings ¶ 198 (collecting sources).
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corrective actions even after every precinct in Queens South failed the QAD audit of activity log
entries for three consecutive years.316 Failure on this scale indicates, in the words of plaintiffs’
police practices expert Lou Reiter, that “the operational way memo books are used in the field is
contrary to . . . all of the written training and all of the policy,” and the supervisors “are not
holding their officers accountable for it.”317
On March 5, 2013, five years after the commencement of this litigation and two
weeks before the beginning of trial, Chief Hall circulated a memo requiring all patrol borough
officers to include nine categories of information in every activity log entry for a stop; to
elaborate the basis for a stop in the “Additional Circumstances/Factors” section of the UF-250;
and to photocopy every activity log entry for a stop and attach the photocopy to the UF-250
before submitting it to a supervisor.318 Just as I gave little weight to the equally ambitious memo
that Chief Hall circulated shortly before the beginning of the Ligon preliminary injunction
hearing,319 I give little weight to the March 5 memo or to the City’s uncorroborated anecdotal
evidence of compliance with it.320
316
PX 155 at 93–94, 118–120 (Dale deposition).
317
4/24 Tr. at 4845. Accord id. (Reiter testifying that “[i]t’s like everybody sticks
their head in the sand and hopes that passing [a] memo up through the chain of command and
back down will somehow change it.”).
318
See 2013 Memorandum of Chief of Patrol James Hall, DX J13. The nine
categories of information are: “Date/time of stop; Location of stop; Suspect’s Last name, First
name; Suspect’s pedigree; Suspected crime or offense (felony or penal law misdemeanor);
Explanation of suspicion (looking into windows, pulling on doorknobs, etc[.]); Whether or not
the suspect was frisked; Sprint/Job number; Disposition of stop (96, 92C, 93Q, etc.).” Id.
319
See Ligon, 2013 WL 628534, at *25 n.291.
320
See Def. Findings ¶ 54 (citing testimony of Chief Hall and Chief William Morris).
This evidence included the review by NYPD personnel of a sample of forty UF-250s. According
to the City’s witness, all forty were accompanied by memo book entries, but sixteen contained
“either no entry or an inadequate entry regarding the reason for the stop” — the essential
element in determining whether a stop was legally justified. 5/9 Tr. at 6578–6580. In addition,
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An untested, last-minute adjustment — even if undertaken in good faith — cannot
undo ten uninterrupted years of willful disregard. I take the March 5 memo neither as evidence
that the NYPD has solved the problem of documenting stops, nor as evidence of the NYPD’s
commitment to finding a solution, but rather as a belated recognition of the obvious inadequacies
of the existing system of documentation.321
Finally, I note that the NYPD has no meaningful procedures for auditing stop
paperwork to monitor the constitutionality of stops. The City agreed to conduct regular audits of
whether stops recorded on UF-250s were based on reasonable suspicion when it executed the
Stipulation of Settlement in Daniels v. City of New York on September 24, 2003.322 After
signing the settlement, however, QAD simply continued to use audit protocols that it had
introduced in 2002. These protocols, which remain in effect today, require every command to
conduct the monthly “self-inspection” described above, using two forms, Worksheets 802 and
802-A, which are then reviewed by QAD.323 The only arguably substantive element of these
forms is a column on Worksheet 802 in which the reviewer is asked to note whether at least one
because plaintiffs were not given an opportunity to review the forty UF-250s and accompanying
memo book entries, see id., it is possible that more than sixteen lacked adequate entries
regarding the reason for the stop.
321
Cf. United States v. Oregon State Med. Soc., 343 U.S. 326, 333 (1952) (“It is the
duty of the courts to beware of efforts to defeat injunctive relief by protestations of repentance
and reform, especially when abandonment seems timed to anticipate suit, and there is probability
of resumption.”).
322
See 9/24/03 Stipulation of Settlement, Daniels v. City of New York, No. 99 Civ.
1695, PX 114, at 6.
323
See PX 58, 71, 89 (Worksheets 802 and 802-A, and instructions); Finest Message
Regarding Compliance with Operations Order 11 § 2 (12/26/02), PX 350 (ordering selfinspection based on Worksheets 802 and 802-A); 4/23 Tr. at 4630; Pl. Findings ¶¶ 108–121;
Def. Findings ¶ 24.
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box on the UF-250 was checked under “What Were Circumstances Which Led To Stop?”324 In
other words, the Worksheets lead to a superficial review of whether paperwork was completed,
not a substantive review of whether a stop was constitutional. QAD’s annual audit of the selfinspections is similarly ineffective.325
Despite the obvious inadequacy of the QAD audits as a means to identify either
unjustified stops or racial profiling,326 officials in the NYPD continue to defend the QAD audit
process.327 Inspector Mary Cronin, the former Executive Officer and current Commanding
Officer of QAD, testified that the QAD audit worksheets allow reviewers to evaluate whether a
stop was based on reasonable suspicion, because any form on which at least one stop
circumstance has been checked — for example “furtive movements” as the sole basis for a
criminal trespass stop — is sufficient “for purposes of [QAD’s] review.”328 This testimony
demonstrates the patent inadequacy of QAD audits. A review of whether a single stop factor has
324
See PX 89 at 2, 4.
325
See 4/23 Tr. at 4650 (Cronin).
326
See, e.g., 3/22 Tr. at 1053–1055 (Assistant Chief Diaz conceding that officers
engaged in racial profiling are unlikely to write on a UF-250 “‘I stopped this person because
they’re black’”). As early as 1999, Commissioner Safir recognized the inadequacy of relying
solely on paperwork prepared by an officer to monitor the constitutional adequacy of the
officer’s stops. See PX 46 at 48. In addition, NYPD commanders and supervisors testified at
trial that UF-250s do not provide enough information to determine whether reasonable suspicion
existed for a stop. See, e.g., 4/10 Tr. at 3207 (McHugh); Pl. Findings ¶ 118. Accord Def. Mem.
at 7.
327
Defending the current paperwork-only audit process, Deputy Commissioner
Farrell rejected a proposal to include field observations of stops in the audit. See 5/15 Tr. at
7297–7299. QAD is aware of practical methods for evaluating police conduct without relying
purely on paperwork, such as the methods it uses to audit the treatment of crime complaints, and
complaints about courtesy, professionalism, and respect. In both cases, QAD makes phone calls
to a sample of civilians to evaluate their encounters with the police. See 4/24 Tr. at 4792
(Cronin); 5/15 Tr. at 7291–7293 (Farrell).
328
4/23 Tr. at 4640–4641, 4720–4721.
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been checked on a UF-250 is not an effective review of the constitutionality of a stop.
b.
Inadequate Supervision
As summarized above, the NYPD’s documentation provides an inadequate basis
for monitoring whether officers are conducting unconstitutional stops. Nevertheless, the City
argues that in practice, the NYPD identifies unconstitutional stops through “a chain of command
of supervisors, namely, sergeants, lieutenants, and precinct commanders.”329 At trial, the City
introduced a large volume of testimony and other evidence concerning the details of this chain of
command, and the responsibilities of NYPD personnel at various ranks.330 Very little of this
evidence was relevant, however, because very little of it concerned the supervision of the
constitutionality of stops. In fact, the City notes only two concrete mechanisms for identifying
unconstitutional stops: first, sergeants “routinely witness stops made by officers”; and second,
sergeants “review their officers’ UF-250s and frequently discuss the underlying facts of stops
with officers to determine whether an officer is able to articulate a proper basis for the stop.”331
The evidence showed that neither mechanism provides an effective means for
monitoring the constitutionality of stops. With regard to sergeants witnessing stops, there was
no quantitative evidence concerning how many of the 4.4 million stops during the class period
were witnessed by sergeants or how many of the observed stops were self-initiated versus based
329
Def. Findings ¶ 47. Accord Pl. Findings ¶ 86; 4/9 Tr. at 2841–2842, 2919 (Chief
Esposito testifying that supervisory review mitigates the risk posed by incomplete or inaccurate
documentation of stops); id. at 2929–2930 (Chief Esposito testifying that he relies on supervisors
as his “main . . . way of determining” whether the NYPD’s officers are acting in accordance with
the policy against racial profiling and the policy of only making stops based on reasonable
suspicion).
330
See, e.g., Def. Findings ¶ 47 (collecting some sources).
331
Id.
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on radio runs.332 More importantly, the evidence showed that sergeants do not effectively
monitor the constitutionality of stops even when they are present.333
With regard to supervisors’ review of stops after the fact, there are no written
policies requiring supervisors to evaluate the constitutionality of stops. The section of the Patrol
Guide containing the procedures for stops and frisks directs uniformed members of the service to
“[i]nform [the] desk officer, [in the] precinct of occurrence, of [the] facts [of the stop].”334 Chief
Giannelli explained that this requirement is satisfied when the officer submits a UF-250 to her
supervisor.335 Despite the fact that NYPD officials like Chief Esposito present supervisory
review as the central mechanism for monitoring the constitutionality of stops, the section of the
Patrol Guide describing the desk officer’s duty to review UF-250s contains no mention of a
332
As noted above, 78% of the stops during the class period were self-initiated rather
than based on a radio run. See PX 417D.
333
Sergeant Stephen Monroe, when asked directly how he ensures “that officers
under [his] supervision are conducting lawful stops based on reasonable suspicion,” responded :
“I usually . . . observe the stops looking for safety and their approach of the suspect.” 4/29 Tr. at
5266–5267 (emphasis added). When asked what he discusses with officers regarding their stops,
Sergeant Monroe again emphasized officer safety and effectiveness, making no mention of
constitutionality. See id. at 5267; 4/17 Tr. at 3778. In addition, the supervisors who witnessed
the unconstitutional stops in this case failed to recognize or respond to their unconstitutionality.
See, e.g., 3/27 Tr. at 1145–1147, 1176–1179 (Sergeant Korabel testifying that he was
supervising Officer Dennis in the anticrime unit during the stop of Devin Almonor); infra Part
IV.D.1.b (concluding that Almonor’s stop and frisk was unconstitutional).
Sergeant Loria testified that during his twelve years as an anticrime sergeant, he
was present “[v]ery frequently” for stops by his officers. 4/17 Tr. at 3755–3756, 3789–3792.
Nevertheless, he testified that he had never told a single officer that a stop or frisk was improper.
See id. at 3778. Sergeant Loria also testified at his deposition that as a sergeant, he did not
review his officers’ UF-250s for reasonable suspicion, and that he could not recall anyone in the
NYPD ever telling him to do so. See id. at 3770; 4/8 Tr. at 2706 (Officer Leek testifying that his
supervising Sergeant never exited the police van during the February 24, 2011 stop of Clive
Lino). See infra Part IV.D.2.d.
334
Patrol Guide 212-11, Stop and Frisk (7/18/03) (“P.G. 212-11”), PX 98 at 1;
Patrol Guide 212-11, Stop and Frisk (5/24/02), Ex. 4 to Giannelli Dep.
335
See Giannelli Dep. at 166–167. Chief Giannelli also testified that he did not
require desk officers to ask police officers about the facts of a stop. See id. at 168.
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review for constitutionality, or of any substantive review for that matter.336 In addition, while the
lesson plan for training newly promoted sergeants on stop and frisk mentions the need for
reasonable suspicion and the prohibition on racial profiling, the plan does not instruct sergeants
to perform any review of stops for constitutionality.337
The evidence also shows that in practice, supervisors do not review the
constitutionality of stops after the fact. Rather, supervisors review whether a UF-250 was fully
completed.338 Supervisors are not required to review activity logs alongside UF-250s,339 nor do
they routinely discuss the circumstances of a stop with the stopping officer in order to determine
whether the stop was justified.340
336
See P.G. 212-11 ¶ 10.
337
See Lesson Plan, Sergeants Leadership Course (4/30/09), DX R3; 4/29 Tr. at
5168–5170 (Chief James Shea unable to explain why, contrary to his testimony that sergeants
are trained to review every street stop for reasonable suspicion, lesson plan does not instruct
newly promoted sergeants to do this); 4/2 Tr. at 1937, 1939, 1951–1953 (Sergeant Richard
Hegney testifying that he does not recall receiving any training regarding stop and frisk after he
was promoted to sergeant in 2000). I also note that the Quest for Excellence program, as
discussed above, does not require supervisors to review the constitutionality of officers’ stops.
See supra Part IV.C.4.a; 4/15 Tr. at 3385–3390 (Deputy Commissioner Beirne conceding that
nothing in Orders 49, 50, or 52 directs a supervisor to review stops for constitutionality).
338
See, e.g., Pl. Findings ¶ 94 (collecting sources); 4/17 Tr. at 3763 (Sergeant Loria’s
deposition testimony that when he reviews UF-250s, he “make[s] sure that it’s signed and all the
boxes are filled in,” but does not review it for anything else); 3/20 Tr. at 634 (Officer Edward
Velazquez testifying that supervisors had only returned UF-250s to him based on
incompleteness, such as failing to record the date); 3/22 Tr. at 986–990 (Sergeant Julio Agron
ultimately conceding that he does not believe an Operation Impact sergeant is required to review
his officers’ UF-250s at the end of a tour).
339
See, e.g., Pl. Findings ¶ 100 (collecting sources); 4/16 Tr. at 3522 (Deputy
Inspector Ortiz testifying that he did not require supervisors to review activity logs alongside
UF-250s).
340
See, e.g., Pl. Findings ¶¶ 95–96 (collecting sources); 3/20 Tr. at 606–607 (Officer
Victor Marrero testifying that when a sergeant reviews a UF-250, the officer is usually present,
but that the only question the sergeant asks is the time of the occurrence); 3/20 Tr. at 634
(Officer Velazquez testifying that no supervisor had ever questioned him about the
circumstances of a stop based on a UF-250). In addition, supervisors do not notice stop patterns
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Alternately, the City suggests that Integrity Control Officers (“ICOs”) are
available to monitor the constitutionality of stops.341 ICOs are “the eyes and ears of the Precinct
Commander,” and they are tasked with performing various inspections and reviews to identify
misconduct by officers.342 While ICOs might in theory be well-positioned to review the
constitutionality of officers’ stops,343 there is no evidence that ICOs do so in practice, or are
instructed to do so through training or written policies.344 The detailed thirty-one-point list of an
ICO’s duties and responsibilities contains no mention of monitoring the constitutionality of
officer behavior in general or of stops specifically, nor does it require ICOs to review officers’
UF-250s or activity log entries for stops.345 Former Chief Giannelli testified that he expects
that suggest unconstitutionality. See Pl. Findings ¶ 87. For example, Lieutenant Telford
testified that as an anticrime sergeant, he reviewed his officers’ UF-250s. However, he was
unaware that two of his officers were among the four top issuers of UF-250s in the NYPD in the
third quarter of 2009 — including Officer Gonzalez, who checked the same four boxes on 99%
of his UF-250s. See 5/7 Tr. at 6314–6315. Sergeant Joseph Marino was unaware that Officer
Dang, one of the anticrime officers under his supervision, was another of the officers who
conducted the most stops in the third quarter of 2009. See 4/30 Tr. at 5555–5556.
341
See Def. Findings ¶ 48.
342
Giannelli Dep. at 47. See generally 4/16 Tr. at 3581–3582 (Lieutenant Enno
Peters, ICO of the 28th Precinct, stating that ICOs are usually lieutenants, and assistant ICOs are
usually sergeants).
343
For example, ICOs observe officers in the field responding to radio runs, and at
least some ICOs review officers’ memo books.
344
For example, Lieutenant Cosmo Palmieri, ICO of the 43rd Precinct, testified that
despite his regular field observations of officers, during his five years as an ICO he has never
observed an officer perform a stop. See 4/17 Tr. at 3673. Lieutenant Peters testified at a
deposition that as ICO of the 28th Precinct, he could not remember having ever discussed
reasonable suspicion with members of the precinct. See 4/16 Tr. at 3583–3584.
345
See Patrol Guide 202-15, Command Integrity Control Officer (“P.G. 202-15”),
DX F5. Paragraph 16 of P.G. 202-15 requires ICOs to inspect and sign the activity logs of
sergeants, but not of officers, and not specifically in relation to stops. I note that the burden of
carrying out the thirty-one duties listed on P.G. 202-15 make it highly unlikely that ICOs would
have the time or resources to review the constitutionality of stops unless specifically trained and
directed to do so.
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ICOs to review UF-250s to determine whether officers’ stops are based on reasonable
suspicion.346 In practice, however, ICOs review UF-250s and officers’ activity logs solely for
completeness, if at all,347 rather than for the constitutionality of the underlying stop.348
In sum, neither the NYPD’s review of stop documentation nor its supervision of
officers provides an adequate mechanism for identifying unconstitutional stops. Consequently,
the NYPD is unable to hold officers accountable for those stops or prevent them from happening
in the future. I also note that the failure of supervisors and ICOs to effectively supervise the
constitutionality of stops is not the result of oversight by subordinates, but rather stems from the
failure of senior NYPD managers and officials to direct supervisors and ICOs to perform this
task.349
5.
Partially Inadequate Training
The core constitutional standards governing stop and frisk are well established.350
Training officers to comply with these standards, however, is no simple task, because there are
no mechanical rules for their application to the varied circumstances of an officer’s work.
Viewed in light of this difficulty, the NYPD’s efforts to train its recruits have been largely
346
See Giannelli Dep. at 48–50, 106.
347
See 4/17 Tr. at 3675 (Lieutenant Palmieri testifying that as an ICO, he has not
reviewed UF-250s).
348
See, e.g., 5/2 Tr. at 5692–5693 (Cirabisi); Pl. Findings ¶¶ 102–107. The City
solicited lengthy testimony concerning the duties and activities of ICOs. See, e.g., Def. Findings
¶ 48 (collecting sources). As with so much of the City’s evidence concerning institutions at the
NYPD, however, this testimony was largely irrelevant because it did not relate to the
constitutionality of stops.
349
See, e.g., Pl. Findings ¶¶ 89, 91 (collecting some sources showing that high-level
managers, such as precinct commanders, did not direct supervisors and ICOs to monitor the
constitutionality of stops).
350
See supra Part III.
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adequate.351 The gravest problems in the NYPD’s stop and frisk practices stem not from
inadequate training but from a divergence between the NYPD’s written training materials and
the “operational policy” carried out in the streets.352
Nevertheless, plaintiffs accurately note several problematic and obvious
omissions or errors in the NYPD’s training programs.353 Some of these flaws effectively
encourage officers to commit constitutional violations, and the evidence in this case shows that
predictably, such violation have in fact occurred on a widespread basis. The following are some
of the problems I find in the written training materials.
First, the Police Student’s Guide’s training on reasonable suspicion explains
“Furtive Behavior” as follows: “If an officer observes strange, suspicious, or evasive behavior,
he or she may have reasonable suspicion. The officer’s experience and/or expertise are often
taken into account in these situations.”354 The vagueness and overbreadth of this description
invites officers to make stops based on “hunches,” in violation of Terry. Given the frequency
with which Furtive Movements is checked (roughly 42% of forms), and the obvious risk that
stops based merely on “strange, suspicious, or evasive behavior” may lack reasonable suspicion,
the Guide’s description of furtive movements is inadequate.
The danger of this inadequate training is illustrated by the testimony of Officer
Christopher Moran, who stopped David Ourlicht for walking in a suspicious way with an
351
See Def. Findings ¶¶ 43, 45 & nn.46, 48 (collecting sources).
352
The distinction between official policy and operational policy is common in the
study of law enforcement. See 4/24 Tr. at 4834–4835 (Reiter).
353
See generally Pl. Findings ¶¶ 122–134.
354
Police Student’s Guide, Policing Legally: Street Encounters (July 2012)
(“Student’s Guide: Street Encounters”), DX Q11, at 17.
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ostensible bulge under his winter clothing.355 Officer Moran testified that “people acting
nervous” could “[o]f course” provide reasonable suspicion for a stop.356 Officer Moran also
explained that “furtive movement is a very broad concept,” and could include “changing
direction,” “walking a certain way,” “acting a little suspicious,” “making a movement that is not
regular,” being “very fidgety,” “going in and out of his pocket,” “going in and out of a location,”
“looking back and forth constantly,” “looking over their shoulder,” “adjusting their hip or their
belt,” “moving in and out of a car too quickly,” “[t]urning a part of their body away from you,”
“[g]rabbing at a certain pocket or something at their waist,” “[g]etting a little nervous, maybe
shaking,” and “stutter[ing].”357 To the extent that Officer Moran views nervousness or fidgeting,
standing alone, as an adequate basis for seizing, questioning, and potentially frisking a person
under the Fourth Amendment, he is incorrect. But his view is also a natural response to the
vague and overly broad description of furtive movement in the Police Student’s Guide.
Misconceptions like Officer Moran’s are a predictable consequence of the training reflected in
the Guide, and likely lead to unconstitutional stops.358
Second, the NYPD’s training on the identification of weapons invites unjustified
stops based on “suspicious bulges” that are not in fact suspicious, and constitutionally unjustified
frisks and searches based on objects that officers cannot reasonably suspect to be weapons. In
355
See infra Part IV.D.1.g.
356
4/18 Tr. at 4042 (Moran).
357
Id. at 4046–4049.
358
See infra Part IV.D.1.g. See also infra Part IV.D.1.b (unconstitutional Almonor
stop based in part on “furtive movements”); 5/9 Tr. at 6431–6433 (Officer Dang explaining that
“usually” a furtive movement is someone “hanging out in front of [a] building, sitting on the
benches or something like that” and then making a “quick movement,” such as “bending down
and quickly standing back up,” “going inside the lobby . . . and then quickly coming back out,”
or “all of a sudden becom[ing] very nervous, very aware”).
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particular, the training draws attention to several “unusual firearms,” such as a gun shaped like a
pen, a gun shaped like an old-model cell phone, and a folding gun that fits into a wallet.359 It is
no doubt valuable for officers’ safety to know that such weapons exist.360 However, the outline
of a commonly carried object such as a wallet or cell phone does not justify a stop or frisk, nor
does feeling such an object during a frisk justify a search. The training materials are misleading
and unclear on this point.361 The materials encourage officers to perform stops and frisks
without reasonable suspicion based on the now-ubiquitous bulge created by a cell phone or other
common objects — as was the case in the stops of Leroy Downs, Devin Almonor, Cornelio
McDonald and Nicholas Peart,362 and was likely the case in the vast majority of stops involving
suspicion that the suspect was carrying a weapon, based on the extremely low seizure rate.363
Third, more generally, the NYPD’s training materials fail to make clear the legal
standard for when a frisk may be undertaken. Rather than simply stating that a frisk must be
based on reasonable suspicion that a person is armed and dangerous,364 the training materials
present a four-part rule that includes an invitation for officers to conduct frisks whenever “they
359
See Detective Benito Gonzalez, Characteristics of Armed Subjects (“Armed
Subjects Powerpoint”), DX C8, at 44–57.
360
See 4/25 Tr. at 5040–5043 (Shea).
361
See Armed Subjects Powerpoint at 4; Lesson Plan, Firearms and Tactics Section
(3/12) (“Firearms Lesson Plan”), DX W3, at 1, 20; 4/29 Tr. at 5176–5177 (Shea).
362
See infra Part IV.D.1.a–d (Leroy Downs frisked based on presence of keys, wallet
and bag of cookies in his pocket; Officer Brian Dennis checked “suspicious bulge” on the UF250 after the fact, when Devin Almonor had only his cell phone in his pocket; Cornelio
McDonald stopped based on “suspicious bulge” that turned out to be cell phone; Nicholas Peart
stopped in August 2006 based on anonymous suspect description corroborated only by
“suspicious bulge” that turned out to be cell phone).
363
See Fagan Rpt. 57, 64 tbl. 15.
364
See Johnson, 555 U.S. at 326–27.
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are in fear of their safety,” without clarifying that the fear must be both reasonable or related to a
weapon.365 Based on this four-part rule, which officers have apparently internalized,366 it is not
surprising that several of the individual stops in this case involved unconstitutional frisks,367 or
that the 2.3 million frisks during the class period resulted in the recovery of weapons only 1.5%
of the time.368
Fourth, while the NYPD deserves praise for its use of scenarios and role playing
in training on the legal justification for stops, plaintiffs correctly observe that these exercises are
exclusively based on radio runs rather than self-initiated stops.369 As noted above, 78% of stops
during the class period were self-initiated,370 and self-initiated stops create a different set of
constitutional risks than stops based on suspect descriptions from a radio run. Just as ICOs
observing stops based on radio runs cannot provide adequate monitoring of self-initiated stops,
365
Firearms Lesson Plan at 2. If an officer’s fear for her safety is unrelated to any
suspicion that the stopped person may be armed, there is no reason to conduct a protective frisk
for weapons, and such a frisk would be unjustified. For example, an officer may not frisk a
stopped person simply because the stopped person is physically imposing, or because the stop
took place in a dangerous neighborhood. The only justification for a protective frisk is to
discover weapons. See generally supra Part III.B.3 (noting that the frisk standard in CPL
§ 140.50 does not reflect the constitutional standard for a frisk).
366
See, e.g., 4/17 Tr. at 3867 (Officer Mahoney, who frisked Downs, testifying that
the standard for whether a stopped person may be frisked is “[w]hether it was a violent crime or
you have reasonable . . . fear for your safety or the safety of . . . [a] civilian”); 4/10 Tr. at
3117–3120 (Officer Luke White testifying, although somewhat unclearly, that his frisk of
Dominique Sindayiganza was justified based on reasonable suspicion that Sindayiganza had
committed aggravated harassment, even though this is not a violent crime and Officer White did
not suspect that Sindayiganza had a weapon). See also infra Parts IV.D.1.a, IV.D.2.a (detailing
Downs’s and Sindayiganza’s stops and frisks).
367
See infra Parts IV.D.1–2.
368
See DX V14-A; DX V14-C.
369
See Pl. Findings ¶ 126; 4/25 Tr. at 5161–5162 (Shea).
370
See PX 417D.
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role playing that focuses exclusively on radio runs is inadequate to train officers about the
application of constitutional standards to self-initiated stops.
Fifth, the NYPD’s training regarding racial profiling does not clearly define the
difference between the constitutionally permissible use of race in a stop based on a specific,
reliable suspect description, and the constitutionally impermissible targeting of racially defined
groups for stops in general.371 Because the NYPD has an unwritten policy of conducting the
latter type of stops, as described above, this omission is not surprising.
Sixth, I have already noted in another opinion the constitutional infirmities in the
NYPD’s stop and frisk refresher course at the Rodman’s Neck training center in the Bronx, as
well as other recently introduced materials.372 In that opinion, I expressed concern that the recent
training materials misstate what constitutes a stop, which likely leads some officers not to
prepare UF-250s in cases when they wrongly conclude that the encounter did not rise to the level
of a stop.373 Although Chief Shea testifed that the Rodman’s Neck training was developed in
part because the NYPD wants officers to fill out UF-250s more selectively, a more significant
concern is the failure of officers to fill out UF-250s after encounters that clearly were stops.374 In
371
See generally infra Part V.B.1 (conclusions of law regarding racial profiling).
For the NYPD’s racial profiling training, see, for example, Police Student’s Guide, Policing
Impartially, DX V11, at 3–7, 12–14 (appropriately drawing attention to latent bias even among
well-intentioned officers, but offering an inadequately narrow definition of racial profiling:
“when a police officer decides to stop and question a person when the sole rationale for the
contact is the race, ethnicity, or national origin of the person being stopped” (emphasis added)).
372
See Ligon, 2013 WL 628534, at *25, *35–39; Pl. Findings ¶¶ 130–131. I stated in
that opinion that more than three thousand officers had attended the training since its
development in 2012. See Ligon, 2013 WL 628534, at *25. More than six thousand officers
have now attended. See 4/25 Tr. at 5121 (Shea).
373
See Ligon, 2013 WL 628534, at *38.
374
See 4/25 Tr. at 5126, 5151–5154 (Shea). The individual stops in this case show
that officers frequently fail to fill out UF-250s after encounters that were clearly stops. See, e.g.,
infra Part IV.D.1.a (no UF-250 for Downs stop); infra Part IV.D.1.h (no UF-250 for February 5
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addition, testimony in the present case confirmed that officers misunderstand what constitutes a
stop based on training materials used at Rodman’s Neck.375
6.
Inadequate Discipline
As described in earlier sections, the NYPD has chosen to document, review, and
supervise its officers’ stops in such a way that unconstitutional stops are unlikely to be
identified, and as a result the responsible officer cannot be held accountable. Moreover, when
confronted with evidence of unconstitutional stops, the NYPD routinely denies the accuracy of
the evidence, refuses to impose meaningful discipline, and fails to effectively monitor the
responsible officers for future misconduct.
Civilian complaints are one source of notice to the NYPD that an unconstitutional
stop may have taken place. Anyone can make a complaint against an NYPD officer for
misconduct through a variety of channels, including the CCRB, an all-civilian municipal agency
tasked with investigating allegations against the NYPD of excessive force, abuse of authority,
Lino stop). See also Ligon, 2013 WL 628534, at *11, *20 & n.241.
375
See 4/29 Tr. at 5212 (Detective Damian Vizcarrondo testifying that an encounter
rises to the level of a stop not based on whether the stopped person is free to leave, but based on
whether the officer has reasonable suspicion); 4/25 Tr. at 4971 (Lieutenant James McCarthy
testifying to the same). The Rodman’s Neck training materials, which are reflected in Detective
Vizcarrondo’s and Lieutenant McCarthy’s testimony, teach the following lesson: if an officer
has an encounter with a civilian and is wondering whether to fill out a UF-250, the officer should
ask himself whether the encounter was based on reasonable suspicion — not whether a
reasonable person would have felt free to leave. This approach is legally incorrect and will
predictably lead to officers not filling out UF-250s after encounters that began based on
something less than reasonable suspicion, but that in retrospect involved a level of coercion
amounting to a stop. Chief Shea argued that it makes more sense to train officers never to
conduct stops without reasonable suspicion than it does to train officers to prepare a UF-250
even when a stop was not based on reasonable suspicion. See 4/25 Tr. at 5119–5124 (Shea).
But officers can and should be trained to do both. That is, they should be trained never to
conduct stops without reasonable suspicion and trained to recognize when an encounter that was
intended to be a “Level 1” request for information or “Level 2” inquiry under De Bour in fact
resulted in a Terry stop. Whenever this occurs, whether intentionally or unintentionally, the
encounter must be recorded as a stop.
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discourtesy, or offensive language (collectively referred to as “FADO”);376 the Bloomberg
administration’s “311” information and government services hotline; or by contacting the NYPD
directly.377 Of course, a complaint made to the NYPD may not even be recorded if the officer
receiving that complaint decides to ignore it — as Officer Anthony Moon did in response to
Downs’s complaint.378 It is impossible to know how often the NYPD simply disregards
complaints.
The correct practice when the NYPD receives a complaint regarding a stop is to
either forward the complaint to the CCRB, or, if the complaint falls outside of the FADO
categories, to the Investigative Review Section of the Office of the Chief of Department
(“OCD”).379 The NYPD’s Internal Affairs Bureau (“IAB”) can, in theory, initiate its own
investigations into alleged misconduct based on media reports,380 although no evidence was
offered that IAB has in fact done this in response to the media reports over the last decade
concerning racially biased and/or constitutionally unjustified stops and frisks.
Once the CCRB receives a complaint of an unconstitutional stop, CCRB
investigators will generally “interview complainants, witnesses, and officers and determine
376
Allegations of improper stops or frisks fall within the category of “abuse of
authority” complaints. See 4/15 Tr. at 3284 (Joan Thompson, Executive Director of CCRB);
CCRB, January–June 2012 Report (“CCRB June 2012 Report”), DX V13, at 4 (defining “Abuse
of Authority”).
377
See Def. Findings ¶ 25.
378
See infra Part IV.D.1.a. Downs took extraordinary measures to identify the police
officers despite the lack of any official record of the stop.
379
See Def. Findings ¶ 25 & n.34 (noting that the NYPD refers all FADO complaints
to the CCRB, including “[s]earch and seizure allegations relating to stop, question, and frisk,”
and refers “the remainder of the complaints” to the OCD); id. ¶ 32 (noting that the OCD
processes a small number of “complaints featur[ing] allegations related to” stop and frisk).
380
See id. ¶ 25.
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whether allegations are substantiated, unsubstantiated, exonerated, or unfounded.”381 A
complaint is “substantiated” if, based on the preponderance of the evidence, “[t]here is sufficient
credible evidence to believe that the subject officer committed the act charged in the allegation
and thereby engaged in misconduct.”382 A complaint is “unsubstantiated” if there is insufficient
evidence to determine whether the officer committed misconduct.383 The investigator’s decision
will be reviewed by a supervisor and then passed along to a three-member panel, which makes
the final decision after reviewing the evidence. If the panel finds a complaint substantiated, the
case is forwarded to the NYPD’s Department Advocate’s Office (“DAO”), which serves as an
internal prosecutor for officer misconduct at the NYPD.384
It is at this stage that the CCRB complaint process founders. Rather than
accepting the CCRB’s findings, the DAO conducts its own review of the materials that the
CCRB’s three-member panel has just reviewed. Instead of applying the well-established
“preponderance of the evidence” standard like the CCRB, the DAO applies its own evidentiary
standards. Deputy Commissioner Julie Schwartz, an attorney who has lead the DAO since 2005,
testified that if the CCRB bases its findings on a credibility determination in favor of a witness
and against a police officer, the DAO will as a rule reject the CCRB’s findings. In Deputy
Commissioner Schwartz’s words, it “doesn’t matter” that the CCRB has seen and heard the
381
Def. Findings ¶ 26.
382
CCRB June 2012 Report at 4.
383
See id. An officer is “exonerated” if she committed the alleged acts, but the acts
“were determined to be lawful and proper,” and an allegation is “unfounded” if there is sufficient
evidence that the officer did not commit the alleged act. Id. Accord 4/15 Tr. at 3272
(Thompson).
384
See Def. Findings ¶ 26; CCRB, 2011 Annual Report (“CCRB 2011 Annual
Report”), DX P12, at 17–18 (describing prosecutorial function of the DAO). In the first half of
2012, the CCRB closed 2,518 cases. Of the 27% of cases closed after full investigations, 11%
resulted in a finding of substantiated misconduct. See CCRB June 2012 Report at 10.
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witnesses, while the DAO has not, “[b]ecause if one witness says A happened and the other
witness says B happened,” the complaining witness cannot satisfy the preponderance of the
evidence standard: “there is nothing that brings [the allegation] to 51 percent.”385 In this “he said
. . . she said” situation, the DAO will only accept the CCRB’s findings if there is “a little
corroboration,” like visible marks on a complainant alleging overly tight handcuffs.386
Deputy Commissioner Schwartz stated further that “in any stop-and-frisk case in
which you only have the complainant’s version and the officer’s version, the department cannot
pursue discipline.”387 It appears that in the eight years that she has led the DAO, Deputy
Commissioner Schwartz has consistently applied the unique evidentiary standard that a
complainant’s testimony can never be sufficient standing alone.
Deputy Commissioner Schwartz also testified that the CCRB and the OCD apply
the same evidentiary standard,388 although she was unable to cite any source articulating that
standard. When pressed, Deputy Commissioner Schwartz changed her testimony and stated that
in some instances a complainant’s word is enough to sustain a complaint.389 I do not find this
later testimony credible.390 Instead, I find that the DAO follows a policy of rejecting CCRB
determinations when they are based only on the uncorroborated testimony of a civilian witness.
Deputy Commissioner Schwartz testified that she was not concerned about allegations that the
385
4/22 Tr. at 4485–4486.
386
Id. at 4486–4487.
387
Id. at 4508.
388
See id. at 4484, 4486–4487, 4508.
389
See id. at 4508–4511.
390
Deputy Commissioner Schwartz’s later testimony also conflicted with her
deposition testimony in another case. See id. at 4511–4512.
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DAO is biased in favor of police officers.391
Because many of the complaints related to stop and frisk involve precisely the
scenario described by Deputy Commissioner Schwartz, the DAO’s evidentiary theory seriously
undermines the NYPD’s ability to hold officers accountable for unconstitutional stops or
frisks.392 In light of this evidentiary standard, as well as other indications of the DAO’s
resistance to evidence of unconstitutional stops provided by the CCRB,393 it is not surprising that
the DAO frequently declines to pursue any discipline against officers who have been the subject
of substantiated CCRB complaints. Between 2007 and 2011, the DAO declined to pursue
discipline in between 16% and 36% of the substantiated complaints forwarded by the CCRB,
and in 2012 the percentage of substantiated cases resulting in no discipline rose again.394 In
addition, the NYPD consistently downgrades the discipline recommended by the CCRB,
imposing only instructions — the least serious form of discipline — in the majority of cases in
most years.395 The DAO’s frequent rejection of the CCRB’s disciplinary recommendations has
391
See id. at 4512–4513.
392
See id. at 4481–4482, 4485–4486, 4496; 4/15 Tr. at 3289, 3292 (Thompson).
393
Deputy Commissioner Schwartz also testified that the law governing search and
seizure, and especially De Bour, is not “clearly established, well-articulated, and
understandable,” and when an officer violates an unclear law like De Bour unintentionally, the
CCRB should consider the officer’s “good faith” in its credibility determination. 4/22 Tr. at
4513–4521. In addition, she testified that when the CCRB has failed to identify an officer by
name and has not conducted a show-up or a photo array, the DAO will dismiss the case rather
than attempting to determine the identity of the officer based on specific identifying information
in the CCRB’s findings. See id. at 4484–4485.
394
See CCRB 2011 Annual Report at 17; CCRB, Police Department Discipline, DX
U13. These figures exclude the small number of cases where the statute of limitations had
expired or the officer resigned before the NYPD could take action. Several officers testified that
they were never disciplined even after the CCRB substantiated complaints against them. See Pl.
Findings ¶¶ 139–141 (collecting sources).
395
See 4/15 Tr. at 3294 (Thompson); CCRB 2011 Annual Report at 18, tbl. 30.
Instructions as the most common form of discipline in every year. Chief Hall testified that an
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likely undermined public confidence in the CCRB and discouraged the filing of complaints —
many of which may have been meritorious.396
The relatively few stop complaints that pass through the OCD are no more likely
to result in officer discipline than those processed by the CCRB and the DAO.397 Despite the
fact that the OCD is apparently the only entity responsible for addressing civilian complaints of
racial profiling, its system for categorizing and tracking complaints contains no tracking code for
either stop complaints or complaints of racial profiling.398 Not surprisingly, the evidence showed
that the OCD has been ineffective in monitoring and imposing discipline in response to
allegations of racial profiling. For example, the OCD received an allegation that Officer
officer who engages in stops that are not based on reasonable suspicion could be subjected to
“incredibly severe discipline,” up to and including termination. 5/16 Tr. at 7628. When asked
on cross-examination whether he had personal knowledge of any officer being subjected to such
discipline for a stop lacking reasonable suspicion, Chief Hall said that he did not. See id. at
7629.
396
See 3/19 Tr. at 345 (Nicholas Peart testifying that after his first CCRB complaint
was not substantiated, he did not file any CCRB complaints in response to later stops because he
did not believe that the CCRB would do anything). See also Pl. Findings ¶ 155 (collecting
sources indicating the DAO’s awareness of longstanding public concerns that the NYPD does
not take the CCRB’s recommendations seriously); id. ¶ 156 (noting that even after the NYPD
agreed in 2012 to allow CCRB attorneys to prosecute a small category of serious police
misconduct cases, they can only do so at the discretion of the Police Commissioner). The City’s
proposed findings describe at great length the NYPD’s performance monitoring system, which
tracks officers who have received multiple substantiated CCRB complaints. See Def. Findings
¶¶ 36–42; Pl. Findings ¶ 138. However, this system is ineffective for monitoring unjustified
stops because of the low likelihood that a wrongfully stopped person will have the knowledge
and take the time to file a CCRB complaint. The likelihood of multiple complaints against the
same officer is even lower.
397
See Pl. Findings ¶¶ 142–147 (collecting sources).
398
See 4/18 Tr. at 3962–3968, 3981, 4013 (Inspector McAleer). In addition, there
was evidence that complaints of racial profiling made during stops are not conveyed to the OCD.
See Tr. 5/7 at 6307, 6332–6333 (Lieutenant Telford testifying that as an anticrime supervisor in
2009, he was not concerned after Officer Gonzalez submitted a UF-250 indicating that a black
male he had stopped had asked: “Why don’t you stop other people?”); PX 557 at
*15999–16000.
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Jonathan Rothenberg stopped and arrested someone based on racial profiling a year before his
stop of Ian Provost,399 yet he was never questioned about the allegation,400 and the NYPD is
unable to determine whether an investigation ever occurred.401 The OCD’s inadequate response
to civilian complaints of wrongful stops is all the more troubling because the OCD receives most
of the racial profiling complaints that are addressed either to the CCRB or the NYPD.402
7.
Ongoing Notice of Constitutional Violations
The 1999 AG Report put the NYPD on notice that its stop and frisk practices
were resulting in constitutional violations. Despite that notice, senior NYPD officials
significantly increased the risk of constitutional violations by applying pressure throughout the
chain of command to raise the number of stops without imposing a countervailing pressure to
ensure their constitutionality, and without instituting adequate supervisory, monitoring, or
disciplinary procedures. This section describes the various ways the NYPD has continued to
receive notice since 1999 of widespread constitutional violations in its practice of stop and frisk.
The NYPD has received thorough and consistent notice of constitutional
problems in its stop practices from multiple sources, including the media, community members,
community and legal organizations, individual police officers, and the class members and
attorneys in this case. As Reiter testified, the prominent media coverage of complaints about
baseless and racially motivated stops would have given “any reasonable police department”
399
See 4/17 Tr. at 3822 (Rothenberg); infra Part IV.D.1.f (detailing Provost stop and
400
See 4/17 Tr. at 3820, 3825 (Rothenberg).
401
See 4/30 Tr. at 5385 (stipulation).
frisk).
402
See, e.g., 4/18 Tr. at 3962–3963 (Inspector Helen McAleer, OCD, testifying that
CCRB forwards non-FADO complaints to OCD, including racial profiling complaints, of which
there have been “[v]ery few”); 4/15 Tr. at 3271 (Thompson testifying that the CCRB sometimes
forwards racial profiling complaints to the OCD).
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notice of the need “to take a look at” these issues.403 In fact, Chief Esposito is aware of media
reports that the NYPD racially profiles young black and Hispanic males in its stop activities, and
has personally heard complaints from community organizations, civil liberties groups, and
elected officials about racial profiling in stops.404 Deputy Chief Marino testified that the
NYPD’s stop and frisk practices are “always a concern and a complaint in any precinct I’ve
worked in,” and that community leaders and community members had complained to him about
suspicionless stops and frisks.405 Similarly, Inspector Lehr has heard complaints from black
residents about being stopped for no reason, and has witnessed demonstrations in
overwhelmingly black precincts that raised concerns about stop and frisk and racial profiling.406
Chief Morris testified that he, too, had heard complaints from individuals who felt they were
stopped for no reason.407 Chief Shea testified that when members of the community participate
in the multicultural immersion course for newly graduated officers, community leaders have
repeatedly shared complaints involving stops based on racial profiling.408 Similarly, Chief Shea
testified that when he was a precinct commander, “there were occasions when community
members might come to a community meeting and claim a family member or themselves was
the subject of police action and they fear it was influenced by their race.”409 Despite this
403
4/24 Tr. at 4878.
404
See 4/10 Tr. at 3023–3027. Chief Esposito also testified that he has been aware
of public controversies concerning street encounters between NYPD officers and blacks and
Hispanics since at least 2000, when he became Chief of Department. See 4/9 Tr. at 2794–2796.
405
3/22 Tr. at 931.
406
See 4/30 Tr. at 5410, 5429–5430, 5434–5435.
407
See 5/10 Tr. at 6633.
408
See 4/25 Tr. at 5081.
409
Id. at 5081–5082.
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extensive evidence, Chief Esposito and other NYPD officials testified that they had never heard
an individual complain about being stopped based on his race.410 I do not find this testimony
credible given the other testimony in this case and the widespread public concern regarding
racially biased policing by the NYPD.411 In any event, whether or not high officials heard
individual complaints is immaterial, given the many other sources of notice discussed in this
section.
In addition to receiving notice from the public and community organizations, the
NYPD has been apprised of unconstitutional practices by some of its own officers. In 2009,
Officer Polanco delivered an anonymous letter412 to his ICO, reporting that officers were
engaging in racial profiling and other misconduct toward minority communities:
[W]e were handcuffing kids for no reason. They would just tell us handcuff
them. And boss, why are we handcuffing them? Just handcuff them. We’ll
make up the charge later.
Some of those kids were not doing anything. Some of those kids
were just walking home. Some of those kids were just walking from
school.413
In his letter, which he believed would be forwarded to IAB, Officer Polanco described the following
incident, from 2009:
I remember one incident where one kid — and I reported this — they stopped
410
See, e.g., 3/22 Tr. at 1055–1056 (Diaz testifying that he is not sure); 4/10 Tr. at
3025–3026 (Esposito); 4/30 Tr. at 5434 (Lehr); 5/9 Tr. at 6511 (Holmes); 5/10 Tr. at 6633
(Morris); Def. Findings ¶ 23.
411
See, e.g., 5/14 Tr. at 7174 (Deputy Commissioner Farrell testifying that he was
aware in early 2007 of “concerns raised by [some] members of the public that the NYPD may be
engaging in racially biased policing”).
412
When asked why he submitted the letter anonymously, Officer Polanco explained
that he was worried by the adverse consequences Officer Schoolcraft suffered after reporting the
alleged manipulation of crime statistics. See 3/20 Tr. at 453.
413
3/20 Tr. at 450, 453, 508–509. The letter does not appear in the record. See id. at
450, 661; 3/19 Tr. at 435–436.
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his brother. He was 13. And he was waiting for him from school at the
corner to bring him home. When he came to us, the officer — Officer,
what’s wrong with my little brother? Was he acting out? He wind[s] up with
handcuffs too. For simply asking what was going on with his brother.414
Officer Polanco also reported in the letter that on more than one occasion, he was required to
drive on patrol with supervisors who directed him to stop individuals without what he believed
to be reasonable suspicion. A supervisor would point to a “group of black kids or Hispanic kids
on the corner, in the park, or anywhere,” and direct Officer Polanco to “just go grab, go 250
them, go summons them. Sometimes they will ask me to summons them. We will ask the
supervisor why. And they will say unlawful assembly or something like that . . . [b]ecause
there’s more than three of them on the corner.”415
After his initial letter in 2009, Officer Polanco anonymously called IAB to
express his concerns regarding the treatment of minority youths and the manipulation of crime
statistics.416 Finally, Officer Polanco gave IAB the recordings played at trial, which corroborated
his testimony about institutional pressure to meet target numbers of enforcement activity by
making stops and arrests without an adequate legal basis.417
414
3/20 Tr. at 450-451, 509. See also id. at 460–461 (Officer Polanco testifying that
his letter to IAB stated the address, date, and other information concerning the encounter with
the thirteen-year-old).
415
Id. at 457–458. See also id. at 459–460 (Officer Polanco testifying that after an
unjustified stop, supervisors instructed him about which boxes to check on the UF-250,
including High Crime Area and Furtive Movements).
416
See id. at 455–456.
417
See id. at 462–464. For a summary of some of Officer Polanco’s recordings, see
supra Part IV.C.2. Eventually, Officer Polanco abandoned his anonymity and participated in a
televised interview. See 3/20 Tr. at 515–516. After the interview aired in March 2010, IAB
charged him with perjury. The charge was based on an incident described in Officer Polanco’s
complaint to IAB. Officer Polanco stated that he was once instructed to issue a summons to
someone for walking a dog without a license, even though he had not seen a dog, and that he
obeyed the instruction. See id. at 451–452, 540. While Officer Polanco was charged with
perjury, the supervisor who issued the instruction was promoted. See id. at 540.
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CCRB complaints regarding stop and frisk, discussed above, provided a further
source of ongoing notice to the NYPD.418 In addition, the NYPD has received mounting
evidence regarding unconstitutional stops through the proceedings in Daniels v. City of New
York, filed in 1999;419 this case, filed in 2008;420 and the two related stop and frisk cases, Davis v.
City of New York and Ligon v. City of New York, filed in 2010 and 2012, respectively.421
The City attempts to rebut evidence of notice by pointing to a 2007 report by the
RAND Corporation that found little evidence of pervasive racial profiling in the NYPD’s
pedestrian stop and frisk activity.422 But the RAND study used violent crime suspect data as its
benchmark, which is problematic for reasons discussed at length in the section on expert
I note that Officer Craig Matthews has alleged in another case that the NYPD
retaliated against him for complaining to superiors about “‘a system of quotas mandating
numbers of arrests, summonses, and stop-and-frisks’” that was allegedly introduced in 2008.
See Matthews v. City of New York, No. 12 Civ. 1354, 2013 WL 3879891, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July
29, 2013) (quoting Complaint ¶ 2). Officer Matthews’ allegations of retaliation echo Officer
Polanco’s allegations. Compare 3/20 Tr. at 575–576 (Officer Polanco testifying that footpost
assignment was punitive for someone with his seniority), and 3/21 Tr. at 727, 789 (Officer
Serrano testifying to same), with Complaint ¶ 21, Matthews, 2013 WL 3879891 (describing
footpost assignment as punitive). While recognizing that “as a matter of fact, Officer Matthews’
speech had undeniable value to the public,” the Court granted summary judgment to the City
based on First Amendment grounds unrelated to the substance of Officer Matthews’ allegations.
Matthews, 2013 WL 3879891 at *19.
418
See 3/28 Tr. at 1424–1425 (Officer Hernandez testifying regarding CCRB
complaints about his stop activity).
419
See Daniels, No. 99 Civ. 1695. See also 4/9 Tr. at 2800–2801 (Chief Esposito
testifying that, as of 1999, he was aware of the allegations in Daniels of racial profiling and stops
and frisks that lacked reasonable suspicion).
420
I note that plaintiffs originally intended to pursue this case as a challenge to the
NYPD’s non-compliance with the Daniels settlement.
421
See Davis, No. 10 Civ. 0699; Ligon, No. 12 Civ. 2274.
422
Def. Findings ¶ 20. See RAND REPORT . I note that the City only relies on the
RAND Report as proof that it lacked notice of racially motivated stops, but not that it lacked
notice of stops made without reasonable suspicion. See Def. Findings ¶ 20. I also note that the
RAND Report was admitted only for the purpose of notice, not for the truth of its conclusions.
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testimony.423 As a result, the Report concluded that the NYPD’s stop patterns are racially neutral
because the people stopped by the NYPD resemble the suspects in reported violent crimes —
even though less than a quarter of stops are based on suspicion of violent crimes,424 and even
though blacks are more highly represented in the violent crime suspect data than in the suspect
data for other types of crime.425 Nonetheless, the Report cautioned that the use of benchmarks
“can either detect or hide racial bias due to unobserved or unmeasured factors that affect both
the racial distribution that the benchmark establishes and the racial distribution of the stops.”426
Moreover, even if the NYPD did not question the Report’s choice of benchmark,
the Report concluded that “for some particular subsets of stops, there are racial disparities, and,
423
See supra Part IV.B.3.
424
See 4/19 Tr. at 4302 (Assistant Commissioner McGuire); Fagan Rpt. apps. C4–C6
(noting that 15% of stops from 2004 to 2009 were based on suspicion of violent crime); Fagan
2d Supp. Rpt. app. B tbl. 2 (noting that 23% of stops from 2010 to 2011 were based on suspicion
of violent crime). The earlier chart shows that 15% of all UF-250s from 2004 to 2009, including
those that failed to state a specific suspected crime, were based on suspicion of a violent crime;
by contrast, the later table appears to show that 23% of the UF-250s from 2010 to 2011
containing a codable suspected crime were based on suspicion of a violent crime. Compare
Fagan Rpt. app. C4–C5 noting that the suspected crime on 18% of UF-250s was uncodable or
otherwise erroneous), with Fagan 2d Supp. Rpt. app. B tbl. 2 (not including UF-250s with
erroneous crime codes in any category). Thus, the 15% figure appears to be a more accurate
indication of the percentage of stops that are based on suspicion of a violent crime.
425
See RAND REPORT at 19 (noting that “black suspects were described in 69
percent of all violent-crime suspect descriptions”); Fagan Rpt. at 76 tbl. 18 (revealing,
apparently based on updated data, that the suspect’s race was black in 73% of the violent crime
reports in 2006 indicating a suspect’s race, versus 54% for non-violent crimes). The RAND
Report’s claim that black suspects were described in 69% of all violent-crime suspect
descriptions in 2006 is not strictly accurate, because no race was indicated in 47% of those
complaints. See Fagan Rpt. at 76 tbl. 18, 77 (noting that contrary to the language in the RAND
Report, black was in fact “identified as the suspect’s race in only 38.50% of all violent crime
complaints . . . in 2005,” once the complaints lacking race data are included). As Dr. Fagan
testified, the lack of race information in 47% of the complaints further undermines the reliability
of the 2006 violent crime suspect data as a benchmark. See 4/4 Tr. at 2266–2268; Fagan Rpt. at
75–77.
426
RAND REPORT at 19 (emphasis added).
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in some boroughs for some outcomes, the disparities are fairly large” — such as in Staten Island
for frisks of blacks, and Brooklyn South for the use of force against blacks.427 The Report
recommended a “closer review” of stop outcomes in these boroughs, which was never carried
out.428 The NYPD also failed to effectively implement other recommendations in the Report.429
In light of these warnings and recommendations, the NYPD’s reliance on the RAND Report as
proof that its stops are racially neutral was and is unreasonable. In sum, the numerous sources
discussed above were more than adequate to put the NYPD on notice that its officers were
engaging in racially motivated stops, and nothing in the RAND report justified ignoring those
clear signs.
D.
Individual Stops
Plaintiffs offered evidence from twelve individuals regarding nineteen stops. In
twelve of those stops the plaintiff testified as did some or all of the police officers involved in
the stop. Evaluating whether these stops — and often frisks — complied with the Fourth
Amendment turned, in large part, on the credibility of the witnesses. In some cases the
427
Id. at 44.
428
See 4/9 Tr. at 2830–2831 (Esposito); 5/14 Tr. at 7121 (Deputy Commissioner
Farrell testifying that “it was our conclusion that the differences that did exist were quite small”).
Throughout his testimony, Deputy Commissioner Farrell refused to acknowledge the validity of
statistical evidence of racial disparities in stops and stop outcomes, no matter how large or
persistent the disparities. See, e.g., 5/15 Tr. at 7248–7256.
429
See RAND REPORT at 44–46. For example, the NYPD began a pilot project to
distribute information cards to stopped pedestrians, as recommended by the RAND Report. See
5/14 Tr. at 7106–7107; DX A8 (tear-off card used in pilot project). Although Deputy
Commissioner Farrell testified that the pilot project had been expanded citywide, none of the
individuals stopped in this case testified to receiving a card, and the card itself does not provide a
number for making complaints to the CCRB or the NYPD. Instead, the card states: “For more
information . . . www.nyc.gov/nypd,” and directs recipients of the card to call a toll-free number
or 311 with tips about illegal handguns. DX A8. See also Pl. Findings ¶¶ 179–182 (collecting
sources regarding the NYPD’s failure to implement the RAND Report’s recommended early
warning system for officers who overstop minorities).
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testimony of the plaintiff and the officers was irreconcilable, and I was required to accept one
version and disregard the other.
In the remaining seven stops, no officer testified — either because the officers
involved in the stop could not be identified or, in one case, because the officers identified dispute
that the stop ever occurred. In the majority of these cases the plaintiff’s testimony was either not
sufficiently credible or lacked sufficient detail to establish that the stop was unconstitutional. In
others, I found the plaintiff’s testimony sufficiently credible and sufficiently detailed to make a
determination about the constitutionality of the stop. I recognize the dilemma posed by making
findings based on only one side of the story, particularly given the NYPD’s apparent good faith
efforts to locate the officers involved. However, finding a failure of proof in all stops where no
officer was identified would create a perverse incentive for officers not to record stops where the
basis for those stops or the police conduct during the stop was clearly problematic, which would
immunize the most egregious stops from scrutiny. This appears to be what happened in the stop
of Leroy Downs, discussed below, and it was only through his extraordinary persistence that the
officers involved were identified.
Evaluating the police conduct in each of these stops is an imperfect science.
There is no objective contemporaneous recording of the stop — either audio or visual. I am
relegated to finding facts based on the often conflicting testimony of eyewitnesses. The task is
particularly challenging where everyone who testified had an interest in the outcome, which may
have, consciously or otherwise, affected the veracity of his or her testimony. I understand that a
judge reviewing the facts in hindsight is in an entirely different position from officers on the beat
making split-second decisions in situations which may pose a danger to themselves and others.
With this in mind, I have endeavored to exercise my judgment faithfully and impartially in
making, as I am required to do, the following findings of fact with respect to each of the nineteen
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stops at issue.430 I have placed each stop in one of three categories: (1) unconstitutional stop and
frisk (if frisk occurred); (2) unconstitutional frisk only; (3) insufficient evidence to find that the
stop or frisk was unconstitutional.
1.
Unconstitutional Stop and Frisk
a.
Leroy Downs
i.
Findings of Fact
Leroy Downs is a black male resident of Staten Island in his mid-thirties.431 On
the evening of August 20, 2008, Downs arrived home from work and, before entering his house,
called a friend on his cell phone while standing in front of a chain link fence in front of his
house. Downs used an earpiece connected to the phone by a cord, and held the cell phone in one
hand and the black mouthpiece on the cord in the other.432
Downs saw a black Crown Victoria drive past and recognized it as an unmarked
police car. The car stopped, reversed, and double-parked in front of Downs’s house, at which
point Downs told his friend he would call back.433 Two white plainclothes officers, later
identified as Officers Scott Giacona and James Mahoney, left the car and approached Downs.434
One officer said in an aggressive tone that it looked like Downs was smoking weed. They told
430
See Terry, 329 U.S. at 22 (“The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes
meaningful only when it is assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with
enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must
evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular
circumstances.”).
431
See 4/19 Tr. at 4094–4095 (Downs). The following account is largely taken from
Downs’s testimony, which I found credible despite minor inconsistencies.
432
See id. at 4095–4097.
433
See id. at 4097–4098.
434
Officer Giacona was wearing a black t-shirt and Officer Mahoney was wearing a
New York Jets jersey that said “Favre” on the back.
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him to “get the [fuck] against the fence,” then pushed him backwards until his back was against
the fence. Downs did not feel free to leave.435
Downs explained that he was talking on his cell phone, not smoking marijuana,
that he is a drug counselor, and that he knows the captain of the 120th Precinct. Without asking
permission, the officers patted down the outside of his clothing around his legs and torso,
reached into his front and back pants pockets and removed their contents: a wallet, keys, and a
bag of cookies from a vending machine. The officers also searched his wallet.436
After the officers failed to find any contraband, they started walking back to the
car. Downs asked for their badge numbers. The officers “laughed [him] off” and said he was
lucky they did not lock him up. Downs said he was going to file a complaint, and one of them
responded by saying, “I’m just doing my [fucking] job.” Charles Joseph, a friend of Downs who
lives on the same block, witnessed the end of the stop. After the officers drove away, Downs
walked to the 120th Precinct to file a complaint.437
Downs told Officer Anthony Moon at the front desk that he wanted to make a
complaint and described what had happened. Officer Moon said that he could not take the
complaint because Downs did not have the officers’ badge numbers, and that Downs should file
a complaint with the CCRB. As Downs left the station he saw the two officers who stopped him
driving out of the precinct in their Crown Victoria, and he wrote down its license plate number
on his hand.438
Downs then returned to the station. He tried to give Officer Moon the license
435
See id. at 4098–4102.
436
See id. at 4101–4106.
437
See id. at 4106–4108.
438
See id. at 4108–4111.
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plate information, but Officer Moon said that he should give the information to the CCRB
instead. Downs waited at the station until he saw the two officers come through the back door
with two young black male suspects.439
Downs pointed out the two officers to Officer Moon and asked him, “Can you get
their badge numbers?” Officer Moon talked to the officers and then told Downs “maybe you can
ask them.” At that point, Downs went outside again and took a picture of the license plate on the
Crown Victoria, which was the same number he had written on his hand.440
Eventually, Downs spoke with a supervisor, who said he would try to get the
officers’ badge numbers and then call Downs. The call never came. Having spent a few hours at
the station, Downs went home.441
The next day, Downs submitted a complaint to the CCRB. Five months later,
Officers Mahoney and Giacona both testified under oath to the CCRB that they had no memory
of stopping and frisking Downs — an assertion that was “not entirely credited” by the CCRB,
because it is “unlikely that PO Giacona and PO Mahoney would not recall their actions
immediately prior to effecting two arrests.” The CCRB substantiated Downs’s complaint that
Officers Mahoney and Giacona failed to provide their badge numbers. The CCRB found the
complaints that the officers stopped Downs without reasonable suspicion, and used profanity
unsubtantiated. The CCRB found Downs’s allegation of a search into his pants pockets
439
See id. at 4110–4111, 4113; PX 166-D, 166-CL. Officer Mahoney was still
wearing his Brett Favre jersey. Officer Giacona’s records confirm that he arrested two young,
black men that evening.
440
See 4/19 Tr. at 4111–4112; PX 166-C.
441
See 4/19 Tr. at 4114–4115. Downs later spoke with a Deputy Inspector at the
120th Precinct, who told him the stop “was probably an isolated incident,” and invited Downs to
attend the citizens’ police academy, to better understand the NYPD’s practices. Downs attended
the academy for eleven months. At the end, he still believed the August 20 stop violated his
rights. See id. at 4116–4119, 4124–4126.
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“unfounded,” based in part on Joseph’s testimony that he did not witness a search. The CCRB
substantiated the complaint against Officer Moon for failing to process Downs’s complaint.442
Neither Officer Mahoney nor Officer Giacona received any discipline as a result
of the CCRB’s recommendations. Instead, each lost five vacation days for failing to make a
memo book entry for the Downs stop. They also failed to prepare a UF-250 for the stop, but
received no discipline for this. Officer Mahoney has since been promoted to Sergeant.443
Officers Mahoney and Giacona testified that they have no recollection of the
Downs stop. Like the CCRB, I do not find their denials of recollection credible.444
Downs testified that he has been stopped “[m]any times” other than the stop on
August 20, 2008.445
ii.
Mixed Findings of Fact and Law
Downs was stopped when the officers told him to “get the [fuck] against the
fence.” The officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Downs. The officers seized Downs
based on a glimpse of a small object in Downs’s hand from the window of their passing car. The
officers’ hunch, unaided by any effort to confirm that what they glimpsed was contraband, was
too unreliable, standing alone, to serve as a basis for a Terry stop.
Moreover, whatever legal justification the officers might have had for the stop
442
See id. at 4116; PX 166 (CCRB file for Downs’s complaint).
443
See 4/17 Tr. at 3847–3850, 3852–3853, 3865, 3870 (Mahoney); id. at 3876–3879
(Giacona); Tr. 4/18 at 3895 (Giacona). I refer to Sergeant Mahoney as Officer Mahoney because
that was his rank at the time of the stop.
444
See Tr. 4/17 at 3849–3850 (Officer Mahoney); id. at 3875–3875 (Officer
Giacona); Tr. 4/18 at 3892–3896 (Officer Giacona) (“According to CCRB I guess or whatever
their investigation, they found that I did this stop that I don’t remember or have any knowledge
of. . . . So that’s — I guess that’s what I was disciplined for, not having memo book entries for
the stop that I don’t remember doing.”).
445
See 4/19 Tr. at 4119 (Downs).
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dissipated shortly after they approached Downs. The absence of any physical evidence, smoke
or marijuana smell, and Downs’s explanation that he was talking on his mouthpiece, negated any
ground for reasonable suspicion. Just as an officer may not reach into the pocket of a suspect
after a frisk has negated the possibility that the pocket contains a dangerous weapon or
immediately perceptible contraband,446 so an officer may not persist in stopping a person after
the suspicion giving rise to the stop has been negated.447 Officers Mahoney and Giacona
violated Downs’s rights under the Fourth Amendment by stopping him based on a hunch, and
continuing to detain him after it became clear that he had not been smoking marijuana.
The officers further violated the Fourth Amendment by frisking Downs without
any objective basis for suspecting that he was armed and dangerous. Nothing about the
suspected infraction — marijuana use — in combination with the facts summarized above
provides reasonable suspicion that Downs was armed and dangerous.
The officers further violated Downs’s Fourth Amendment rights by searching his
pockets and wallet after the frisk. Such a search would only have been justified if the officers’
frisk of the outer surfaces of Downs’s pockets gave rise to reasonable suspicion that his pockets
contained a dangerous weapon, or if the frisk made it immediately apparent that an object in his
pockets was a form of contraband. Nothing in Downs’s pockets could have provided reasonable
suspicion that he was armed; nor could it have been immediately apparent from the patdown that
446
See Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 373, 377–78.
447
See United States v. Jones, 269 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 2001) (“Fourth
Amendment intrusion ‘must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the
purpose of the stop’ and . . . the officer should employ the least intrusive means available to
dispel the officer’s suspicion in a timely fashion.”) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500
(1983)).
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Downs’s pockets contained contraband.448
b.
Devin Almonor
i.
Findings of Fact
Devin Almonor is a sixteen-year-old black male high school student living in
Manhattan. In 2010, Almonor was thirteen years old.449 He was approximately five foot ten and
weighed approximately 150 pounds.450
On March 20, 2010, a Saturday, around 8:45 p.m., Almonor left his house to walk
his friend Levon Loggins to the bus stop at 145th Street and Amsterdam.451 After Loggins
boarded the bus, Almonor began to walk home along Hamilton Place toward a bodega where he
planned to meet his brother Malik.452 A group of males was standing outside the bodega and,
after talking to friends outside, Almonor continued home with another individual.453
Around 10:00 p.m., Officer Brian Dennis and Sergeant Jonathan Korabel454 were
driving an unmarked vehicle in the vicinity of Hamilton Place in response to nine 911 calls
describing a group of about forty youths fighting, throwing garbage cans, and setting off car
448
Because Officers Mahoney and Giacona disclaim any memory of the incident, I
cannot draw any inferences in their favor.
449
See 3/18 Tr. at 111–114 (Almonor). Minor inconsistencies between Almonor’s
deposition and trial testimony, such as whether he began to walk his friend to the bus stop at 8
p.m. versus 8:45 p.m., see id. at 137, or whether the bodega was at 141st or 142nd Street, see
id. at 140, do not undermine his credibility.
450
See id. at 143–144.
451
See id. at 115–117.
452
See id. at 119–124. Malik texted Almonor that he was at the bodega.
453
See id. at 134–135. Neither officer saw Almonor with a group of males.
454
Korabel is now a Lieutenant, see 3/27 Tr. at 1068 (B. Dennis), but I will refer to
him as Sergeant Korabel, as that was his title at the time of the stop.
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alarms. A few calls indicated the possibility that weapons were involved.455 The calls suggested
that the youths were dispersing when marked cars arrived and then returning. When the officers
arrived at Hamilton Place there were garbage cans in the middle of the street and car alarms still
going off.456 The only description they had of the individuals was that they were young black
males.457
The officers briefly observed Almonor and another individual walking on
Hamilton Place in the direction from which the calls originated.458 The individuals crossed 141st
Street.459 The officers — two white males in plainclothes — pulled up alongside Almonor, at
which point Almonor retreated onto the sidewalk.460 After the officers exited the car and
approached Almonor, Officer Dennis grabbed Almonor’s arm and said: “Police.”461 Almonor
pulled away and within moments, Officer Dennis pushed Almonor down on the hood of the
police car because he was not “satisfied [that Almonor] did not have something in his waist.”462
Together the officers handcuffed Almonor.463 Without explanation, Officer
455
See id. at 1085–1087, 1115. The officers arrived at Hamilton Place about twenty
minutes after the last 911 call. See id. at 1096.
456
See id. at 1117. Accord id. at 1189 (Korabel).
457
See id. at 1086 (B. Dennis).
458
See id. at 1117; id. at 1150 (Korabel).
459
See id. at 1119.
460
See 3/18 Tr. at 125–126 (Almonor).
461
See id. at 127; 3/27 Tr. at 1069, 1087 (B. Dennis).
462
3/27 Tr. at 1088, 1121 (B. Dennis). Officer Dennis thought Almonor was
twisting his body as if to keep his right side away from the officers — a behavior called
“blading.” See id. at 1144.
463
See id. at 1121–1122. Sergeant Korabel testified that the reason for handcuffing
Almonor was that his conduct rose to the level of disorderly conduct. See id. at 1162 (Korabel).
However, he testified that he did not observe any disorderly conduct prior to the frisk. See id. at
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Dennis patted Almonor down from his feet to his torso, during which Almonor was saying,
“What are you doing? I’m going home. I’m a kid.”464 The officers did not recover anything —
Almonor only had a cell phone in his right front pocket and a few dollars.
The officers did not ask Almonor his name until after he was handcuffed.465
Almonor did not have ID but identified himself as “Devin Al.”466 Almonor told the officers that
he was thirteen years old and was going home, which was a few blocks away.467 At some point,
though not initially, Almonor gave the officers his full address.468 The officers did not ask for
Almonor’s phone number or whether his parents were home — instead the officers put Almonor
in the back of the patrol car, took him to the precinct, and placed him in the juvenile room
because of the possibility that he was thirteen.469
1164, 1169. Moreover, Officer Dennis testified that Almonor was not yelling or screaming
when he was being questioned and frisked. See id. at 1090 (B. Dennis). While Almonor may
have struggled in response to being grabbed by the arm and pushed up against a car, I do not find
credible the assertion that Almonor’s behavior constituted disorderly conduct.
464
Id. at 1089–1090. Officer Dennis testified that he frisked Almonor after
handcuffing him and that the basis for the frisk was that Almonor’s “actions as he was walking
down the street and as I continued to observe him by holding his waist, I suspected that he may
have had a weapon at that point, and that’s the area that I frisked.” Id. at 1093. See also id. at
1161 (Korabel) (Officer Dennis frisked Almonor within a few seconds of exiting the car). I do
not find credible that Almonor was walking as if he had a weapon in his waist.
465
See id. at 1091 (B. Dennis).
466
See id. at 1205 (Korabel) (the name of the individual Sergeant Korabel tried to
call was Ms. Al); 3/18 Tr. at 145–146 (Almonor) (acknowledging that he initially identified
himself as Devin Al).
467
See 3/18 Tr. at 128–129. Almonor’s age was relevant because if he was sixteen
or older, the officers could issue a summons for disorderly conduct, but if he was younger than
sixteen, he would have to be released to his parents. See 3/27 Tr. at 1123 (B. Dennis).
468
See 3/27 Tr. at 1090 (B. Dennis).
469
See id. at 1124. Accord 3/18 Tr. at 130–131, 143 (Almonor). Almonor disputes
that he resisted efforts by the police to search, cuff or put him in the squad car. See id. at 157
(Almonor).
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After Almonor was released, Officer Dennis completed a handwritten UF 250
form and a juvenile report.470 The suspected crime was criminal possession of a weapon, and the
circumstances of the stop indicated on the form were “fits description” and “furtive movements.”
The “suspicious bulge” box was not checked and Officer Dennis testified that he did not see a
suspicious bulge that night.471 No contemporaneous document noted that Almonor was touching
his waistband.472 The juvenile report form indicated that Almonor was “resisting arrest,”
although Almonor was never arrested.473 The next morning, Officer Dennis filled out a
computerized UF-250 and another juvenile report worksheet, both of which noted a suspicious
bulge.474
ii.
Mixed Findings of Fact and Law
Almonor was stopped when the officers approached him on the sidewalk, and
Officer Dennis grabbed Almonor’s arm and said: “Police.” Even if credited, Almonor’s alleged
furtive movements — looking over his shoulder and jaywalking — in combination with the
generic description of young black male does not establish the requisite individualized suspicion
that Almonor was engaged in criminal activity.475 The officers could have approached Almonor
470
See 3/27 Tr. at 1125 (B. Dennis).
471
See id. at 1070–1077.
472
See id. at 1103.
473
Id. at 1081. Officer Dennis acknowledged that the officers did not have probable
cause to arrest Almonor. See id. at 1088. I do not believe Sergeant Korabel’s testimony that
they had probable cause based on Almonor’s alleged jaywalking in violation of New York laws.
In any event, Sergeant Korabel acknowledged that the officers did not intend to arrest Almonor
for jaywalking. See id. at 1152–1155 (Korabel).
474
See id. at 1125–1126 (B. Dennis). Officer Dennis acknowledged that he did not
see a suspicious bulge on Almonor. See id. at 1078–1079.
475
See Lambert, 98 F.3d at 1190–91 (“If the general descriptions relied on here can
be stretched to cover [plaintiffs] then a significant percentage of [black] males walking, eating,
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and asked him some questions, but instead chose to physically restrain and handcuff him first,
and ask questions later. The circumstances did not justify any restraint of Almonor’s liberty,
much less immediate physical restraint and the use of handcuffs.476
Even if the officers had possessed the requisite basis to stop Almonor — which
they did not — they had no basis to frisk him. While some of the 911 calls suggested that some
youths involved in the fighting may have had weapons, that alone does not establish
individualized suspicion that Almonor was armed and dangerous. No contemporaneous
document indicates a suspicious bulge, and Almonor was not in possession of anything that
would have created a suspicious bulge. Almonor’s actions did not indicate that he was armed.477
Finally, not only were Almonor’s Fourth Amendment rights violated at the
inception of both the stop and the frisk, but the officers made no effort to minimize the intrusion
on his liberty. Instead, they used the most intrusive methods at their disposal, thereby
exacerbating the violation of his rights.478
c.
Cornelio McDonald
i.
Findings of Fact
Cornelio McDonald is a middle-aged black male who resides on Parsons
going to work . . . might well find themselves subjected to similar treatment.”).
476
See El-Ghazzawy, 636 F.3d at 457–58 (investigative stop unconstitutional where
there was no indication that plaintiff was armed and dangerous, and officer “failed to conduct
even the most basic investigation into the facts prior to handcuffing and frisking”); Lambert, 98
F.3d at 1188 (stating that “handcuffing substantially aggravates the intrusiveness of an otherwise
routine investigatory detention”) (quotations omitted).
477
See Singleton v. United States, 998 A.2d 295, 302 (D.C. 2010) (A “generic bulge
in a pocket can be explained by too many innocent causes to constitute ‘reasonable’ suspicion.”).
478
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 28–29 (“The Fourth Amendment proceeds as much by
limitations upon the scope of governmental action as by imposing preconditions upon its
initiation.”).
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Boulevard, in a private co-op apartment building in Queens.479 McDonald often cares for his
mother who lives across the street from him in a New York City Housing Authority (“NYCHA”)
complex called Pomonok Houses.480 Parsons Boulevard is a wide street with a concrete island
dividing two lanes and cars parked on both sides of each lane.481 The majority of residents on
McDonald’s side of the block are white, while the majority of residents on his mother’s side of
the block are black.482
On December 18, 2009, a Friday, McDonald spent approximately ten hours at his
mother’s house and left her building around 1:00 a.m.483 Because the weather that night was
below freezing, McDonald was wearing a zipped-up jacket, with his hands in his pockets the
entire time he was crossing the street. He had his cell phone in his left jacket pocket, his keys in
his right pants pocket, and his wallet in his back pocket. McDonald turned his body sideways to
pass through the cars parked along the divider.484
McDonald had crossed the first lane of Parsons Boulevard and was standing
between two parked cars on the far side of the island, getting ready to cross the second lane,
when he saw an unmarked red van with plainclothes individuals inside make a u-turn and pull up
479
See 4/17 Tr. at 3677 (McDonald). McDonald is employed at Cavalry Staffing
where he drives cars. See id.
480
See id. at 3678.
481
See id. at 3679–3680.
482
See id. at 3678–3679. McDonald testified that about 80% of the residents on
McDonald’s side of the block are white, while about 80% of the residents on his mother’s side of
the block are black. The basis for this testimony was McDonald’s own perception rather than
documented statistical information. See id. at 3701.
483
See id. at 3679. It was December 19 when he left.
484
See id. at 3681–3683, 3696.
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in front of him, trapping him between two parked cars.485
The driver rolled down the window and, without identifying himself as police,
asked McDonald where he was coming from, to which McDonald responded, “Why you
stopping me for?”486 At that point both officers in the van, one of whom was Officer Edward
French, and both of whom were white,487 stepped out of the car, identified themselves as police,
and began to search McDonald without explanation.488 Officer French told McDonald to remove
his hands from his pockets, patted down the outside of McDonald’s pockets, asked McDonald to
take out his keys — which McDonald did — placed his hand inside McDonald’s pocket, and
removed a cell phone.489 When McDonald asked why he was being frisked, the officer said he
wanted to be sure McDonald did not have a weapon.490
After conducting the frisk, which failed to produce any contraband, Officer
French asked McDonald for ID. McDonald obliged and then asked for the officers’
identification. Only Officer French identified himself and gave his shield number.491 McDonald
was then permitted to leave. No summons was issued and the entire incident took seven to ten
485
See id. at 3680–3681.
486
Id. at 3683.
487
Although French has been promoted to detective, I refer to him by his rank at the
time of the stop. See id. at 3739 (French).
488
See id. at 3685, 3709 (McDonald).
489
See id. at 3686. Accord id. at 3750 (French) (testifying that he frisked the
outermost jacket and the pocket in which he observed the suspicious bulge, including placing his
hand inside the pocket, because once McDonald removed his hands from his pockets, there was
still a suspicious bulge). I do not believe that a cell phone created a “suspicious” bulge.
490
See id. at 3706–3707 (McDonald).
491
See id. at 3687.
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minutes.492
On the UF-250, Officer French listed McDonald’s suspected crime as criminal
possession of a weapon.493 Officer French did not believe he needed to include the reason he
suspected a person of a crime in his memo book — he believed that the reason for stopping a
person was enough.494 At trial, however, Officer French testified that his suspicion was based on
crime patterns and a suspicious bulge.
Officer French testified about three crime patterns. First, he made an arrest for
armed robbery a month earlier in the general vicinity where he stopped McDonald. Second, he
was aware of a robbery pattern somewhere in Queens on the night he stopped McDonald —
specifically, a black male holding up commercial establishments. Third, he was aware that a
black male had been burglarizing residential establishments in Queens, but could not be more
specific about the location of the burglaries.495 The other explanation Officer French gave for his
suspicion was his observation that McDonald had his hands in his pockets and was leaning to
one side, and had a “suspicious bulge” in his left front pocket.496 I do not believe that Officer
French saw a suspicious bulge.497
McDonald believes that he was stopped based on his race because other, non-
492
See id. at 3689.
493
See id. at 3726 (French).
494
See id. at 3737.
495
See id. at 3726, 3743. The only suspect description was black male. See id. at
496
See id. at 3747.
3743.
497
The testimony about a “suspicious bulge” appears to have been an after-the-fact
justification and is unsupported by either contemporaneous documents or the objects McDonald
had in his pockets.
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black individuals — whites or Asians — were coming out of a bowling alley about twenty-five
feet from where he was stopped, and none of them were stopped.498
ii.
Mixed Findings of Fact and Law
McDonald was stopped when two officers pulled up to him in a police van,
trapped him between two cars, and proceeded to question him. The officers made a u-turn and
specifically targeted him in a manner that would not have made a reasonable person feel free to
simply walk away.
The only articulated bases for the stop were the existence of highly generalized
crime patterns involving black males — a month-old armed robbery, a robbery pattern
somewhere in Queens and a burglary pattern somewhere in Queens499 — the fact that McDonald
was walking with his hands in his pockets in December and a supposedly suspicious bulge,
which turned out to be a cell phone. “[P]resence in an area of expected criminal activity,
standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is
committing a crime.”500 Moreover, a crime area defined as the entire borough of Queens is far
too broad to contribute to a totality of the circumstances establishing reasonable suspicion, let
alone to form the sole basis.501 This, combined with the vague description of “black males” and
the entirely unsuspicious act of putting one’s hands in one’s pockets in the wintertime, is a far
cry from the individualized suspicion of wrongdoing that constitutes reasonable suspicion.
498
See id. at 3688–3689, 3701 (McDonald). McDonald has brought several lawsuits
based on racial discrimination in the past. Specifically, he alleged that the postal service
falsified the records of African Americans and sued a white male for racial discrimination. See
id. at 3691.
499
See id. at 3726.
500
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (citing Texas, 443 U.S. at 47).
501
See 4 LA FAVE § 9.5(h) (“the time and spatial relation of the ‘stop’ to the crime is
an important consideration in determining the lawfulness of the stop”) (collecting cases).
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Absent any other justification, there was no basis for a Terry stop, and there was certainly no
basis to believe that McDonald was armed and dangerous.
I also find that McDonald was stopped because of his race. The only suspect
description was “black male,” the street was racially stratified, and other non-black individuals
were present and presumably behaving no differently than McDonald — yet only McDonald was
stopped. In sum, McDonald was stopped, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, because he was a black man crossing the street late at night in Queens.
d.
Nicholas Peart — August 5, 2006
i.
Findings of Fact
Nicholas Peart is a twenty-four-year-old black resident of Harlem. He is the legal
guardian of three younger siblings and works for a non-profit organization as an after-school
program facilitator.502 On August 5, 2006, around 5:00 a.m., Peart was with his cousin and a
friend, both of whom are also black, after celebrating his eighteenth birthday at his sister’s
house.503 It was dark out and Peart was wearing light blue basketball shorts and a white — or
black and white — tank top. At least one of the men was wearing a hat.504
Peart and his companions were standing in the median at 96th and Broadway
when three marked police cars pulled up on 96th Street.505 Approximately five uniformed
502
See 3/19 Tr. at 300–302 (Peart).
503
See id. at 319–320.
504
See id. at 320, 347–348. Peart testified that he only recently found the shorts he
was wearing that day while doing laundry. See id. at 320.
505
See id. at 320. Officer White, who has since been promoted to detective, was in a
vehicle with Officer Fontanez. See 5/7 Tr. at 6211–6213 (White). On August 5, Officer White
responded as backup to a radio run reporting crime in progress involving a man with a gun in the
vicinity of 96th and Broadway. See id. at 6214. Three cars responded. See id. at 6215–6216.
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officers exited the cars with their guns drawn.506 Officer White stated: “Police. Don’t move. Let
me see your hands” and, when the men did not immediately show their hands, ordered them to
get down on the ground.507 Peart and his companions protested but eventually obeyed the
order.508 Once Peart was on the ground, Officer White patted him down over his shorts and in
the groin area and buttocks, without consent.509 Officer White also frisked the other two men.510
After frisking the men, Officer White told them to stand up and asked for ID.511
In response to Peart’s inquiries about why they were stopped, Officer White played the radio call
three times to show that the men fit the description in the radio call.512 The dispatcher’s report
described a call coming from a payphone at 96th and Broadway about three black males — one
carrying a firearm and wearing blue pants and a black shirt, and two others wearing blue and
white tank tops, shorts and red hats — walking uptown on Broadway toward 98th Street.513
506
See 3/19 Tr. at 320–321 (Peart). Accord 5/7 Tr. at 6224 (White).
507
5/7 Tr. at 6224 (White). Officer White testified that he ordered Peart and his
companions to get on the ground because they did not initially comply with the order to raise
their hands and because he believed one or more of them might be armed.
508
See id. at 6225 (Officer White stating that he had to ask two or three times before
the men got on the ground, during which time they asked “Why? For what? What did I do? I
didn’t do nothing.”).
509
See 3/19 Tr. at 322–323, 326–327 (Peart).
510
See 5/7 Tr. at 6226 (White).
511
See id. at 6227; 3/19 Tr. at 324–326 (Peart).
512
See 3/19 Tr. at 324–326 (Peart); 5/7 Tr. at 6256–6258 (White) (discussing the
radio run description). The officers asked central command to repeat the description several
times in an effort to convince the three individuals that they were stopped was because they fit
the suspect description and location provided in the call. See 5/7 Tr. at 6219–6220, 6227
(White).
513
See DX Z8 (radio transmissions).
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After hearing the radio run, Peart and his companions were free to leave.514 However, they
continued to ask why they had been stopped, and stated their belief that the only reason they
were stopped was because they were black.515
Following the stop, Peart filed a complaint with the CCRB.516 He declined to
state his race in filing the complaint.517 Over a year later, Peart received a letter informing him
that the officers had been exonerated.518
The officers who stopped Peart and his friends were responding to a radio run
based on a report from an anonymous caller.519 The officers stopped the three men because they
resembled the description relayed by the dispatcher and were in the same location from which
the call had been made only minutes before.520 Based on the descriptions from the radio run,
Officer White believed he had stopped the right people, although no weapons were found.521
Officer White completed three UF-250s after the stop. He checked the boxes for
514
See 3/19 Tr. at 324–326 (Peart).
515
See 5/7 Tr. at 6227 (White).
516
See 3/19 Tr. at 326 (Peart). In his formal interview with the CCRB on August 26,
2006, Peart said that he had received a laceration on his lip when he dropped to the ground in
response to the officers’ commands. However, he corrected this testimony at trial, explaining
that the reason he lied was that he was eighteen and wanted to be taken seriously. See id. I find
this explanation plausible and it does not undermine Peart’s generally credible trial testimony.
517
See id. at 370.
518
See id. at 345. Peart did not file any CCRB complaints concerning his later stops
because he did not feel that the CCRB would do anything, given that his initial complaint had
not been substantiated. See id.
519
See DX Z8; 5/7 Tr. at 6219 (White).
520
See 5/7 Tr. at 6219–6221. Although Officer White could not recall exactly what
the men were wearing, he testified that “[t]hey were wearing exactly what central had put over
which [] was very unique.” Id. at 6222.
521
See id. at 6228. The officers attempted to locate the caller but were unsuccessful.
See id.
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“fits description” and “suspicious bulge.”522 As reasons for the frisk, he listed violent crime
suspected, suspicious bulge, and refusal to comply with directions (relating to the command that
the men show their hands and get on the ground).523 On each form Officer White noted that the
“bulge in pocket” had in fact been a cell phone. As additional circumstances, Officer White
noted “report from victim witness” and “proximity to crime location.” However, nothing about
the radio run suggested that the caller was a victim rather than a mere observer.524
ii.
Mixed Findings of Fact and Law
Peart and his companions were stopped when the officers exited their car with
guns drawn. Although it is a close call, I am constrained by controlling Supreme Court law to
find that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to forcibly stop the men. In Florida v. J.L., the
Supreme Court held that “an anonymous caller[’s report] that a young black male standing at a
particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun” did not establish reasonable
suspicion for a stop and frisk.525 The Court held that “reasonable suspicion . . . requires that a
tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate
person.”526 The Court rejected an exception for reports of firearms, explaining that “[s]uch an
522
See id. at 6230. Officer White acknowledged that he couldn’t stop someone
based on the description “male blacks with a gun,” or solely based on an anonymous call
reporting criminal conduct. He explained that he would need additional contributing factors and
that, in this case, those factors were the bulges in the waistband and proximity to the crime
location. See id. at 6234.
523
See id. at 6231. Officer White did not check violent crime suspected on all three
forms, which he attributed to “officer oversight.” Id. at 6231–6232.
524
See id. at 6232.
525
529 U.S. 266, 268 (2000). The report described three black males, one of whom
was wearing a plaid shirt. See id.
526
Id. at 272 (explaining that “[a]n accurate description of a subject’s readily
observable location and appearance is of course reliable in th[e] limited sense [that it] will help
the police correctly identify the person whom the tipster means to accuse. Such a tip, however,
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exception would enable any person seeking to harass another to set in motion an intrusive,
embarrassing police search of the targeted person simply by placing an anonymous call falsely
reporting the target’s unlawful carriage of a gun.”527 Florida v. J.L. makes clear that a suspect
description from an anonymous caller cannot by itself justify the forcible stop and frisk of Peart
and his companions. Although the Second Circuit held that a 911 call reporting that an assault
(or any crime for that matter) was in progress would require less corroboration, the calls here did
not indicate that an assault was in progress.528
The only additional factor cited as the basis for the stop was the bulges in the
men’s waistband area.529 The only items recovered from the frisk were cell phones. Because the
men were wearing minimal clothing, it would be difficult to mistake a cell phone for a firearm.
Moreover, to conclude that the bulge created by the now ubiquitous cell phone can provide the
additional corroboration necessary to justify an invasive stop and frisk would eliminate the
corroboration requirement entirely.530
I do not find credible the assertion that the officers saw any suspicious bulges that
would corroborate the anonymous caller’s statement that the men stopped were armed. Rather, I
find that they stopped the men solely on the basis of the description in the radio run. No other
does not show that the tipster has knowledge of concealed criminal activity”). Under the
reasoning in J.L., Officer White’s belief that he stopped the right individuals, although they were
not armed, does not establish reasonable suspicion.
527
Id.
528
See Simmons, 560 F.3d at 103.
529
See 5/7 Tr. at 6223 (White).
530
Accord Singleton, 998 A. 2d at 302 (“[A] generic bulge in a pocket can be
explained by too many innocent causes to constitute ‘reasonable’ suspicion.”) (distinguishing
cases in which only a “noticeable bulge” was cited from cases in which the officer identified
with specificity the characteristics that led him to believe it was a firearm).
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factor establishes reasonable suspicion for the highly intrusive stop. Because there was no
legally sufficient justification for the stop, the frisk was also unconstitutional.
e.
Nicholas Peart — April 13, 2011 Stop531
i.
Findings of Fact
On April 13, 2011, around 11:00 p.m., Peart was walking on 144th Street between
Lenox and Seventh Avenue — the block on which he resides — on his way to the corner store.
Peart was wearing sneakers, jeans and a red hooded sweatshirt. He was sending a text message
while walking when two uniformed officers appeared directly in front of him. One officer was
white, shorter than Peart, and wore glasses (“Officer A”). The other officer was roughly Peart’s
height and had salt-and-pepper hair (“Officer B”).532
One of the officers took Peart’s cell phone and instructed Peart to put his hands
up against the wall of a church. Officer A patted Peart down outside his clothing over his entire
body and put his hands in his pockets. Officer B also put his hands in Peart’s pockets, removed
Peart’s keys and wallet, and searched the wallet for ID. Officer B did not ask permission to
search the wallet and Peart did not consent.533 During the search Peart asked, “why is this
happening?” In response to questions about what building he was coming from, he explained
that he was coming from his apartment in the Frederick Samuel House, which is a NYCHA
building.534
531
No officers were identified in connection with the April 13, 2011 stop of Peart
and no UF-250 or other form exists. My findings are based entirely on Peart’s testimony, which
was both detailed and consistent in identifying which officer did what.
532
See 3/19 Tr. at 303–307. Peart was not certain of the second officer’s race but
testified that the officer was not black. See id. at 305.
533
See id. at 307–311.
534
See id. at 312, 397–398. The officers asked if he was coming from building 129,
and he explained that he was coming from building 125. See id. at 409.
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Officer A then grabbed Peart’s sweatshirt with his fist near Peart’s chest area and
handcuffed him.535 Officer B, who had Peart’s keys, asked which key opened Peart’s door, and
Peart identified the key in order to prove that he lived where he said he did. He did not give
Officer B permission to enter the apartment, but Officer B entered the building and remained for
about five minutes.536
While Officer B was in the building, Officer A, who was still holding Peart’s
sweatshirt, placed Peart, still handcuffed, in the back of an unmarked police vehicle parked in
front of the church. Officer A removed Peart’s sneakers, patted down his socks and asked Peart
if he had weed on him. Peart said he did not.537 Eventually, Officer B came out of Peart’s
building. The officers opened the car, let Peart out, removed the handcuffs, and returned his
keys, phone and wallet.538 The officers explained that Peart fit the description of someone who
had been ringing a doorbell at the Frederick Samuel House.539 Peart was then free to go.
ii.
Mixed Findings of Fact and Law
Peart was stopped when the officers blocked his path and told him to put his arms
against the wall. The stated reason for the stop was that he fit a suspect description of someone
who was ringing doorbells in NYCHA housing. While I cannot know from Peart’s testimony
whether the description he allegedly fit was sufficiently detailed to form the basis for reasonable
535
See id.
536
See id. at 313–314.
537
See id. at 315–316, 399. Peart testified that he was upset and concerned that the
other officer was inside the building with his younger siblings. See id. at 316.
538
See id. at 317–318.
539
See id. at 399–400. The door of Peart’s building had recently been replaced,
requiring all residents to obtain a new key, which was an involved process requiring proof of
residency in the building. See id. at 391–394.
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suspicion,540 the stop the officers conducted was not justified by the circumstances.541 The
officers had every right to ask Peart whether he lived in the Frederick Samuel House — a
question he could have answered easily. Instead, they forced him up against a wall and
handcuffed him.
The officers violated Peart’s Fourth Amendment rights by frisking him, going
into his pockets and searching his wallet.542 The officers further abused their authority — and
Peart’s rights — when Officer B took Peart’s keys and entered his apartment without permission
while Officer A continued to search Peart and question him about drugs.
f.
Ian Provost
i.
Findings of Fact
Ian Provost is a forty-two-year-old black male who currently resides in North
Carolina but lived in Queens from 1978 to 2011.543 On November 24, 2009, Provost was at his
girlfriend’s apartment in the Seth Low Houses at 365 Sackman Street in Brooklyn, which is a
540
See 4 LA FAVE § 9.5(h) (discussing requisite specificity for suspect descriptions).
541
See El-Ghazzawy, 636 F.3d at 457 (Terry stop must be conducted in a manner
“‘reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place.’”) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19–20); Allen v. City of Los Angeles, 66 F.3d 1052, 1057
(9th Cir. 1995) (“‘The relevant inquiry is always one of reasonableness under the
circumstances.’” (quoting United States v. Sanders, 994 F.2d 200, 206 (5th Cir. 1993))).
542
See Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 378 (“The officer’s continued exploration of
[plaintiff’s] pocket after having concluded that it contained no weapon was unrelated to the sole
justification of the search under Terry: the protection of the police officer and others nearby.”)
(original alterations and quotations omitted). Because the initial frisk provided no evidence of a
weapon or immediately perceptible contraband, it could not have justified a further search of his
pockets or wallet.
543
10/10/12 Deposition of Ian Provost (“Provost Dep.”), PX 584, at 17–19. Provost
did not testify at trial. His testimony was received through his pretrial deposition.
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NYCHA housing project with a high crime rate.544 Provost had a key to access the apartment
and the front door lock was broken.545 That day Provost had been doing odd jobs around his
girlfriend’s apartment, which involved tools including a knife with a four-inch blade.546
Provost left his girlfriend’s apartment around 2:15 p.m. to get food at a restaurant
across the street on Belmont Avenue. He was wearing jeans, a hooded sweatshirt and a down
jacket, which did not cover his back pockets, and was carrying the knife in his right back
pocket.547 As he reached the corner of Belmont and Sackman, Provost saw two uniformed police
officers, since identified as Jonathan Rothenberg and David Furman.548 After he passed them,
Officer Rothenberg said “excuse me,” and Provost stopped and turned around.549 The officers
asked if Provost was from around there, where he was going, and where he was coming from.
Provost responded that he was from Queens and that he was coming from a friend’s house.550
When Officer Rothenberg asked where he was going, Provost responded that it was not the
officer’s business which led to an argument about whether the officer had the right to question
Provost’s comings and goings.551 Provost said, “you have no reason to stop me. This is
544
See id. at 33–36, 82–83. Both Officer Rothenberg and Sergeant Houlahan
testified that crowds sometimes gathered and became violent in response to police activity in the
area.
545
See id. at 33–36.
546
See id. at 38–41.
547
See id. at 34–35, 39, 42.
548
See id. at 42–46. Provost testified that he had seen the officers from the window
of his girlfriend’s apartment before he left. See id. at 44. See also 1/8/13 Deposition of Sergeant
Daniel Houlahan (“Houlahan Dep.”), DX Q14, at 41.
549
See Provost Dep. at 45–46. Accord 4/17 Tr. at 3807 (Rothenberg).
550
See Provost Dep. at 46–48.
551
See id. at 49.
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harassment.”552 Officer Rothenberg told Provost he was being stopped for criminal trespass.553
Provost tried to use his cell phone and Officer Rothenberg commanded him not
to. When Provost asked why, Officer Rothenberg said that he did not like people using their cell
phones when he was talking to them.554 When Provost attempted to use his cell phone a second
time, Officer Rothenberg grabbed his right hand, which was holding the cell phone, handcuffed
him, and pushed him up against the fence.555 As he was being handcuffed, Provost repeated
Officer Rothenberg’s name and badge number so he could remember it to file a complaint.
Provost also yelled out to his girlfriend in hopes that she would hear him from her apartment.556
After Provost was handcuffed, Officer Rothenberg frisked him.557 Provost
informed Officer Rothenberg that he had a knife and told him which pocket it was in.558 After
retrieving the knife from Provost’s pocket, Officer Rothenberg called Sergeant Houlahan.559
Officer Rothenberg then searched Provost’s person and looked through Provost’s cell phone.560
552
4/17 Tr. at 3807 (Rothenberg).
553
Id. Officer Rothenberg claims that he was using suspicion of criminal trespass
and questioning Provost about where he was going to divert attention from the fact that he knew
Provost was carrying a knife. See id. at 3809. In fact, the officer had no basis to suspect that
Provost had committed criminal trespass.
554
See Provost Dep. at 48–51. Provost could not recall whether his cell phone was in
his hand or in his pocket but noted that he was not inclined to reach into his pockets while
talking to police because he believed police had a tendency to shoot people who reach into their
pockets and pull things out while being questioned. See id. at 51–52.
555
See id. at 58.
556
See id. at 59, 60.
557
See id. at 58.
558
See id.
559
See id. at 64–65.
560
See id. at 59.
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When Sergeant Houlahan arrived, he felt it was unsafe to stay on the street where
crowds sometimes gathered and became violent, so he instructed the officers to put Provost in
his car and then drove him to the precinct.561 After the officers determined that the knife was not
a gravity knife, Provost was given a summons for carrying a knife with a blade exceeding four
inches and a summons for disorderly conduct for being loud and boisterous.562
Officer Rothenberg’s memo book entry for the stop reflected that he had stopped
Provost for possible criminal trespass, but did not include any information about the
circumstances leading to the stop.563 Rothenberg had observed Provost going in and out of the
Seth Low Buildings and did not observe him use a key, but Rothenberg acknowledged that he
did not have reasonable suspicion to believe that Provost was engaged in criminal trespass.564
Officer Rothenberg testified that he observed an inch or two of a knife handle sticking out of
Provost’s pocket when Provost approached the corner where he and another officer were
standing, and that this was the reason for his stop.565
Provost filed a CCRB complaint after the incident and was interviewed. The
complaint was not substantiated.566 Provost does not believe that the officers saw the knife
561
See Houlahan Dep. at 46–49.
562
See 4/17 Tr. at 3814, 3832 (Rothenberg). Rothenberg admitted that Provost was
not being disorderly prior to being stopped and that he was not engaging in “tumultuous
behavior” as defined in the disorderly conduct statute.
563
See id. at 3802; PX 277 (memo book). Rothenberg testified that he mistakenly
wrote criminal trespass because he was rushed. See 4/17 Tr. at 3833. See also Houlahan Dep. at
85–86 (stating that if Officer Rothenberg engaged Provost because of a knife in plain view, he
should have recorded it in his activity log). Criminal possession of a weapon was also noted in
the memo book but not as a basis for the stop and no further details were recorded. See PX 277.
564
See 4/17 Tr. at 3804.
565
See id. at 3805.
566
See Provost Dep. at 92–93.
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before he informed them that he was carrying it, which occurred after the stop but before the
frisk.567
ii.
Mixed Findings of Fact and Law
Provost was stopped when Officer Rothenberg informed him that he was being
stopped on suspicion of criminal trespass, and possibly earlier. Whether the stop was unlawful
turns on whether I credit Officer Rothenberg’s testimony that he stopped Provost because he saw
the knife in his right back pants pocket. I do not. While it is plausible that an officer would
delay handcuffing and frisking an individual suspected of possessing a gravity knife, the
testimony suggests that Officer Rothenberg had not, in fact, seen the knife when he first stopped
Provost. In particular, the fact that Officer Rothenberg wrote in his memo book — the only
contemporaneous record of the stop — that he stopped Provost for possible criminal trespass
rather than not possession of a weapon, suggests that the knife was not the original reason for the
stop.568
In light of this conclusion, there was no basis to stop Provost on suspicion of
criminal trespass. Going in and out of his girlfriend’s building is not in and of itself suspicious
behavior and, without more, does not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion. Handcuffing and
then frisking Provost was also unreasonable. Although Officer Rothenberg’s actions may have
been influenced by the fact that he had been assaulted in the area on a prior occasion, nothing in
Provost’s actions — arguing about his right not to disclose where he was coming from, reaching
for his cell phone while stating that he was reaching for his cell phone — suggested that he
567
See id. at 74.
568
As I have recognized, memo books, while imperfect, are the only
contemporaneous documents by which a judge or supervisor can evaluate the basis for the stop
— that is their primary purpose. Therefore, I have no choice but to credit them over after-thefact testimony of what occurred, which often incorporates post hoc justifications for the stop.
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presented a sufficient threat to warrant handcuffing him. The frisk was unreasonable for the
same reason, particularly in light of the fact that Provost was already handcuffed and could not
have harmed Officer Rothenberg or anyone else.569
g.
David Ourlicht — January 30, 2008 Stop
i.
Findings of Fact
David Ourlicht is a twenty-five-year-old male of mixed black and white heritage
who grew up and currently lives in Manhattan. At the time of his testimony Ourlicht was
applying for admission to law school.570 On January 30, 2008, Ourlicht was enrolled at St.
John’s University in Queens. Around 2:00 p.m., he left school and walked his girlfriend to her
job. Ourlicht then began walking north on 164th Street to a deli near his dorm. He was wearing
a black down Marmot jacket, a sweatshirt, jeans and sneakers. The jacket had six pockets which
held Ourlicht’s keys, cell phone, wallet, passport, ipod, pens, and a five-subject notebook. Most
of the items were in the jacket’s interior pockets, but the notebook lay flat in one of the front
external pockets, with about twenty-five percent sticking out of the pocket.571
As Ourlicht was walking up 164th Street, he saw a uniformed officer, Christopher
Moran,572 on a police scooter drive past him from behind. They made brief eye contact but
Ourlicht kept walking. When Ourlicht reached the intersection where Officer Moran’s scooter
was stopped, Officer Moran asked what Ourlicht was doing in the area and where he was
569
Because Provost was not arrested prior to Sergeant Houlahan’s arrival, the
search of Provost’s person and cell phone cannot be justified as part of a search incident to
arrest. The stated purpose of calling Sergeant Houlahan was to determine whether or not Provost
should be arrested.
570
See 4/19 Tr. at 4173–4177 (Ourlicht).
571
See id. at 4175–4176, 4185.
572
Moran was promoted to Sergeant in 2010, but I will refer to him by the position
he held at the time of the stop. See 4/18 Tr. at 4027 (Moran).
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going.573 Ourlicht did not feel free to leave.574
Officer Moran left the scooter and asked Ourlicht for ID, to which Ourlicht
responded, “why are you stopping me?” Officer Moran asked whether Ourlicht went to school
around there, and Ourlicht said, “why are you asking me this?” Officer Moran again asked for
ID and Ourlicht asked, “why do you need to see ID? What did I do?” in an irritated way. Officer
Moran responded that it looked like Ourlicht had a gun on him, and proceeded to pat down his
waist area.575 Officer Moran did not reach into Ourlicht’s pockets.576
As soon as Officer Moran told Ourlicht he suspected him of having a gun,
Ourlicht asked if he could give him his ID, and then reached into the inside breast pocket of his
jacket and handed Officer Moran his passport and his St. John’s student ID.577 Officer Moran
recorded Ourlicht’s information at which point Ourlicht said, “now that you have my
information do you mind if I take down yours?” Officer Moran said sure, and Ourlicht made
clear that he was going to reach into his pocket to get a pen and paper and began to write down
Officer Moran’s badge number, nameplate, and scooter number.578
573
See 4/19 Tr. at 4177–4180 (Ourlicht); 4/18 Tr. at 4051, 4055 (Moran).
574
See 4/19 Tr. at 4181 (Ourlicht) (“Q: Why didn’t you just walk away when [the]
officer started asking you questions? A: He was a police officer. He had a gun. I don’t know
anybody that would in that situation, walk away.”).
575
See id. at 4180–4181. Ourlicht disputes that he was yelling or being hostile, see
id., while Officer Moran testified that Ourlicht was irate, screaming and using obscene language.
See 4/18 Tr. at 4059 (Moran). Although I believe that Ourlicht may have used obscene language
in response to receiving the summons, I credit Ourlicht’s testimony that he was not disorderly
during the initial stop. At most he became irate after being frisked. See id. at 4069 (Moran) (“A:
In the beginning I started to question — asked him a question. Began a conversation. I frisked
him. He became very irate. He was yelling obscenities . . . He stated he wanted to fight me.”).
576
See 4/19 Tr. at 4183 (Ourlicht).
577
See id.
578
See id. at 4184.
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Officer Moran had radioed for backup and a patrol car pulled up.579 Officer
Moran then said, “okay now you’re going to get the full treatment, get against the wall.”580 Two
uniformed police officers got out of the car.581 Ourlicht faced the wall with his hands behind his
head and the officers proceeded to pull everything out of his jacket pockets and reached into his
jeans pockets, which were empty.582 The officers instructed Ourlicht to sit on the ground, which
he did, while Officer Moran returned to the scooter with Ourlicht’s ID.583
Officer Moran returned and asked Ourlicht for his address, which Ourlicht
provided, and Officer Moran accused him of lying. Ourlicht then provided his mailing address,
which was different from his residence — a college dorm.584 Moran wrote Ourlicht a ticket for
disorderly conduct. When Ourlicht learned what the ticket was for he said “that’s fucked up”
and “I’m going to fight this.” Ourlicht was then free to go.585 The summons was dismissed.
Ourlicht’s mother filed a CCRB complaint regarding the stop.586
Officer Moran observed Ourlicht for no more than two minutes — as he
approached Ourlicht on the scooter and after he passed him, from his rearview mirror.587 Officer
579
See 4/18 Tr. at 4081 (Moran).
580
4/19 Tr. at 4148 (Ourlicht).
581
See id. at 4185. Moran testified that based on threats Ourlicht was making, “after
[Officer Moran] had frisked him and found nothing, [he] reasonably suspected at that time that
[Ourlicht] was hiding something else”). See 4/18 Tr. at 4070.
582
See 4/19 Tr. at 4186 (Ourlicht).
583
See id. at 4187–4188.
584
See id. at 4189–4190.
585
See id. at 4191; PX 248 (criminal court summons). Moran never handcuffed
Ourlicht.
586
See 4/19 Tr. at 4192 (Ourlicht).
587
See 4/18 Tr. at 4079 (Moran).
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Moran believed Ourlicht was “blading” the right side of his body in order to protect something
in his right waist area that was preventing him from taking normal steps.588 Officer Moran
claimed he saw an object running from Ourlicht’s hip along his ribs. Based on that and the way
Ourlicht was walking, Officer Moran decided to stop him.589
Officer Moran completed a UF-250 in connection with the stop of Ourlicht. He
checked the “suspicious bulge” box but did not identify what the bulge ultimately was.590
Officer Moran noted in his memo book that he stopped a male around 2:15 p.m. based on a
suspicious bulge, and issued a summons. No other details about the stop were recorded.591
ii.
Mixed Findings of Fact and Law
Ourlicht was stopped when Officer Moran confronted him on the sidewalk and
began questioning him — and certainly when the men began to argue about Officer Moran’s
authority to demand information about Ourlicht’s comings and goings. The only articulated basis
for the stop was the “blading.” Even if Officer Moran saw Ourlicht walking strangely because
he had a five-subject notebook in his pocket, that is insufficient to form a “reasonable,
particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime.”592 Nothing else about the
circumstances provided added basis for suspicion. It was daytime and Ourlicht made eye contact
with Officer Moran, and did not attempt to evade his presence.
I also do not find that Officer Moran reasonably believed that Ourlicht was armed
and dangerous. The five-subject notebook, the only item that could have been the object that
588
See id. at 4051–4052.
589
See id. at 4056.
590
See id.; PX 250 (UF-250 form).
591
See 4/19 Tr. at 4068 (Moran); PX 249 (Memo Book Entry).
592
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (citing Texas, 443 U.S. at 47).
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supposedly caused Officer Moran to believe Ourlicht was armed, could not be confused for a
gun, and, in fact, would be easily identifiable as a notebook.593 Therefore, I also find that the
first frisk was unreasonable.
Even if the first frisk were justified, the search when the other officers arrived
was not justified because Moran had already frisked Ourlicht and found nothing. Nothing that
Ourlicht did after the initial stop justified Moran’s suspicion that Ourlicht was hiding
“something,” much less that he was hiding a weapon. Terry’s authorization of “strictly
circumscribed” protective searches contemplated that evidence of criminal conduct might be
missed, but concluded that the Constitution did not permit a more intrusive search absent
probable cause.594
h.
Clive Lino — February 5, 2008 Stop
i.
Findings of Fact
Clive Lino is a thirty-two-year-old black resident of the Bronx. He works as a
social worker at a non-profit faith-based organization. Lino is about five foot ten and weighs
about 175 pounds.595
593
I note that because Officer Moran’s memo book and the UF-250 did not state
what the suspicious bulge actually was, I conclude that it was either entirely fabricated, or was,
in fact, the five subject notebook.
594
Terry, 392 U.S. at 25–26 (contrasting a search based on probable cause, which is
justified on grounds other than protecting the arresting officer, including obtaining evidence of
the crime, with “[a] search for weapons [which must] be strictly circumscribed. . . .”). Nor does
Terry authorize stopping an individual, antagonizing him, and then conducting a more intrusive
search based on post-stop allegations of disorderly conduct. Even Moran doesn’t contend that
Ourlicht was being disorderly before he frisked him. Ourlicht admits that he questioned the
basis for the stop and the need for ID but not that he was being disorderly. Because Officer
Moran’s memo book had no details and his memory is limited, I credit Ourlicht, who
acknowledged that he used obscenity after receiving the summons and is generally more
credible.
595
See 4/1 Tr. at 1728–1729, 1762 (Lino).
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On February 5, Officer Brian Kovall, who is white, and Officer Edward Arias,
who is black, learned during roll call of a robbery pattern involving two black males, one
wearing a beige or yellow coat and the other wearing a blue or black coat, committing gunpoint
robberies in the vicinity of a check-cashing location near 103rd Street and Lexington Avenue, a
high crime area.596 The height range for the suspects was five foot six to six foot two, the weight
range was 170 to 200 pounds, and the age range was mid-twenties.597 Officer Kovall watched a
video of the two suspects running, which was taken around noon on January 30.598
Around 8:00 p.m. on February 5, Lino and his friend James went to pick up
takeout from a Chinese restaurant at 103rd Street and Lexington Avenue. At the time, Lino lived
just two blocks from the restaurant. Lino and James ordered food and were waiting outside the
restaurant facing the street.599 Lino was wearing a tan State Property-brand jacket and James
was wearing the same jacket in a greenish color.600
As Lino and James waited outside for their food, Officers Kovall and Arias
approached and ordered Lino and James to take their hands out of their pockets, which they did
after several requests.601 The officers asked the men what they were doing on the corner, where
they were going, where they were coming from, where they lived, and if they had ID. Lino said
596
See 4/16 Tr. at 3468–3471, 3485 (Arias). See also id. at 3479 (there are higher
crime rates near subways stations).
597
I note that this description is so generic as to cover the vast majority of young
black males.
598
See 4/10 Tr. at 3045, 3063–3064 (Kovall). Officer Kovall testified that the man
running “looked like — I don’t want to say a normal person, but of a medium stature, as [did]
Mr. Lino and the other gentleman stopped.” Id. at 3077.
599
See 4/1 Tr. at 1729–1730, 1752, 1765.
600
See id. at 1731–1732.
601
See 4/10 Tr. at 3050, 3069.
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he did not have ID because he had just come from his apartment to get food and was going right
back there.602 Lino and James were not free to leave.603
The officers informed Lino and James that they were stopped because they fit the
description of armed robbery suspects. Officer Arias stated that they had orders to stop anyone
on that particular corner whenever they felt like it.604 Officer Arias frisked Lino’s pockets and
waist but did not reach inside his pockets.605 The officers obtained Lino and James’s names and
addresses.
The officers called their supervising Lieutenant to come down and confirm
whether these men were the robbery suspects, which took five to ten minutes.606 During that
time, Officer Kovall permitted Lino to enter the restaurant and get the food because Officer
Kovall was “satisfied that there were absolutely no weapons on either individual.”607
After Lino returned with the food, Lieutenant Gaglio and two other officers
arrived in plainclothes. Lino knew they were officers because “they spoke to the officers who
were already there, and they were able to have access to us.”608 After asking the same questions
that Officers Kovall and Arias had asked, Lieutenant Gaglio told Officer Kovall and Arias that
602
See 4/1 Tr. at 1732–1733, 1768 (Lino).
603
See 4/10 Tr. at 3048 (Kovall); 4/16 Tr. at 3473 (Arias).
604
See 4/1 Tr. at 1734 (Lino). I credit this testimony both because Lino’s
recollection of the stop was generally credible and because Officer Arias testified that the
particular corner of 103rd and Lexington was a high crime, high traffic area. See 4/16 Tr. at
3468–3471, 3485, 3479 (Arias).
605
Lino conceded that neither officer checked his pockets. See 4/1 Tr. at 1734–1735.
The officers also frisked James. See id.
606
See 4/10 Tr. at 3071 (Kovall).
607
Id.
608
4/1 Tr. at 1735–1736. Accord 4/16 Tr. at 3491–3492 (Arias).
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these were not the men.609 Lieutenant Gaglio told Officers Kovall and Arias to run the men’s
names. While they were doing so, one of the plainclothes officers frisked Lino again.610
Officers Kovall and Arias returned and reported a summons that Lino and James
had received in January. The plainclothes officers left and Lino asked Kovall and Arias for their
badge numbers. Officer Kovall provided his name and badge number, while Officer Arias just
walked away.611 Lino was then free to go. He did not receive a summons and was not arrested.
Following the stop, Lino filed a complaint with the CCRB, which was
unsubstantiated.612 Lino believed he and James were stopped because of their race.613
The officers stopped the men because their coats matched the description in the
robbery pattern — one light coat and one dark coat. In addition, the officers observed Lino and
James standing outside on a cold night in the vicinity of the robberies, and they were still there
after the officers circled the block and returned.614 Officer Arias frisked Lino because the
suspected crime was armed robbery.615
Officer Kovall filled out a UF-250 after stopping Lino. Under circumstances that
led to the stop he checked “Fits Description”; “Area Has High Incidence Of Reported Offense
609
See 4/10 Tr. at 3072 (Kovall).
610
See 4/1 Tr. at 1735–1736 (Lino). But see 4/16 Tr. 3492 (Arias); 4/10 Tr. at 3072
(Kovall) (testifying that they did not see the other officers frisk either man). I credit Lino’s
testimony that Kovall and Arias were sent to run the names because he said they returned and
reported that he had an outstanding summons.
611
See 4/1 Tr. at 1736–1737 (Lino).
612
See id. at 1738; 4/16 Tr. at 3492 (Arias).
613
See 4/1 Tr. at 1774 (Lino).
614
See 4/16 Tr. at 3486–3489 (Arias).
615
See id. at 3490. Officer Arias did not fill out a UF-250 and did not follow the
requirements for filling out his memo book in connection with this stop. See id. at 3475 (Arias);
PX 214.
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Of Type Under Investigation”; and “Time Of Day, Day Of Week, Season Corresponding To
Reports Of Criminal Activity” because of “Ongoing Investigations, e.g. Robbery Pattern.” As
the reason for the frisk, Officer Kovall checked “Violent Crime Suspected” and “Knowledge Of
Suspect’s Prior Criminal Violent Behavior/Use of Force/Use of Weapon,” to refer to the fact that
he was looking for an armed robbery suspect. “Refusal To Comply With Officer’s Directions”
was also checked, in reference to Officer Kovall’s initial instruction to Lino to remove his hands
from his pockets.616
ii.
Mixed Findings of Fact and Law
Lino and James were stopped when the officers approached and told them to
remove their hands from their pockets. Although it is a close question, I find that the officers
lacked reasonable suspicion to forcibly stop Lino and James. The suspect description alone —
two black men, of average height and weight, one wearing a light jacket and one wearing dark
— is too generic to form the basis for reasonable suspicion, especially given the passage of time
between the commission of the armed robberies and the stop of Lino and James.617
The act of standing outside in the cold near the check-cashing location for the
amount of time it took the officers to circle the block does not raise the totality of the
circumstances to reasonable suspicion justifying a forcible stop of Lino and James.618 No other
616
See 4/10 Tr. at 3053–3054 (Kovall); PX 211.
617
Contrast 4 LA FAVE § 9.5(h) (5th ed.) (discussing Hampleton v. United States, 10
A.3d 137 (D.C. App. 2010) (finding reasonable suspicion where robbers were described only as
“black males in dark clothing,” but direction of flight and distance from the crime location fit,
and defendant was stopped in close time/space relationship to that event, and “was the only one
in the immediate area who fit the lookout description”) and United States v. Turner, 699 A.2d
1125 (D.C. App. 1997) (reasonable suspicion where officers arrived at scene of crime within a
minute and encountered only two persons fitting fairly general description).
618
While observing the men standing facing the street across from the check-cashing
location with no apparent agenda for an extended period of time might give rise to the suspicion
that they were casing a location for a robbery, several minutes is insufficient.
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circumstances provided additional cause for suspicion. Furthermore, Officer Arias told Lino that
the officers had orders to stop anyone on that corner whenever they felt like it. Such an order
ignores the requirement of individualized, articulable suspicion, and Officer Arias’ reference to
it discredits the officers’ assertions that they had the requisite suspicion in this instance. Thus,
the initial stop of Lino violated his Fourth Amendment rights.619
I note that the officers could easily have observed for a few minutes longer to
determine whether there was an innocent explanation for this conduct — namely obtaining the
food — at no cost to their safety or law enforcement objectives.620 Moreover, they would have
been justified in approaching the men and asking them some questions — the equivalent of a
DeBour level one stop. But the intrusion here was considerably more severe and included a frisk
of the men’s persons.621 The second frisk by the plainclothes officers further violated Lino’s
rights, as there was clearly no threat at that point that the men were armed and dangerous.
i.
Lalit Clarkson
i.
Findings of Fact
619
Lino’s rights were further violated when he was detained for additional time by
the plainclothes officers. By the time these officers arrived, Lino had dispelled any suspicion
that he and James were engaging in criminal activity by showing that they were in fact waiting
for Chinese food. See Royer, 460 U.S. at 500 (Terry stop must “last no longer than is necessary
to effectuate the purpose of the stop”).
620
The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not require police to
use the least intrusive means possible to verify their suspicions, reasoning that such a rule would
“unduly hamper the police’s ability to make swift, on-the-spot decisions.” Sokolow, 490 U.S. at
10-11. However, this deference only applies when the suspicion to be verified is sufficient to
justify a Terry stop. See id. at 10 (holding that the circumstances gave rise to reasonable
suspicion that the suspect was smuggling drugs, and only then turning to whether police were
required to use least intrusive means possible to investigate). See also El-Ghazzawy, 636 F.3d at
457–58.
621
I note that because the suspected crime was robbery at gunpoint, if the stop had
been reasonable at its inception, the frisk would also have been justified, particularly in light of
the men’s hesitancy to remove their hands from their pockets, which occurred before the men
were frisked.
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Lalit Clarkson is a thirty-one-year-old black male who works as a union organizer
and lives in New Jersey, but visits New York frequently.622 When he was stopped in January,
2006, Clarkson worked as a teacher’s assistant at Grand Concourse Academy, a school located at
169th Street in the Bronx. Clarkson was returning to the school after picking up lunch at a
Subway around 1:00 p.m., wearing slacks, a tie, and a collared shirt.623 Clarkson entered a
bodega on the corner of 169th and Walton, across from the school, holding a clear Subway bag
containing a sandwich. He saw two plainclothes officers, one white and one Hispanic, standing
in the back of the bodega, and assumed they were police because of the way they were standing
and his experience in the neighborhood. Clarkson did not interact with the officers in the
bodega. He purchased a food item, put it in his pocket and left the store.624
As he was about to cross the street, he heard a voice say, “hey” and he turned
around. The white officer said, “come over here, can I talk to you,” and Clarkson went over.
The officers showed their badges and identified themselves as police. The officers came closer
to Clarkson so that eventually his back was against the bodega wall and the officers were
standing between Clarkson and the street.625
The officers told Clarkson they had seen him walk past a building down the block
that they knew to be a drug building. Clarkson had walked past the building because it was on
the route he took back to school, but had not stopped or spoken to anyone. The officers asked
622
See 4/8 Tr. at 2634–2635 (Clarkson).
623
See id. Clarkson was not sure of the exact day he was stopped. No CCRB
complaint was filed and no UF-250 or memo book entry was identified in connection with this
stop. The officers who conducted the stop were never identified. Therefore, my findings
regarding this stop are based entirely on Clarkson’s testimony, which I find credible.
624
See id. at 2636–2637.
625
See id. at 2638–2641.
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twice if Clarkson had any contraband on him, and he said he did not. Then they asked: “if I go
in your pockets you don’t have anything on you?” Again Clarkson said no. He did not consent
to a search and the officers did not search him. The officers left after Clarkson said a third time
that he had no contraband, and did not consent to be searched. The stop lasted a few minutes.626
At no point did Clarkson feel free to leave.627
ii.
Mixed Findings of Fact and Law
Clarkson was stopped when the officers called him over and surrounded him with
his back against the wall. Although merely blocking a means of egress may not constitute a
seizure where the police do not actually prevent a person from leaving,628 the act of surrounding
an individual on the street against a wall is an intentional “assertion of authority to restrain a
person’s freedom of movement” sufficient to constitute a seizure.629 Clarkson was not required
to attempt to push past the officers in order to test whether or not he was, in fact, free to leave.
Because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Clarkson where all he did was walk past
a building known to be associated with drugs, this stop violated the Fourth Amendment.630
2.
Unconstitutional Frisk Only
a.
Dominique Sindayiganza
626
See id. at 2641–2642.
627
See id. at 2643.
628
Pinto-Montoya v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 126, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (discussing
Delgado, 466 U.S. at 218).
629
Id. (citing Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007) (“A person is seized .
. . when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, terminates or restrains his
freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.”) (quotation marks and citations
omitted)).
630
See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (citing Texas, 443 U.S. at 47) (presence in high
crime area insufficient).
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Findings of Fact
Dominique Sindayiganza is a middle-aged, black male who resides in Queens
with his wife and two daughters. In 2010, Sindayiganza worked at a non-profit organization in
Manhattan.631 On February 12, 2010, Sindayiganza left his office at Lexington Avenue and 25th
Street around 5:30 p.m. carrying a backpack and wearing dark blue rain pants and a green winter
jacket. After running an errand in Union Square, he was walking along Broadway toward the F
train at 14th Street and Sixth Avenue to go home. He entered Petco on the corner of Broadway
and East 17th Street thinking it was a store that sold children’s clothes. He quickly realized it
was a pet store, and as he started to exit he heard someone say: “this is the guy.” Four young
white male uniformed officers, including Luke White and Sean Gillespie, surrounded him and
forcibly escorted him out of the store.632
Once outside, the officers surrounded Sindayiganza on the sidewalk and
aggressively questioned him about what he was doing there, where he came from, and whether
he was armed. The officers told him that a lady had identified him as the man who was
following her and asking her for money.633 Sindayiganza replied that he was an educator, that he
was buying supplies for a field trip and then going home to Queens, and that he had not followed
631
See 4/8 Tr. at 2586–2587 (Sindayiganza).
632
See id. at 2588–2592, 2598, 2606. Sindayiganza testified that the officers looked
like they were in their mid-twenties and questioned him like rookie cops. See id. at 2597. See
also 4/10 Tr. at 3087–3088 (White); 4/15 Tr. at 3420 (Gillespie) (both testifying that the
majority of the officers in the impact squad to which they were assigned at the time of the stop
were recent graduates of the police academy).
633
See 4/8 Tr. at 2592–2595 (Sindayiganza). Officer White spoke first with the
Petco employee and then directly with the woman. The woman did not say that she was verbally
threatened or touched and she did not identify herself when she initially spoke with Officer
White. See 4/10 Tr. at 3093–3094 (White).
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any lady. He asked to see the woman so he could clear his name and was told he could not.634
At some point during this initial interaction, Officer White frisked Sindayiganza.635
Officer White asked Sindayiganza for ID and then went into Petco to see if the
woman could identify Sindayiganza as the harrasser. The other officers continued to
aggressively question Sindayiganza.636 The woman identified Sindayiganza and stated that she
just wanted him to leave.637 Officer White went back outside and told Sindayiganza that he
could go but that he had to walk north up Broadway. Sindayiganza asked if he could go to the 4
train or the F train, both of which were south, and was told he could not. Sindayiganza asked
indignantly why, if he was free to go, he could not go to the train that would take him directly
home.638 He was speaking loudly at this point, but was not yelling.639
Officer White went back inside Petco and conferred with the woman who said she
wanted Sindayiganza arrested. Officer White then told Sindayiganza that he was going to teach
him a lesson and told him to put his hands against the wall, made him take off his backpack,
handcuffed him, and forced him to sit down on the sidewalk.640 Another officer looked through
634
See 4/8 Tr. at 2596–2597 (Sindayiganza).
635
See 4/10 Tr. at 3115–3116 (White) (testifying that although he may have frisked
Sindayiganza before arresting him, it was all part of a continuous event and acknowledging that
he testified in his CCRB report that he patted down Sindayiganza before the woman informed
him that she wanted to press charges).
636
See 4/8 Tr. at 2597–2599 (Sindayiganza); 4/10 Tr. at 3102 (White). Officer
White clarified that he did not specifically point out Sindayiganza to the woman, but rather
asked her if she recognized anyone. See 4/10 Tr. at 3105 (White).
637
See 4/10 Tr. at 3106–3107 (White).
638
See 4/8 Tr. at 2599–2600 (Sindayiganza). See id. at 2616. Accord 4/10 Tr. at
3108 (White).
639
See 4/10 Tr. at 3146 (White).
640
See 4/8 Tr. at 2600 (Sindayiganza). Just before handcuffing Sindayiganza,
Officer White spoke to the woman who identified Sindayiganza and told her that Sindayiganza
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Sindayiganza’s backpack and removed items, and opened his jacket and searched his pockets, all
without consent. When Sindayiganza asked why he was being arrested, the officers told him it
was for “excessive panhandling.” Sindayiganza was then taken in a police car to the precinct
and given a summons for disorderly conduct, which was never prosecuted.641 Sindayiganza
submitted a CCRB complaint online a day or two after the event and provided a sworn statement
seven months later.642
Officer White believed he had reasonable suspicion to stop Sindayiganza because
he matched the woman’s description — tall, light-skinned black male with dark hair, a big
backpack, glasses, a green jacket, and green pants — and was in close proximity to the location
of the incident.643 Officer White believed he had probable cause to arrest Sindayiganza for
aggravated harassment based on the woman’s allegations and identification.644 He further
believed that once he handcuffed Sindayiganza, he had the right to search him incident to
arrest.645 No arrest report was filled out and only a summons for disorderly conduct was
was refusing to walk north, at which point she told Officer White that she wanted to press
charges. Until she said this, Officer White had no intention of arresting Sindayiganza, although
he believed he had probable cause to do so based on the witness’s identification. See 4/10 Tr. at
3112 (White).
641
See 4/8 Tr. at 2600–2602 (Sindayiganza).
642
See id. at 2623–2624. Sindayiganza explained that he did not want to provide a
sworn statement to the CCRB until his summons was resolved because he was unsure how legal
proceedings worked. See id. at 2629.
643
See 4/10 Tr. at 3104, 3143 (White).
644
See id. at 3117.
645
See id. at 3112–3113, 3120. One of the officers obtained the woman’s personal
identification prior to handcuffing Sindayiganza but Officer White threw it out once it was
determined that Sindayiganza would not be arrested. See id. at 3123–3124.
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issued.646
ii.
Mixed Findings of Law and Fact
Sindayiganza was stopped when the police surrounded him and escorted him
outside. The police had reasonable suspicion to forcibly stop Sindayiganza for suspected
harassment because he matched a specific description provided by an identified victim, and was
in close proximity to the reported harassment just minutes after it allegedly occurred.647
There was, however, no basis to frisk Sindayiganza. His stop was based on a
woman’s report that a man had been following her and asking her repeatedly for money, which
caused her alarm.648 The woman never said she believed her harasser was armed, or that she had
been physically threatened.
The frisk cannot be justified as a search incident to arrest that preceded the arrest.
As a preliminary matter, the officers almost certainly lacked probable cause under New York
law to arrest Sindayiganza. Based on the woman’s allegations, Officer White at most had
reasonable suspicion that Sindayiganza had committed harassment in the second degree, a
violation under New York law.649 New York law prohibits arrest based on second–degree
646
See id. at 3121. No UF-250 was filled out. See id. at 3125. Officer White
recorded the arrest in his memo book and noted that the arrest occurred about fifteen minutes
after he stopped Sindayiganza. See id. at 3131.
647
See Williams, 407 U.S. at 147 (holding that “when the victim of a street crime
seeks immediate police aid and gives a description of [her] assailant,” that may form the basis
for reasonable suspicion and a forcible stop).
648
See Def. Findings ¶ 2 (describing Sindayiganza stop).
649
See PL § 240.26 (defining harassment in the second degree as “follow[ing] a
person in or about a public place or places; or . . . engag[ing] in a course of conduct . . . which
alarm[s] or seriously annoy[s] such other person and which serve[s] no legitimate purpose”).
Although Officer White stated that he had probable cause to arrest Sindayiganza for aggravated
harassment, nothing about the woman’s statement suggested any fear of physical injury, much
less any of the elements of aggravated harassment. See id. § 240.30 (aggravated harassment,
even in the second degree, involves use of the mails or telephone, or use of physical violence).
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harassment that does not occur in the arresting officer’s presence.650
Even if probable cause for an arrest had existed, when Officer White frisked
Sindayiganza he had no intention of arresting him; rather he planned to let Sindayiganza leave,
as long as he walked north. A frisk cannot be justified after the fact as a search incident to
arrest, where there is no intent to arrest at the time the frisk is conducted.651
b.
David Floyd — April 20, 2007 Stop652
i.
Findings of Fact
David Floyd is a thirty-three-year-old black male who lived in the Bronx from
650
See CPL § 140.10 (commentary) (“Where [violations] are concerned . . . while an
arrest, even for an offense punishable only by a fine, does not violate federal constitutional
Fourth Amendment rights . . . , [New York law] bars an arrest based upon a report made to the
officer about something that occurred outside the officer’s presence.”). Accord People v.
Solomon, 817 N.Y.S.2d 819 (4th Dep’t 2006) (“The warrantless arrest of defendant for a
violation, i.e., harassment, that did not occur in the presence of the arresting officers was
illegal.”). Although arrest for the violation would not have violated Sindayiganza’s Fourth
Amendment rights per se, the fact that the officers lacked authority to arrest Sindayiganza under
New York law forecloses using search incident to arrest as a basis for the stop.
651
The Second Circuit has upheld the constitutionality of the search incident to arrest
conducted prior to an arrest where probable cause to arrest existed and an arrest was later
effectuated. See United States v. Wilson, 94 Fed. App’x 14, 17 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Once probable
cause was established, it is irrelevant whether the officers’ searches of Wilson occurred prior or
subsequent to his arrest.”); United States v. Jenkins, 496 F.2d 57, 72–73 (2d Cir. 1974).
However, these cases left open the question whether a search could be justified as a search
incident to arrest where no arrest was ever made. See Evans v. Solomon, 681 F. Supp. 2d 233,
249 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). Although the court in Evans held that the search was justified even if no
arrest was ultimately made, I decline to go a step further and hold that a search can be justified
as incident to arrest where the officer has no intention of arresting the individual at the time the
search is conducted.
652
No officers were ever identified in connection with this stop. I am satisfied that
the defendant performed a thorough investigation to identify the officers who conducted this
stop. See 4/30 Tr. at 5480 (Stipulation). Floyd was uncertain about the exact day that the stop
occurred. See 3/18 Tr. at 196–197 (Floyd). However, I find Floyd’s testimony generally
credible and sufficiently detailed, and base my findings on that testimony.
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2001 until 2010, when he left to attend medical school.653 On or around April 20, 2007, a Friday,
Floyd was coming from the subway walking towards his home at 1359 Beach Avenue in the
Bronx, wearing jeans and sneakers, and carrying his wallet, keys and cell phone in his pocket.654
As he crossed East 172nd Street, Floyd saw two police officers about a block-and-a-half away
interacting with another individual. The officers then got into a van and Floyd continued
walking down Beach Avenue toward his home. Shortly thereafter, the van pulled up to Floyd
and the officer in the driver’s seat said, “Excuse me, may I speak to you, sir?” Floyd
immediately stopped walking.655
Three uniformed officers, one Latino male, one white male and one female,
exited the vehicle and one asked Floyd for ID.656 Floyd asked whether he had to give ID, but did
not feel free to refuse.657 After he produced the ID, Floyd reached into his pocket to get his cell
phone or a pen to write down the officers’ identification. The white male officer jumped toward
him and Floyd immediately stopped and put his hands up and said, “it’s a cellphone.” The
officer said that it made him nervous when people put their hands in their pockets. The officer
asked Floyd if he had a weapon, and Floyd said he did not and that he did not consent to being
searched. The officer proceeded to pat down Floyd’s entire body including pushing the cell
phone, a BlackBerry, up out of Floyd’s pocket with his finger.658
653
3/18 Tr. at 160–161 (Floyd).
654
See id. at 161–162.
655
See id. at 164–166, 213.
656
See id. at 166.
657
See id. at 166–168. See also 3/19 Tr. at 223 (“Q: [Y]ou knew that you were free
not to give the ID to the police officer, correct? A: I did not feel like it would have been smart
for me not to have given it to them. So I did give it to them.”).
658
See 3/18 Tr. at 170–172; 3/19 Tr. at 229, 253–254.
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The frisk lasted about thirty seconds and then the officer holding Floyd’s ID told
him it was illegal for him not to have a New York City license — Floyd’s ID was out-of-state.
The officers then got back in the van. Floyd asked for names and badge numbers and two of the
officers identified themselves as Rodriguez and Goodman and provided badge numbers. The
officers then left.659 Floyd did not file a CCRB complaint in connection with this stop.660
ii.
Mixed Finding of Fact and Law
Without testimony from the stopping officers, I have insufficient evidence to
determine whether they had reasonable suspicion to approach Floyd and question him.
However, I credit Floyd’s testimony and find that there was no basis for the frisk. The officers
did not appear to believe that Floyd was armed and dangerous when they approached him,
because they did not immediately frisk him. Nothing in Floyd’s behavior gave the officers
reason to reconsider whether Floyd was “armed and dangerous.” He reached for his cell phone
and promptly identified it as such. The officer asked Floyd if he had a weapon and Floyd said he
did not. I find that there was no credible basis for believing Floyd was armed and dangerous.
Therefore, the frisk was unconstitutional.
c.
David Floyd — February 27, 2008 Stop
i.
Findings of Fact
On February 27, 2008, Floyd resided on Beach Avenue in a three-family home
with a separate cottage. Floyd’s Godmother owned the property and lived on the top floor, and
tenants occupied the ground floor and the basement. Floyd lived in the cottage. Around 3:00
p.m., Floyd left the cottage carrying a backpack, with his wallet, cell phone, keys, and some
659
See 3/18 Tr. at 172–173. The badge numbers that Floyd identified did not belong
to officers named Rodriguez or Goodman. See id. at 204–205.
660
See 3/19 Tr. at 232.
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change in his pocket. Before Floyd got to the street, the basement tenant, also a black male, told
Floyd that he was locked out of his apartment and asked for Floyd’s assistance because Floyd
had access to the spare keys.661
Floyd retrieved seven to ten keys on separate key rings from his Godmother’s
apartment and went to the door of the basement apartment with the tenant. Because the keys
were not marked, both Floyd and the tenant tried five or six different keys for a minute or two.662
At that point, three plainclothes officers, since identified as Officers Cormac Joyce and Eric
Hernandez, and Sergeant James Kelly, approached and told Floyd and the tenant to stop what
they were doing and put their hands up.663 Floyd obeyed.664 Officer Joyce patted Floyd down
and searched Floyd’s pockets without his consent.665 He did not remove anything from Floyd’s
pockets.666
After frisking the men, the officers remained calm throughout the encounter.667
The officers asked the men for ID, and Floyd showed his Louisiana drivers’ license. The tenant
did not have ID on him. After additional inquiries, Floyd produced an electric bill with his name
and address on it, and the tenant went inside his apartment and got ID.668 Floyd asked why he
661
See 3/18 Tr. at 174–177, 180.
662
See id. at 177–178; 3/19 Tr. at 237 (Floyd).
663
See 3/19 Tr. at 239–241 (Floyd); 3/28 Tr. at 1312 (Joyce).
664
See 3/28 Tr. at 1322 (Joyce) (testifying that the officers would not have permitted
the men to leave).
665
See 3/18 Tr. at 179–180 (Floyd). Joyce admitted frisking Floyd but disputes that
he put his hands in Floyd’s pockets. See 3/28 Tr. at 1329, 1364 (Joyce).
666
See 3/19 Tr. at 244 (Floyd).
667
See id. at 247.
668
See id. at 244–246.
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had been stopped and the officers informed him that there had been a pattern of burglaries in the
area. Floyd asked for the officers’ names and badge numbers and the officers provided them.
The officers then left.669
Earlier that day the officers had been patrolling Beach Avenue in response to
reports of robberies and burglaries of private homes in the area — specifically the area of the
43rd Precinct near the Cross-Bronx Expressway. Proximity to the Cross-Bronx Expressway was
significant because it provided easy access for a vehicle to get away from the area quickly.670
The majority of the burglaries in the pattern identified during trial occurred in January 2008,
with the last occurring on February 2.671
The officers observed Floyd and the tenant for about two minutes before
approaching them.672 Sergeant Kelly observed them playing with the door knob, and also saw a
bag on the ground next to Floyd.673 When he approached the men, he saw that they were trying
numerous keys, which was consistent with his belief that they might be burglars, because
burglars sometimes have master keys.674 The basis for the frisk was the belief that Floyd and the
tenant were in the process of committing a violent felony.675
669
See 3/18 Tr. at 181; 3/19 Tr. at 245.
670
See 3/28 Tr. at 1360, 1362. Accord id. at 1404–1406 (Hernandez) (testifying that
many robberies and burglaries happened near the Cross-Bronx and that there was a specific
burglary pattern in private homes in the northern part of the 43rd Precinct that day). See also
DX K13 (mapping out burglary pattern).
671
See 3/28 Tr. at 1411 (Hernandez); DX L4. Officer Hernandez could not confirm
whether he saw the specific burglary pattern identified in DX L4, but testified that he was aware
of patterns of burglaries and robberies in that area on the day he stopped Floyd.
672
See 3/28 Tr. at 1319 (Joyce) (discussing UF-250 form).
673
See id. at 1450 (Kelly).
674
See 3/29 Tr. at 1480.
675
See id. at 1363 (Joyce). See also id. at 1509 (Kelly).
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Officer Joyce filled out a UF-250 in connection with this stop. He checked the
box for Furtive Movements based on the jostling of the doorknob and the keys.676 He also
checked time of day corresponding to criminal activity.677
ii.
Mixed Findings of Fact and Law
Floyd was stopped when the officers told him to stop what he was doing and raise
his hands. The totality of the circumstances established reasonable suspicion to stop Floyd and
his neighbor. The officers observed the men jostling the door knob and trying numerous keys in
the door, and also observed a backpack on the ground. Beach Avenue is near the Cross Bronx
Expressway, which makes it a target for burglary. The officers also had knowledge of a specific
burglary pattern in the area of Beach Avenue. Although the last reported burglary was over
three weeks before Floyd was stopped, the totality of the circumstances just recounted justified
the officers’ belief that the men might be in the process of committing a daytime burglary.
Furthermore, because burglary is often a violent crime, the officers were justified
in promptly telling the men to put their hands up and frisking their outer garments for weapons
before further investigating.678 The stop was also reasonable in duration because Floyd’s ID was
out of state and the basement tenant did not have ID on him. Therefore, the officers were
justified in continuing to investigate the possibility that the men were burglars. However,
Officer Joyce did not testify that he felt anything that might be a weapon or anything that was
676
See 3/28 Tr. at 1327 (Joyce); DX X4 (UF-250 form). Officer Joyce also checked
the box for “evasive, false or inconsistent response to officer’s question,” which he explained
was based on the out-of-state ID, which was inconsistent with Floyd living on Beach Avenue.
See 3/28 Tr. at 1330–1331 (Joyce). This is irrelevant, however, because it relates to events that
occurred after the stop and frisk had already taken place.
677
See 3/28 Tr. at 1333–1334 (Joyce).
678
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 28 (frisk justified where “[t]he [suspects’] actions . . . were
consistent with . . . a daylight robbery — which, it is reasonable to assume, would be likely to
involve the use of weapons”).
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clearly contraband. Therefore, Officer Joyce violated Floyd’s Fourth Amendment rights when
he felt inside his pockets.
d.
Clive Lino — February 24, 2011 Stop
i.
Findings of Fact
On the night of February 24, 2011, Lino was at a party at his mother’s apartment
at 102nd Street and Third Avenue. He left the apartment to take the subway home, wearing a red
leather Pelle Pelle brand jacket and carrying a white plastic grocery bag full of Tupperware
containing leftover food.679
Lino entered the subway at 103rd Street and Lexington Avenue and noticed two
male police officers, since identified as Officer Daniel Leek, who is white, and Officer Edgar
Figueroa, who is Hispanic.680 Lino went down to the uptown platform.681 As an uptown-bound
train was pulling into the station, the officers entered the uptown platform. Lino stepped back on
the platform to let them pass but instead the officers surrounded him.682
Officer Figueroa immediately put his hand in Lino’s right jacket pocket, and Lino
pushed it away while stepping aside. Lino asked what the problem was, to which the officers
responded that he needed to wait with them. Lino missed the train. Lino asked why he was
being stopped and stated his belief that his race was the reason. Officer Leek said, “If you shut
679
See 4/1 Tr. at 1738–1739. Lino’s jacket was red leather, said “Pelle Pelle” on the
front and had no white stripes or numbers on it. Lino testified that it is a popular brand.
680
See id. at 1739 (Lino). On February 24, Officers Leek and Figueroa were
conducting a directed patrol in the subway station at 103rd Street and Lexington Avenue because
it is a high pedestrian traffic, high crime area. See 4/8 Tr. at 2695, 2725 (Leek).
681
See 4/1 Tr. at 1739 (Lino).
682
See id. at 1740.
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the fuck up, we’ll tell you why we stopped you.”683
The officers told Lino to put the bag of food on the platform, which he refused to
do because it was filthy. Officer Figueroa said “just put the [fuck]ing bag down” and reached for
the bag. Lino placed the bag on the bench. The officers asked for ID, which Lino produced.684
Officer Leek asked Lino if he had anything on him that he shouldn’t have and
Lino said no. Officer Leek then said, “Do you mind if we check?”685 While Lino may have
initially consented, he clearly did not agree to be searched and at one point said, “you can’t
search me.”686 Yet Officer Leek patted his waist and front pockets, and Officer Figueroa reached
into his back pockets. When Lino looked back at what Officer Figueroa was doing, Officer
Figueroa asked if Lino had a “fucking problem.” Lino said he did have a problem because the
officer “was in his pockets.”687 He had not yet been told why he had been stopped. Officer Leek
eventually informed Lino that he was being stopped because there were reports of a shooting
suspect wearing a jacket similar to Lino’s.688
After frisking Lino, the officers forced Lino to go upstairs with them without
explaining why. At no point was Lino free to walk away.689 Outside the subway station, Officer
683
See id. at 1741–1742. See also 4/8 Tr. at 2737, 2773 (Leek).
684
See 4/1 Tr. at 1742 (Lino).
685
4/8 Tr. at 2754 (Leek).
686
Id. at 2759 (Figueroa). See also PX 216 (Officer Leek memo book) (stating that
Lino gave permission for frisk when Leek asked him).
687
4/1 Tr. at 1743 (Lino). Accord 4/8 Tr. at 2760 (Figueroa) (testifying that Lino
jerked his body around when he felt Officer Figueroa’s hands on his back pockets, at which
point Officer Figueroa asked if there was a problem).
688
See 4/1 Tr. at 1743 (Lino).
689
See id. at 1745–1746; 4/8 Tr. at 2734 (Leek) (investigative stop was not
completed when the officers took Lino upstairs); id. at 2774 (Figueroa) (same).
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Figueroa stayed with Lino while Officer Leek took Lino’s ID to the police van where his
Sergeant was waiting. Officer Leek attempted, unsuccessfully, to locate the wanted poster
describing the shooting suspect. He did not run Lino’s ID because Lino had not, to Officer
Leek’s knowledge, committed a crime.690 Officer Leek returned and the officers walked Lino
back down to the platform, without his having to pay another fare, and returned his ID.691
Lino never received a ticket or summons. The interaction lasted about twenty
minutes.692 Following the interaction, Lino filed a complaint with the CCRB. The CCRB
complaint was substantiated with respect to the stop and charges were recommended against the
officers. The allegations regarding the search and the officers’ use of rude or obscene language
were unsubstantiated.693
The officers stopped Lino because he matched a description of a homicide suspect
from a wanted poster given to them by their sergeant at the beginning of their tour that day. The
poster stated that the crime occurred on February 10, 2011, two weeks earlier, at 108th Street
and Madison Avenue, two avenues and five blocks away from where Lino was stopped. The
poster described a black male approximately five foot nine to six feet tall and showed a security
690
See 4/8 Tr. at 2704–2706, 2735–2736 (Leek). Sergeant Shirvis never exited the
van, and did not confirm whether Lino was the suspect.
691
See 4/1 Tr. at 1746–1747 (Lino). Lino then pulled out his cell phone and Officer
Leek said “Oh, no, you’re not taking no fucking pictures of me.” Id. at 1748. Lino asked
Officer Figueroa for his information, and Officer Figueroa mumbled it. When Lino asked for his
information again, Officer Figueroa said, “I already gave it to you, if you didn’t get it the first
time too bad.” Id.
692
See id. Accord 4/8 Tr. at 2706 (Leek).
693
See PX 194. Lino received no additional follow up. See 4/1 Tr. at 1748–1749
(Lino). Officer Leek received a letter notifying him that the charges against him had been
substantiated but received no reprimand or further training. See 4/8 Tr. at 2708 (Leek). Officer
Figueroa was put on monitoring because it was the third CCRB complaint filed against him and
the CCRB recommended that charges be brought. See id. at 2761 (Figueroa).
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photo of the suspect leaving the shooting wearing a red leather Pelle Pelle jacket, and two stock
photos of such a jacket.694 From the photo, Officer Leek discerned the suspect’s height, weight,
and an age range of eighteen to thirty.695
Officer Leek believed that Lino’s jacket, height and complexion matched the
crime scene photo. In addition, he noticed that the jacket was loose-fitting and bulky.696 Officer
Leek frisked Lino because he matched the description of a murder suspect, had a bulky jacket
that could conceal a weapon, and was in a high crime area.697
ii.
Mixed Findings of Fact and Law
Lino was stopped when the officers surrounded him on the subway platform.
Although the murder was two weeks old, the distinctiveness of the red leather Pelle Pelle jacket,
along with the three-inch height range — which was verifiable from the suspect photo — and
the suspect’s race, “afford[ed] a sufficient basis for ‘selective investigative procedures’ vis-a-vis
a universe made up of all [potential suspects] of the crime in question.”698 It was reasonable to
assume that the murder suspect might have lived in the neighborhood and remained or returned
within an eight-block radius.
Murder is a violent crime that would justify a frisk. Although the crime was two
weeks old, it was reasonable to believe that the suspect in a shooting might still be armed and, if
694
See PX 187; 4/8 Tr. at 2698–2699, 2722 (Leek).
695
See 4/8 Tr. at 2723 (Leek).
696
See id. at 2726–2727. Accord id. at 2756 (Figueroa).
697
See id. at 2731–2732 (Leek).
698
4 LA FAVE § 9.5(h) (quotations and citations ommitted). See also U.S. v. Marxen,
410 F.3d 326, 330 (6th Cir. 2005) (“The mere passage of time [– eleven days –], however, does
not negate the lawfulness of the stop under the circumstances presented.”).
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approached and questioned about the murder, would pose a danger to the officers.699 Because
the jacket was loose and a train was approaching, the officers could not readily verify whether
Lino was the right person or whether he was armed before stopping and frisking him.
Although both the stop and the frisk were justified at their inception, the frisk was
not “reasonably related in scope to the justification for [its] initiation.”700 Officer Figueroa
immediately put his hands in Lino’s pockets without Lino’s consent, and the officers later
conducted a search, to which they acknowledge Lino did not consent. The frisk, particularly in
combination with the abusive manner in which the stop was conducted, violated Lino’s Fourth
Amendment rights.
e.
Deon Dennis
i.
Findings of Fact
Deon Dennis was raised in Harlem and resides in South Carolina, but visits New
York frequently.701 Around 8:00 p.m. on January 12, 2008, Dennis arrived at the apartment of
his then-girlfriend at 122nd Street and Seventh Avenue to help set up for her birthday party,
which was scheduled to begin at 11:00 p.m.702 While setting up he drank a beer and some
brandy in a plastic cup.703 Later, Dennis went to smoke a cigarette on the sidewalk outside the
building on Seventh Avenue, while his girlfriend went to the store. The street was empty.
Dennis was wearing a jacket and jeans, and had his cell phone, keys, wallet and cigarettes in his
699
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (“The officer need not be absolutely certain that the
individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would
be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.”).
700
Id. at 29 (citations omitted).
701
See 3/19 Tr. at 263 (D. Dennis).
702
See id. at 278–279.
703
See id. at 266.
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pocket.704
After Dennis finished his cigarette, an NYPD van pulled up and two uniformed
officers, Angelica Salmeron and Luis Pichardo, both of whom are Hispanic, approached
Dennis.705 Dennis was not free to leave.706 Officer Salmeron pointed to a cup several feet to the
right of Dennis and asked if it was his cup. Dennis said it was not. Officer Pichardo asked if
Dennis had been drinking, and Dennis said he had been drinking earlier.707 The officers claim
that Dennis had a cup in his hands and was drinking from it when they approached him, and that
there was a bottle of Hennessy on the sidewalk.708
The officers asked Dennis for ID and he produced his driver’s license from the
wallet in his pocket. Officer Salmeron took Dennis’s ID to the van while Officer Pichardo
stayed and searched Dennis’s jacket and pants pockets without consent. During the search,
Dennis was standing with his wallet in his hand and his hands raised at chest level.709
Officer Salmeron returned from the van having discovered an active warrant
against Dennis. The officers then handcuffed Dennis and put him in the back of the van based
on the open container violation and the active warrant.710 Dennis’s girlfriend returned and saw
704
See id. at 268, 286.
705
The officers were patrolling Seventh Avenue that night on assignment to enforce
“quality of life” offenses. See 3/22 Tr. at 852 (Salmeron).
706
See 4/27 Tr. at 1270 (Pichardo).
707
See 3/19 Tr. at 269–272 (D. Dennis).
708
See 3/22 Tr. at 853 (Salmeron). The officers also claim that when they asked
what he was doing Dennis replied that he was drinking some Hennessy, that it was a Saturday
night and his girlfriend’s birthday and that they were going out later. The officers claim that
there was a bottle of Hennessy on the sidewalk next to Dennis. See id.
709
See 3/19 Tr. at 272–274 (D. Dennis).
710
See 3/22 Tr. at 854–855, 872 (Salmeron); 3/27 Tr. at 1272 (Pichardo) (“So instead
of giving him a summons you arrested him, correct? A. Yes[.]”).
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Dennis handcuffed.711 No summons was issued and Dennis was never prosecuted for drinking in
public. No alcohol was vouchered or put in evidence.712 Neither officer recorded the incident in
his or her memo book.713 Dennis’s girlfriend filed a CCRB complaint about Dennis’s arrest, and
Dennis spoke with a CCRB officer about the incident.714 Dennis believes that he was stopped
because of his race, because “only blacks and Hispanics get stopped in Harlem.”715
ii.
Mixed Findings of Fact and Law
Based on the conflicting testimony about what the officers saw when they
approached Dennis, and because plaintiffs bear the burden of proof, I cannot find by a
preponderance of the evidence that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion that Dennis was
violating New York’s open container law.716 However, even if the officers saw Dennis drinking
from a plastic cup, they would only have had reasonable suspicion to approach him and
investigate further.717 They did not have reasonable suspicion to frisk or search Dennis.
The officers acknowledge that when they took Dennis’s ID to the van, they
intended to issue him a summons, not to arrest him. Even assuming the officers were justified in
issuing Dennis a summons for violating open container laws, and even with knowledge of an
711
See 3/19 Tr. at 274–275 (D. Dennis).
712
See 3/27 Tr. at 1272–1273 (Pichardo); 3/19 Tr. at 275–276 (D. Dennis).
713
See 3/28 Tr. at 1286 (Pichardo).
714
See 3/19 Tr. at 276–277 (D. Dennis)
715
Id. at 295.
716
I do not, however, find that the officers had probable cause to arrest Dennis when
they approached him.
717
See People v. Mack, 853 N.Y.S.2d 764, 765 (4th Dep’t 2008) (holding that the
viewing of three men, one of whom was drinking from a large bottle wrapped in a brown paper
bag, established reasonable suspicion of violation of the open container ordinance).
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active warrant, there was no basis for Officer Pichardo to frisk, let alone search, Dennis.718 The
authority to conduct a protective frisk when issuing a summons for a violation is limited to
occasions where officers have reason to believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous.719
Absent any indication that Dennis posed a threat to the officers’ safety, there was no basis to
conduct a frisk or search prior to arresting Dennis. Officer Pichardo’s search violated Dennis’s
Fourth Amendment rights.720
3.
Failure of Proof
a.
John Doe Stops of Nicholas Peart in Spring 2008 and February
2010 and David Ourlicht in February and June 2008
In the John Doe stops discussed below, plaintiffs’ testimony did not provide
sufficiently detailed credible information for me to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the stop and, in some cases, frisk, lacked reasonable suspicion.721 Nicholas Peart testified that he
was stopped and frisked in the Spring of 2008 in Brooklyn, based on a burglary pattern.
718
See People v. Muhammad, 502 N.Y.S.2d 859, 860 (4th Dep’t 1986) (“Even
assuming, however, that defendant carried an open beer bottle or was drinking beer, the officer
would not have been authorized to frisk or search defendant for a suspected violation of an
ordinance.”) (citations omitted).
719
See, e.g., People v. King, 476 N.Y.S.2d 847, 849 (1st Dep’t 1984) (officer has
authority to conduct a search for safety purposes in circumstances that reveal only the
commission of a violation where it was reasonable for an arresting officer to believe that the
suspect might resist the officers efforts to arrest him or issue a summons to him).
720
Compare Mack, 853 N.Y.S.2d at 765 (holding, in the context of a stop for an
open container violation, that, “[t]he disproportionately frightened reaction of defendant upon
seeing the [officers], his refusal to remove his hand from his pocket despite the repeated
demands of [the officer], his conduct in walking toward that officer with his hand in his pocket,
and the fact that the area in which the incident occurred was one in which violent crimes and
shootings were common provided the officers with reasonable suspicion [] that defendant posed
a threat to their safety”).
721
I find that the NYPD’a attempts to identify the officers involved in the stops of
Ourlicht and Peart were sufficient. See 4/30 Tr. at 5471–5476 (Stipulation) (discussing Ourlicht
stops); id. at 5477–5480 (discussing Peart stops). Therefore, no adverse inference against the
defendant is warranted.
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Although the existence of a burglary pattern alone would not provide reasonable suspicion, I
cannot conclude that there was not reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk Peart without knowing
what additional information the officers had.722 Peart also testified that, in September of 2010,
he was stopped and frisked at 144th Street, between Seventh and Eighth Avenues. Because I
have no information about the basis for this stop, I cannot find that the stop and frisk lacked
reasonable suspicion.723
David Ourlicht testified that on February 21, 2008, he and a friend were stopped
and frisked near the subway station at 168th Street in the Bronx.724 I do not fully credit
Ourlicht’s version of the events, and without the officers’ version of what occurred, I cannot find
that Ourlicht’s Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. Ourlicht also testified
that in June 2008, he was stopped and frisked at an apartment complex at 115th Street and Park
Avenue based on reports of a gun in the area.725 Without information about the officers’
knowledge about the gun in the area, I cannot find that the stop and frisk lacked reasonable
suspicion.
b.
Kristianna Acevedo Stop
Kristianna Acevedo is a thirty-year-old Hispanic female resident of Staten Island
and works as a recruiter of home health aides. In 2007 she lived in Queens.726 On Tuesday,
May 29, 2007, Acevedo was walking on 43rd Street in a desolate area when she noticed two
722
See 3/19 Tr. at 327–336 (Peart).
723
See id. at 337–342.
724
See 4/19 Tr. at 4193–4203 (Ourlicht).
725
See id. 4204–4209, 4265.
726
See 4/1 Tr. at 1693–1694 (Acevedo).
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men, since identified as Detectives Louis DeMarco and Damian Vizcarrondo, in a minivan.727
Detective DeMarco spoke to Acevedo to obtain information about drug activity.728 Acevedo did
not believe the men were police, so she kept walking and then began to run.729
Acevedo stopped at a UPS truck parked up the block.730 The van reversed and
stopped, and three officers — Detectives DeMarco, Vizcarrondo, and a female officer, Detective
Michele Hawkins — got out, approached Acevedo, and identified themselves as police.731 The
officers wanted to assure Acevedo that she was not in danger because there had been recent
media reports of individuals impersonating police officers.732 The detectives did not stop
Acevedo based on reasonable suspicion.733 After a brief exchange, the officers left.
Acevedo called 911 to report what happened and filed a CCRB complaint.734 The
CCRB substantiated the charges that the detectives abused their authority by stopping Acevedo,
and failing to record the incident in their memo books. As discipline, the officers were docked
one vacation day. Detective DeMarco was exonerated of the charges relating to his questioning
727
See id. at 1695–1696, 1698.
728
See 4/8 Tr. at 2659, 2664, 2684 (DeMarco).
729
See 4/29 Tr. at 5198 (Vizcarrondo).
730
See id. at 5199.
731
4/1 Tr. at 1697–1698 (Acevedo); 4/30 Tr. at 5458 (Hawkins). All three detectives
were in plainclothes. See 4/1 Tr. at 1698–1699 (Acevedo).
732
See 4/8 Tr. at 2685 (DeMarco); 4/29 Tr. at 5199 (Vizcarrondo); 4/30 Tr. at 5456
(Hawkins).
733
See, e.g., 4/8 Tr. at 2659 (DeMarco); 4/30 Tr. at 5468 (Hawkins) (explaining that
she did not record the stop in her memo book because she did not believe that the interaction
ever rose to the level of a stop — rather, she perceived it to be a simple request for information).
734
See 4/1 Tr. at 1704–1705 (Acevedo).
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of Acevedo and the other charges were unsubstantiated.735
Acevedo clearly felt free to leave when the detectives first spoke to her because
she continued walking and eventually ran.736 What occurred after the detectives exited the van is
unclear. Acevedo’s version of the events is irreconcilable with the officers’ testimony.
Although the CCRB found that the officers stopped Acevedo, I did not find her story sufficiently
credible to conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that a forcible stop or frisk occurred in
violation of her Fourth Amendment rights.737
c.
Clive Lino — August 3, 2008
Lino testified about an August 3, 2008 interaction with Officers Jose Colon and
Mohamed Hassan in the lobby of his apartment, a NYCHA building at 102nd Street and Third
Avenue.738 Lino’s testimony about what occurred is incompatible with the officers’ testimony.739
Because I credit the officers’ testimony, I do not find that Lino’s Fourth or Fourteenth
Amendment rights were violated by this interaction.
V.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A.
The City Is Liable for Violations of Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment Rights
735
See PX 5.
736
In fact, Acevedo did not believe the officers were police at all, so she cannot have
been stopped based on their show of authority, and the officers did not use force.
737
I also do not find that race played any role in this event. I note, moreover, that this
stop is anomalous insofar as the officers do not assert that they possessed reasonable suspicion of
any crime and never intended to conduct a stop at all. Thus, it is of limited value in assessing the
central claims at issue in this case.
738
See 4/1 Tr. at 1749–1750 (Lino).
739
Lino testified that Officer Hassan received a phone call during the stop, and
suggested that his ringtone, which was a rap song, would calm Lino down. See 4/1 Tr. at
1749–1750 (Lino). Officers Hassan and Colon deny that this ever occurred. See 4/18 Tr. at
4018 (Hassan); see also id. at 4024–4025 (Colon).
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Plaintiffs established the City’s liability for the NYPD’s violation of their Fourth
Amendment rights under two theories, either of which is adequate under Monell: first, plaintiffs
showed that senior officials in the City and at the NYPD were deliberately indifferent to officers
conducting unconstitutional stops and frisks; and second, plaintiffs showed that practices
resulting in unconstitutional stops and frisks were sufficiently widespread that they had the force
of law.
1.
Deliberate Indifference
There is no dispute that the primary concern of a police department can and
should be combating crime. At the same time, section 1983 limits the lack of concern that any
municipal agency may show toward constitutional violations by its employees. The NYPD’s
senior officials have violated section 1983 through their deliberate indifference to
unconstitutional stops, frisks, and searches. They have received both actual and constructive
notice since at least 1999 of widespread Fourth Amendment violations occurring as a result of
the NYPD’s stop and frisk practices. Despite this notice, they deliberately maintained and even
escalated policies and practices that predictably resulted in even more widespread Fourth
Amendment violations.740 Moreover, while the NYPD is an acknowledged leader in the use of
data collection and analysis to improve the effectiveness of policing, it has hindered the
collection of accurate data concerning the constitutionality of its stops, and made no effective
use of the limited data that is available. The NYPD has repeatedly turned a blind eye to clear
evidence of unconstitutional stops and frisks.
Further evidence of deliberate indifference is found in the City’s current positions
as expressed at trial. The City continues to argue that no plaintiff or class member was subjected
to an unconstitutional stop or frisk — not Downs, Almonor, McDonald, Sindayiganza, or any of
740
These policies and practices are summarized supra Part IV.C.
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the other plaintiffs.741 The City defends Officer Dang’s stops in the third quarter of 2009 as
unproblematic,742 despite the fact that he stopped 120 black people and 0 white people during
that period. Officer Dang relied on a routine set of vague and unreliable stop justifications, and
in only 5.5% of his stops made an arrest or summons.743 The City also defends the contents of
the tape recordings quoted above, arguing that they “provide no basis whatsoever from which
any reasonable inference can be drawn that . . . pressure for activity existed that drove officers to
make unconstitutional stops.”744 In addition, the City recognizes the impossibility of tracking
unconstitutional stops through UF-250s,745 but disclaims the need to develop a better, more
adequate system of documentation and review.746 Indeed, the City continues to believe that there
is no need to alter the status quo.747 Confronted with the persuasive statistical evidence that stops
frequently lack reasonable suspicion, the City argues that even if “18% . . . of the 4.43 million
stops” were legally unjustified, that “is not necessarily a widespread pattern,” and would not
require a remedy.748
Throughout the class period, the need for better supervision, monitoring, training,
741
See Def. Mem. at 2–4.
742
See Def. Findings ¶¶ 50–52.
743
See DX L14.
744
Def. Mem. at 11. Accord Def. Findings ¶ 60 (“The recordings made by P.O.s
Polanco and Serrano support” the conclusion that “[f]rom the Chief of Patrol down to officers
straight out of the Police Academy, the message is clear: address conditions, not ‘numbers for
numbers[’] sake.’”).
745
See Def. Mem. at 7.
746
See id. at 12 (presenting plaintiffs’ criticisms of the NYPD’s training,
supervision, monitoring, and discipline as baseless); id. at 24 (“Plaintiffs failed to prove that the
NYPD systems already in place . . . might require more than minor adjustments . . . .”).
747
See id. at 24–25.
748
Id. at 8.
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and discipline to protect against constitutional violations was obvious, but senior officials at the
NYPD “‘fail[ed] to make meaningful efforts to address the risk of harm to plaintiffs.’”749 Even if
“deliberate indifference” were not the standard for liability, it would still perfectly describe the
attitude of senior officials at the NYPD toward the risk of officers conducting stops, frisks, and
searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
2.
Widespread Practice
Despite the NYPD’s deliberate failure to collect accurate data regarding stops that
violate the Fourth Amendment, there is sufficient evidence of such stops to establish Monell
liability based on “practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of
law.”750 As described above, the likely number of stops lacking reasonable suspicion was far
higher than the roughly 200,000 “apparently unjustified” stops identified by Dr. Fagan. In
particular, this conclusion is supported by the number of UF-250s that do not identify a
suspected crime (36% of all forms in 2009), the problems inherent in the two most commonly
checked stop factors (Furtive Movements and High Crime Area), and the fact that only 6% of all
stops result in an arrest for any crime.751 The NYPD’s practice of making stops that lack
individualized reasonable suspicion has been so pervasive and persistent as to become not only a
part of the NYPD’s standard operating procedure, but a fact of daily life in some New York City
neighborhoods.
749
Cash, 654 F.3d at 334 (quoting Reynolds, 506 F.3d at 192).
750
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1359.
751
I was not persuaded, however, by plaintiffs’ argument that “stopping people at
random would more frequently uncover criminal activity,” based on the 9% arrest rate for the
suspicionless roadblocks in Edmond, 531 U.S. at 32. Pl. Mem. at 2. There may be a higher
likelihood of finding contraband in a randomly stopped vehicle than on the person of a randomly
stopped pedestrian. In addition, the police in Edmond, unlike the NYPD in this case, used
narcotics-detection dogs. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 35.
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Likewise, the pervasiveness of unconstitutional frisks was established by the
uncontested fact that over half of all people stopped are frisked, while only 1.5% of frisks reveal
a weapon, as well as the institutional evidence of inaccurate training regarding when to frisk,
testimony by officers who did not know the constitutional standard for a frisk, and anecdotal
evidence of routine unconstitutional frisks in this case. “The security of one’s privacy against
arbitrary intrusion by the police — which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment — is basic to a
free society.”752 Far too many people in New York City have been deprived of this basic
freedom far too often.
B.
The City Is Liable for Violations of Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment
Rights
Plaintiffs have established the City’s liability for the NYPD’s violation of
plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights under two theories, either of which is adequate under
Monell. First, plaintiffs showed that the City, through the NYPD, has a policy of indirect racial
profiling based on local criminal suspect data. Second, plaintiffs showed that senior officials in
the City and at the NYPD have been deliberately indifferent to the intentionally discriminatory
application of stop and frisk at the managerial and officer levels.
1.
Policy of Indirect Racial Profiling
Throughout this litigation the City has acknowledged and defended the NYPD’s
policy of conducting stops based in part on criminal suspect data, of which race is a primary
factor. The NYPD implements this policy by emphasizing to officers the importance of stopping
“the right people.” In practice, officers are directed, sometimes expressly, to target certain
racially defined groups for stops.
“The Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on
752
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
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considerations such as race.”753 The Second Circuit has admonished that courts should “not
condone racially motivated police behavior” and must “take seriously an allegation of racial
profiling.”754 Racial profiling constitutes intentional discrimination in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause if it involves any of the following: an express classification based on race that
does not survive strict scrutiny;755 the application of facially neutral criminal laws or law
enforcement policies “in an intentionally discriminatory manner;”756 or a facially neutral policy
that has an adverse effect and was motivated by discriminatory animus.757 The City’s policy of
targeting “the right people” for stops clearly violates the Equal Protection Clause under the
second method of proof, and, insofar as the use of race is explicit, the first.
a.
Intentionally Discriminatory Application of a Facially Neutral
Policy
In order to establish an equal protection violation based on an intentionally
discriminatory application of a facially neutral policy, plaintiffs “must prove that the defendants’
actions had a discriminatory effect and were motivated by a discriminatory purpose.”758 In this
753
Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
754
United States v. Davis, 11 Fed. App’x 16, 18 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing United States
v. Fares, 978 F.2d 52, 59 (2d Cir. 1992)). Accord, e.g., Chavez, 251 F.3d at 635 (noting that the
use of “impermissible racial classifications in determining whom to stop, detain, and search”
violates the Equal Protection Clause).
755
See Melendres v. Arpaio, No. 07 Civ. 02513, 2013 WL 2297173, at *67–68 (D.
Ariz. May 24, 2013).
756
Brown, 221 F.3d at 337 (citing Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373–74). See also Whren,
517 U.S. at 813 (“[T]he constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory
application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause.”).
757
See Brown, 221 F.3d at 337.
758
Chavez, 251 F.3d at 635–36. In some contexts, discriminatory effect may be
presumed based on proof of discriminatory intent. See Doe v. Village of Mamaroneck, 462 F.
Supp. 2d 520, 543 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Once racially discriminatory intent infects the application
of a neutral law or policy, the group that is singled out for discriminatory treatment is no longer
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case, plaintiffs’ statistical evidence of racial disparities in stops is sufficient to show a
discriminatory effect.759 In particular, plaintiffs showed that: (1) the NYPD carries out more
stops where there are more black and Hispanic residents, even when other relevant variables are
held constant; (2) NYPD officers are more likely to stop blacks and Hispanics than whites within
precincts and census tracts, even after controlling for other relevant variables; (3) NYPD officers
are more likely to use force against blacks and Hispanics than whites, after controlling for other
relevant variables; and (4) NYPD officers stop blacks and Hispanics with less justification than
whites.760 In addition to their statistical evidence of a racially disproportionate impact, plaintiffs
provided significant anecdotal evidence, such as the stark racial disparities in the UF-250s
prepared by Officers Dang and Gonzalez, and the fact that Officer French chose to stop
McDonald, rather than similarly situated non-blacks nearby, based in part on generalized crime
complaints about black males.
To establish discriminatory intent, plaintiffs must show that those responsible for
the profiling did so “at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects
similarly situated to any other in the eyes of the law, so adverse effects can be presumed.”). The
terms “discriminatory purpose” and “discriminatory intent” are interchangeable.
759
See supra Parts IV.A and IV.B. See also Chavez, 251 F.3d at 638 (noting that the
Supreme Court has “repeatedly relied on statistics” to prove discriminatory effect, citing, for
example, Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 227 (1985), and concluding that the Supreme
Court in Armstrong rejected statistical evidence of discriminatory effect “not because plaintiffs
can never use statistics to prove discriminatory effect, but because the particular statistics
presented to the Court did not address the relevant issue,” id. at 639). As the discussion of
benchmarking in Part IV.B makes clear, this Opinion assumes — unlike the presumption
criticized in Armstrong — that there are racial disparities in crime participation rates.
760
Evidence of a racial disparity in stop justifications included the following: (a) the
odds of a stop resulting in any further enforcement action are lower if the person stopped is black
than if the person stopped is white; (b) stops of blacks and Hispanics are less likely to result in
the seizure of a weapon than stops of whites; (c) officers are more likely to check Furtive
Movements as the basis for stopping blacks and Hispanics than for whites; and (d) the greater
the black population in a precinct, the less likely that a stop will result in a sanction. See
generally supra Part IV.A–B.
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upon” the profiled racial groups.761 Plaintiffs are not required to prove that race was the sole,
predominant, or determinative factor in a police enforcement action.762 Nor must the
discrimination be based on “ill will, enmity, or hostility.”763
The NYPD has directed officers to target young black and Hispanic men because
these groups are heavily represented in criminal suspect data — the reliability of which is
questionable764 — in those areas where the NYPD carries out most of its stops. Under the
NYPD’s policy, targeting the “right people” means stopping people in part because of their race.
Together with Commissioner Kelly’s statement that the NYPD focuses stop and frisks on young
blacks and Hispanics in order to instill in them a fear of being stopped, and other explicit
references to race discussed in the next section, there is a sufficient basis for inferring
761
Paterson, 594 F.3d at 163 (quoting Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279 (citation and footnote
omitted)) (some quotation marks omitted).
762
Judge G. Murray Snow of the District of Arizona provides a useful summary:
A government policy is presumed to be racially discriminatory when it is
“based in part on reports that referred to explicit racial characteristics.”
Flores v. Pierce, 617 F.2d 1386, 1389 (9th Cir. 1980) (emphasis added)
(Kennedy, J.). In Grutter [v. Bollinger], the Supreme Court applied strict
scrutiny to a policy which involved race as one factor among many even
though plaintiff’s expert conceded that “race is not the predominant factor”
in the policy. 539 U.S. [306, 320 (2003)]; see also Arlington Heights, 429
U.S. at 263 (subjecting government action to equal protection review on
“proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the
decision”).
Melendres, 2013 WL 2297173, at *69 (holding that the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office
violated the Equal Protection Clause through its use of Hispanic ancestry or race as a factor in
forming reasonable suspicion of violating immigration laws, despite express policy against racial
profiling).
763
Ferrill v. Parker Grp., Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 473 & n.7 (11th Cir. 1999).
764
The NYPD’s use of local crime suspect data to target racially defined groups for
stops is not only a form of racial profiling, it is also a deeply flawed way of identifying the
criminal population. See supra Part IV.B.3.b.
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discriminatory intent.765
The fact that the targeted racial groups were identified based on crime victim
complaints does not eliminate the discriminatory intent. Just as it would be impermissible for a
public housing agency to adopt a facially race-neutral policy of disfavoring applications from
any group that is disproportionately subject to tenant complaints, and then apply this policy to
disfavor applications from a racially defined group, so it is impermissible for a police
department to target its general enforcement practices against racially defined groups based on
crime suspect data.
b.
Express Classification
Plaintiffs have readily established that the NYPD implements its policies
regarding stop and frisk in a manner that intentionally discriminates based on race. While it is a
closer call, I also conclude that the use of race is sufficiently integral to the policy of targeting
“the right people” that the policy depends on express racial classifications. When an officer is
directed to target “male blacks 14 to 21” for stops in general based on local crime suspect data
— a practice that the City has defended throughout this litigation — the reference to “blacks” is
an express racial classification subject to strict scrutiny.766 Chief Esposito’s concession that the
NYPD has targeted young blacks and Hispanics for stops confirms that explicit references to
765
Plaintiffs have presented other circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent,
such as the NYPD’s longstanding indifference to evidence of racial discrimination in stops,
discussed at greater length below. See infra Part V.B.2 (deliberate indifference); Pl. Mem. at
20–23.
766
“It is well established that when the government distributes burdens or benefits on
the basis of individual racial classifications, that action is reviewed under strict scrutiny.”
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007). In order to
satisfy strict scrutiny, a racial classification must be “‘narrowly tailored’ to achieve a
‘compelling’ government interest.” Id. (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227).
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race are not limited to a few rogue supervisors.767 The City has not attempted to defend — nor
could it defend — the proposition that the targeting of young black males or any other racially
defined group for stops is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.
Because the use of express racial classifications in the City’s policy of indirect racial profiling
cannot withstand strict scrutiny, the policy violates the Equal Protection Clause.768
This policy far exceeds the permissible use of race in stopping suspects as set
forth in Brown v. City of Oneonta, New York. There, the Second Circuit held that when the
police carry out stops as part of a “search[] for a particular perpetrator,” the use of racial
information from the victim’s description of the suspect is not an express racial classification
subject to strict scrutiny.769 The court explained that the Oneonta police department’s “policy
767
See 4/10 Tr. at 3034 (Chief Esposito acknowledging that “the right people” are
young black and Hispanic youths 14 to 20 for whom there is reasonable suspicion); id. at
3027–3029 (Chief Esposito acknowledging that stops are based on “who is doing th[e]
shootings,” specifically “young men of color in their late teens, early 20s”). Again, I note that
this targeting is based on the inaccurate assumption that the characteristics of the criminal
population can be applied to the non-criminal population. The policy assumes that all members
of a racially defined group are “the right people” to target for stops because some members of
that group committed crimes.
768
To be sure, the policy’s use of racial classifications only becomes express at the
managerial level, when commanders and supervisors acting in accordance with the policy
instruct officers to target racially defined groups for stops. I note, however, that four judges of
the Second Circuit, including now-Associate Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor,
concluded that even the use of race in Brown — where the police attempted to stop every black
person in Oneonta as part of a search for a suspect described as a young black male with a cut on
his hand — constituted an express racial classification requiring strict scrutiny. See Brown v.
City of Oneonta, New York, 235 F.3d 769, 779–83 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing in banc). Accord In re Cincinnati Policing, 209 F.R.D. 395, 401 (S.D. Ohio
2002) (noting that “[i]t is difficult to comprehend how the use of race in routine policing — for
example, in the description of a suspect when the police are not in hot pursuit — could satisfy”
strict scrutiny).
769
Brown, 221 F.3d at 338. The Second Circuit emphasized the narrowness of its
holding:
While we . . . believe that the conduct of the police in the circumstances
presented here did not constitute a violation of the equal protection rights of
186
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Filed 08/12/13 Page 190 of 198
was to investigate crimes by interviewing the victim, getting a description of the assailant, and
seeking out persons who matched that description” and, as such, “was race-neutral on its
face.”770
The NYPD’s policy of targeting “the right people” for stops, by contrast, is not
directed toward the identification of a specific perpetrator.771 Rather, it is a policy of targeting
expressly identified racial groups for stops in general. There is no dispute that it would violate
equal protection for a police department to adopt an express policy of targeting members of one
race for stops or other enforcement activities — such as an express policy of only pulling over
speeding drivers who are Hispanic. Similarly, the following hypothetical police department
policy would surely be subject to strict scrutiny, despite its failure to mention any specific race at
the outset: “No one is to be stopped except the members of whatever race participated at the
highest rate in violent crime during the previous month, based on suspect descriptions.” Such a
policy would be especially deserving of strict scrutiny if its drafters knew that the same race
would be targeted every month, and managers implementing the policy were responsible for
expressly directing officers to stop members of that race. The NYPD’s policy of indirect racial
the plaintiffs, we do not establish any rule that would govern circumstances
giving rise to liability that are not present in this case. Any such rule will
have to wait for the appropriate case.
Id. at 339. As already noted, the Second Circuit has subsequently reiterated that it is concerned
about allegations of racial profiling. See Davis, 11 Fed. App’x at 18.
770
Brown, 221 F.3d at 337.
771
The Second Circuit specifically distinguished the facts of Brown from the type of
policy at issue here, stating: “Plaintiffs do not allege that . . . the police used an established
profile of violent criminals to determine that the suspect must have been black. Nor do they
allege that the defendant law enforcement agencies have a regular policy based upon racial
stereotypes that all black Oneonta residents be questioned whenever a violent crime is reported.”
Id. Indeed, Brown may be strictly limited to its facts — the use of race in the search for a
particular suspect in a particular crime who was identified in part by his race.
187
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Filed 08/12/13 Page 191 of 198
profiling is closer to this hypothetical policy than it is to the race-neutral policy in Brown.
c.
Conclusion
Whether through the use of a facially neutral policy applied in a discriminatory
manner, or through express racial profiling, targeting young black and Hispanic men for stops
based on the alleged criminal conduct of other young black or Hispanic men violates bedrock
principles of equality. Two young men in the 81st Precinct who are similarly situated in every
way, except that one is black and the other white, are similarly situated for the purposes of equal
protection and must be treated alike. Brown establishes the common-sense principle that if a
description of a specific criminal suspect includes the fact that the suspect is black, then the
police need not focus equal attention on individuals of other races in pursuit of that suspect. But
Brown specifically rejects the use of racial profiling as a basis for enforcement activity. The
Equal Protection Clause does not sanction treating similarly situated members of different racial
groups differently based on racial disparities in crime data. Indeed, such treatment would
eviscerate the core guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause. If equal protection means
anything, it means that individuals may not be punished or rewarded based on the government’s
views regarding their racial group, regardless of the source of those views.772
772
Finally, the City argues, erroneously, that “plaintiffs failed to prove individual
equal protection claims against known or unknown NYPD officers by proving discriminatory
purpose against and discriminatory effect upon at least one of the named plaintiffs.” Def. Mem.
at 18 (emphasis added). Such proof is unnecessary. Even if named plaintiffs are unable to prove
their claims at trial, the claims of an unnamed member of the class is sufficient for the purposes
of Article III standing and may serve as a basis for liability. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,
402 (1975) (“The controversy [required by Article III] may exist . . . between a named defendant
and a member of the class represented by the named plaintiff, even though the claim of the
named plaintiff has become moot.”); Whitlock v. Johnson, 153 F.3d 380, 384 & n.1 (7th Cir.
1998) (noting that “[t]he reasoning of Sosna . . . applies with equal force” whether named
plaintiffs’ claims are terminated based on mootness or a failure on the merits); Melendres, 2013
WL 2297173, at *59 (“[W]hen the claims of named plaintiffs are not proven at trial, unnamed
class members may be awarded relief so long as a ‘controversy’ still exists between the unnamed
class members and the defendants.”). As discussed above, Officer French treated McDonald, an
unnamed class member, differently than the similarly situated whites or Asians leaving the
188
Case 1:08-cv-01034-SAS-HBP Document 373
2.
Filed 08/12/13 Page 192 of 198
Deliberate Indifference
In a case alleging that a municipality bears Monell liability based on senior
officials’ deliberate indifference to equal protection violations by subordinates, it is not
necessary for plaintiffs to provide direct evidence that the senior officials were motivated by a
discriminatory purpose. Rather, it is sufficient if plaintiffs show that: (1) subordinates followed
a course of action in part because of its adverse effects on an identifiable group, and (2) senior
officials were deliberately indifferent to those adverse effects in such a way that a reasonable
inference can be drawn that those officials intended those adverse effects to occur.773
Plaintiffs in this case did provide direct evidence of discriminatory intent, as
discussed above. But plaintiffs also showed that senior officials in the City and at the NYPD
have been deliberately indifferent to the discriminatory application of stop and frisk at the
managerial and officer level such that a reasonable inference of discriminatory intent can be
drawn. Despite frequent and ongoing notice of troubling racial disparities in stops,774 the NYPD
bowling alley nearby, and Officer French stopped McDonald in part because of his race, as a
result of the NYPD’s policy of indirect racial profiling. See supra Part IV.C.3 (McDonald’s stop
as illustration of indirect racial profiling policy).
773
See Cash, 654 F.3d at 334. See also DiStiso v. Cook, 691 F.3d 226, 241 (2d Cir.
2012) (noting that an equal protection claim against school officials can be based on their
deliberate indifference to student-on-student racial harassment, even in the absence of direct
proof of the officials’ discriminatory intent, provided that the evidence of their “clearly
unreasonable” response to “actually known” circumstances “give[s] rise to a reasonable
inference that [the officials] intended for the harassment to occur”).
774
Although the following sources lie outside the trial record and therefore play no
role in my decision, I observe for the public record that notice of racial bias in NYPD stops has
continued since the close of discovery. For example, the Human Rights Committee of the
United Nations recently asked the United States to “provide information on steps taken to
address discriminatory and unlawful use of ‘stop and frisk’ practices by officers of the New
York Police Department,” as part of the Committee’s preparation of the fourth periodic report on
U.S. compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ratified by the
United States in 1992. UN Human Rights Committee, List of issues in relation to the fourth
periodic report of the United States of America (CCPR/C/USA/4 and Corr. 1), adopted by the
Committee at its 107th session (11-28 March 2013) (4/29/13). No other police department is
189
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Filed 08/12/13 Page 193 of 198
has long shown its lack of concern for racial profiling through the failure of NYPD officials and
managers to discuss racial profiling among themselves or at Compstat meetings, and through the
numerous failures of supervision, monitoring, training, and discipline discussed above.775 In
addition, senior NYPD officials such as Deputy Commissioner Farrell have adopted an attitude
of willful blindness toward statistical evidence of racial disparities in stops and stop outcomes.776
mentioned. See id.
In addition, as has been widely reported, a teenager named Alvin Cruz has made
public an audio recording of his stop in Harlem on June 3, 2011. It appears to be the only known
recording of a stop by a civilian. In the recording, the officers verbally abuse Cruz, threaten to
break his arm, and appear to physically abuse him. After an officer asks Cruz if he wants to go
to jail, Cruz asks why the officers are threatening to arrest him, and one replies: “For being a
fucking mutt! You know that?” Ross Tuttle & Rein Schneider, Stopped-and-Frisked: ‘For
Being a F**king Mutt’ [VIDEO], THE NATION , Oct. 8, 2012; 1/11/13 Letter from Darius
Charney, Counsel for Plaintiffs, to the Court (“1/11/13 Charney Letter”) at 2. An amicus brief
from a caucus of the New York City Council states that during three heavily attended public
hearings in October 2012, several constituents who had been stopped “compared their own
experiences of needlessly aggressive policing” to the Cruz recording. 3/4/13 Brief of Amicus
Curi[a]e the Black, Latino, and Asian Caucus of the Council of the City of New York at 4.
Plaintiffs requested on January 11, 2013 that they be allowed to add Cruz as a trial witness, after
first contacting Cruz in December 2012. See 1/11/13 Charney Letter at 2. I denied the request
on the basis of prior scheduling orders and the imminent trial date. See 1/17 Tr. at 4–5.
775
See supra Part IV.C; Pl. Findings ¶¶ 186–190 (collecting sources regarding lack
of internal attention to racial profiling).
776
See supra Parts IV.C.1, 4, 7. I note that the City’s highest elected official, Mayor
Bloomberg, has also defended the racial disparities in the NYPD’s stops by invoking the crime
suspect data benchmark. See April 30, 2013 Bloomberg Address at 3. On that basis, he has
argued that the police “‘disproportionately stop whites too much and minorities too little.’”
Associated Press, Bloomberg: Police Stop Minorities “Too Little,” June 28, 2013. Echoing
Chief Esposito’s testimony, Mayor Bloomberg stated that “‘[t]he cops’ job is to stop (people in)
the groups fitting the description. It’s society’s job to make sure that no one group is
disproportionately represented as potential perpetrators.’” Id. (emphasis added).
Similarly, Commissioner Kelly has embraced the use of violent crime suspect
data as a benchmark, and on this basis has argued that “‘really, African-Americans are being
under-stopped.’” Lawrence Downes, What Ray Kelly Said About Stop-and-Frisk, TAKING NOTE :
THE EDITORIAL PAGE EDITOR’S BLOG , N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2013 (quoting May 1, 2013 interview
with ABC News). Of course, using violent crime suspect data as a benchmark for measuring
racial bias in the NYPD’s stops is even less valid than using general crime suspect data as a
benchmark. See supra Part IV.C.7 (discussing RAND Report’s use of violent crime suspect data
benchmark). I note that Commissioner Kelly has also promoted the use of a violent crime
suspect benchmark for stops through yearly public reports released by the NYPD. See, e.g.,
190
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Filed 08/12/13 Page 194 of 198
During trial this indifference was further demonstrated by many officials’ apparent belief that
racial profiling is a myth created by the media,777 as well as by the testimony describing and
defending the targeting of “the right people” for stops.778
The City and the NYPD’s highest officials also continue to endorse the
unsupportable position that racial profiling cannot exist provided that a stop is based on
reasonable suspicion.779 This position is fundamentally inconsistent with the law of equal
protection and represents a particularly disconcerting manifestation of indifference. As I have
emphasized throughout this section, the Constitution “prohibits selective enforcement of the law
based on considerations such as race.”780 Thus, plaintiffs’ racial discrimination claim does not
depend on proof that stops of blacks and Hispanics are suspicionless.781 A police department
that has a practice of targeting blacks and Hispanics for pedestrian stops cannot defend itself by
showing that all the stopped pedestrians were displaying suspicious behavior. Indeed, the
targeting of certain races within the universe of suspicious individuals is especially insidious,
because it will increase the likelihood of further enforcement actions against members of those
KELLY , CRIME AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY , at 15 (presenting, without explanation, racial
composition of stop subjects alongside racial composition of violent crime suspects).
777
See supra Part IV.C.7 (noting skepticism of NYPD officials toward reports of
racial profiling, which they claim to have not personally heard).
778
See supra Part IV.C.3 (targeting “the right people”). The City finds nothing
problematic in Inspector McCormack’s instruction to Officer Serrano to target “male blacks 14
to 20, 21” for stops based on local crime suspect data. See Def. Findings ¶ 65; PX 332T at 24.
779
See, e.g., 4/9 Tr. at 2824 (Esposito); Def. Mem. at 19 (“Plaintiffs . . . have failed
to prove a widespread pattern of suspicionless stops, and consequently cannot prove a
widespread pattern of race-based stops.” (emphasis added)).
780
Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (emphasis added).
781
I note, however, that plaintiffs have offered evidence of a widespread pattern of
suspicionless stops. See supra Part V.A.
191
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Filed 08/12/13 Page 195 of 198
races as compared to other races, which will then increase their representation in crime statistics.
Given the NYPD’s policy of basing stops on crime data, these races may then be subjected to
even more stops and enforcement, resulting in a self-perpetuating cycle.782
The Equal Protection Clause’s prohibition on selective enforcement means that
suspicious blacks and Hispanics may not be treated differently by the police than equally
suspicious whites. Individuals of all races engage in suspicious behavior and break the law.
Equal protection guarantees that similarly situated individuals of these races will be held to
account equally.
VI.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the City is liable for the violation of plaintiffs’ Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In a separate opinion, I will order remedies, including
immediate changes to the NYPD’s policies, a joint-remedial process to consider further reforms,
and the appointment of an independent monitor to oversee compliance with the remedies ordered
in this case. I conclude with a particularly apt quote: “The idea of universal suspicion without
individual evidence is what Americans find abhorrent and what black men in America must
constantly fight. It is pervasive in policing policies — like stop-and-frisk, and . . . neighborhood
782
The direction not to stop “a 48-year-old lady [who] was walking through St.
Mary’s Park when it was closed,” is just one example of instructions not to stop all individuals
for whom a justification for a stop exists, but only to stop the right people. PX 332T at 21.
While this particular instruction seems benign, to the extent that the NYPD focuses its resources
on blacks and Hispanics to the exclusion of whites generally, the result is deeply troubling.
White people also carry guns and contraband, but if the NYPD declines to stop them, they will
go undetected and unrepresented in crime statistics.
In addition, applying law enforcement tactics unequally between various racial
groups is a recipe for abuse. “[N]othing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to
allow . . . officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply [the law] and thus to
escape the political retribution that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were affected.”
Railway Express Agency, 336 U.S. at 112 (Jackson, J., concurring). I note one poll shows that
76% of black voters disapprove of stop and frisk. See Quinnipiac University, New Yorkers Back
Ban on Take-Out Foam More Than 2-1, at 8 (Feb. 28, 2013).
192
Case 1:08-cv-01034-SAS-HBP Document 373
Filed 08/12/13 Page 196 of 198
watch - regardless of the collateral damage done to the majority of innocents. It's like burning
down a house to rid it of mice.,,783
Dated:
August 12, 2013
12,2013
New York, New York
783
783
IS,
Charles Blow, The Whole System Failed Trayvon Martin , N.Y. TIMES, July 15,
Martin, N.Y.
2013.
193
Case 1:08-cv-01034-SAS-HBP Document 373
Filed 08/12/13 Page 197 of 198
APPENDIX A
Blank UF-250
L
l
l
l
COMPLETE ALL CAPTIONS
~
~
STOP, QUESTION AND FRISK Pel-Serial No.
Ic-~--~~~~---
REPORT WORKSHEET
PD344-151A (Rev, 11..02)
Time Of Stop
Dale
Pet. Of OCC.
Period Of Observation
Prior To Stop
Address/Intersection Or Cross Streets Of Slop
o Inside
o Outside 0 Housin
Type Of Location
Describe:
Specify Which FelonylP.L. Misdemeanor Suspected
Duration Of Slop
What Were Circumstances Which Led To Stop?
(MUST CHECK AT LEAST ONE BOX)
o
o
o
o
Carrying Objects In Plain V_
0
Actions Indicative Of Engaging
In Drug Tran&aClion.
0
0
Used In Commission Of Crime
o.g .. Slim JirN'Pry Bar. etc.
Fits Description.
Actions 1ncSic:atNe Of ·Casing"
VlClim Or Location.
Actions Indicative of Ading As A
Ftwtive Movements.
Actions Indicative Of Engaging
In VIOlent Crimes.
Wearing CIotheslOisguises
Commonly Used In
0
~
o DO
Commission Of Crime.
Lookovl.
I
D Suspicious BuIQelObjoct (Describe)
Other Reasonable Suspicion Of CrimirJal Activity (Specify)
o
Name Of Person Stopped
Nicknamel
Street Name
Date Of Birth
0000
ApI. No.
Address
o
Photo 1.0.
o
Refused
"
"
i
I•
Other (Scars, Tattoos. Etc.)
Did Officer Explain If No, Explain:
Reason For Stop
Yes ONo
Yes If Yes, Ust Pel. Serial Nos.
Were Other Persons Stopped! 0
Questioned/Frisked?
0
No
If Physical Force Was Used, Indicate Type:
o Hands On Susped
0 Drawing Firearm
o Suspect On Ground
D BatOll
D Polnllng Firearm At Suspect
D Pepper Spray
D Handcuffing Suspect
0 Other (Describel
o
o
Suspect Against WalllCar
Was Suspect Arrested? Offense
DYes 0
No
Was Summons Issued? Offense
DYes 0
No
OffICer In Uniform?
If No, How Identified?
o
i
Yes
0
No
Arrest No.
~
I
z
~
>
•
o
Summons No.
o Shield
~
I~I
01.0. Card
o Verbal
194
Case 1:08-cv-01034-SAS-HBP Document 373
Filed 08/12/13 Page 198 of 198
- Appearances For Plaintiffs:
For Defendant:
Darius Charney, Esq.
Sunita Patel, Esq.
Baher Azmy, Esq.
Rachel Lopez, Esq.
Ghita Schwarz, Esq.
Chauniqua Young, Esq.
Center for Constitutional Rights
666 Broadway, 7th Floor
New York, NY 10012
(212) 614-6439
Heidi Grossman
Brenda Cooke
Linda Donahue
Morgan Kunz
Joseph Marutollo
Suzanna Publicker
Lisa Richardson
Judson Vickers
Assistant Corporation Counsel
New York City Law Department
100 Church Street
New York, NY 10007
(212) 356-3503
Philip I. Irwin, Esq.
Eric Hellerman, Esq.
Gretchen Hoff Varner, Esq.
Kasey Martini, Esq.
Bruce Corey, Jr., Esq.
Covington & Burling LLP
620 Eighth Avenue
New York, NY 10018
(212) 841-1000
Jonathan Moore, Esq.
Jenn Rolnick Borchetta, Esq.
Beldock Levine & Hoffman LLP
99 Park Avenue, Suite 1600
New York, NY 10016
(212) 490-0900
195
EXHIBIT C
Case 1:12-cv-02274-SAS-HBP Document 105
Filed 02/14/13 Page 1 of 158
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
x
JAENEAN LIGON, individually and on
behalf of her minor son, J.G.; FAWN
BRACY, individually and on behalf of her
minor son, W.B.; JACQUELINE YATES;
LETITIA LEDAN; ROSHEA JOHNSON;
KIERON JOHNSON; JOVAN JEFFERSON;
A.O., by his parent DINAH ADAMES;
ABDULLAH TURNER; FERNANDO
MORONTA; and CHARLES BRADLEY,
individually and on behalf of a class of all
others similarly situated,
AMENDED
OPINION & ORDER
12 Civ. 2274 (SAS)
Plain tiffs,
- against CITY OF NEW YORK; RAYMOND W.
KELLY, COMMISSIONER OF THE NEW
YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT;
POLICE OFFICER JOHNNY BLASINI;
POLICE OFFICER GREGORY
LOMANGINO; POLICE OFFICER
JOSEPH KOCH; POLICE OFFICER
KIERON RAMDEEN; POLICE OFFICER
JOSEPH BERMUDEZ; POLICE OFFICER
MIGUEL SANTIAGO; and POLICE
OFFICERS JOHN DOE 1-12,
Defendants.
x
Case 1:12-cv-02274-SAS-HBP Document 105
Filed 02/14/13 Page 2 of 158
I.
INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
II.
LEGAL STANDARD FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. . . . . . . . . . . 10
III.
APPLICABLE LAW.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A.
B.
C.
D.
IV.
Sources of Liability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Fourth Amendment, Stops, and Reasonable Suspicion. . . . . . . .
Criminal Trespass under New York State Law.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
De Bour. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
FINDINGS OF FACT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
A.
Evidence of an Unconstitutional Practice or Custom of the NYPD. . 23
1.
2.
3.
B.
Findings of Fact Regarding Testimony of ADA Rucker and
Decline to Prosecute Forms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Findings of Fact Regarding Plaintiffs’ Stops. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a.
Charles Bradley’s Stop. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b.
Abdullah Turner’s Stops.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c.
J.G.’s Stop. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d.
Jerome Grant’s Stop. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
e.
Roshea Johnson’s Stop. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
f.
Letitia Ledan’s Stops. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
g.
Fernando Moronta’s Stop. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
h.
Kieron Johnson’s Stop. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i.
Jovan Jefferson’s Stop. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Expert Testimony Regarding UF-250 Forms. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
24
32
35
41
49
52
54
57
61
62
64
67
Steps Taken by the NYPD in 2012. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
1.
2.
3.
V.
12
16
20
21
NYPD Recognition of a Problem in TAP.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Interim Orders 22 and 23 of 2012.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Absence of Steps Meaningfully Addressing Outdoor TAP
Stops. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
DISCUSSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
2
Case 1:12-cv-02274-SAS-HBP Document 105
A.
B.
Standing.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
Preliminary Injunctive Relief. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
1.
2.
3.
4.
C.
Clear or Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits. . . . 97
a.
Deliberate Indifference. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
i.
ADA Rucker’s Testimony. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
ii.
Plaintiffs’ Stops. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
iii.
Decline to Prosecute Forms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
iv.
Dr. Fagan’s Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
v.
Notice to Defendants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
vi.
Legal Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
b.
Failure to Rebut Deliberate Indifference Claim Based on
Steps Taken by NYPD in 2012.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Irreparable Harm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
Balance of Equities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
Public Interest. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
Appropriate Scope of Injunctive Relief.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
1.
2.
VI.
Filed 02/14/13 Page 3 of 158
Immediate Relief.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Proposed Additional Relief.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a.
Policies and Procedures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b.
Supervision. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c.
Training. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d.
Attorneys’ Fees.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
142
144
146
147
147
149
CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
APPENDIX A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
APPENDIX B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
3
Case 1:12-cv-02274-SAS-HBP Document 105
Filed 02/14/13 Page 4 of 158
SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN, U.S.D.J.:
I.
INTRODUCTION
This case, filed in 2012, is one of three cases currently before this
Court challenging aspects of the New York City Police Department’s “stop and
frisk” practices.1 Of the three cases, this case is the most narrow. It deals only
with stops made by the police on suspicion of trespass outside of certain privatelyowned buildings in the Bronx. But the legal issues raised by this case have roots
that stretch back decades.
In 1964, New York adopted the first version of its stop and frisk law,
which has since been amended several times. The essence of the law is that a
police officer may stop a person in a public place when he reasonably suspects that
such person is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime, and the
1
Floyd v. City of New York, filed in 2008, challenges the NYPD’s stop
and frisk practices in general, arguing among other things that the NYPD is
systematically violating the rights of New York City’s residents and visitors under
the Fourth Amendment to be free from unreasonable searches, and under the
Fourteenth Amendment to be free from discrimination on the basis of race. See
Floyd v. City of New York, 283 F.R.D. 153, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (granting class
certification). Davis v. City of New York, filed in 2010, focuses on stop and frisk
practices at public housing properties run by the New York City Housing
Authority (“NYCHA”). Plaintiffs in Davis argue that the NYPD uses unlawful
stops, searches, and arrests to enforce the prohibitions against trespassing on public
housing property. See Davis v. City of New York, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2012 WL
4813837, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2012) (granting in part and denying in part
defendants’ motions for summary judgment regarding individual plaintiffs’ arrests
and tenancies).
4
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officer may demand of him his name, his address, and an explanation of his
conduct. Upon stopping a person, if the police officer reasonably suspects that he
is in danger of physical injury, he may search the person for a deadly weapon.2
This law and the policing practices associated with it have raised a
host of difficult questions, including: (1) what is reasonable suspicion; (2) what
constitutes a stop; (3) what is a public place; (4) when is a stopped person free to
walk away from the police; and (5) when does an officer have grounds to
reasonably suspect that he is danger of physical injury. None of these questions
are easily answered.
In 1968, the United States Supreme Court heard a challenge to New
York’s stop and frisk statute in the context of two criminal convictions, and made
some important points that bear repeating today.3 First, the Court held that
although states may develop their own laws on stop and frisk, they may not
“authorize police conduct which trenches upon Fourth Amendment rights,
regardless of the labels which it attaches to such conduct.”4 The Court stated, in no
2
See generally New York Criminal Procedure Law (“CPL”) § 140.50.
3
See generally Sibron v. State of New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968)
(reversing conviction for failure to suppress evidence seized in an unlawful stop,
and affirming conviction in a related appeal, finding that the seizure in latter case
was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment).
4
Id. at 61.
5
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uncertain terms, that the question is not whether a particular search was authorized
by state law but “‘whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.’”5 Second, the Court held that it would not judge the constitutionality
of the New York statute on its face, but rather as applied to the particular facts of
the two cases it was reviewing.6 Third, the Court stressed that a police officer must
have reasonable grounds before he seizes a person. In that regard the Court stated:
“The police officer is not entitled to seize and search every person whom he sees
on the street or of whom he makes inquiries.”7
In confronting the issues addressed in this Opinion, I am keenly aware
that this Court does not stand in the shoes of the Police Department and is in no
way qualified or empowered to engage in policy determinations. The sole role of
the Court is to interpret and apply the law — in this case the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United
States and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit — to the
5
Id. (quoting Cooper v. State of California, 386 U.S. 58, 61 (1967)).
6
See id. (“Our constitutional inquiry would not be furthered here by an
attempt to pronounce judgment on the words of the statute. We must confine our
review instead to the reasonableness of the searches and seizures which underlie
these two convictions.”).
7
Id. The Court continued: “Before he places a hand on the person of a
citizen in search of anything, he must have constitutionally adequate, reasonable
grounds for doing so.” Id.
6
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specific facts before it. I have endeavored faithfully to carry out that limited role.
My object here is only to clarify what the law permits — and does not permit — an
officer to do when initiating and conducting a stop or stop and frisk of people in
the public areas outside of certain privately owned buildings in the Bronx.
Plaintiffs, all of whom are African-American or Latino residents of
New York,8 argue that the Police Department has a widespread practice of making
unlawful stops on suspicion of trespass outside buildings in the Bronx that are
enrolled in the Trespass Affidavit Program (“TAP”), which was formerly known in
the Bronx as Operation Clean Halls.9 This program allows “police officers to
patrol inside and around thousands of private residential apartment buildings
throughout New York City.”10 Plaintiffs argue that the NYPD’s trespass stops
outside TAP buildings are often made without reasonable suspicion, and thus
8
See Complaint ¶¶ 11–23.
9
See Ligon v. City of New York, No. 12 Civ. 2274, 2012 WL 3597066,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2012) (allowing preliminary injunction hearing to
proceed). For the history of TAP, see infra Part IV.B. Plaintiffs’ Complaint
concerns stops in and around TAP buildings throughout New York City, but
plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction focuses solely on outside stops in the
Bronx. See Ligon, 2012 WL 3597066, at *3–4; Memorandum of Law in Support
of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification (“Class Mem.”) at 1 n.1.
10
See Ligon, 2012 WL 3597066, at *1.
7
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violate the Fourth Amendment.11 Plaintiffs stated that such stops have caused them
to feel “violated,”12 “disrespected,”13 “angry,”14 and “defenseless.”15 As the
Supreme Court noted in Terry v. Ohio, even limited stops and searches represent
“an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience,”16 and thus must be
based on reasonable suspicion.
On September 24, 2012, plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary
injunction, seeking an order requiring the NYPD to create and implement new
policies, training programs, and monitoring and supervisory procedures that
specifically address the problem of unconstitutional trespass stops outside TAP
buildings.17 The preliminary injunction hearing took place between October 15
and November 7, 2012.18 This Opinion addresses plaintiffs’ motion.
11
See Plaintiffs’ Revised Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law (“Pl. Findings”) ¶¶ 64–67, 69–70.
12
Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing (“Tr.”) 10/16 at 275:8.
13
Id. at 349:1.
14
Tr. 10/17 at 444:2.
15
Id. at 486:1.
16
392 U.S. 1, 25 (1968).
17
See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Preliminary Injunction at 21; Pl. Findings ¶¶ 72–75.
18
See Tr. 10/15 at 1; Tr. 11/7 at 1282.
8
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I begin by summarizing the relevant legal standards, then state my
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Based on all the evidence presented at the
hearing, I conclude that plaintiffs have shown a clear likelihood of proving that
defendants have displayed deliberate indifference toward a widespread practice of
unconstitutional trespass stops by the NYPD outside TAP buildings in the Bronx.
This conclusion is based on five categories of evidence, briefly summarized here
and fully explored below: (1) the testimony of Bronx Assistant District Attorney
Jeannette Rucker (“ADA Rucker”), who concluded that the NYPD frequently
made trespass stops outside TAP buildings in the Bronx for no reason other than
that the officer had seen someone enter and exit or exit the building; (2) a sample
of “decline to prosecute” forms prepared by the Bronx District Attorneys’ Office,
which revealed the alarming frequency of unlawful trespass stops in the vicinity of
TAP buildings in the Bronx; (3) the testimony of eight plaintiffs and a non-party
witness, who described remarkably similar encounters with the police when
stopped in the vicinity of TAP buildings in the Bronx; (4) the analysis by Dr.
Jeffrey Fagan, plaintiffs’ expert, of an NYPD database of recorded stops, which
provided further evidence of the frequency of apparently unlawful trespass stops
outside TAP buildings in the Bronx; and (5) NYPD training materials that continue
to misstate the minimal constitutional standards for making stops.
9
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In sum, while it may be difficult to say where, precisely, to draw the
line between constitutional and unconstitutional police encounters, such a line
exists, and the NYPD has systematically crossed it when making trespass stops
outside TAP buildings in the Bronx. For those of us who do not fear being stopped
as we approach or leave our own homes or those of our friends and families, it is
difficult to believe that residents of one of our boroughs live under such a threat.19
In light of the evidence presented at the hearing, however, I am compelled to
conclude that this is the case.
As a result, plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary injunction.
However, with one exception, I am not yet ordering relief pending a further
hearing on the appropriate scope of such relief.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
“‘A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded
as of right.’”20 In general, to obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party
19
To echo language quoted by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the evidence
in this case “has evoked images of other days, under other flags, when no man
traveled . . . without fear of unwarranted interruption.” Florida v. Bostick, 501
U.S. 429, 443 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
20
UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc., 660 F.3d
643, 648 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555
U.S. 7, 24 (2008)).
10
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must establish: (1) “that [it] is likely to succeed on the merits,” (2) “that [it] is
likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,” (3) “that the
balance of equities tips in [its] favor,” and (4) “that an injunction is in the public
interest.”21 The Second Circuit has held that the moving party may be entitled to a
preliminary injunction even if the party is unable to establish a likelihood of
success on the merits, provided that the party demonstrates “‘a serious question
going to the merits to make them a fair ground for trial, with a balance of hardships
tipping decidedly in the plaintiff’s favor.’”22 In addition, when the moving party
seeks a “mandatory” injunction, that is, an injunction that commands action rather
than merely prohibiting it, the standard is higher: “[W]here ‘the injunction sought
will alter rather than maintain the status quo,’ the movant must show [a] ‘clear’ or
21
Winter, 555 U.S. at 20 (citing Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689–90
(2008); Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987); Weinberger
v. Romero–Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311–12 (1982)). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)
(preliminary injunctions).
22
Red Earth LLC v. United States, 657 F.3d 138, 143 (2d Cir. 2011)
(quoting Metropolitan Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, 615 F.3d 152,
156 (2d Cir. 2010)). Accord Pamlab, L.L.C. v. Macoven Pharm., L.L.C., — F.
Supp. 2d —, 2012 WL 2540234, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2012) (recognizing that
the Supreme Court in Winter “cast some doubt on the continuing viability” of the
Second Circuit’s “serious questions” prong, but noting that “the Second Circuit has
since held that ‘our venerable standard for assessing a movant’s probability of
success on the merits remains valid’” (quoting Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG
Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 38 (2d Cir. 2010))).
11
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‘substantial’ likelihood of success.”23
Because plaintiffs seek mandatory injunctive relief including the
drafting and distribution of new policies, the development and implementation of
new training programs, and the implementation of new monitoring and supervision
procedures,24 they must establish a clear or substantial likelihood that they will
succeed at trial.
III.
APPLICABLE LAW
A.
Sources of Liability
Plaintiffs bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of
their Fourth Amendment rights by the City of New York and several of its
employees.25 As the Supreme Court established in Monell v. New York City
23
Rodriguez v. DeBuono, 175 F.3d 227, 233 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting
Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 473–74 (2d Cir. 1996)). The Second Circuit has
recognized that “[t]he distinction between mandatory and prohibitory injunctions is
not without ambiguities or critics, and that in a close case an injunction can be
framed in mandatory or prohibitory terms.” Jolly, 76 F.3d at 474 (quotation marks
and citations omitted).
24
See Pl. Findings ¶¶ 72–75.
25
See Compl. ¶¶ 1, 203. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
12
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Department of Social Services,26 in order to have recourse against a municipality or
other local government under section 1983, plaintiffs “must prove that ‘action
pursuant to official municipal policy’ caused the alleged constitutional injury.”27
In general, “[o]fficial municipal policy includes the decisions of a government’s
lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and
widespread as to practically have the force of law.”28
One way to establish an official policy is through a showing of
“deliberate indifference” by high-level officials. “‘[W]here a policymaking official
exhibits deliberate indifference to constitutional deprivations caused by
subordinates, such that the official’s inaction constitutes a deliberate choice, that
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
26
436 U.S. 658 (1978). Interpreting the language of section 1983 and
the legislative history surrounding its passage in the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the
Court in Monell held that local governing bodies could be held liable either on the
basis of formally approved policy or on the basis of “‘customs’” or “‘usages.’” Id.
at 690–91 (quoting Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167–68 (1970)).
Later cases have “considerably broadened the concept of official municipal
action.” Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 125 (2d Cir. 2004).
27
Cash v. County of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting
Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011), in turn quoting Monell, 436
U.S. at 691).
28
Connick, 131 S.Ct. at 1359 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Pembaur
v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986); Adickes, 398 U.S. at 167–68).
13
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acquiescence may be properly thought of as a city policy or custom that is
actionable under § 1983.’”29 “Deliberate indifference” requires “‘proof that a
municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.’”30
Recognizing that “deliberate indifference” is “a stringent standard of
fault,” the Second Circuit requires “that the policymaker’s inaction was the result
of ‘conscious choice’ and not ‘mere negligence.’”31 The Second Circuit has held
that municipal liability can be established “by demonstrating that the actions of
subordinate officers are sufficiently widespread to constitute the constructive
acquiescence of senior policymakers.”32
29
Cash, 654 F.3d at 334 (quoting Amnesty, 361 F.3d at 126).
30
Connick, 131 S.Ct. at 1359 (quoting Board of Comm’rs of Bryan Cty.
v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997)).
31
Cash, 654 F.3d at 334 (quoting Connick, 131 S.Ct at 1360; Amnesty,
361 F.3d at 128).
32
Sorlucco v. City of New York, 971 F.2d 864, 871 (2d Cir. 1992)
(emphasis added), quoted with approval by Amnesty, 361 F.3d at 126; Okin v.
Village of Cornwall-on-Hudson Police Dep’t, 577 F.3d 415, 440 (2d Cir. 2009).
Though the Second Circuit has not explicitly reaffirmed the “constructive
acquiescence” theory of Monell liability articulated in Sorlucco since the Supreme
Court decided Connick, the Second Circuit noted in Jones v. Town of E. Haven,
691 F.3d 72, 82 (2d Cir. 2012), that the plaintiff there could have established
municipal liability by showing:
a sufficiently widespread practice among police officers of abuse
of the rights of black people to support reasonably the conclusion
that such abuse was the custom of the officers of the Department
14
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A municipality may incur Monell liability based on deliberate
indifference through its training practices. Although “[a] municipality’s
culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on
a failure to train,”33 the Supreme Court has held that “[w]hen city policymakers are
on actual or constructive notice that a particular omission in their training program
causes city employees to violate citizens’ constitutional rights, the city may be
deemed deliberately indifferent if the policymakers choose to retain that
program.”34 “[D]eliberate indifference may be inferred where ‘the need for more
or better supervision to protect against constitutional violations was obvious,’ but
the policymaker ‘fail[ed] to make meaningful efforts to address the risk of harm to
plaintiffs[.]’”35
and that supervisory personnel must have been aware of it but
took no adequate corrective or preventive measures (or some
combination of the two).
Jones, 691 F.3d at 82. The Second Circuit thus continues to hold that if a practice
of misconduct is sufficiently widespread, the municipality may be assumed to have
acquiesced in it, even in the absence of direct evidence of such acquiescence.
33
Connick, 131 S.Ct. at 1359 (citing Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S.
808, 822–23 (1985) (plurality opinion)).
34
Id. (citing Bryan Cty., 520 U.S. at 407).
35
Cash, 654 F.3d at 334 (quoting Reynolds v. Giuliani, 506 F.3d 183,
192 (2d Cir. 2007); Vann v. City of New York, 72 F.3d 1040, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995)).
Cash reaffirmed the validity of the three-part framing of the failure-to-train inquiry
15
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The Fourth Amendment, Stops, and Reasonable Suspicion
The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment,36 states: “The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”37
As interpreted by the courts, the Fourth Amendment prohibits arrest without
probable cause, but allows the police to “‘stop and briefly detain a person for
investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by
in Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 297–98 (2d Cir. 1992), summarized
as:
(1) policymaker knows “to a moral certainty” that its employees
will confront a given situation; (2) either situation presents
employees with difficult choice that will be made less so by
training or supervision, or there is a record of employees
mishandling situation; and (3) wrong choice by employees will
frequently cause deprivation of constitutional rights.
Cash, 654 F.3d at 334. “Where the plaintiff establishes all three elements, then . . .
the policymaker should have known that inadequate training or supervision was ‘so
likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the
city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.’”
Walker, 974 F.2d at 298 (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390
(1989)).
36
See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 369 (2003) (citing Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)).
37
U.S. C ONST. amend. IV.
16
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articulable facts that criminal activity “may be afoot,” even if the officer lacks
probable cause.’”38 “This form of investigative detention is now known as a Terry
stop.”39
“While ‘reasonable suspicion’ is a less demanding standard than
probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the
evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective
justification for making the stop.”40 “‘The officer [making a Terry stop] . . . must
be able to articulate something more than an inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion or hunch.’”41 “Reasonable suspicion is an objective standard; hence, the
subjective intentions or motives of the officer making the stop are irrelevant.”42
38
United States v. Swindle, 407 F.3d 562, 566 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). Under New York law, the
justifications required for different levels of police intrusion were established in
People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976). See infra Part III.D. States may impose
greater restrictions on police conduct than those established by the Fourth
Amendment, but “may not . . . authorize police conduct which trenches upon
Fourth Amendment rights.” Sibron, 392 U.S. at 61.
39
Davis, 2012 WL 4813837, at *2 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 88).
40
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000).
41
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990) (quoting Sokolow, 490
U.S. at 7) (certain quotation marks omitted). Courts are divided over whether
reasonable suspicion must be of a particular crime, or may be of criminality in
general. See 4 W AYNE R. L AF AVE, S EARCH & S EIZURE § 9.5(c) (5th ed. 2012).
42
United States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 116, 133 (2d Cir. 2000).
17
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It is sometimes the case that a police officer may observe “a series of
acts, each of them perhaps innocent in itself, but which taken together warrant[]
further investigation.”43 “An individual’s presence in an area of expected criminal
activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized
suspicion that the person is committing a crime.”44 However, “the fact that the stop
occurred in a ‘high crime area’ [may be] among the relevant contextual
considerations in a Terry analysis.” 45
Courts reviewing stops for reasonable suspicion “must look at ‘the
totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a
‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.”46 “[T]he
proper inquiry is not whether each fact considered in isolation denotes unlawful
behavior, but whether all the facts taken together support a reasonable suspicion of
wrongdoing.”47
The test for whether a Terry stop has taken place outdoors is whether
43
Terry, 392 U.S. at 22.
44
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47
(1979)).
45
Id. (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144 (1972)).
46
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quoting United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981)).
47
United States v. Lee, 916 F.2d 814, 819 (2d Cir. 1990).
18
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“a reasonable person would feel free ‘to disregard the police and go about his
business.’”48 “‘[W]henever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his
freedom to walk away, he has ‘seized’ that person.’”49 “[P]olice questioning, by
itself, is unlikely to result in a Fourth Amendment violation . . . [u]nless the
circumstances of the encounter are so intimidating as to demonstrate that a
reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave if he had not
responded.”50 The Second Circuit has held that “[a] seizure occurs when (1) a
person obeys a police officer’s order to stop or (2) a person that does not submit to
an officer’s show of authority is physically restrained.”51 Both Terry stops and
48
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434 (quoting California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S.
621, 628 (1991)). Accord United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)
(“[A] person has been ‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only
if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person
would have believed that he was not free to leave.”). In an enclosed space, such as
a bus, this test may be rephrased as “‘whether a reasonable person would feel free
to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.’” United
States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 202 (2002) (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436).
Bostick also notes that “the ‘reasonable person’ test presupposes an innocent
person.” Bostick, 501 U.S. at 438. For a comprehensive summary of the “free to
leave” test as it has been interpreted and applied, see L AF AVE, S EARCH & S EIZURE
§ 9.4(a).
49
Brown, 443 U.S. at 50 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 16).
50
INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984).
51
United States v. Simmons, 560 F.3d 98, 105 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing
Swindle, 407 F.3d at 572).
19
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arrests constitute “seizures” under the Fourth Amendment.52
C.
Criminal Trespass under New York State Law
Criminal trespass is defined under section 140 of the New York Penal
Law. As the Appellate Division, First Department, of the Supreme Court of New
York recently stated in a case concerning alleged trespass in a Clean Halls
building:
A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the second degree
when, in pertinent part, he “knowingly enters or remains
unlawfully in a dwelling” (Penal Law § 140.15[1]). A person
“enters or remains unlawfully” in or upon premises “when he is
not licensed or privileged to do so” (Penal Law § 140.00[5]). “In
general, a person is ‘licensed or privileged’ to enter private
premises when he has obtained the consent of the owner or
another whose relationship to the premises gives him authority to
issue such consent” (People v. Graves, 76 N.Y.2d 16, 20 . . .
[1990]). The prosecution bears the burden of proving the absence
of such license or privilege (People v. Brown, 25 N.Y.2d 374, 377
. . . [1969]).53
The trespass law also states:
A person who, regardless of his intent, enters or remains in or
upon premises which are at the time open to the public does so
with license and privilege unless he defies a lawful order not to
enter or remain, personally communicated to him by the owner of
such premises or other authorized person. A license or privilege
to enter or remain in a building which is only partly open to the
public is not a license or privilege to enter or remain in that part
52
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 16–20.
53
In re Lonique M., 939 N.Y.S.2d 341, 343 (1st Dep’t 2012).
20
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of the building which is not open to the public.54
D.
De Bour
In People v. De Bour, the New York Court of Appeals established a
four-level test for determining the legality of encounters between police officers
and civilians under New York state law. The more intrusive the encounter, the
more justification required:
•
Level 1: Approach to Request Information: “If a police officer
seeks simply to request information from an individual, that
request must be supported by an objective, credible reason, not
necessarily indicative of criminality.”55
•
Level 2: The Common-Law Right of Inquiry: “Once the officer
asks more pointed questions that would lead the person
approached reasonably to believe that he or she is suspected of
some wrongdoing and is the focus of the officer’s investigation,
the officer is [engaged in] a common-law inquiry that must be
supported by a founded suspicion that criminality is afoot.”56
•
Level 3: Forcible Stop: “Where a police officer has reasonable
suspicion that a particular person was involved in a felony or
misdemeanor, the officer is authorized to forcibly stop and detain
that person.”57 A Level 3 stop is legally equivalent to a Terry
54
N.Y. Penal Law § 140.00.
55
People v. Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d 181, 184 (1992) (reaffirming De Bour
despite case law suggesting that the Fourth Amendment does not protect against
police-initiated encounters falling short of seizures).
56
Id. at 184–85 (emphasis added).
57
Id. at 185 (emphasis added).
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stop, and New York state court opinions generally refer to Level
3 De Bour stops and Terry stops interchangeably.58
•
Level 4: Arrest: “Finally, where the officer has probable cause to
believe that a person has committed a crime, an arrest is
authorized.”59
At least in the context of police encounters inside TAP and NYCHA
buildings, New York courts have often identified requests for name and purpose in
the building as Level 1 questions.60 Mere presence in a drug-prone NYCHA
building with a history of trespassing has been identified as an objective, credible
reason justifying Level 1 questioning.61 Level 1 questioning of someone exiting a
58
See, e.g., People v. Reyes, 651 N.Y.S.2d 431, 432–33 (1st Dep’t
1996); People v. Francis, 847 N.Y.S.2d 398, 401 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Co. 2007).
59
Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d at 185.
60
See, e.g., People v. Hendricks, 841 N.Y.S.2d 94, 94 (1st Dep’t 2007)
(holding that NYCHA building’s “history of drug activity and trespassing”
provided “objective, credible reason” for Level 1 inquiry “to determine if
defendant was legitimately in the building”); People v. Anderson, 759 N.Y.S.2d
676, 676 (1st Dep’t 2003) (holding that group of nine or ten people descending
staircase in drug-prone TAP building provided objective credible reason to ask
defendant whether he lived there, “‘which constituted a level one request for
information and not a common-law inquiry’” (quoting People v. Tinort, 709
N.Y.S.2d 511, 511 (1st Dep’t 2000))).
61
See Hendricks, 841 N.Y.S.2d at 94. Level 1 questioning of a person
in a NYCHA building requires “[a]t a minimum, . . . evidence of prior criminality”
in the building. People v. Ventura, 913 N.Y.S.2d 543, 546–47 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.
2010). “To the extent that . . . in public housing the police routinely engage in
random, unjustified questioning — and there is evidence that they do — the
practice would amount to a systematic violation of De Bour.” Id. at 547 (citing
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TAP building, on the other hand, appears to require more than a history of drug
activity in the building.62
IV.
FINDINGS OF FACT
A.
Evidence of an Unconstitutional Practice or Custom of the NYPD
At the hearing, plaintiffs offered three categories of evidence in
support of their contention that the NYPD has a practice of making
unconstitutional trespass stops outside Clean Halls buildings in the Bronx. First,
plaintiffs offered the testimony of ADA Rucker regarding her concerns about
trespass stops and arrests at Clean Halls buildings, corroborated by “decline to
prosecute” forms from the Bronx District Attorney’s office. Second, plaintiffs
offered testimony regarding their personal experiences of having been stopped
outside Clean Halls buildings.63 Third, plaintiffs offered the expert testimony of
Adam Carlis, The Illegality of Vertical Patrols, 109 C OLUM. L. R EV. 2002 (2009)).
62
See, e.g., People v. Kojac, 671 N.Y.S.2d 949, 953–54 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
Co. 1998) (“The police are not justified in approaching an individual merely
because he exits [a TAP building] known for its high incidence of drug activity.”).
See also People v. Almonte, No. 0209/2009, 2011 WL 864940, at *2 (Sup. Ct.
Bronx Co. Mar. 8, 2011) (suggesting that decisions upholding Level 1 questioning
of individuals exiting TAP buildings have “noted some additional factor” other
than location, such as defendant’s conduct not being innocuous).
63
Plaintiffs introduced testimony regarding eleven stops. See infra Part
IV.A.2. All of the stops were of named plaintiffs except the July 2011 stop of nonparty witness Jerome Grant, a relative of two named plaintiffs. See infra Part
IV.A.2.d. For convenience, when making general statements about the personal
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Dr. Jeffrey Fagan regarding the number and nature of trespass stops outside Clean
Halls buildings.
I address each of these categories of evidence in turn.
1.
Findings of Fact Regarding Testimony of ADA Rucker and
Decline to Prosecute Forms
Since 2007, ADA Rucker has been chief of the complaint and
arraignments bureau at the Bronx DA. In this position, she oversees the arrest to
arraignment process, ensuring “that we evaluate all cases that are coming through
and making sure we are doing the right thing.” ADA Rucker testified that around
2007 she started to become concerned about cases in which people were being
stopped and then arrested based solely on their having entered or exited a Clean
Halls building. Especially in 2009, judges began dismissing these cases
frequently, sometimes saying that the police had no right to approach the arrested
person in the first place.64
ADA Rucker also started to receive a steady stream of complaints
about trespass arrests from the defense bar, the Legal Aid Society, and the Bronx
testimony of stops offered at the hearing, I will often refer to named plaintiffs and
non-party witness Jerome Grant collectively as “plaintiffs.”
64
See Tr. 10/15 at 168–75.
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Defenders.65 At first, she ignored the complaints. But in 2010, her staff began
telling her that judges were not only dismissing trespass cases, but were finding
evidence that the defendant lived in the building where the trespass was said to
have occurred.66
Finally, in 2011, ADA Rucker investigated the law governing trespass
stops based on entry to and exit from a Clean Halls building, and she determined
that the office’s position on the prerequisites for a legal stop had been wrong.67
She sent memos to a number of commanders and other police officials clarifying
that, contrary to previous statements, observing someone exiting a Clean Halls
building is not by itself a sufficient justification for a stop.68 ADA Rucker testified
that she sent the memos in her official capacity, and that the memos expressed the
views of the Bronx DA’s office.69
65
See id. at 175:20–22. The Bronx Defenders are co-counsel for
plaintiffs in this case.
66
See id. at 175:21–25, 176:2–8.
67
See id. at 176:9–23.
68
See id. at 176:14–177:22, 180:19–181:21; 7/7/11 Letter from ADA
Rucker to Deputy Inspector William McSorley (“7/7/11 Rucker Letter”), Plaintiffs’
Exhibit (“Pl. Ex.”) 6. See also Tr. 10/15 at 184:7–185:17; 7/13/11 Memo from
ADA Rucker to ADAs, Pl. Ex. 7 at 2 (explaining that Bronx DA would decline to
prosecute trespass cases where stop was based on nothing more than entry and exit
from Clean Halls building).
69
See Tr. 10/15 at 182:11–183:8.
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I find ADA Rucker’s testimony credible. It is no small matter when
an ADA publicly suggests that the NYPD has been engaged in a recurring pattern
of unlawful stops. Such testimony is entitled to significant weight. A prosecutor
has professional and institutional incentives to be skeptical of allegations that the
police are making stops and arrests without a legal basis. That ADA Rucker
overcame her skepticism says a great deal about the severity of the problem she
came to recognize. I also note that the NYPD itself found ADA Rucker
sufficiently trustworthy to allow her to train police officers regarding procedures in
the complaint room.70
Yet defendants argue that ADA Rucker’s impression that a problem
existed regarding unlawful trespass stops at Clean Halls buildings was unfounded,
and in fact rested only on the two specific cases she discussed in detail at the
hearing.71 Defendants’ argument is without merit. ADA Rucker made clear that
70
See id. at 170:12–173:17. Throughout this opinion, for convenience, I
will refer to NYPD trainees as “officers,” though in some cases the training
involves “recruits.” See Tr. 10/19 at 839:18–24.
71
See Defendants’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
(“Def. Findings”) ¶¶ 11–14. One case involved an anonymous letter whose author
claimed to have been arrested for trespass while leaving a friend’s building with
the friend. See Tr. 10/15 at 190:17–20; Tr. 10/16 at 239:1–240:22; 3/13/12
Anonymous Letter to ADA Rucker, Pl. Ex. 11. The other involved a stop inside a
Clean Halls building, and was brought to ADA Rucker’s attention by the Bronx
Defenders. See Tr. 10/15 at 196:13–198:15; Tr. 10/16 at 241:5–243:2. In the latter
case, according to ADA David Grigoryan, who performed an investigation at ADA
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over the years she learned of “many” cases involving unlawful trespass stops at
Clean Halls buildings,72 that “the judges kept dismissing” them,73 that “[a]t least
five” judges had dismissed Clean Halls trespass cases based on lack of probable
cause,74 and that her concerns were also based on complaints from other ADAs,
phone calls from the arraignment parts, and ADAs coming to her after leaving
court, or when sent to her by their supervisors.75 ADA Rucker explicitly stated on
cross-examination that her concerns were not based only on the anonymous letter
Rucker’s request, the defendant was stopped and questioned for no specified
reason at his sister’s building, where he was apparently staying, and then the
defendant was arrested because he failed to provide his sister’s name or apartment
number. See Tr. 10/18 at 609:7–614:19, 617:25–619:9. ADA Grigoryan testified
that in his opinion this arrest was “absolutely valid.” Id. at 611:14.
72
Tr. 10/15 at 176:7–8.
73
Id. at 176:10–11.
74
Tr. 10/16 at 234:9.
75
See id. at 237:13–238:8, 239:11–24, 240:6–7, 243:13–18, 244:6–12.
Further support for ADA Rucker’s criticisms can be found in the opinions of New
York state courts. See, e.g., Almonte, 2011 WL 864940, at *1 (criticizing police
officer who was apparently “operating under the assumption that he had the
authority to identify anyone leaving a trespass affidavit building”). Other cases
describe problems with stops and arrests inside TAP buildings. See, e.g., People v.
Ruiz, No. 056832C-2006, 2007 WL 1428689, at *3–4 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Co. May 15,
2007) (chastising NYPD after apparently unlawful trespass arrest inside Clean
Halls building, and concluding: “One hopes the New York City Police Department
will better train its officers in the realm of Criminal Trespass so that only true
trespassers will be arrested, and innocents will be spared.”).
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and the indoor stop highlighted by defendants.76
To the extent that ADA Rucker’s concerns were based partly on
statements made by non-parties who did not testify at the hearing and whose
statements do not fall under any hearsay exception, I give no weight to the truth of
those statements. I do not accept, however, the insinuation that ADA Rucker
invented the problem of unlawful Clean Halls trespass stops in order to lessen the
Bronx DA’s caseload,77 or that she imagined the dismissed trespass cases under
pressure from the Bronx Defenders.78 ADA Rucker’s concerns are independently
corroborated by numerous “decline to prosecute” affidavit forms. As ADA Rucker
explained, the Bronx DA’s office produces these affidavits after a police officer or
witness is interviewed and the office declines to prosecute the case.79
The decline to prosecute forms are an important source of information
and I have reviewed each of them. Plaintiffs entered into evidence twenty-six
76
See Tr. 10/16 at 237:13–16. Accord Tr. 10/15 at 202:22–203:20
(ADA Rucker rejecting mischaracterization of her views in 9/6/12 Letter from
Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly to Bronx County District Attorney
Robert Johnson, Pl. Ex. 12); Tr. 10/16 at 235:3–7 (ADA Rucker explaining that
she had orally conveyed details of other cases to the NYPD).
77
See Tr. 10/16 at 246:8–248:14.
78
See id. at 222:9–224:2.
79
See id. at 213:5–7.
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forms generated by the Bronx DA’s office in support of its decision not to
prosecute cases involving arrests for trespass outside TAP buildings in the Bronx
over three sample months in 2011.80 Without giving weight to the truth of any
hearsay statements attributed to arrestees in the decline to prosecute forms, the
forms persuasively show that ADA Rucker was not alone in the Bronx DA’s office
in perceiving a recurring problem involving legally unjustified trespass stops and
arrests outside Clean Halls buildings.81 Defendants concede that the forms are, at
minimum, admissible “for the limited purpose of establishing that officers’
observations of entries/exits were the bases for the underlying stops,” though
defendants question whether the forms can support this finding in the absence of
80
See Pl. Findings ¶ 16 n.1; Tr. 10/16 at 210:17–220:25; Tr. 10/17 at
508:11–509:20; Bronx DA Decline to Prosecute Affidavits (“Decline Prosecute
Affs.”), Pl. Ex. 74. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 74 contains thirty-one forms, but plaintiffs
later conceded that only twenty-eight forms expressly identify the building outside
of which the stop took place as a TAP building. See Pl. Findings ¶ 16 n.2
(referring to Decline Prosecute Affs. at 4425, 5001, 5055). In addition, two of the
forms are revisions of other forms. Compare Decline Prosecute Affs. at 2996,
3088, with id. at 3174, 3086.
81
ADA Rucker confirmed that the types of cases described in the
decline to prosecute forms were, in part, what motivated the Bronx DA’s office to
adopt a policy in July 2011 of declining to prosecute cases where the arresting
officer had only observed someone exiting or entering and exiting a Clean Halls
building. See Tr. 10/16 at 218:16–219:8. Accord Tr. 10/15 at 180:13–182:18;
7/7/11 Rucker Letter.
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testimony from the assigned ADA and further paperwork.82 Defendants were free
to elicit such testimony and introduce such paperwork. They did not.83 I decline to
draw inferences in defendants’ favor based on the speculative possibility that
further testimony would have revealed persuasive legal justifications for the stops
described in the forms.
In an Appendix to this Opinion, I have collected excerpts from the
twenty-six narratives of stops and arrests that appear in the decline to prosecute
forms.84 One of the shorter and less redacted narratives reads:
On January 5, 2011 the defendants were observed exiting a
[C]lean [H]alls building. The defendants stated they were there
to visit a tenant in the building. After being arrested[,] a tenant
from the building did corroborate the defendant[s’] statements and
the tenant stated that both defendants were in the building as his
guests.
Therefore, the People are declining to prosecute this case at this
time [redacted].85
Based solely on a review of these forms, none of the stops leading to the arrests
described in the forms were based on a reasonable suspicion of trespass. All were
82
Def. Findings ¶ 13.
83
Neither party attempted to determine whether the stops described in
the decline to prosecute forms were recorded in UF-250s.
84
See infra Appendix A (“App. A”).
85
Decline Prosecute Affs. at 4407, excerpted at App. A ¶ 2.
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based merely on exit or entry and exit from a Clean Halls building.86 Thus, over
the course of three months in 2011, there were at least twenty-six arrests for
trespass outside Clean Halls buildings in the Bronx that resulted from stops lacking
reasonable suspicion. As will be discussed in greater detail below, these arrests
independently suggest a widespread practice of unlawful stops.87
In sum, ADA Rucker’s testimony and the supporting exhibits,
including the decline to prosecute forms, contained more than enough evidence to
support the conclusion that there is a clear and substantial likelihood that plaintiffs
will be able to prove at trial that NYPD officers in the Bronx repeatedly stopped
and questioned people on suspicion of trespass simply because they were observed
exiting or entering and exiting a Clean Halls building. ADA Rucker’s testimony
and the supporting exhibits show that a nexus existed between the Clean Halls
program and the kinds of unlawful trespass stops described by plaintiffs and
quantified by Dr. Fagan, as discussed in the sections below. That is, the stops of
people exiting or entering and exiting Clean Halls buildings took place because the
buildings were enrolled in Operation Clean Halls.
86
Some of the forms describe stops in which an officer eventually
obtained probable cause for an arrest. See, e.g., App. A ¶ 23. But the instant case
concerns the legal basis for stops, not arrests.
87
See infra Part V.B.1.a.
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Findings of Fact Regarding Plaintiffs’ Stops
Plaintiffs offered testimony at the preliminary injunction hearing
regarding their experiences in having been stopped on suspicion of trespass outside
Clean Halls buildings in the Bronx. Sometimes plaintiffs’ accounts were
corroborated by other plaintiffs and witnesses. In a few cases, the parties were able
to identify officers who took part in the stops, and these officers testified. In other
cases, neither plaintiffs nor defendants were able to identify the officers.
Defendants argue that plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient
information to identify the John Doe officers in the case, and that as a result this
Court should not credit plaintiffs’ testimony.88 Defendants go so far as to suggest
that the stops about which plaintiffs testified “may not have occurred at all.”89
Based on the testimony described below, I reject this contention. Perhaps the
strongest sign of the credibility of plaintiffs’ testimony is the striking similarities
among plaintiffs’ stops. A person approaches or exits a Clean Halls building in the
Bronx; the police suddenly materialize, stop the person, demand identification, and
question the person about where he or she is coming from and what he or she is
doing; attempts at explanation are met with hostility; especially if the person is a
88
See Tr. 11/7 at 1298:19–22 (defendants’ summation).
89
Def. Findings ¶ 15.
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young black man, he is frisked, which often involves an invasive search of his
pockets; in some cases the officers then detain the person in a police van in order to
carry out an extended interrogation about the person’s knowledge of drugs and
weapons; and in some cases the stop escalates into an arrest for trespass, with all of
the indignities, inconveniences, and serious risks that follow from an arrest even
when the charges are quickly dropped.
Nevertheless, while I found plaintiffs’ testimony credible, it would
obviously have been valuable to hear from the unnamed officers involved in
plaintiffs’ stops. The officers were never identified. I find that this was due in part
to the lack of specificity in some of plaintiffs’ memories of their encounters. At
the same time, I also find that defendants made inadequate efforts to identify
officers based on the information plaintiffs did provide.
Defendants claim that Sgt. Robert Musick of the NYPD’s Special
Litigation Support Unit “conducted an exhaustive search to determine the officers
involved in the purported incidents presented by plaintiffs at the hearing.”90 Sgt.
Musick’s reference to his “limited attempts” to identify the officers is closer to the
mark.91 A large part of Sgt. Musick’s investigation involved searches of the
90
Id. (emphasis added). See also Tr. 10/23 at 1113:24–1114:19.
91
Tr. 10/23 at 1115:16.
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electronic UF-250 database, which contained only the addresses and birthdates —
not the names — of individuals stopped after July 2010 when the stop did not
result in a summons or arrest.92 Sgt. Musick conceded that he is “definitely not an
expert” at using the database.93 For example, he was only able to narrow down the
potential list of officers who might have stopped Jerome Grant in the summer of
2011 (discussed below) to a list of three hundred. Yet this list included officers of
all ethnicities, while Grant had testified that one of the two officers was Asian. On
cross-examination, Sgt. Musick explained that he had not searched for Asian
officers within the list of three hundred because Grant’s description of the other
officer did not specify an ethnicity.94 This makes no more sense than refusing to
search a drawer for a pair of striped socks because one cannot remember which
color shoes they match: there was no reason to make the search for the Asian
officer contingent on obtaining more information about his partner. In the end,
92
See Chart by Sgt. Musick (“Musick Chart”), Defendants’ Exhibit
(“Def. Ex.”) UU; Tr. 10/23 at 1123:23–1128:11. Officers are required to complete
a UF-250 form, also known as a “Stop, Question and Frisk Report Worksheet,”
after each stop. See Tr. 10/15 at 67:4–21, 69:24–70:6; Tr. 10/23 at 1110:9–11; UF250 Form, App. B to 7/27/12 Report of Plaintiffs’ Expert Dr. Jeffrey Fagan
(“Fagan Report”), Pl. Ex. 4. UF-250s are discussed at greater length below. See
infra Part V.B.1.a. I have attached a copy of a blank UF-250 form as Appendix B
to this Opinion.
93
Tr. 10/23 at 1145:1, 1158:19–25.
94
See id. at 1153:4–1154:8.
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Sgt. Musick was unable to locate a single UF-250 for any of the eleven stops to
which plaintiffs testified.95
Because I find it extremely implausible that any plaintiff simply
invented the stop or stops to which he or she testified, because defendants failed to
make a sufficiently persuasive effort to identify the officers involved, and because
the officers who did testify failed to undermine any plaintiff’s credibility, I decline
to draw speculative inferences in defendants’ favor regarding the reasons that
unidentified officers might have provided for their stops.
a.
Charles Bradley’s Stop
On May 3, 2011, after finishing his work for the day as a security
guard, Charles Bradley, a black fifty-one year old resident of the Bronx, took the
subway to visit his fiancée, Lisa Michelle Rappa, as they had arranged the evening
before.96 Rappa lived in the Bronx at 1527 Taylor Avenue.97 Bradley formerly
lived with Rappa and had keys to her apartment, but following a disagreement
Bradley had returned his keys.98 1527 Taylor Avenue is a Clean Halls building.99
95
See id. at 1125–1143.
96
See Tr. 10/16 at 257:17–258:22, 259:10–19, 261:1–24, 272:6.
97
See id. at 258:23–24, 259:23.
98
See Tr. 10/15 at 258:23–260:21.
99
See Tr. 10/16 at 260:3–7.
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When Bradley arrived at Rappa’s apartment building, a young man
who lived on the first floor and knew of Bradley’s and Rappa’s relationship let
Bradley into the building. Bradley then walked up the stairs to Rappa’s apartment
on the fifth floor and knocked. Because Rappa is deaf in one ear, Bradley waited a
minute or two. When there was still no response, he returned downstairs and left
the building. Outside, he looked up toward Rappa’s window.100
While Bradley was standing on the sidewalk, an unmarked green
police van approached and an officer in the passenger seat — later identified as
Officer Miguel Santiago — gestured for Bradley to come over.101 After Bradley
approached the van, the officer got out and asked, “What are you doing here?”102
Bradley explained he was there to see Rappa, and that he worked as a security
guard. Bradley testified that the officer responded to his attempts to explain his
presence by suggesting Bradley was acting “like a fucking animal,”103 searched
Bradley’s pockets,104 then told Bradley to place his hands behind his back. Once
100
See id. at 262:4–264:12.
101
See id. at 264:14–265:9; Tr. 10/22 at 1079:18–19.
102
Tr. 10/16 at 266:3.
103
Id. at 266:8.
104
Though plaintiffs have not focused their arguments on the legal
standard for frisks, I note that a frisk requires an additional justification beyond the
reasonable suspicion for the stop. The Supreme Court held in Terry:
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Bradley was handcuffed, the officer placed him in the van, where there were two
other officers. While the van drove away, the officers began to question Bradley:
“When was the last time you saw a gun? When was the last time you got high?
When was the last time you bought some drugs?”105
After twenty or thirty minutes in the van, the officers stopped at the
station house. Bradley was taken into a room, stripped, and told to wait.106 He was
searched in “inappropriate areas.”107 For the next two hours, he waited in a cell
with other people who had been arrested. He was then fingerprinted and given a
[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads
him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal
activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is
dealing may be armed and presently dangerous; . . . he is entitled
for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an
attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 (emphasis added). If the officer who searched Bradley had
no reason to conclude that Bradley posed a danger, the officer’s frisk violated
Bradley’s rights under the Fourth Amendment. See also People v. Driscoll, —
N.Y.S.2d —, 2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 09097, 2012 WL 6699161, at *1 (3d Dep’t Dec.
27, 2012) (“To conduct a protective pat frisk, an officer must have knowledge of
some fact or circumstance that supports a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is
armed or poses a threat to safety[.]” (quotation marks and citation omitted)).
105
Tr. 10/16 at 265:20–22, 266:1–267:17.
106
See id. at 267:16–268:1.
107
Id. at 268:5–6. Bradley later stated that his experiences on May 3
made him feel “extremely violated, to say the least.” Id. at 275:8.
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desk appearance ticket and a date to appear in court to answer the criminal charge
of trespassing. Later, Bradley’s defense attorney provided the Bronx DA’s office
with a notarized letter from Rappa stating that Bradley had been visiting her.108
“[A]t that point in time,” Bradley testified, “paperwork was submitted to me stating
that the People of New York declined to prosecute.”109
Officer Santiago also testified at the hearing, explaining that he
worked two tours on May 3, 2011, the first from 4 a.m. to 12:35 p.m. and the
second from 1 p.m. to 9:30 p.m. Bradley’s arrest took place around 5:20 p.m.,
after Officer Santiago had been patrolling with his partner, Officer Landro Perez,
for a few hours without incident.110 Officer Santiago emphasized that 1527 Taylor
Avenue is in “a drug prone location” with “a lot of robberies, a lot of shootings” in
the area.111 It is a “high crime neighborhood.”112
Officer Santiago’s account of Bradley’s arrest differed from Bradley’s
in several respects. Officer Santiago claimed that before stopping Bradley, he had
108
See id. at 268:9–25, 269:1, 12–13, 272:3–273:7; 7/7/11 Notarized
Letter from Rappa (“Rappa Letter”), Pl. Ex. 17.
109
Tr. 10/16 at 269:2–270:4.
110
See Tr. 10/22 at 1076:8–10, 1077:3–11, 1078:16–18, 1079:5–7.
111
Id. at 1081:5–6, 1082:24–25.
112
Id. at 1082:24.
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observed Bradley at the end of a hallway inside the building “suspiciously walking
back and forth” for two or three minutes and “disappearing.”113 Officer Santiago
claimed that he was able to see Bradley’s suspicious behavior even though he was
inside a police van parked across the street, twenty to thirty feet from the front
door, separated from Bradley not only by the street but by the windows of the front
door, a vestibule, the windows of an inner door, and the hallway.114
Officer Santiago testified that he approached Bradley after Bradley
exited the building and said: “Excuse me, sir, could you come over here?”115 In
response to Officer Santiago’s questioning, Bradley could not tell him the name of
his girlfriend or her apartment number, and could not produce any identification.116
After he arrested Bradley for criminal trespass, they drove five or ten minutes to
the precinct.117 There was only one other officer in the van.118 Officer Santiago did
not ask Bradley any questions along the way, and Bradley was not strip-searched
113
Id. at 1086:21–1087:1; Tr. 10/23 at 1097:8–9, 1101:13–15.
114
See Tr. 10/22 at 1087:2–11; Tr. 10/23 at 1101:20–25.
115
Tr. 10/22 at 1088:15–16.
116
See id. at 1088:11–1089:1; Tr. 10/23 at 1097:1–9.
117
See Tr. 10/23 at 1098:11–1099:1.
118
See Tr. 10/22 at 1080:23–25; Tr. 10/23 at 1098:19–1099:1.
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upon arrival at the station.119
The paperwork Officer Santiago completed with regard to Bradley’s
stop and arrest contained numerous, self-serving errors.120 In direct contradiction
to his testimony at the hearing, Officer Santiago made the following statements on
the arrest fact sheet: first, that he observed Bradley in the building for seven
minutes; second, that he stopped Bradley inside the building; third, that he went to
the apartment Bradley said he was visiting; and fourth, that the apartment was
occupied.121 By all accounts, each of these statements was false. Officer
Santiago’s credibility was further called into question by the fact that in 2002 or
2003 he lied within the scope of his police work by creating two improper
summonses to help a friend.122 Finally, Officer Santiago failed to complete the UF250 form he was required to fill out for Bradley’s stop.123
119
See Tr. 10/23 at 1098:11–1099:1.
120
Officer Santiago admitted that by the time he completed the
paperwork, he had worked fourteen or fifteen hours straight and was “a little tired.”
Id. at 1099:11–12. See also id. at 1105:8–16.
121
See 5/3/11 Clean Halls Fact Sheet for Charles Bradley Arrest
(“Bradley Fact Sheet”), Pl. Ex. 39.
122
See Tr. 10/23 at 1099:17–1100:2. Officer Santiago testified that he
was trying to help a landlord friend who was having problems with a tenant, “so I
issued two improper summons, one in the bus stop and one in the fire hydrant, and
the car was never there.” Id. at 1099:24–1100:2.
123
See id. at 1110:9–11.
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I find Bradley’s account credible. Bradley entered a Clean Halls
building based on an invitation from a tenant, walked upstairs to the tenant’s
residence, found the tenant not home, then returned outside and waited on the
sidewalk while considering what to do. In response to Officer Santiago’s
questions, Bradley offered reasonable and unsuspicious answers. Bradley’s
conduct provided no further basis for a stop.
b.
Abdullah Turner’s Stops
On the evening of March 26, 2011, Abdullah Turner, a black twentyfour year old, had plans to go to an engagement party in the Bronx with his close
friend Anginette Trinidad.124 Both Turner and Trinidad testified at the hearing that
Trinidad was carrying a sweater in a plastic bag.125 When the two had nearly
arrived at the party, Trinidad told Turner she had to return the sweater to someone
in the next building, 2020 Davidson Avenue, which is a Clean Halls building.126
While Trinidad went inside, Turner remained outside and called
another close friend, Felisha Black, on his cell phone. During the call, he paced in
124
See Tr. 10/17 at 472:14–15, 473:9–474:9.
125
See id. at 475:8–15; Tr. 10/18 at 622:25–623:4.
126
See Tr. 10/17 at 474:13–475:7, 481:23–25.
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a circle on the sidewalk, trying to stay warm.127 It was “freezing cold” that night,
but Turner was wearing only a cardigan sweater and t-shirt with no coat or hat.128
After Turner had been pacing and talking on the phone for about five
minutes, someone “snatched the phone out of my hand.”129 When Turner turned,
he saw three police officers: one who was Hispanic and a little stocky; one who
was Indian, tall and slim; and a third officer that Turner did not “get a good look
at.”130 One of the officers, Kieron Ramdeen, testified that he was only with one
other officer, Michael Pomerantz.131 Officer Ramdeen’s testimony on this point
127
See id. at 475:21–476:25.
128
Id. at 495:5–18 (Turner’s testimony). Defendants suggest that it is
implausible that Turner did not go inside the building, because he knew that the
door was unlocked. See Def. Findings ¶ 23 & n.11; Tr. 10/17 at 476:7–10. But
Turner testified that he liked the cold and did not need a coat. See Tr. 10/17 at
477:2–4. Accord id. at 487:20–21, 502:5–19. While Turner’s winter-weather
clothing choices and apparent tolerance for the cold may be idiosyncratic, they do
not undermine his credibility. There is also a facial inconsistency in defendants’
apparent attempt to suggest both that any reasonable person in Turner’s
circumstances would have entered the building to warm up, and that if Turner did
so, he would have provided legal grounds for a Terry stop. A reasonable person
would presumably want to avoid being stopped and frisked, and thus would prefer
standing in the cold to going inside, if doing so would create a reasonable
suspicion of criminal trespass.
129
Tr. 10/17 at 477:8. I note that a reasonable person would not feel free
to leave when his personal property has been seized by the police.
130
Id. at 477:19–23.
131
See Tr. 10/22 at 1008:20, 1012:5–25.
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was not credible, as Officer Pomerantz’s own memobook stated that he was
patrolling on the night of March 26 with Officer Ramdeen and Premativo
Montanez, a Hispanic officer.132
Turner testified that the Hispanic officer who took his phone began
questioning him about what he was doing and whether he lived at 2020 Davidson.
Turner explained that his friend was returning a sweater and they were on their
way to a party in the next building. The officer asked for identification, and Turner
gave him his driver’s license. After the officer saw that Turner did not live on the
block, he asked again what Turner was doing at 2020 Davidson, and Turner
explained again.133 Then the officer asked: “So you don’t know anybody who
lives in this building?”134 When Turner said no, the officer asked him to stand
against the wall.135
While Turner stood against the wall, the Hispanic officer entered 2020
Davidson with Turner’s driver’s license and cell phone still in his possession.
Officer Ramdeen, now alone with Turner, continued asking Turner the same
132
See id. at 1059:11–1061:6; Page from Memobook of Officer Michael
Pomerantz, Def. Ex. HHHH.
133
See Tr. 10/17 at 478:13–22, 479:8–11.
134
Id. at 479:11–12.
135
See id. at 479:12–13.
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questions as before. Eventually, Trinidad emerged from the building, no longer
carrying the plastic bag, and Turner pointed to her as proof of what he had been
saying. Trinidad confirmed Turner’s story while the other officers returned. The
Hispanic officer asked for Trinidad’s ID, and Trinidad gave it to him.136 Then the
officer asked her if she had “anything on her that she shouldn’t have,” and in
response, Trinidad said she had “a little pocketknife that her husband gave her for
protection and a bag of marijuana.”137
After confiscating these items, the Hispanic officer approached Turner
and pointed to a sign on 2020 Davidson and asked him if he knew what the sign
meant. Turner said he did not. The sign stated that 2020 Davidson was enrolled in
Operation Clean Halls. The officer told Turner that he was trespassing and was
going to jail. Turner asked how he could be trespassing if he was outside. The
officer repeated that Turner was going to jail and placed him in handcuffs.138
After being driven to the precinct in a paddy wagon, Turner spent
several hours waiting, was fingerprinted, and then was transferred to central
booking, where he spent several more hours. It was not until the next day that a
136
See id. at 479:13–24, 480:12–24.
137
Id. at 481:1–3.
138
See id. at 481:7–25, 482:1–8.
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judge released Turner. He was then obligated to return to court eight to ten times
before the charges were dismissed.139 Turner testified that the events on March 26
made him feel “defenseless.”140 Trinidad’s testimony at the hearing supported
Turner’s account of the stop.141
Officer Ramdeen testified to a different version of events. He testified
that he and Officer Pomerantz were driving past 2020 Davidson when he saw
Turner in the lobby. Officer Pomerantz stopped the car and Officer Ramdeen
watched as Turner paced aimlessly in the lobby for two to three minutes,
occasionally looking up the stairs. Aware that 2020 Davidson was a Clean Halls
building, Officer Ramdeen approached Turner, who then exited the lobby. In
response to Officer Ramdeen’s brief questioning, Turner volunteered that his
139
See id. at 482:21–483:10, 483:14–21.
140
Id. at 486:1. Turner continued:
It’s like when you’re a kid, when someone is bothering you or
someone is like threatening you, you run to your parents for
protection, and when you’re an adult, you’re supposed to run to
the police. But who are you supposed to run to when like the
police are harassing you or like threatening you . . ., who are you
supposed to run to then?
Id. at 486:3–8.
141
See Tr. 10/18 at 619:23–628:6.
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friend was engaged in a drug deal.142 “I asked him what he was doing in the
building and, in sum and substance, he responded with, I am not going to lie,
Officer, I just came with my friend. She went upstairs to buy weed.”143 Officer
Ramdeen did not record this alleged confession in his arrest report.144
Officer Ramdeen then arrested Turner for trespassing, basing “the
charges on the fact that he had no lawful reason to be in the building and that he
knowingly was there to buy marijuana.”145 Officer Ramdeen could not recall
having arrested Trinidad. He conceded that neither he nor Officer Pomerantz took
any steps to investigate or arrest the drug dealer who, according to their version of
events, was operating that night a few stories above them at 2020 Davidson.146
142
See Tr. 10/22 at 1016:17–1017:14, 1020:11–1021:25.
143
Id. at 1021:21–24.
144
Officer Ramdeen’s arrest report only states that Turner was inside a
Clean Halls building without permission or authority to be there. See id. at
1038:19–1041:24; 3/26/11 Arrest Report of Plaintiff Abdullah Turner (“Turner
Arrest Report”), Def. Ex. ZZ. The confession does appear in Officer Ramdeen’s
supporting deposition, signed on the following day. See 3/27/11 Officer Ramdeen
Supporting Deposition in State v. Turner, Def. Ex. CCC. Like Officer Santiago
after Bradley’s stop, Officer Ramdeen also failed to complete the required UF-250
form for his stop of Turner. See Tr. 10/22 at 1024:2–7. In fact, Officer Ramdeen
marked “NO” next to the field “Stop And Frisk” on Turner’s arrest report. See
Turner Arrest Report at 1.
145
Tr. 10/22 at 1022:20–22. See also id. at 1025:14–1026:4.
146
See id. at 1026:21–22, 1064:13–1065:12.
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I find Turner’s testimony to be credible. Turner stopped briefly at
2020 Davidson so that Trinidad could allegedly return a sweater. While Trinidad
went inside, Turner talked on his cell phone outside for a few minutes. Officers
Ramdeen, Pomerantz, and likely Montanez saw him standing outside the building
in the cold, stopped him, and questioned him. Turner’s responses to the officers’
questions were reasonable and unsuspicious. Turner provided no other grounds for
suspicion. I did not find credible Officer Ramdeen’s testimony concerning
Turner’s spontaneous confession. Turner persuasively denied that he made the
confession,147 and the officers took no steps to investigate or stop the drug dealer
who (according to Officer Ramdeen’s testimony) was operating several floors
above them. I also did not find credible Officer Ramdeen’s testimony concerning
his observation of Turner’s suspicious pacing inside the building before the
officers approached. Based on the totality of the evidence presented at the hearing,
I do not believe that Turner entered the building.148
147
See Tr. 10/17 at 500:12–23.
148
I note, however, that even if Turner entered the building, paced in the
lobby, looked up the stairs, and then exited the building to make his call, a stop
would still have been unjustified. This behavior is innocuous and would not,
without something more, provide reasonable suspicion of criminal trespass, or of
any other crime. As in Bradley’s and Roshea Johnson’s cases, entering and exiting
a Clean Halls building under ordinary circumstances does not establish reasonable
suspicion. See infra Part V.B.1.a.
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Finally, Turner credibly testified to having been stopped on another
night during December 2011 or January 2012 outside of his own building, 2249
Morris Avenue, which is also a Clean Halls building in the Bronx. As Turner was
exiting the building, a police car pulled up. Turner’s thirteen-year-old brother, a
friend, and the friend’s nephew were talking at the front of the courtyard. When
Turner began to step out of the courtyard, a female officer got out of the car and
asked whether they all lived in the building, and they all responded yes. Then the
officer asked for Turner’s identification, and he gave it to her.149 Finally, the
officer “told us that we can’t stand in front of our building, so when they come
back we would need to be gone.”150 Turner testified that he did not feel free to
leave while the officer talked to him: “[S]he had my ID, and I don’t know anyone
. . . who ever just walked away from a cop in the middle of a conversation.”151 In
this encounter as well, I find that Turner’s behavior provided no grounds for
suspicion of trespass or any other crime.
As to whether Turner’s second stop was based on the suspicion of
149
See Tr. 10/17 at 486:9–490:25.
150
Id. at 491:4–5.
151
Id. at 491:6–8, 22–23.
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trespass, the evidence is less clear.152 Nevertheless, because I found Turner’s
testimony credible, because the officer’s questions concerned the right of Turner
and the others to be on Clean Halls property, because there is no indication that the
officers suspected Turner of any other crime, and because the parties were unable
to locate a UF-250 or any other documentation showing otherwise, I find it more
likely than not that Turner’s second stop was based on the suspicion of trespass.
c.
J.G.’s Stop
J.G. is the son of plaintiff Jaenean Ligon and the brother of J.A.G. and
Jerome Grant. The family lives in a Clean Halls building in the Bronx.153
J.G., who is black and seventeen years old, testified that the first time
he remembered being stopped around his apartment building was on an evening in
August 2011. He had gone to a nearby store to buy ketchup for dinner. On his
way back, he saw two plainclothes officers with badges in front of his building and
three uniformed officers across the street. When J.G. reached his building, the
officers stopped him and began asking him questions, such as where he was
152
Defendants’ post-hearing brief does not challenge whether Turner’s
second stop was based on suspicion of trespass, but does challenge whether five of
the other unrecorded stops described by plaintiffs were for trespass. See Def.
Findings ¶¶ 17 (Kieron Johnson), 19 (Jerome Grant), 20 (both of Letitia Ledan’s
stops), 21 (Roshea Johnson). I address each of defendants’ challenges below.
153
See Tr. 10/17 at 438:4–25.
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coming from, where he was headed, and what he had in his bag. After J.G.
answered that he had ketchup in the bag, one of the officers asked him to raise his
hands, then asked him what he had in his pockets. The officer started to frisk him,
first shaking J.G.’s pockets, then putting a hand in J.G.’s left pocket,154 then patting
J.G.’s arms down. After the search, the officer asked for J.G.’s ID and took his
name down on a notepad. Then the other officer looked in J.G.’s bag and
inspected the ketchup. The officers asked for J.G.’s apartment number and rang
the bell. Finally, after Ligon had come downstairs and confirmed that J.G. was her
son, the officers handed her the ketchup and let them go.155
Ligon’s testimony supported J.G.’s account. Ligon testified that she
sent J.G. to the store for ketchup one evening when she was cooking chicken and
154
As I noted above, plaintiffs have not focused on the issue of frisks in
the instant litigation. Nevertheless, it is worth emphasizing that the officer’s
placement of his hand in J.G.’s pocket goes beyond “a carefully limited search of
the outer clothing . . . in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to
assault him.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. If the officer had no reasonable basis for
believing J.G.’s pocket contained a dangerous weapon that J.G. might use to harm
the officer, the officer’s search of J.G.’s pocket violated J.G.’s rights under the
Fourth Amendment. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993)
(reaffirming that Terry frisk “must be strictly ‘limited to that which is necessary for
the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others
nearby’” (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 26)).
155
See Tr. 10/17 at 437:17, 439:4–443:2.
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french fries. A few minutes after he left, she heard her bell ring.156 Jerome Grant
answered the bell and an unfamiliar voice said: “[C]an you please come down and
identify your son.”157 Hearing these words, Ligon thought J.G. was dead or hurt.
She ran downstairs and collapsed on the steps when she saw J.G. standing,
uninjured, beside the officers. The plainclothes officer who was standing with J.G.
approached Ligon, laughing, and handed her the ketchup.158
I find J.G.’s and Ligon’s testimony credible. J.G. provided no
grounds for suspicion of trespass — or indeed of any other crime — as he
approached his building. He also provided no grounds for suspicion in his
responses to the officers’ questions. J.G. provided no further basis for a stop,
much less a frisk. Because the officers did not ask J.G. whether he lived in the
building, it is unclear whether J.G.’s stop was based on the suspicion of trespass.
Nevertheless, because J.G. was only stopped as he approached a Clean Halls
building, because the officers’ questions indicate no suspicion of any other crime
other than trespass, and because the parties have been unable to locate a UF-250
indicating otherwise, it remains more likely than not that J.G. was stopped on
156
See id. at 429:7–430:4.
157
Id. at 430:4–14.
158
See id. at 430:16–433:1.
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suspicion of trespass — if his stop was indeed based on a particularized suspicion
of any crime at all.
d.
Jerome Grant’s Stop
Jerome Grant, J.G.’s older brother and Ligon’s son, testified that his
grandmother, Betty Ligon, lives at 274 Bonner Place in the Bronx.159 274 Bonner
Place is a Clean Halls building.160
Grant, who is black and nineteen years old, testified that the first time
the police stopped him at his grandmother’s building was in July 2011. He had
been playing basketball with his little brother J.A.G., his cousin, and a friend. In
the evening, the group needed to pick up a key from Grant’s grandmother’s house,
so they began walking toward it and sent J.A.G. to run ahead. J.A.G. went inside
the building without leaving the door open, so the others knocked loudly on the
door.161 Grant’s cousin was “a little upset” by being locked out.162
Two uniformed male police officers, one white and one Asian,
approached with flashlights and asked if Grant, his cousin, and his friend lived in
159
See id. at 452:13–25.
160
See Photo of 274 Bonner Place, Pl. Ex. 37.
161
See Tr. 10/17 at 451:21, 453:6–19, 454:17–455:17, 464:19–466:5.
162
Id. at 464:11.
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the building, and if they were trespassing. Grant explained that they were visiting
their grandmother’s apartment to get a key, and Grant’s cousin asked if they were
doing anything wrong.163 The Asian officer responded, “I’m the one that’s talking
here.”164 When Grant’s cousin said that he just wanted to know if there was a
problem, the Asian officer told him to “hush up” and there would not be any
problems.165 Then the officers made Grant, his cousin, and his friend stand with
their backs against a wall and take out their IDs.166 When only Grant had an ID,
the Asian officer told Grant’s cousin and friend: “I could take you in because you
don’t have ID.”167 The Asian officer then wrote down Grant’s cousin’s and
friend’s names and birthdates in a notepad while the white officer did the same for
Grant.168
Then the Asian officer returned Grant’s ID and told the group to turn
around and place their hands against the wall. The Asian officer asked Grant’s
163
See id. at 455:19–20, 456:8–12.
164
Id. at 456:13.
165
Id. at 456:18–19.
166
See id. at 456:21–457:5.
167
Id. at 457:15. I know of no law stating that failure to carry an ID,
standing alone, provides probable cause for an arrest.
168
See id. at 457:18–21.
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cousin whether he had any drugs or blades in his pockets, then grabbed his
shoulders and patted him down to the ankles, stopping to remove all the contents
from his pockets.169 The white officer frisked Grant’s friend and Grant. Finally,
the Asian officer told the group to put their backs against the wall again, warned
them to carry their IDs with them, and explained that the officers had wanted to
make sure the group was not trespassing. J.A.G. came outside shortly after the
officers left. Grant testified that he did not feel free to leave until the officers told
him to go home.170
I find Grant’s testimony largely credible, though it conflicted in
certain minor details with his deposition testimony.171 Defendants argue that the
officers approached based on the group knocking on the door, rather than on the
suspicion of trespass.172 But I accept Grant’s testimony that the John Doe
defendant Asian officer mentioned trespassing as the basis for the stop.173
e.
Roshea Johnson’s Stop
169
Again, as in the cases of Bradley and J.G., the officer’s conduct
clearly exceeded the constitutional bounds of a frisk.
170
See id. at 458:3–459:21, 461:4–24, 462:3–5.
171
For example, Grant stated at the deposition that the Asian officer
frisked all three members of the group. See id. at 467:8–9.
172
See Def. Findings ¶ 19.
173
See Tr. 10/17 at 461:4–19.
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Roshea Johnson is the brother of plaintiff Letitia Ledan.174 From 2001
through 2010, Johnson lived at River Park Towers, a complex of buildings in the
Bronx. Sometimes he lived with Ledan, and at other times with a friend. River
Park Towers is enrolled in Operation Clean Halls.175
On the morning of Father’s Day 2010, Johnson, who is black and was
then thirty-four years old, went to Ledan’s apartment to change into clothes he had
left there. To enter River Park Towers, it is not necessary to pass through security
or a closed gate, or to have a key. Johnson walked into Ledan’s building and took
the elevator to her floor. When he knocked at Ledan’s door, there was no answer.
He went back to the elevator and returned to the ground floor, planning to call
Ledan on the payphone in front of a supermarket in the complex.176
As Johnson crossed the street to the payphone, a black van pulled up
with police officers inside. One officer asked him where he was coming from.177
174
See Tr. 10/16 at 394:2–395:2. Roshea Johnson is unrelated to plaintiff
Kieron Johnson. See id. at 393:20–22.
175
See id. at 298:11–19, 394:2–395:2.
176
See id. at 394:3–399:7.
177
See id. at 399:21–400:13. Defendants have not located a UF-250
connected to Roshea Johnson’s stop, or identified the officers involved in the stop,
despite Roshea Johnson’s precise identification of the time and place of his stop
and his detailed physical descriptions of the officers. See Musick Chart (incident
11); Tr. 10/16 at 401:20-402:3.
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Johnson told the officer he was coming from his sister’s house but she was not
home.178 Then the officer “mentioned something about trespassing.”179 Johnson
tried to tell the officer that he could prove he was not trespassing, and that he had a
letter in his pocket with his name and his sister’s address on it. The officer
responded by handcuffing Johnson and placing him in the back of the van.180
The officers then drove the van to another part of the complex and
questioned Johnson.181 One of the officers asked Johnson “where was the drugs or
the guns at.”182 Johnson said he “didn’t know where the drugs or the gun was.”183
The officers continued asking similar questions for a few minutes, then pulled out
of the complex.184 During the drive, the officers “said you could make it easy on
yourself if you tell us where the guns and the drug was, but I didn’t know where no
guns or drugs was.”185 Finally, after about fifteen or twenty minutes, the officers
178
See Tr. 10/16 at 400:14–15.
179
Id. at 400:17.
180
See id. at 400:17–401:18.
181
See id. at 402:4–22.
182
Id. at 402:19–20.
183
Id. at 402:21–22.
184
See id. at 402:23–403:8.
185
Id. at 403:11–13.
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pulled over at a location about a mile from River Park Towers, opened the door,
and told Johnson to get out of the van.186 “When I got out of the van, he said
maybe you don’t know nothing, and took the handcuffs off me and let me go.” 187
Looking back, Johnson said that the encounter made him feel “angry and kind of
helpless.”188
I find Johnson’s testimony credible. Johnson provided no grounds for
suspicion of trespass as he entered and exited Ledan’s building. He also provided
no grounds for suspicion in his interactions with the officers. Nor did Johnson’s
conduct provide any other basis for a stop.
f.
Letitia Ledan’s Stops
Letitia Ledan, Roshea Johnson’s sister, testified that she has lived at
River Park Towers for the past eleven years. She chairs the maintenance and
elevator committee in the tenants’ association. As noted above, River Park Towers
is enrolled in Operation Clean Halls.189
Ledan, who is black, testified that she has been stopped six times in or
186
See id. at 403:15–20, 403:25–404:3.
187
Id. at 403:18–20.
188
Tr. 10/17 at 417:21–23.
189
See Tr. 10/16 at 297:2–298:19.
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around her building. Twice the stops occurred outdoors. The first took place at
some time in 2009, although she could not provide a more precise date. Two white
male officers stopped her in front of a supermarket in the River Park Towers
complex as she was about to leave the complex. They asked her whether she lived
there and whether she had an ID, then took her ID, looked at it, handed it back to
her, and said to have a nice day. During the roughly three-minute encounter, she
did not feel free to leave because the officers were standing in front of her and had
her ID.190
Ledan’s second outdoor stop occurred in the summer of 2011. Ledan
was returning home from work in the afternoon and saw four uniformed police
officers standing with her husband and two of her friends in front of her building.
While one of the officers patted down one of Ledan’s friends, another was patting
down Ledan’s husband and removing items from his pockets. As Ledan
approached her building, she asked what was going on.191 Then an officer
approached her, and she asked, “[W]hy are you stopping us?”192 The officer told
her to be quiet and asked whether she lived at the building, then asked for her ID,
190
See id. at 300:22–24, 301:1–14, 302:5–25, 317:18–25.
191
See id. at 306:16–308:8.
192
Id. at 308:8–10.
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which she gave to him.193 After returning her ID and finishing the search of her
husband and friends, the officers “just started walking away.”194 As in 2009,
Ledan did not feel free to leave during the encounter because the officer blocked
the entrance to her building and had her ID.195
I find Ledan’s testimony as to both encounters credible. Plaintiffs
have failed to establish, however, that Ledan’s encounters constituted Terry stops.
Despite Ledan’s subjective feeling that she was not free to leave in the first
encounter, Ledan’s limited testimony tended to show that the officers approached
and asked her questions politely and not in an aggressive, coercive, or threatening
manner. “[E]ven when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular
individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual; [and] ask to
examine the individual’s identification . . . as long as the police do not convey a
message that compliance with their requests is required.”196 Ledan’s testimony did
193
See id. at 308:10–19.
194
Id. at 308:19–309:4.
195
See id. at 328:22–330:4.
196
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434–35 (collecting cases) (citations omitted).
Accord Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216 (“[P]olice questioning, by itself, is unlikely to
result in a Fourth Amendment violation . . . [u]nless the circumstances of the
encounter are so intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable person would
have believed he was not free to leave if he had not responded.”).
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not provide adequate evidence that the police conveyed a message that compliance
with their requests was required, and thus that she was not free to terminate the
encounter.
Similarly, Ledan’s testimony concerning her second encounter with
the police suggested that it was consensual. Without delving into the intricacies of
Fourth Amendment case law concerning consensual stops,197 the Supreme Court
has made clear that “[l]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable seizures merely by approaching
individuals on the street or in other public places and putting questions to them if
they are willing to listen.”198 Ledan testified that in her second encounter, she
approached the police, initiated the encounter, and questioned the police before
being questioned by them. Based on this testimony, I find that Ledan’s second
encounter was most likely consensual.
197
Even when the Supreme Court has found consent for a search, it has
held that the “terminate the encounter” standard defines a Terry stop. See, e.g.,
Drayton, 536 U.S. at 200–01 (“The proper inquiry ‘is whether a reasonable person
would feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the
encounter.’” (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436)). See also L AFAVE, S EARCH &
S EIZURE § 9.4(a) (“[I]t does not appear . . . that the Mendenhall-Royer [‘free to
leave’] test is intended to divide police-citizen encounters into their seizure and
nonseizure categories by reliance upon the amorphous concept of consent.”).
198
Drayton, 536 U.S. at 200 (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497
(1983) (plurality opinion)).
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Fernando Moronta’s Stop
Fernando Moronta, who is Latino, was thirty-six years old at the time
of the hearing. He lives in a Clean Halls building in the Bronx. One day after
work in the winter of 2008, Moronta went with his brother, Eladio Vasquez, to his
brother’s apartment building at 1453 Walton Avenue in the Bronx, which is also a
Clean Halls building.199
When Moronta left the building at around 10:30 p.m., a police van
pulled up and half a dozen uniformed officers exited and began questioning
Moronta about where he was going and what he was doing in the building. After
Moronta explained that he had been at his brother’s apartment, one of the officers
asked if he had anything sharp in his pockets and then patted him down and
searched his pockets.200 Then the officer asked if they could go upstairs to confirm
Moronta’s story, and Moronta gave his permission. A white officer asked for
Moronta’s ID.201 On the way up in the elevator, a black officer told Moronta that
he “better be telling the truth,” because if Moronta’s brother did not live in the
199
See id. at 340:24–341:4, 342:1–343:13, 343:14–344; Pl. Findings ¶ 43
(“Eladio”).
200
Once again, as in the searches of Bradley, J.G., and Grant, the officer
violated the Fourth Amendment by exceeding the constitutionally permissible
scope of a frisk.
201
See Tr. 10/16 at 344:24–346:11.
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building, Moronta would be arrested for trespassing.202
At the door, Moronta’s brother identified Moronta, and after the white
officer compared the name given to the name on Moronta’s ID, “he looked at me
and smirked and gave my ID back.”203 On the way down the elevator, the officers
explained that they had stopped Moronta because “the neighborhood is bad, got
drugs and stuff like that.”204 Moronta stated that he did not feel free to leave until
he left his brother’s building.205
I find Moronta’s testimony credible. Moronta provided no grounds
for suspicion as he exited his brother’s building, or in his responses to the officers’
questions. Moronta’s conduct provided no other basis for a stop.
h.
Kieron Johnson’s Stop
Kieron Johnson, who is black, was twenty-one years old at the time of
202
Id. at 346:14–18.
203
Id. at 346:19–347:4.
204
Id. at 347:6–9.
205
See id. at 346:12–349:1. Moronta’s initial inability to remember
whether the stop occurred in the winter of 2007 or of 2008 does not significantly
undermine his credibility. See id. at 350:12–24. Defendants also note that
plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges that Moronta’s stop occurred in 2010. See Def.
Findings ¶ 22 n.10; Compl. ¶ 129. But Moronta testified that he had not looked at
the Complaint closely enough to notice the error until three days before his hearing
testimony, and that plaintiffs’ counsel may have confused the stop to which he
testified with an arrest for trespass in 2010. See Tr. 10/16 at 350:22–352:18.
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the hearing. He lives in a Clean Halls building in the Bronx and testified to having
been stopped in or near Clean Halls buildings seven or eight times, and to having
seen others stopped about ten times. His best friend, plaintiff Jovan Jefferson,
lives across the street at 1546 Selwyn Avenue, another Clean Halls building.206
On a warm day in 2010, around noon, Jefferson invited Johnson over
to play basketball. Johnson went to Jefferson’s building and waited outside, about
six steps away from the door.207 After about two minutes, two uniformed officers
“pulled up in a car and . . . jumped out and ran out and around me.”208 One asked
whether Johnson had been in the building. After he replied that he had not, one of
the officers asked for his ID while the other patted down his front pockets and
reached into his back pockets, where he kept his wallet.209 The officer looked
through his wallet, then the other officer returned his ID and told him he was free
to go. Until then, Johnson did not feel free to leave.210
206
See Tr. 10/16 at 377:11–379:22.
207
See id. at 380:1–381:11.
208
Id. at 381:12–23.
209
Yet again, as in the cases of Bradley, J.G., Grant, and Moronta, the
officer who searched Johnson violated Johnson’s Fourth Amendment rights by
reaching into his pockets during a frisk without a reasonable basis in selfprotection.
210
See id. at 382:6–383:5. Johnson stated that after the incident, he felt
“[e]mbarrassed and worried,” because “there’s usually people outside and I don’t
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I find Johnson’s testimony credible, despite his inability to offer a
more precise date for the stop. Defendants argue that Johnson’s stop was not for
trespass, because he testified that at the time of the stop, he believed the officers
were truancy officers.211 But defendants offer no persuasive evidence that the
officers were, in fact, truancy officers.212 Even if the officers were truancy officers,
defendants fail to show how this fact would undermine plaintiffs’ claim that
Johnson was stopped on suspicion of trespass.213 Presumably truancy officers are
no less able to make trespass stops than any other kind of officer. Moreover,
Johnson’s testimony that the officers asked him whether he had been inside the
building suggests a trespass stop.214 Based on Johnson’s testimony, I find that he
provided no grounds for suspicion of trespass as he waited outside Jefferson’s
building, in his responses to the officers’ questions, or in any other manner.
i.
Jovan Jefferson’s Stop
Jovan Jefferson, who is black, was twenty years old at the time of the
hearing. As noted above, he lives in a Clean Halls building in the Bronx.
like when they see me being stopped by officers.” See id. at 384:7–10.
211
See id. at 385:4–13; Pl. Findings ¶ 17.
212
See Tr. 10/16 at 385:4–387:19, 389:8–391:5, 392:3–10.
213
Cf. id. at 387:21–23.
214
See id. at 382:6–10.
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Jefferson testified that he had been stopped outside Clean Halls buildings about
seven to eight times, and inside Clean Halls buildings about three to four times.
Jefferson’s friend Brandon Muriel lives at 1515 Selwyn Avenue, another Clean
Halls building in the Bronx.215
Jefferson testified that his most recent stop outside a Clean Halls
building occurred between April and June 2012. He and Muriel had been watching
SportsCenter in Muriel’s apartment when Muriel left for work. It was shortly after
noon as the two of them stepped out of Muriel’s building.216 A passing police van
stopped and three officers got out, including two that Jefferson recognized as
officers named “Marquez” and “Rodriguez.”217 Jefferson testified that these
officers had previously stopped him inside his building, and had arrested Kieron
Johnson for trespass inside Jefferson’s building at a time when Jefferson was with
him. The officers had also arrested another friend of Jefferson’s for trespass.218 I
215
See id. at 359:17–361:14.
216
See id. at 361:15–362:16.
217
Id. at 362:18–363:15; Compl. ¶ 83. Officer Luis Rodriguez testified
to being a truancy officer who patrolled Selwyn Avenue between April and June
2012. See Tr. 10/22 at 1067:1–18. Rodriguez testified that he recognized
Jefferson but did not remember stopping him between April and June 2012. See
id. at 1068:8–1069:5.
218
See Tr. 10/16 at 363:14–364:8.
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find it more likely than not that Rodriguez participated in the stop that Jefferson
described.
Rodriguez asked Jefferson and Muriel where they were coming from
and why they were in the building. The officers also asked Muriel for his ID.
Then Jefferson’s mother drove by with his aunt.219 After his mother got out and
approached the officers, Rodriguez stated that Jefferson was “free to go and that he
was just talking to me.”220 Jefferson testified that he did not feel free to leave
before his mother approached.221
I find Jefferson’s testimony largely credible, despite his failure during
his deposition to remember the stop to which he testified at the hearing.222 Given
the number of times Jefferson has apparently been stopped, it is understandable
that he might forget one and then remember it later, just as it would be
understandable if a police officer were unable to remember a relatively brief,
unrecorded stop. I find that neither Jefferson nor Muriel provided grounds for
219
See id. at 364:22–365:17.
220
Id. at 365:7–13.
221
See id. at 366:13–15. He also stated that the stop made him feel the
officers were biased “because I am being stopped all the time just because of the
kind of neighborhood that I live in.” Id. at 366:16–22.
222
See id. at 370:11–372:3.
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suspicion of trespass as they exited Muriel’s building, as they responded to the
officers’ questions, or in any other manner.
3.
Expert Testimony Regarding UF-250 Forms
Plaintiffs’ expert witness, Dr. Jeffrey Fagan, is a criminologist with
expertise in statistics.223 Dr. Fagan performed a statistical analysis of data
contained on certain UF-250 forms completed by NYPD officers in the Bronx in
2011.224 As noted above, officers are required to complete a UF-250 form after
each stop.225 The front and back of the form contain various checkboxes and fields
in which officers indicate the nature of the stop and the circumstances that led to
the stop.226
Dr. Fagan ultimately concluded that the NYPD recorded 1,663 stops
outside a Clean Halls building in the Bronx in 2011 based only on a suspicion of
trespass, and without observing any indoor behavior.227 Of these stops, Dr. Fagan
223
See Floyd v. City of New York, 861 F. Supp. 2d 274, 279–80
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (describing Dr. Fagan’s qualifications).
224
See Fagan Report at 2. Dr. Fagan extracted the data from the City of
New York’s Stop, Question, and Frisk Database. See id.
225
See id. at 3; Tr. 10/15 at 69:24–70:1. See also infra Part V.B.1.a
(more detailed discussion of UF-250 forms).
226
See infra Appendix B (“App. B.”).
227
See Fagan Report at 2–6 & nn.2–8 (analysis leading to original count
of 1,857 stops); Apps. C–E to Fagan Report (exclusion of stops where indoor
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concluded that 1,044 lacked any justification on the front or back of the UF-250
form that would have constituted reasonable suspicion of trespass.228 In other
words, Dr. Fagan concluded that sixty-three percent of the recorded trespass stops
outside Clean Halls buildings in the Bronx in 2011 where no indoor behavior was
observed were not based on any articulated reasonable suspicion.229
Defendants offer a number of arguments against Dr. Fagan’s
conclusions. First, they argue that it is impossible to conclude whether reasonable
suspicion existed for a stop based on a UF-250 alone because “it is a conclusory
form that does not capture all details, nuances and circumstances that may lead to a
stop.”230 Defendants argue that Dr. Fagan had an obligation to incorporate into his
behavior was observed); Tr. 10/15 at 73:5–77:7 (general search method),
114:23–115:2 (exclusion of alleged NYCHA stops), 117:20–119:20 (recapitulation
of general search method); Table 14: Period of Observation of Proximity Stops,
Bronx Trespass Stops, 2011 (“Period of Observation Table”), Pl. Ex. 98 (stop
totals at various stages of analysis).
228
See Fagan Report at 15 tbl. 8; App. L to Fagan Report; Tr. 10/15 at
114:4–115:2.
229
See Tr. 10/15 at 115:1–2.
230
Def. Findings ¶ 3 n.1. In Arvizu, the Supreme Court rejected the
Ninth Circuit’s attempt to clarify the reasonable suspicion standard by analyzing
various stop factors in isolation as part of what the Supreme Court described as a
“reasonable-suspicion calculus.” 534 U.S. at 272. The Supreme Court emphasized
the importance of looking to the “‘totality of the circumstances’” in reasonable
suspicion analyses. See id. at 273 (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417–18). Dr.
Fagan’s report, though quantitative, attempts no such mechanistic analysis, because
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analysis other sources of information, such as “911 calls or SPRINT Reports,
memobooks, arrest and complaint reports, Trespass Crimes Fact Sheets, Owner’s
Affidavits and/or criminal court complaints.”231 Defendants also criticize Dr.
Fagan for having no expertise regarding police training on street stops and
reasonable suspicion, and for having conducted no interviews with police
personnel.232
If defendants believe that such research would have shown that
reasonable suspicion existed for some or all of Dr. Fagan’s 1,044 unlawful stops,
defendants were free to conduct such research themselves and introduce evidence
rebutting Dr. Fagan’s conclusions regarding specific UF-250 forms. Defendants
it does not claim to be the final word on whether reasonable suspicion existed for
any individual stop in the UF-250 database. See Fagan Report at 15 (identifying
stops “where there does not appear” to be any combination of factors justifying a
trespass stop (emphasis added)). Accord Floyd, 861 F. Supp. 2d at 293 (noting that
“(il)legality of a stop” cannot be “conclusively determined on the basis of
paperwork alone,” and clarifying that the UF-250 database “is necessarily an
incomplete reflection of the totality of the circumstances leading to each stop”).
Unlike a hearing on a single motion to suppress, this hearing aims to determine,
based on necessarily limited data, whether the City and NYPD engaged in a
widespread practice of constitutional violations.
231
Def. Findings ¶ 7.
232
See id. ¶ 4.
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did not.233 In general, as I stated when evaluating Dr. Fagan’s methods in Floyd,
the contents of UF-250s are admissible and probative.234 As defendants themselves
emphasize, officers are required to record all the reasons justifying a stop,235 and
the UF-250 provides spaces for officers to record any reason.236 To the extent that
plaintiffs used the UF-250 database primarily to estimate the magnitude of the
problem at issue in this case, plaintiffs were under no legal obligation to
supplement “the extremely rich and informative material”237 contained in the UF233
Similarly, defendants speculate that some of the buildings Dr. Fagan
identified as Clean Halls buildings might not have been enrolled in Clean Halls on
the date of the stop. See id. ¶ 10. Yet defendants fail to identify a single stop for
which this was actually the case.
234
See Floyd, 861 F. Supp. 2d at 290–91. Defendants’ expert misquotes
this earlier opinion as flatly holding that “it would be improper to declare certain
stops ‘unjustified’ and others ‘justified’ on the basis of paperwork alone.” Report
of Defendant[s’] Expert Dr. Dennis Smith in Response to Plaintiffs’ Expert Dr.
Jeffrey Fagan (“Smith Report”), Def. Ex. JJJJ, at 3 n.3 (quoting Floyd, 861 F.
Supp. 2d at 291). In fact, the quoted sentence continues: “without offering any
qualifications: a perfectly lawful stop cannot be made unlawful because the
arresting officer has done a poor job filling out the post-arrest paperwork; nor can
an egregiously unlawful stop be cured by fabrication of the paperwork.” Floyd,
861 F. Supp. 2d at 291 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs have presented Dr. Fagan’s
conclusions in the instant case with the appropriate qualifications.
235
See Def. Findings ¶ 4 (“NYPD training evidence . . . clearly identifies
that its officers are instructed to include all circumstances leading to the stop on the
worksheet[.]” (citing Tr. 10/15 at 86:12–87:2)); Tr. 10/19 at 849:13–19 (testimony
of NYPD Chief James Shea).
236
See App. B.
237
Floyd, 861 F. Supp. 2d at 292.
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250 database with other paperwork or testimony.
In any case, even if there are reasons to believe that Dr. Fagan’s
exclusive reliance on UF-250s led to inaccuracies, the inaccuracies generally
favored defendants, not plaintiffs. UF-250s present a one-sided picture of a stop:
they are completed not by neutral third parties, or with the cooperation of the
stopped person, but by officers who have obvious incentives to justify the stops
they have made.238 More significantly, evidence from the hearing suggested that
many stops take place for which no UF-250 form is ever generated. Sgt. Musick
failed to identify a single UF-250 form for any of the eleven stops to which
plaintiffs testified,239 and in both of the stops where officers were clearly identified,
the officers admitted that they had failed to complete a UF-250 for the stop.240
Plaintiffs also introduced two reports by the Civilian Complaint Review Board
(“CCRB”) stating that there is a systemic problem with officers failing to complete
238
This conclusion receives anecdotal support from Officer Santiago’s
erroneous paperwork regarding Bradley’s arrest, which tended to overstate rather
than understate the justifications for the arrest. See Bradley Fact Sheet.
239
See Tr. 10/23 at 1125–1143.
240
See Tr. 10/22 at 1024:2–7 (Officer Ramdeen’s failure to complete UF250 for Turner’s stop); Tr. 10/23 at 1110:3–18 (Officer Santiago’s failure to
complete UF-250 for Bradley’s stop).
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UF-250 forms after stops.241
In light of the above, I reject defendants’ contention that the sole
reliance on UF-250 forms as a statistical tool provides a categorically inadequate
basis for determining the rough magnitude of unlawful stops in this case. I also
find that failures to fill out UF-250 forms likely led to a significant undercounting
of both lawful and unlawful stops in Dr. Fagan’s analysis.
Second, defendants attack Dr. Fagan’s analysis based on his failure to
take account of a field on the UF-250 labeled “Period of Observation Prior To
Stop.”242 Defendants correctly note that the location field that Dr. Fagan matched
to Clean Halls addresses indicates not the location of the suspected trespass but the
location of the stop.243 According to defendants’ theory, Dr. Fagan’s analysis
overcounted the number of outdoor stops based on suspicion of trespass in Clean
241
See CCRB 2010 Annual Report, Pl. Ex. 78, at 13 (2010 report
describing failure to fill out UF-250s as “major failure[]”); CCRB 2011 Annual
Report, Pl. Ex. 79, at 14 (2011 Report describing same as “major categor[y] of
failure”). I note that the NYPD Legal Bureau’s PowerPoint presentation at
Rodman’s Neck may be read as suggesting, erroneously, that UF-250s need not be
prepared when a stop results in arrest: “If the investigation does not lead to an
arrest the individual must be released immediately, and a UF-250 must be
prepared.” NYPD Legal Bureau, Street Encounters PowerPoint Presentation
(“Street Encounters Presentation”), Def. Ex. J, at 27. But see id. at 33 (stating that
a UF-250 must be prepared for every stop that is based on reasonable suspicion).
242
See Def. Findings ¶ 6; App. B.
243
See Tr. 10/15 at 45:14–47:4.
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Halls buildings because officers may have stopped someone near a Clean Halls
building on suspicion of trespass in a nearby building.244 As defendants conceded
in their opening argument, however, the possibility of a discrepancy between the
location of the suspected trespass and the location of the stop “cuts both ways.”245
Just as Dr. Fagan’s analysis might erroneously include stops that were in fact based
on suspicion of trespass in a building near a Clean Halls building, so might his
analysis erroneously exclude stops that were based on suspicion of trespass in a
Clean Halls building but took place elsewhere.246 I am not persuaded that one
effect would be larger than the other.
On the other hand, there is some validity to defendants’ argument that
Dr. Fagan’s method might have failed to exclude stops based wholly or in part on
observations of indoor behavior, despite Dr. Fagan’s attempt to exclude these
stops.247 Dr. Fagan assumed that whenever an officer checked “Outside” rather
than “Inside” on a UF-250 and gave no indication elsewhere on the form of having
244
See Def. Findings ¶¶ 6, 10; Tr. 11/7 at 1309:9–1310:22.
245
Tr. 10/15 at 47:1–4. Accord Fagan Report at 5–6 (noting
underinclusive results of Dr. Fagan’s “exact match” method).
246
I address below defendants’ argument that the period of observation
field could contribute to reasonable suspicion.
247
See Def. Findings ¶ 10.
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observed indoor behavior,248 the officer’s suspicion was not based at all on an
observation of indoor behavior.249 But it is easy to imagine an officer observing
behavior inside a Clean Halls building, making a stop outside, checking the
“Outside” box as a result of the stop location, describing the location of the
outdoor stop in greater detail in the “Type of Location” field, and failing to
indicate elsewhere on the form that all or part of the observed behavior took place
inside.
Nonetheless, defendants have failed to show why it was necessary for
Dr. Fagan to exclude all stops involving the observation of indoor behavior in the
first place. An outdoor stop based on the observation of unsuspicious indoor
behavior may be just as unconstitutional, and just as potentially relevant to
establishing a pattern of unlawful trespass stops outside Clean Halls buildings,250 as
248
According to plaintiffs, the UF-250 database fields that could contain
text suggesting an observation of indoor behavior included the field called
“premname,” as summarized in App. D to the Fagan Report, and the field called
“detailSA,” as summarized in App. E to the Fagan Report.
249
See Fagan Report at 3–4; Tr. 10/15 at 73:8–77:7, 128:1–130:16.
250
See Pl. Findings ¶ 69 (stating plaintiffs’ claim as follows: “[T]he
defendants have a pattern and practice of unlawful stops on suspicion of
trespassing outside TAP buildings in the Bronx.”). Some of the text strings in
Fagan Report Appendices D and E that indicate indoor behavior also indicate
reasonable suspicion for a trespass stop, such as “DRINKING IN REAR OF
BUILDING,” and “STAIRWELL DRINKING.” App. E to Fagan Report. Many
others, however, do not. See App. D to Fagan Report (excluding stops with text
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a stop based solely on the observation of unsuspicious outdoor behavior near a
TAP building, or a person exiting a TAP building. Perhaps Dr. Fagan attempted to
exclude all stops involving the observation of indoor behavior because these stops
as a group tend to have a greater likelihood of being based on reasonable
suspicion, especially if the officer observed the person indoors for a long period of
time. If so, the exclusion was a gesture of methodological conservatism,251 and the
apparent unfeasibility of perfectly executing the exclusion should not be held
against plaintiffs. While Dr. Fagan’s methods may have failed to exclude some
stops that were preceded by an observation of indoor behavior, this failure, by
itself, is unlikely to have any significant impact on the validity of Dr. Fagan’s
conclusions.252
Third, defendants criticize Dr. Fagan for having departed from
strings such as “LOBBY,” and “VESTIBULE”); App. E to Fagan Report (same
with text strings such as “INSIDE CLEAN HALLS,” and “SUSPECT
OBSERVED INSIDE CLEAN HALL BUILDING”).
251
Dr. Fagan’s testimony suggested that he attempted to exclude any stop
that was “not purely an outdoor stop.” See Tr. 10/15 at 74:3–5 (emphasis added).
252
A similar argument applies to defendants’ assertion that Dr. Fagan’s
method failed to exclude some stops that took place outside a Clean Halls building
but within the legal limits of the property on which the building sits. See Def.
Findings ¶ 10; Tr. 10/15 at 128:1–9. An unconstitutional stop outside a Clean
Halls building but within the property line can support the existence of a pattern of
unconstitutional stops outside Clean Halls buildings just as well as an
unconstitutional stop a few steps outside the lot boundary.
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methods he used to analyze UF-250 forms in Davis and Floyd.253 I decline to
evaluate Dr. Fagan’s simple methods in the instant case through the circuitous
route proposed by defendants of analyzing Dr. Fagan’s far more complicated
methods in the other two cases, determining whether those methods were valid,
comparing those methods to Dr. Fagan’s methods in the instant case, analyzing
whether Dr. Fagan’s methods in the instant case are consistent with the methods in
the other two cases, and then, if any inconsistency arises, rejecting Dr. Fagan’s
methods in the instant case on that basis. Instead, I will simply evaluate the
validity of Dr. Fagan’s methods in the instant case on their own terms.
Furthermore, it would be entirely understandable if the application of
the method from Floyd to the instant case resulted in a lower count of unlawful
stops than the method Dr. Fagan used here. The explanation for such a
discrepancy is apparent. Dr. Fagan used more conservative assumptions
throughout Floyd than in the instant case, and with valid reason.254 The universe of
stops that Floyd analyzes for unconstitutionality is vastly larger than the universe
253
See Def. Findings ¶ 4 (citing generally Dr. Fagan’s analyses in Floyd
and Davis).
254
For example, Dr. Fagan assumed in Floyd and Davis, which also dealt
with a far larger universe of stops, that Furtive Movements in combination with
High Crime Area should be coded as constituting reasonable suspicion. See Tr.
10/15 at 151:2–5.
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analyzed for unconstitutionality as part of the instant motion — 2.8 million stops
versus 1,663.255 As a result, the plaintiffs in Floyd have less of a need for precision
than plaintiffs in the instant case. That does not mean that plaintiffs’ precision in
the instant case is spurious. Dr. Fagan’s credibility should hardly be questioned in
the instant case simply because, for whatever strategic or pragmatic reasons, he
chose cautious but more manageable methods in another case that might result in a
large number of unlawful stops being coded as lawful. Once again, the relevant
question in evaluating Dr. Fagan’s methods in the instant case is whether the
methods are valid here, not whether they are identical to the methods used in a
different case based on a different universe of stops.256
Fourth, defendants persuasively note that Dr. Fagan’s analysis,
255
Compare Floyd, 861 F. Supp. 2d at 278, with Period of Observation
Table.
256
In addition, I note that the method in Floyd aims to identify stops for
which no reasonable suspicion of any crime exists, whereas the method in the
instant case aims to identify stops for which no reasonable suspicion of trespass
exists. Given a universe of forms recording stops based only on suspicion of
trespass, there may be some forms containing data that could arguably constitute
reasonable suspicion of some crime, but not of trespass. The Floyd method will
identify these stops as arguably lawful, while Dr. Fagan’s method in the instant
case will identify them as apparently unlawful. As a result, Dr. Fagan’s method in
the instant case will result in a higher count of unlawful stops than his method in
Floyd. This does not imply bad faith or a contradiction in Dr. Fagan’s methods,
much less prove the invalidity of Dr. Fagan’s method in the instant case. Floyd
and Ligon simply aim to assess different sets of stops.
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standing alone, does not provide a convincing methodology for establishing a
causal nexus between the Clean Halls program and the stops that Dr. Fagan
analyzed.257 As Dr. Smith, stated in his report:
Professor Fagan’s methodology, by its very nature, cannot
distinguish between whatever impact Clean Halls may have had
on the pattern of Terry stops in the Bronx [and] the impact other
factors . . . might have had on that same pattern. . . . [I]t would be
invalid to conclude that Professor Fagan has demonstrated that the
Clean Halls program itself, and its implementation, caused the
outcomes Professor Fagan observes and the Plaintiffs challenge.258
In essence, Dr. Fagan selected a set of stops from the UF-250 database
based on several selection criteria — the stops had to be in the Bronx, on suspicion
of trespass only, at the location of a Clean Halls address, outside, and so on 259 —
and then determined how many of the stops in the set were unjustified. This
approach cannot show whether stops in the set were more likely to be unjustified
than stops in the UF-250 database in general, or stops in some other relevant set.
Much less can this approach show that belonging to the set causes an increased
likelihood that a stop will be unjustified. Just as Dr. Fagan analyzed the number
257
See Def. Findings ¶ 3 (citing Tr. 10/23 at 1172–77; Smith Report at
7–29).
258
Smith Report at 8 (emphasis added).
259
See Fagan Report at 8 tbl.1; Tr. 10/15 at 83:15–85:7, 124:25–126:17
(excluding stops at NYCHA addresses).
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and percentage of trespass stops outside Clean Halls buildings that were
unjustified, one could analyze the quantity of unjustified trespass stops outside any
arbitrary category of building — such as green buildings, or buildings with oddnumbered addresses. If, hypothetically, the police were making a large number of
unjustified stops throughout New York City, the analysis would show that a large
number of stops outside odd-numbered buildings were unjustified. It would
obviously be inappropriate to infer from this that the police had a customary
practice of making unlawful stops outside odd-numbered buildings, or to grant a
preliminary injunction requiring the police to conduct specific training regarding
stops outside odd-numbered buildings.260
Thus, defendants are correct that Dr. Fagan’s analysis, standing alone,
cannot establish a causal nexus between Clean Halls buildings and unlawful
trespass stops. But plaintiffs have already established a clear likelihood of proving
such a nexus based on other evidence. ADA Rucker credibly testified to the police
260
Plaintiffs imply in their Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (“Reply Mem.”) that it is not
necessary for plaintiffs to prove “that officers are stopping people because the
building is enrolled in the Clean Halls program.” Reply Mem. at 3. But as the
analogy to the odd-numbered building hypothetical suggests, this cannot be
correct. Plaintiffs’ request for preliminary relief depends on there being a specific
problem involving stops outside Clean Halls buildings, a problem that can only be
partially solved by improving the general training regarding the law of stop and
frisk.
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repeatedly making unjustified trespass stops and arrests outside Clean Halls
buildings because they were Clean Halls buildings.261 One plaintiff testified that
an officer explained an unlawful trespass stop based on the fact that it took place
outside a Clean Halls building.262 As discussed below, an officer in the NYPD’s
Legal Bureau learned through focus groups with sergeants and lieutenants that they
believed it was legal to approach and question, if not stop, anyone in a TAP
building even without a reason for doing so.263 Finally, on 417 of the UF-250s in
Dr. Fagan’s original universe of 1,857 trespass stops outside Clean Halls buildings,
officers handwrote phrases or words to the effect of “Clean Halls” or “Trespass
Affidavit.”264 The purpose of a UF-250 is to record the circumstances that led to an
261
See supra Part IV.A.1.
262
See Tr. 10/17 at 481:7–482:8 (Hispanic officer in Turner stop). I also
note — though the evidence does not relate directly to the outdoor stops at issue in
this case — that Officer Santiago testified that even after receiving the NYPD’s
stop and frisk training at Rodman’s Neck, he still believed there was legal
justification to ask anyone in the lobby or hallways of a Clean Halls building for an
ID, even in the absence of any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise. See Tr. 10/23 at
1111:2–1113:10. Officer Santiago attempted to qualify this rule by stating that the
building needed to be in a high crime area in order to justify a request for ID. See
id. at 1111:9–22. He then undermined this qualification by stating, categorically,
that all Clean Halls buildings are in high crime areas. See id. at 1111:24–1112:1.
263
See Tr. 10/18 at 648:18–649:16.
264
See Tr. 10/15 at 124:18–24.
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officer’s stop.265 The frequency with which officers took the time to note “Clean
Halls” on a form, even though there is no specific field or checkbox and no reason
for doing so,266 suggests that many officers thought a building’s enrollment in
Clean Halls contributed to the justification for the stop.
Fifth, defendants challenge the methods and assumptions Dr. Fagan
followed in processing the information contained on UF-250 forms into
conclusions regarding the number of unlawful stops.267 Not surprisingly,
defendants argue that many of the forms Dr. Fagan identified as lacking an
articulation of reasonable suspicion in fact contained such an articulation. Because
these arguments involve mixed questions of fact and law that depend on a finegrained analysis of what constitutes reasonable suspicion, I will address them in
my conclusions of law below.268 In any case, the facts regarding how Dr. Fagan
counted the number of unlawful stops are not in material dispute.
Based on the testimony of plaintiffs and others, the decline to
prosecute forms, and the statistical analysis performed by Dr. Fagan and discussed
265
See id. at 123:17–20.
266
See id. at 124:14–17; Tr. 10/22 at 1058:24–1059:2, 1072:9–19; Tr.
10/23 at 1110:23–1111:1; App. B.
267
See Def. Findings ¶¶ 3, 6, 8–10.
268
See infra Part V.B.1.a.
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in greater detail below, I find that plaintiffs have shown a clear likelihood of laying
a sufficient factual foundation to prove that defendants have engaged in a
widespread practice of making unlawful trespass stops outside TAP buildings in
the Bronx.
B.
Steps Taken by the NYPD in 2012
TAP began in the early 1990s in Manhattan.269 Despite the program’s
name, TAP was originally focused not on trespass but on narcotics sales taking
place in the common areas of private buildings, such as lobbies, stairwells, and
rooftops.270 An officer who testified regarding the origins of TAP stated that “[t]he
more that we cracked down on drug sales on the street, the more that you saw drug
dealers move indoors.”271 Before TAP, officers had to deal informally with
269
See Tr. 10/17 at 519:8–520:16; Smith Report at 10–11; NYPD Legal
Bureau, Trespass Affidavit Program: Legal Guidelines for Citizen Encounters in
Trespass Affidavit Buildings (“1999 TAP Legal Guidelines”), Def. Ex. O, at 1.
When TAP expanded to the Bronx, it was called “Clean Halls,” though as of May
2012 the NYPD has begun referring uniformly to the program as TAP. See Tr.
10/17 at 520:17–521:7. In Queens, TAP was referred to, inexplicably, as “FTAP.”
See id.
270
See Tr. 10/17 at 519:23–520:16. For the historical background of the
War on Drugs, see W ILLIAM J. S TUNTZ, T HE C OLLAPSE OF A MERICAN C RIMINAL
JUSTICE 23–26, 267–74 (2011); M ICHELLE A LEXANDER, T HE N EW JIM C ROW
40–58 (2010).
271
Tr. 10/17 at 519:14–16.
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landlords to get permission to enter private buildings in search of drug sales.272
TAP provided a formal process for building owners to permit officers to conduct
“vertical patrols” inside the buildings.273
Defendants were unable to produce a single written policy or
procedure governing any aspect of TAP between the program’s origins in the early
1990s and the issuance of two orders in 2012, discussed below.274 Nor did
defendants produce evidence that the NYPD conducted any training or created any
training materials specific to TAP before 2012.275 Nor did the NYPD have an
272
See id. at 519:8–520:6.
273
See id. at 519:23–520:6.
274
See id. at 633:13–17. In 1999, the NYPD’s Legal Bureau created its
“Legal Guidelines for Citizen Encounters in Trespass Affidavit Buildings.” See
1999 TAP Legal Guidelines. One passage of the fourteen-page document states:
“IT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD THAT WHEN AN OFFICER IS NOT IN THE
BUILDING (E.G., SITTING ACROSS THE STREET IN AN R.M.P.), MERELY
OBSERVING AN INDIVIDUAL ENTERING AND EXITING THE BUILDING,
OR SIMPLY EXITING THE BUILDING, IS NOT ENOUGH TO CONDUCT A
STOP.” Id. at 6; Tr. 10/18 at 684:2–4. But Inspector Sweet testified that he did
not know of anyone to whom the document had been distributed. See Tr. 10/18 at
654:5–7. Defendants argue that a document from 2000 called Patrol Guide 21259, “Vertical Patrol” (P.G. 212-59), Def. Ex. FFFF, governed TAP before the 2012
Interim Orders. See Def. Findings ¶ 26 & n.15 (citing P.G. 212-59). But P.G. 21259 provides general guidelines for conducting vertical patrols and makes no
mention of TAP or Clean Halls. See Tr. 10/18 at 679:20–25.
275
For the first TAP-specific training and the absence of prior training,
see the numerous citations to the record at Pl. Findings ¶ 48 & n.7.
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accurate and complete count of buildings enrolled in TAP prior to a survey
conducted in the summer of 2012.276
1.
NYPD Recognition of a Problem in TAP
The improvements to TAP in 2012 had their roots in earlier years.
Inspector Kerry Sweet, the executive officer of the NYPD Legal Bureau, testified
that by early 2010, he had become involved in a group that was examining vertical
patrols and trespass issues in NYCHA buildings.277 Inspector Sweet received
approval to examine these issues in the TAP program as well.278 In the summer of
2010 through 2011, Inspector Sweet conducted focus groups with sergeants and
lieutenants involved with TAP, and then with prosecutors and various NYPD
officials.279 Inspector Sweet learned that “there really wasn’t a lot of direction
about the administration of the program.”280 During his deposition, Inspector
Sweet testified that he also learned of “some confusion” regarding TAP stops:
[O]fficers believe their role might have been as doorman [or]
276
See Tr. 10/19 at 773:23–775:14. The survey revealed that there were
over eight thousand buildings enrolled in TAP, including over three thousand in
the Bronx. See id.
277
See Tr. 10/17 at 511:10–514:17.
278
See id. at 521:13–23.
279
See id. at 523:13–524:5, 528:11–13, 531:6–533:1.
280
Id. at 524:6–7.
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custodian, rather than a strict application of De Bour. And once
again, understanding that they needed that articulate reason to
approach somebody and that if you were a doorman, you could
approach everybody, but that is not the case. . . . [I]n TAP
buildings, you have to have a reason to approach people.
...
I wasn’t getting the sense necessarily that they were stopping
people in their tracks, but they may have been asking everybody
coming into a building, what are you doing here, what is your
reason for being here. And that obviously isn’t what we want
them to do nor is it probably the right thing to do under the De
Bour standard.281
Inspector Sweet testified that Katherine Lemire, special counsel to Police
Commissioner Raymond Kelly, attended meetings with Inspector Sweet where this
problem was discussed.282
2.
Interim Orders 22 and 23 of 2012
After completing the focus groups in 2010 and 2011, Inspector Sweet
helped to draft two new regulations to govern the TAP program: Interim Orders
281
Tr. 10/18 at 648:18–649:16. I note that Inspector Sweet’s testimony
regarding what officers said at the focus groups appears to refer to the practice of
stops without reasonable suspicion inside TAP buildings, and thus does not
necessarily indicate that Inspector Sweet was aware of the problem of unlawful
stops outside TAP buildings. At the hearing, Inspector Sweet also emphasized that
his concern was with unlawful approaches, not unlawful stops. See id. at
649:20–650:7.
282
See id. at 650:18–651:17.
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(“IOs”) 22 and 23, both published in May 2012.283 IO 23 of 2012 addresses
various administrative issues relating to TAP, including procedures for enrolling
buildings in the program.284 IO 22 of 2012 lays out procedures for the conduct of
vertical patrols inside TAP buildings, with an emphasis on trespass arrests.285 It
provides explicit guidance regarding when stops are lawful based on the suspicion
of trespass in a TAP building. The second page of the Order begins with an
italicized warning:
A uniformed member of the service may approach and question
persons if they [sic] have an objective credible reason to do so.
However, a uniformed member may not stop (temporarily detain)
a suspected trespasser unless the uniformed member reasonably
suspects that the person is in the building without authorization.286
The next page, in a separate section, repeats the first sentence of this note, and then
continues, again in italics:
When reasonable suspicion exists, a STOP, QUESTION AND
FRISK REPORT WORKSHEET shall be prepared as per P.G.
212-11, “Stop and Frisk.” Some factors which may contribute to
283
See Tr. 10/17 at 534:6–536:1; Interim Order 22 of 2012 (“IO 22 of
2012”), Def. Ex. A; Interim Order 23 of 2012 (“IO 23 of 2012”), Def. Ex. B. An
“Interim Order” is a revision to a patrol guide procedure and becomes the policy of
the NYPD upon publication. See Tr. 10/17 at 522:2–13.
284
See IO 23 of 2012.
285
See IO 22 of 2012 at 1 (¶ 1, “SCOPE,” and “PROCEDURE”).
286
Id. at 2.
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“reasonable suspicion” that a person is trespassing, in addition
to those factors set forth in P.G. 212-11, “Stop and Frisk,” are
contradictory assertions made to justify presence in the building
and/or assertions lacking credibility made to justify presence in
the building.287
The section continues by stating that a trespass arrest requires probable cause, and
that refusal to answer questions is insufficient to establish probable cause.288
As plaintiffs correctly note, however, IO 22 of 2012 makes no
reference to stops outside TAP buildings.289 It does not explicitly state that stops
outside TAP buildings require reasonable suspicion, and that merely exiting a TAP
building is insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion, even in a high crime
area.290
At the hearing, defendants offered evidence of numerous steps that
have been taken to support the implementation of IOs 22 and 23 of 2012.291 After
287
Id. at 3.
288
See id.
289
See Pl. Findings ¶ 54.
290
See IO 22 of 2012.
291
I give little weight to an August 20, 2012 memo from Chief of Patrol
James P. Hall to all commanding officers. See 8/20/12 Memo from Chief of Patrol
to Commanding Officer, All Patrol Boroughs, Def. Ex. E. The letter, distributed as
the preliminary injunction hearing approached, contains a number of ambitious
orders, such as that platoon commanders must personally critique all interior or
exterior “street encounters” involving TAP buildings, including all stops. See id.
¶ 3. At the hearing, the executive officer of the Patrol Services Bureau testified
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any trespass arrest, officers must now complete a “Trespass Crimes – Fact Sheet”
documenting the facts that established probable cause.292 The Chief of Patrol
distributed IOs 22 and 23 to 2012 to all commanding officers with a brief
synopsis,293 pursuant to a two-page plan to promote knowledge of criminal trespass
offenses among uniformed servicemembers.294 Legal Bureau and other personnel
offered instruction on IOs 22 and 23 of 2012 to training sergeants and special
operations lieutenants,295 who were then expected to pass along the information to
“the rank and file” at training sessions during roll call.296 Legal Bureau and other
that he was unaware of any supervisors conducting critiques of stops inside or
outside of TAP buildings. See Tr. 10/19 at 759:6–15.
292
See Tr. 10/17 at 545:15–546:1, 559:24–560:7; Trespass Crimes – Fact
Sheet, Def. Ex. H. While the use of this fact sheet may be a welcome
development, it will do nothing to clarify officers’ confusion regarding the
standards for making a stop outside a Clean Halls building. There is also a new
“Trespass Crimes – Owner’s Affidavit” in support of the administrative goals of IO
23 of 2012. See Tr. 10/17 at 526:21–528:7; Trespass Crimes – Owner’s Affidavit,
Def. Ex. G.
293
See 8/12/12 Memo from Chief of Patrol to Commanding Officers, All
Patrol Boroughs, Def. Ex. C.
294
See 6/18/12 Memo from Chief of Patrol to Chief of Department
(“Trespass Law Plan”), Def. Ex. D, ¶ 2.
295
See id. ¶ 3.
296
Tr. 10/19 at 789:19–790:5.
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personnel provided separate instruction to borough and precinct commanders.297
Some of the training involved the use of a newly prepared video on “Stop,
Question, and Frisk,”298 and an updated version of the Chief of Patrol Field
Training Guide.299
Many of these steps are peripheral to the concerns of this case. The
video and the Training Guide, for example, deal with stop and frisk in general, and
make no specific reference to trespass stops outside TAP buildings.300 In addition,
as discussed below, some of the training materials contain inaccurate or misleading
information that could exacerbate rather than resolve the problem of
297
See Tr. 10/18 at 711:24–714:11.
298
See, e.g., Tr. 10/22 at 996:2–4.
299
See Trespass Law Plan ¶ 6; July 2012 Chief of Patrol Field Training
Unit Program Guide (“Training Guide”), Def. Ex. N. The Police Student’s Guide,
which is hundreds of pages long, has also been revised to include several pages on
IO 22 of 2012. See Police Student’s Guide (excerpt) (“Police Student’s Guide”),
Def. Ex. RRR, at 30–34; Tr. 10/22 at 915:7–919:17.
300
See Training Guide at 10–24; NYPD Stop Question & (Possibly)
Frisk Video Series, “Frisk,” (“SQF Training Video No. 5”), Def. Ex. T; Script of
SQF Training Video No. 5, Def. Ex. U; Tr. 10/22 at 942:25–943:3 (nothing in film
deals specifically with TAP). One page of the Training Guide, which was
distributed only to the supervisors of IMPACT officers, reiterates IO 22 of 2012 by
stating that reasonable suspicion is required for stops based on suspicion of
trespass in a TAP building. See Training Guide at 65; Tr. 10/23 at 1252:1–3. The
page makes no specific reference to stops outside TAP buildings, and could easily
be read, in context, as a discussion of stops during vertical patrols. See Training
Guide at 65.
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unconstitutional stops.301
3.
Absence of Steps Meaningfully Addressing Outdoor TAP
Stops
During the hearing, defendants emphasized the training that officers
receive throughout their careers regarding the laws governing stop and frisk in
general.302 This training has recently been supplemented by a refresher course on
stop and frisk at the Rodman’s Neck training center in the Bronx.303 More than
three thousand officers have attended the training course since its development in
2012.304
The root problem that led to unlawful trespass stops outside TAP
buildings in the Bronx, however, based on ADA Rucker’s testimony and the other
evidence introduced at the hearing, is that officers perceived trespass stops in the
proximity of TAP buildings as exceptions to the general rules governing stop and
frisk. Improving the training surrounding stop and frisk in general may do nothing
to dispel the notion that there is an exception for stops outside TAP buildings.
IO 22 of 2012 makes clear that presence inside a TAP building is not
301
See infra Part V.B.1.b.
302
See Def. Findings ¶¶ 35–36.
303
See Tr. 10/17 at 571:25–572:23.
304
See Tr. 10/19 at 888:1–2; Tr. 10/22 at 955:8–13.
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a sufficient basis for a stop, and that stops made during vertical patrols of TAP
buildings must be based on reasonable suspicion. But IO 22 of 2012 and the
training introduced in support of it present themselves as guides to conducting
vertical patrols inside a TAP building, not guides for making trespass stops and
arrests outside TAP buildings. The difference may seem insignificant when
viewed in the abstract. In theory, officers should be able to infer from the rules in
IO 22 of 2012 how to perform lawful trespass stops outside TAP buildings.
In practice, however, the evidence at the hearing suggests that NYPD
officers are trained to carry out their duties according to a set of standard operating
procedures. The NYPD’s training reduces the unpredictable, confusing challenges
that arise on patrol to a manageable set of standard situations and orderly
procedures for addressing them.305 If a recurring, problematic situation is not
305
IO 22 of 2012, for example, defines the standard scenario for a
vertical patrol in a TAP building, lays out various common problems that may arise
during such a patrol, and prescribes what to do and what not to do in response to
them, including specific questions to ask. See IO 22 of 2012 at 2. After receiving
training on IO 22 of 2012, including role-play simulations, see Tr. 10/19 at
836:7–840:13, an officer will have less need to improvise under pressure or base
his or her responses on inferences from general principles or analogies to other
scenarios. In this sense, the NYPD’s training follows the model of a traditional
Western military academy, which aims “to reduce the conduct of war to a set of
rules and a system of procedures — and thereby to make orderly and rational what
is essentially chaotic and instinctive.” JOHN K EEGAN, T HE F ACE OF B ATTLE 18
(1976). On the functioning of standard operating procedures in bureaucracies
generally, see G RAHAM A LLISON & P HILIP Z ELIKOW, E SSENCE OF D ECISION
143–96 (2d ed. 1999) .
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included in the training, officers may categorize it in the wrong way and employ
inappropriate responses — such as stopping someone simply because he exited a
TAP building. The evidence at the hearing, as summarized in the previous section,
strongly supports the conclusion that many officers took such actions before
2012.306 Yet none of the steps taken by the NYPD in 2012 were directly and
meaningfully focused on uprooting the misconceptions regarding trespass stops
outside TAP buildings that resulted in the constitutional violations in this case.
In fact, based on the evidence at the hearing, the only piece of
instruction that has been provided to officers on a systematic basis and that
specifically targets the problem of outdoor trespass stops at TAP buildings is a
single bullet point included in a PowerPoint presentation offered by the Legal
Bureau as part of the Rodman’s Neck training.307 The bullet point, which takes up
306
As plaintiffs stated in their summation: “We have a 20-year program.
There is a culture around these stops. So [corrective instruction] needs to happen
periodically . . . so that people get the message.” Tr. 11/7 at 1373:2–6.
307
See Street Encounters Presentation at 40; Tr. 10/17 at 572:24–573:6;
Tr. 10/18 at 663:13–664:1. A former commanding officer of the New York City
Police Academy testified that the role-playing at Rodman’s Neck sometimes
involves individuals standing outside of TAP buildings, but the individuals appear
to play the role of civilian bystanders and witnesses, not suspects. See Tr. 10/19 at
815:11–14, 838:25–840:9. Chief Hall testified that “we have made [it] clear” to
officers that “we do not want” them “stopping an individual outside of [a] Clean
Halls building simply because they are exiting a building, without more.” Tr.
11/23 at 1244: 6–12. Chief Hall did not provide specifics as to how this was made
clear. See id.
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one third of a page of a forty-five-page presentation, states:
Observation of an individual exiting a NYCHA/TAP Building,
without more, is not an objective, credible reason to approach that
individual.308
As common sense would suggest, and evidence at the hearing
confirmed, attendees at the Rodman’s Neck training do not always absorb the
lesson contained in this bullet point, or even recall having seen it. One officer who
had recently attended the refresher course at Rodman’s Neck testified that he did
not remember any discussion of TAP,309 and both he and another officer testified
that they could not remember any training involving outdoor stops on suspicion of
trespass.310
In light of the above, and in the absence of reliable statistics regarding
stops in 2012, I find that defendants failed to introduce persuasive evidence
regarding whether the improvements undertaken by the NYPD in 2012 have
affected the magnitude of unlawful trespass stops outside TAP buildings in the
Bronx.311
308
Street Encounters Presentation at 40.
309
See Tr. 10/22 at 1043:17–1044:13.
310
See id.; Tr. 10/23 at 1111:2–8.
311
Defendants introduced evidence of a dramatic reduction in declines to
prosecute for trespass arrests, in general, in the Bronx in 2012. See, e.g., Tr. 10/18
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DISCUSSION
A.
Standing
As a preliminary matter, defendants argue that plaintiffs lack standing
to seek injunctive relief.312 I addressed this issue extensively in Floyd, and again in
Davis, and the same analysis applies here.313 First, “[c]oncrete injury is a
prerequisite to standing and a ‘plaintiff seeking injunctive or declaratory relief
cannot rely on past injury to satisfy the injury requirement but must show a
likelihood that he or she will be injured in the future.’”314 Second, “‘[t]he
possibility of recurring injury ceases to be speculative when actual repeated
incidents are documented.’”315 Third, “‘the presence of one party with standing is
sufficient to satisfy Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement.’”316
at 726:18–727:7; Tr. 10/23 at 1249:7–17. But this obviously does not provide a
reliable basis for inferring that unlawful trespass stops outside TAP buildings have
declined.
312
See Def. Findings ¶ 47.
313
See Davis, 2012 WL 4813837, at *26; Floyd, 283 F.R.D. at 169.
314
Floyd, 283 F.R.D. at 169 (quoting Deshawn v. Safir, 156 F.3d 340,
344 (2d Cir. 1998)).
315
Davis, 2012 WL 4813837, at *26 n.225 (quoting Nicacio v. United
States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 768 F.2d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1985)).
316
Id. at *26 (quoting Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional
Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 53 (2006)).
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Abdullah Turner testified to two specific unlawful trespass stops
outside TAP buildings in the Bronx, and J.G. and Jovan Jefferson both referred to
having been stopped multiple times outside TAP buildings.317 The evidence
suggests that both of Turner’s stops were on suspicion of trespass.318 Furthermore,
Turner has lived since 2008 in a TAP building,319 where, based on the evidence
presented at the hearing, he will likely be the target of future unlawful stops — if
such stops continue to take place as they have in the past.320 This is sufficient to
317
See supra Part IV.A.2.b, c, i. Jefferson testified to being stopped
seven to eight times outside TAP buildings. See Tr. 10/16 at 361:12–14.
318
See supra Part IV.A.2.b.
319
See Tr. 10/17 at 471:11–472:19, 486:9–487:1.
320
I also note, as I did in Floyd, that in light of the frequency of unlawful
trespass stops outside TAP buildings in the Bronx, even those plaintiffs who have
only been subjected to such a stop one time would likely have standing, provided
that they continue to live in or visit TAP buildings. “‘[T]here is no per se rule
requiring more than one past act, or any prior act, for that matter, as a basis for
finding a likelihood of future injury.’” Floyd, 283 F.R.D. at 170 n.106 (quoting
Roe v. City of New York, 151 F. Supp. 2d 495, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)). Accord
Battle v. City of New York, No. 11 Civ. 3599, 2012 WL 112242, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 12, 2012) (concluding that plaintiffs, each of whom had only one alleged
wrongful experience with NYPD officers under program involving searches of
livery cars, had standing to pursue injunctive relief against NYPD, based on
number of cars enrolled in the program and plaintiffs’ reliance on such cars);
National Cong. for Puerto Rican Rights v. City of New York, 75 F. Supp. 2d 154,
161–62 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (concluding that frequency of NYPD stops and plaintiffs’
belonging to groups distinctly affected by NYPD stop practices gave plaintiffs
standing to seek injunctive relief).
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confer standing on plaintiffs.321
B.
Preliminary Injunctive Relief
Plaintiffs seek a variety of injunctive remedies that would require the
NYPD to act in ways that depart from the status quo, including the development
and implementation of new formal policies, new training procedures, and
burdensome new supervisory and monitoring procedures.322 Because the
preliminary injunctive relief sought by plaintiffs is thus mandatory rather than
prohibitory, plaintiffs must show (1) that they are clearly or substantially likely to
prove at trial that defendants are engaged in an ongoing custom of making trespass
stops outside TAP buildings in the Bronx in the absence of reasonable suspicion, in
violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) that plaintiffs are likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief; (3) that the balance of equities
tips in plaintiffs’ favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest.323
321
Of course, plaintiffs would not be likely to suffer injury in the future if
the NYPD no longer had a custom of making unlawful trespass stops outside TAP
buildings. But while defendants have introduced evidence of certain changes in
the NYPD’s policies and training in 2012, defendants have not proven that the
NYPD’s custom of making unlawful trespass stops outside TAP buildings has
ended. See supra Part IV.B.3; infra Part V.B.1.b.
322
See Pl. Findings ¶¶ 72–75. The remedies proposed in this Opinion,
though not identical to those requested by plaintiffs, remain largely mandatory in
nature. See infra Part V.C.
323
See supra Part II.
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The following sections address each of these factors in turn.
1.
Clear or Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Because plaintiffs do not assert that defendants have an explicit or
formally approved policy of making trespass stops without reasonable suspicion
outside TAP buildings in the Bronx, plaintiffs must show a clear or substantial
likelihood of proving at trial that defendants have a custom or usage of making
such stops. Specifically, plaintiffs argue that defendants “have a pattern and
practice” of making unlawful trespass stops outside TAP buildings, and that “the
City of New York has been deliberately indifferent” to this practice “by failing to
supervise and train.”324
My analysis of plaintiffs’ claim proceeds in two steps. First, I analyze
plaintiffs’ deliberate indifference claim and conclude that plaintiffs have shown a
clear likelihood of establishing that defendants’ longstanding failure to train
officers regarding the legal standards for trespass stops outside TAP buildings in
the Bronx, despite actual or constructive notice that this omission was causing city
employees to violate individuals’ constitutional rights, has risen to the level of
deliberate indifference. Whether plaintiffs’ deliberate indifference claim is
324
Pl. Findings ¶¶ 69–70. Plaintiffs present the former as a “constructive
acquiescence” claim, and the latter as a deliberate indifference claim based on
failure to train. See id. Because constructive acquiescence is merely a way of
proving deliberate indifference, I analyze the claims together.
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analyzed in terms of the general standard in Connick, the three-part Walker
standard, or the constructive acquiescence standard, plaintiffs have shown a clear
likelihood of success on their Monell claim. Second, I analyze whether defendants
have rebutted plaintiffs’ evidence of deliberate indifference based on the steps
taken by the NYPD in 2012. I conclude that these steps have not meaningfully
addressed the specific problem of unconstitutional trespass stops outside TAP
buildings in the Bronx.
a.
Deliberate Indifference
Applying the law of Terry stops to my findings of fact, above,
plaintiffs offered more than enough evidence at the hearing to support the
conclusion that they have shown a clear likelihood of proving at trial that the
NYPD has a practice of making unlawful trespass stops outside of TAP buildings
in the Bronx:
i.
ADA Rucker’s Testimony
As described above, ADA Rucker credibly testified that NYPD
officers have treated proximity to a TAP building as a factor contributing to
reasonable suspicion, and have frequently made trespass stops outside TAP
buildings for no reason other than that the officer had seen someone enter and exit
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or exit the building.325 These stops were made because the building was enrolled
in TAP, and they were not based on any reasonable suspicion of trespass.326 ADA
Rucker’s testimony is corroborated by the accounts of stops and arrests in the
twenty-six decline to prosecute forms, as well as by the hundreds of UF-250s on
which officers wrote “Clean Halls” as a justification for a stop.327 As discussed
below, Dr. Fagan’s analysis of UF-250s provides further corroboration of ADA
Rucker’s testimony.328
ii.
Plaintiffs’ Stops
The conclusion that the NYPD has repeatedly made trespass stops
outside TAP buildings without reasonable suspicion is further supported by the
credible and mutually corroborating testimony of named plaintiffs regarding the
circumstances leading to their encounters with police.329 First, with the exception
of Ledan’s two police encounters, each of plaintiffs’ encounters with the police
constituted Terry stops requiring reasonable suspicion. As Ledan’s first encounter
illustrates, it is possible for an officer to approach a person outside a TAP building
325
See supra Part IV.A.1.
326
See id.
327
See Tr. 10/15 at 124:18–24; Fagan Report at 13.
328
See infra Part V.B.1.a.iii.
329
See supra Part IV.A.2.
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and ask the person her name, where she is coming from, whether she lives in the
building, and if not, whether she knows anyone in the building, all the while acting
in such a way that a reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter
and go about her business. But the other plaintiffs’ testimony showed that many
trespass-related encounters outside TAP buildings involve aggressive, coercive,
and threatening police behavior that would not leave a reasonable person feeling
free to terminate the encounter.
Bradley was stopped when an officer in a van gestured for him to
come over, he came over, and the officer asked “What are you doing here?”330
Turner was stopped when three officers approached and one “snatched the phone
out of [his] hand,”331 abruptly and aggressively ending his call and taking control
of his property, without any request for permission to do so. The stop continued as
the officer asked Turner what he was doing and whether he lived in the building
beside which he was standing.332 Turner was stopped a second time when a police
car pulled up in front of him as he and others were exiting a Clean Halls building,
330
Tr. 10/16 at 266:3.
331
Tr. 10/17 at 477:8.
332
See id. at 478:13–22, 479:8–11.
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an officer got out, questioned the group, and requested Turner’s identification.333
J.G. was stopped when five officers approached him outside his building, stopped
him, and asked him where he was coming from, where he was headed, and what he
had in his bag. He was surely stopped when the officers made him raise his hands,
frisked him, and searched inside his pockets and his grocery bag.334 Jerome Grant
was stopped when two officers approached with flashlights, questioned him and
his friends to determine whether they were trespassing, and in response to
questions from those who were stopped, replied with strong words such as “I’m the
one that’s talking here,”335 and “hush up.”336 Roshea Johnson was stopped when a
black van pulled up in front of him with police officers inside and one of them
began questioning him about trespassing.337 He was certainly stopped — and
arrested — a moment later when he was placed in handcuffs in the back of the
van.338
No reasonable person would have felt free to leave in these plaintiffs’
333
See id. at 486:9–490:25.
334
See id. at 437:17, 439:4–443:2.
335
Id. at 456:13.
336
Id. at 456:18–19.
337
See id. at 399:21–400:17.
338
See id. at 400:17–401:18.
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circumstances once an officer or officers approached, caused the plaintiff to stop
through a command, gesture, accusatory introduction, or by taking possession of
the person’s property, and then began asking questions that were clearly intended
to elicit incriminating responses regarding trespassing.
Any doubt that these plaintiffs were free to leave after the
commencement of intrusive investigatory questioning is resolved by looking to the
instances in the decline to prosecute forms when suspects attempted to terminate
their encounters. In one encounter, “the defendant attempted to walk away[,] at
which time [the officer] grabbed the defendant[’]s arms.”339 After a struggle, the
defendant was arrested.340 In another encounter, “[t]he arresting officer stopped
defendant and defendant clenched his fists on his sides and spread his feet apart
and . . . stated . . . YOU’RE NOT GOING TO TOUCH ME. YOU’RE NOT
GOING TO TOUCH ME. YOU’RE NOT PUTTING YOUR HANDS ON ME.”341
The arresting officer then handcuffed the defendant and placed him in a patrol
vehicle.342 Similarly, when various defendants simply refused to answer an
339
App. A ¶ 12.
340
See id.
341
Id. ¶ 20.
342
See id.
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officer’s questions, it became clear that they were not free to terminate the
encounter in this way either.343 In one encounter, the arresting officer “approached
the defendant and asked her where she was coming [from], what was she doing in
the building[,] and what apartment number was she visiting. Defendant responded
in sum and substance: I WAS VISITING A FRIEND. I AM NOT TELLING YOU
THE APARTMENT NUMBER OR THE NAME.”344 The defendant was then
arrested for trespass.345
The responses of the police officers as summarized in the decline to
prosecute forms do not tell a surprising story. Indeed, they are what a reasonable
person would have expected under the circumstances. When a person considers
walking away from an officer who has stopped her and begun asking accusatory
questions, it is objectively reasonable for the stopped person to believe that the
officer will attempt to prevent her from doing so. Persons who are stopped by the
police in circumstances like those described by the plaintiffs (other than Ledan)
343
See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 4, 15, 22, 25, 26. In Davis, I held that “the Fifth
Amendment prohibits police from arresting an individual for refusing to provide
‘testimonial’ evidence.” Davis, 2012 WL 4813837, at *14. Whether refusal to
provide testimonial evidence may contribute to reasonable suspicion of trespass is
a distinct issue, and one not raised by the parties at this stage of the litigation.
344
App. A ¶ 4.
345
See id.
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reasonably conclude that they are not free to terminate the encounter. As a result,
such stops are Terry stops under the Fourth Amendment, and DeBour Level 3
stops under New York state law, and require that the officer have a “reasonable
suspicion” that criminal activity may be afoot.
Second, all but two of the eleven encounters to which plaintiffs
testified appear to have been based on suspicion of trespass, but lacked the
reasonable suspicion of trespass needed to support a Terry stop. The two
exceptions are Jerome Grant’s stop and Letitia Ledan’s second encounter.346
iii.
Decline to Prosecute Forms
There remains the question of how widespread the practice of
unlawful stops was. Plaintiffs argue that the decline to prosecute forms
independently support the finding of a widespread practice of unlawful stops
outside of TAP buildings.347 Their rather complicated argument proceeds as
346
In Grant’s case, his cousin’s or his friend’s knocking loudly and
perhaps angrily on the door of a Clean Halls building may have provided a
minimal level of objective justification for suspecting that Grant and the others
were attempting to enter unlawfully. See supra Part IV.A.2.d. As noted above,
Ledan initiated her second encounter, which was most likely consensual and thus
did not require reasonable suspicion. Even if the stop had been nonconsensual,
under the circumstances her interest in the detention of her husband and friends
may have provided adequate grounds for brief questioning. See supra Part
IV.A.2.f.
347
See Pl. Findings ¶ 17.
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follows: First, plaintiffs assume the City’s expert was correct in reporting that
approximately thirteen percent of the trespass stops analyzed by Dr. Fagan resulted
in arrest.348 From this, plaintiffs infer a rough, general rule that thirteen percent of
trespass stops in the Bronx in 2011 resulted in arrest — or in other words, for every
recorded trespass arrest, there were roughly 7.7 trespass stops.349 Second, in three
randomly selected months in 2011, the Bronx DA’s office produced at least
twenty-six decline to prosecute forms describing arrests that were apparently based
only on a person entering or exiting a TAP building.350 Because entry or exit from
a TAP building does not provide reasonable suspicion, there were at least twentysix arrests in the three sample months that were preceded by stops that were not
based on reasonable suspicion. Third, if the twenty-six decline to prosecute forms
reflect only thirteen percent of the suspicionless trespass stops outside TAP
348
See Smith Report at 6.
349
See Pl. Findings ¶ 17.
350
See supra Part IV.A.1. In the absence of more detailed evidence or
testimony regarding the initial police encounters described in the decline to
prosecute forms, I assume that the encounters were likely similar to those
described by plaintiffs, and thus that the intrusiveness of the encounters likely rose
to the level of a Terry stop at or shortly after the time that the officer or officers
initiated questioning. See generally App. A. I also note that in many of the
encounters described in the decline to prosecute forms, the defendant’s behavior as
described in the form never gave rise to reasonable suspicion, even after the stop
began. See App. A ¶¶ 2, 3, 8, 11, 12, 16, 17, 21, 24.
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buildings in the three sample months in 2011, and if the sample months were
representative of the year, then eight hundred trespass stops took place outside
TAP buildings in the Bronx in 2011 without reasonable suspicion.351
Assuming as I do that the decline to prosecute forms contain largely
accurate descriptions of stops, plaintiffs’ reasoning is persuasive. If anything,
plaintiffs undercount the number of suspicionless stops suggested by the decline to
prosecute forms. Dr. Smith’s thirteen percent figure is the arrest rate for all the
trespass stops outside TAP buildings in Dr. Fagan’s study, including both stops
based on and stops lacking reasonable suspicion.352 Common sense would suggest,
however, that the arrest rate for stops lacking reasonable suspicion — for example,
stops based on nothing more than a person exiting a TAP building — should be
significantly lower than the combined arrest rate for lawful and unlawful stops.
The lower the arrest rate for unlawful stops, the higher the number of unlawful
stops that would be required to generate twenty-six arrests based on such stops. If
the arrest rate for unlawful stops were five percent, for example, the existence of
twenty-six arrests in three months based on unlawful stops would imply a yearly
351
I have altered plaintiffs’ calculations to account for the two decline to
prosecute forms containing revisions of other forms. See supra Part IV.A.1.
352
See Smith Report at 6. Dr. Fagan calculated arrest rates (or, as he
called them, “hit rates”) in Floyd, but does not appear to have done so in the instant
case. Compare Floyd, 861 F. Supp. 2d at 284–85, with Fagan Report.
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total of more than two thousand (2,080) unlawful stops.
iv.
Dr. Fagan’s Analysis
Dr. Fagan’s analysis of the UF-250 database provides further evidence
that plaintiffs have a clear likelihood of being able to prove at trial that the
NYPD’s practice of unlawful stops was widespread. In order to understand Dr.
Fagan’s claim that 1,044 trespass stops within his set apparently lacked reasonable
suspicion, it is necessary to understand the basic features of a UF-250 form.353 I
have included a copy of a blank UF-250 form as Appendix B to this Opinion.
The UF-250 form has two sides.354 On Side 1 there is a section
labeled “What Were Circumstances Which Led To Stop? (MUST CHECK AT
LEAST ONE BOX).” Inside the section are several boxes that officers may check,
such as “Fits Description” and “Actions Indicative of Acting As A Lookout.”
There is also a checkbox for “Other Reasonable Suspicion Of Criminal Activity
(Specify)” (the “Other” box) that officers can check and then supplement with a
handwritten note. On the back of the form, Side 2, there is a section labeled
“Additional Circumstances/Factors: (Check All That Apply).” Inside this section
there are other checkboxes, such as “Report From Victim/Witness” and “Evasive,
353
See Fagan Report at 15 & tbl.8; App. L to Fagan Report (“Stop Factor
List”), Pl. Ex. 64.
354
See App. B.
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False Or Inconsistent Response To Officer’s Questions.” As noted above, officers
are required to record all the reasons justifying a stop.355
In an appendix to Dr. Fagan’s report, he lists the combinations of
factors from UF-250 forms that he counted as indicative of a stop apparently
lacking reasonable suspicion of trespass.356 The list descends from the most
common combinations of factors to the least common.357 On all of the forms that
Dr. Fagan identified as apparently lacking reasonable suspicion, the officer had
checked at most one of the listed “circumstances” on Side 1.358 In some cases the
officer had also checked the “Other” box on Side 1 and handwritten a text string,
which Dr. Fagan also analyzed.359
The most frequent combination of stop factors identified by Dr. Fagan
as apparently inadequate were “Furtive Movements” (Side 1) and “Area Has High
355
See Def. Findings ¶ 4 (“NYPD training evidence . . . clearly identifies
that its officers are instructed to include all circumstances leading to the stop on the
worksheet[.]” (citing Tr. 10/15 at 86:12–87:2)); Tr. 10/19 at 849:13–19 (testimony
of Chief Shea); Police Student’s Guide at 20.
356
See Fagan Report at 15 & tbl.8; Stop Factor List.
357
See Stop Factor List at 1. The final four pages of the six page list
contain the many allegedly inadequate combinations that appeared on only one
UF-250. See id. at 3–6.
358
See Fagan Report at 11–15.
359
See id.
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Incidence Of Reported Offense Of Type Under Investigation” (Side 2), referred to
in Dr. Fagan’s shorthand as the “High Crime Area” box.360 On ninety-one forms,
these two factors were the only recorded basis for the stop.361
Of the 1,044 trespass stops that Dr. Fagan identified as apparently
unlawful, 503 were based on the ten most frequent combinations of stop factors.362
In each of these ten combinations, which offer a manageable illustration of Dr.
Fagan’s assumptions, the officer filling out the form recorded only the following
basis for the trespass stop. First, on Side 1, the officer offered one of the following
three factors:
1)
“Furtive Movements.”
2)
“Other Reasonable Suspicion Of Criminal Activity (Specify)” (the
“Other” box), and a text string referring to “Clean Halls,” “Trespass,”
or both as the sole notation.363
360
See Stop Factor List at 1.
361
See id.
362
See id.
363
See Fagan Report at 13 (explaining “Clean Halls/Trespass” category);
“detailSA Stop Factor Analysis” (“‘Other’ Text Strings”), App. F to Fagan Report
at 5–6 (listing the text strings in this category, including “CLEAN HALLS,”
“CLEAN HALLS BLDG,” “CRIM TRES,” and “CLEAN HALLS PROGRAMCRIM TRES”).
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The “Other” box and words indicating the suspect was observed
exiting the building.364
Second, on Side 2, under “Additional Circumstances/Factors,” the
officer either checked no box, or offered one of the following five justifications:
1)
High Crime Area.
2)
“Time Of Day, Day Of Week, Season Corresponding To Reports Of
Criminal Activity” (the “Time of Day” box).
3)
Both High Crime Area and Time of Day.
4)
“Proximity To Crime Location” (the “Proximity to Scene” box).
5)
“Changing Direction At Sight Of Officer/Flight” (the “Change
Direction” box).
Standing alone, Dr. Fagan’s categorizations leave a great deal of room
for skepticism. The Supreme Court has “recognized that nervous, evasive behavior
is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion.”365 It is possible to
364
See “Other” Text Strings at 7–8 (listing text strings in the “Observed
Exit” category, including many variations on the phrase “EXITING CLEAN
HALLS BUILDING”).
365
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (citing numerous cases). On the other
hand, “furtive behavior absent additional indicia of suspicion generally does not
suffice to establish reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Bellamy, 592 F. Supp.
2d 308, 318–19 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (collecting cases). In Bellamy, the court held that
the following stop factors did not give rise to reasonable suspicion that Bellamy
was trespassing in a building:
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imagine scenarios in which an officer observing behavior that would probably give
rise to reasonable suspicion might reasonably record that behavior by checking
nothing more than “Furtive Movements.” For example, an officer might observe a
person standing nervously outside a TAP building, pretending to walk away
whenever others approach, then returning after they are gone, and finally entering
the building without a key, nervously looking both ways before opening the door.
I also note that in each of the twenty stops where the officer checked “Change
Direction” on Side 2, the officer also checked “Furtive Movement” on Side 1.366 If
these forms were based on an officer seeing someone engage in the behavior
described above, and then run away at the sight of the officer, the officer almost
certainly had reasonable suspicion of trespass.367
(1) the officers’ knowledge that the . . . building was located in a
high-crime, drug-prone neighborhood; (2) the officers’ knowledge
that the . . . building had experienced problems with drug
trafficking and trespassing; (3) the officers’ understanding that the
building had participated in FTAP; (4) Bellamy’s presence in the
[building’s] vestibule; (5) the presence of the supposed “crack
addict” outside of the . . . building; and (6) Bellamy’s furtive
gestures.
Id. at 317.
366
See Stop Factor List.
367
See Floyd, 861 F. Supp. 2d at 298 (discussing Wardlow, which “held
that a defendant’s ‘presence in an area of heavy narcotics trafficking’ and
‘unprovoked flight upon noticing the police’ were together sufficient to raise
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On the other hand, there are good reasons to doubt that most, or even
many, of the forms marked with the combinations listed above were in fact based
on such suspicious behavior. First, many of the 503 forms in the top ten on Dr.
Fagan’s list contain stop factor combinations providing no basis whatsoever for
reasonable suspicion. 205 of these forms simply indicate that the person was
stopped outside a Clean Halls building, or for criminal trespass, neither of which
explains why the officer’s suspicion was reasonable; or that the person was
observed exiting, which also contributes nothing to reasonable suspicion; and that
the stop took place in a high crime area and/or at a suspicious time of day, neither
of which can establish reasonable suspicion in the absence of some additional
contributing factor.368 Thus, at a bare minimum, over two hundred of the five
hundred stops at the top of Dr. Fagan’s list provide no basis for a finding of
suspicious behavior.
Second, Dr. Fagan reported that in his original universe of stops,
officers had checked the Other box on nearly forty percent of the UF-250 forms.369
reasonable suspicion and justify a stop” (quoting Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124)).
368
“Reasonable articulable suspicion does not exist merely on the basis
of [High Crime Area and Time of Day]: many people live in high crime areas and
many crimes occur at night; simply being in a high crime area at night is not
suspicious behavior.” Floyd, 861 F. Supp. 2d at 298 (citations omitted).
369
See Fagan Report at 11.
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Officers were clearly willing and able to describe suspicious behavior when they
observed it.370 In fact, officers frequently took the time to write notes that do not
contribute to reasonable suspicion.371 Given the evident eagerness of officers to
check the Other box and write notes — even when they had no basis for doing so
— it is doubtful that many officers observed the kind of highly suspicious behavior
hypothesized above and then merely checked the Furtive Movements box.372
Third, as Dr. Fagan notes, when police officers are in an area where
they are primed to look for signs that “crime is afoot,” they may be more likely to
perceive a gesture as an indicator of criminality.373 Recent psychological research
370
See, e.g., “Other” Text Strings at 7 (“Observed Entry” text strings
including, for example, “RAN INTO BLDG”). The NYPD Legal Bureau’s
PowerPoint presentation at Rodman’s Neck contains a number of examples of
concise, easily written descriptions of furtive behavior that could give rise to
reasonable suspicion. See Street Encounters Presentation at 22–23.
371
See id. (listing text strings accompanying checked Other boxes).
372
In addition, many behaviors that would, like the behaviors
hypothesized above, lead to a suspicion of trespass would presumably also provide
grounds to check “Actions Indicative [o]f ‘Casing’ Victim Or Location” or
“Actions Indicative of Acting As A Lookout” on Side 1. See App. B.
373
See Fagan Report at 11 n.12 (citing Robert J. Sampson & Steven W.
Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood Stigma and the Social Construction
of “Broken Windows”, 67 S OC. P SYCHOL. Q. 319 (2004); Geoffrey P. Alpert, John
M. MacDonald, & Roger G. Dunham, Police Suspicion and Discretionary
Decision Making During Citizen Stops, 43 C RIMINOLOGY 407 (2005)).
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has provided evidence of such cognitive distortions.374 Thus the category of
Furtive Movements may be inherently prone to overuse on UF-250s. Given the
nature of their work on patrol, officers may have a systematic tendency to see and
report furtive movements where none objectively exist.375
Dr. Fagan raised further doubts in Floyd regarding the general validity
of assuming reasonable suspicion based on Furtive Movements.376 Dr. Fagan’s
report in Floyd showed that “the arrest rates in stops where the high crime area or
furtive movement boxes are checked off is actually below average.”377 Officers
may have a tendency to check these boxes when they are unable to articulate any
other basis for a stop — perhaps because the suspicion leading to the stop was, in
fact, not reasonable.
Defendants attack the accuracy of Dr. Fagan’s categorization scheme
374
See id. Indeed, this is an area in which further training may be highly
beneficial.
375
See Bayless, 201 F.3d at 133 (“Reasonable suspicion is an objective
standard; hence, the subjective intentions or motives of the officer making the stop
are irrelevant.” (emphasis added)).
376
See Floyd, 861 F. Supp. 2d at 284–85; Fagan Report at 11 n.12 (citing
Dr. Fagan’s report in Floyd).
377
Floyd, 861 F. Supp. 2d at 285 (emphasis added).
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in various ways.378 First, defendants criticize Dr. Fagan for neglecting to factor
into his analysis a field on Side 1 of the UF-250 form labeled “Period Of
Observation Prior To Stop.”379 Though defendants’ reasoning is not explicit, I take
it they assume that a long enough period of observation, combined with some of
the stop factor combinations in Dr. Fagan’s list of unlawful stops, might justify
removing a stop from the list.380 Second, defendants’ expert noted a few dozen
text strings accompanying the Other box that Dr. Fagan included in his count of
unlawful stops but that defendants argue could justify a Terry stop.381 For
example, Dr. Fagan categorized “RAN INTO BLDG” as an instance of an
observed entry into a TAP building, and thus not a basis for a stop.382 Third,
378
See Def. Findings ¶¶ 6 (“Period of Observation”), 8 (metacategories
for “Other” text strings), 9 (“Furtive Movements,”“Ongoing Investigation”).
379
See id. ¶ 6; App. B.
380
See Def. Findings ¶ 6. According to the UF-250 database, in sixtyfive percent of the trespass stops outside TAP buildings in the Bronx in 2011, the
Period of Observation was less than one minute, and in eighty-four percent of
those stops, the period of observation was less than two minutes. See Period of
Observation Table. Only five of the 1,044 unlawful stops identified by Dr. Fagan
involved periods of observation of greater than ten minutes. See Table 15:
Distribution of Period of Observation, Pl. Ex. 99.
381
See Def. Findings ¶ 8; Smith Report at 34–39. Neither Dr. Smith nor
defendants offer a total of the number of stops contested by Dr. Smith in this way.
Plaintiffs state that Dr. Smith identified thirty-six stops with contestable text
strings out of Dr. Fagan’s 1,044. See Pl. Findings ¶ 12.
382
See Smith Report at 34–35.
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defendants argue that Dr. Fagan’s list of unlawful stops should not have included
the forty-one stops in which an officer marked Furtive Movement on Side 1 and a
box on Side 2 labeled “Ongoing Investigations, e.g., Robbery Pattern” (the
“Ongoing Investigations” box).383
Rather than addressing each of these claims individually, it is enough
to note that even if the one hundred forty-three stops involving observation periods
over two minutes, the thirty-six stops with contestable text strings, and the fortyone stops with both Furtive Movements and Ongoing Investigations marked were
excluded from Dr. Fagan’s grand total of 1,044 unlawful stops, the total would still
show that out of the 1,663 stops in Dr. Fagan’s revised set of trespass stops outside
TAP buildings in the Bronx in 2011, over eight hundred (824) were
unconstitutional. That is, even if defendants’ arguments on these points are
accepted — and I am not convinced that they should be — Dr. Fagan’s report
would still show that on hundreds of occasions in the Bronx in 2011, people were
stopped without basis outside of TAP buildings, in violation of their rights under
the U.S. Constitution, and required to answer questions from an officer with the
power to arrest them if they answered incorrectly.
The essential fact, sufficiently established by Dr. Fagan’s analysis
383
See Def. Findings ¶ 9; App. B.
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when viewed in combination with the other evidence discussed above, is that a
very large number of constitutional violations took place outside TAP buildings in
the Bronx in 2011. Whether the percentage of trespass stops that were
unconstitutional was thirty or sixty, and whether one assumes that officers failed to
fill out UF-250s ten, twenty, or fifty percent of the time, plaintiffs have succeeded
in showing a clear likelihood that they will be able to prove that the City of New
York and its agents displayed deliberate indifference toward the violation of the
constitutional rights of hundreds and more likely thousands of individuals prior to
2012.
v.
Notice to Defendants
By 2011 city policymakers were on actual notice of a practice of
unconstitutional trespass stops by city employees outside TAP buildings in the
Bronx.384 As early as 1999, the NYPD Legal Bureau was aware that it was
unlawful to stop someone simply for entering and exiting a TAP building.385 By
July 2010, as Inspector Sweet testified, the NYPD was on actual notice that
officers were unlawfully approaching people entering or inside TAP buildings to
384
See supra Part IV.B.1.
385
See 1999 TAP Legal Guidelines at 6; Tr. 10/18 at 684:2–4.
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question them about their presence.386 The special counsel to Commissioner Kelly
attended meetings where the problem was discussed.387 In February 2011, a
number of NYPD officials received letters from ADA Rucker on behalf of the
Bronx DA’s office clarifying the unconstitutionality of stopping people merely for
entering or exiting a TAP building.388 Throughout this period, the NYPD received
copies of decline to prosecute forms describing arrests in which officers apparently
stopped people for no reason other than their proximity to a TAP building.389
vi.
Legal Analysis
Deliberate indifference is “a stringent standard of fault,”390 especially
when it is based on a failure to train.391 Nevertheless, “deliberate indifference may
be inferred where ‘the need for more or better supervision to protect against
constitutional violations was obvious,’ but the policymaker ‘fail[ed] to make
386
See Tr. 10/18 at 648:18–649:16.
387
See id. at 650:18–651:17.
388
See id. at 659:20–660:17.
389
See Tr. 10/16 at 256:8–13.
390
Connick, 131 S.Ct. at 1360.
391
See id. at 1359 (citing Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 822–23).
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meaningful efforts to address the risk of harm to plaintiffs[.]’”392
Based on the conclusions above, plaintiffs have shown a clear
likelihood of proving deliberate indifference under any of the prevailing ways of
framing that standard. Stated in terms of Connick’s general standard for failure-totrain claims, plaintiffs have shown a clear likelihood of proving that city
policymakers were on actual notice by 2011, and constructive notice prior to then,
that the failure to train NYPD officers regarding the legal standard for trespass
stops outside TAP buildings in the Bronx was causing city employees to violate the
constitutional rights of a large number of individuals.393 Stated in terms of the
three-part Walker test for deliberate indifference through failure to train, plaintiffs
have shown a clear likelihood of proving (1) city policymakers knew to a moral
certainty that NYPD officers, who regularly patrol in and around TAP buildings in
the Bronx, would confront the question of when it was legally permissible to stop
people outside those buildings; (2) the decline to prosecute forms, ADA Rucker’s
letters, and the hundreds of UF-250 forms that failed to articulate reasonable
suspicion for trespass stops outside TAP buildings provided an extensive record of
NYPD officers mishandling these stops; and (3) when NYPD officers made the
392
Cash, 654 F.3d at 334 (quoting Reynolds, 506 F.3d at 192; Vann, 72
F.3d at 1049).
393
See Connick, 131 S.Ct. at 1359.
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wrong choice in these stops, the deprivation of constitutional rights frequently
resulted.394 Thus, plaintiffs have shown a clear likelihood of proving that city
policymakers should have known that their inadequate training and supervision
regarding trespass stops outside TAP buildings in the Bronx was “‘so likely to
result in the violation of constitutional rights,’” that their failure to train constituted
deliberate indifference.395 Stated in terms of the constructive acquiescence
standard, plaintiffs have shown a clear likelihood of proving that there was “a
sufficiently widespread practice among police officers” of unlawful trespass stops
outside TAP buildings “to support reasonably the conclusion that such abuse was
the custom of the officers,” and that “supervisory personnel must have been aware
of it but took no adequate corrective or preventive measures.”396
In fact, plaintiffs presented some evidence suggesting that the practice
of making stops outside TAP buildings without regard for reasonable suspicion
might have been “so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of
law.”397 In addition to the sheer magnitude of apparently unlawful stops, ADA
394
See Walker, 974 F.2d at 297–98.
395
Id. at 298 (quoting Canton, 489 U.S. at 390).
396
Jones, 691 F.3d at 82.
397
Connick, 131 S.Ct. at 1359.
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Rucker offered testimony suggesting that prior to her legal research into the
standards governing stops outside TAP buildings, she had been explicitly advising
officers that it was permissible to stop a person simply because he had exited a
TAP building, so long as the officer had observed the person in the vestibule
first.398 Even defendants seemed to recognize that the similarities among the stops
described in this case support the conclusion that officers’ behaviors were the
result of uniform training.399
b.
Failure to Rebut Deliberate Indifference Claim Based
on Steps Taken by NYPD in 2012
Defendants spent a great deal of time at the hearing introducing
evidence concerning steps the NYPD took in 2012 to improve TAP and provide
training regarding stop and frisk practices.400 Yet in spite of receiving actual notice
of NYPD officers carrying out widespread constitutional violations outside TAP
buildings, and in spite of already being engaged in changes to the TAP program
and the training related to stop and frisk more generally, the NYPD has failed to
take meaningful action to address the specific and narrow problem at issue in this
398
See Tr. 10/15 at 176:14–23.
399
See Def. Findings ¶ 29 n.16 (“Defendants contend that any similarity
in the interactions [between officers and plaintiffs] demonstrates that officers are
being uniformly trained.”).
400
See supra Part IV.B.
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case: the problem of unconstitutional trespass stops outside TAP buildings in the
Bronx. To date, as noted above, the only piece of instruction that has been
provided to officers on a systematic basis and that specifically targets the problem
at issue in this case is a single bullet point in a single slide show during a single
part of the Rodman’s Neck training.401 This has been the NYPD’s most
meaningful specific response to the problem that caused Charles Bradley’s
unlawful stop and arrest, Abdullah Turner’s unlawful stop and arrest, the unlawful
stop of J.G. that led Jaenean Ligon to fear for her son’s life, Roshea Johnson’s stop
and interrogation in an unmarked NYPD van, all the other indignities that the other
plaintiffs were obliged to suffer, and the hundreds of other unlawful stops,
recorded and unrecorded, whose precise details this Court will never know.
The Rodman’s Neck bullet point is plainly insufficient to rebut
plaintiffs’ showing of a clear likelihood of success on the merits of their deliberate
indifference claim. Nor did defendants provide reliable statistics regarding stops in
2012 that might have rebutted plaintiffs’ claim. Defendants have provided no
evidence that the NYPD has ceased its practice of making unlawful trespass stops
outside TAP buildings in the Bronx.
The evidence introduced by defendants of broader reforms to TAP
401
See Street Encounters Presentation at 40; Tr. 10/17 at 572:24–573:6;
Tr. 10/18 at 663:13–664:1.
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and stop and frisk undertaken by the NYPD in 2012 also does not rebut plaintiffs’
case that city policymakers have displayed deliberate indifference to an ongoing
practice of constitutional violations by city employees based on unlawful stops
outside TAP buildings. To the contrary, many of the training materials introduced
by defendants may serve to further entrench the problem of these unconstitutional
stops. In some cases, defendants’ introduction of training materials not only failed
to rebut plaintiffs’ case, but made plaintiffs’ case stronger.
Most strikingly, within the last year the NYPD has produced a video
on stop and frisk that has now been shown in every precinct.402 Chief Shea
testified that “it would be fair to say that every single member of a patrol borough
has probably” seen the video by now.403 The video, whose script was also entered
into evidence, begins by briefly summarizing the four levels of police encounters
recognized by New York state courts. Then the video provides the following
description of what constitutes a stop requiring reasonable suspicion, that is, a
Terry stop:
Your authority to conduct a Stop Question and Frisk
402
See Tr. 10/19 at 900:21–904:20; Tr. 10/22 at 942:13–24; SQF
Training Video No. 5; Script of SQF Training Video No. 5.
403
See Tr. 10/22 at 22–24. Chief Shea also testified that the information
in the video is “consistent with the training that recruit officers receive at the
academy” regarding reasonable suspicion. See Tr. 10/19 at 904:16–20.
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encounter is limited to public places within the City of New York.
. . . A forcible stop can take many different forms. It can be
constructive in nature, such as using verbal commands or blocking
a subject’s path. Or it could be an actual stop, such as grabbing or
holding the subject.
The courts will look to an officer’s actions in making this
determination. They consider: if the officer’s gun was drawn; if
the person was physically prevented from moving; the number
and tone of verbal commands; the content of the commands; the
number of officers present; and the location of the encounter.
Usually just verbal commands, such as STOP, POLICE!!!,
will not constitute a seizure. However, a verbal command, plus
other actions may be considered a seizure — other actions, such
as: using physical force to subdue a suspect; physically blocking
a suspect’s path; grabbing a suspect by the arm, shirt or coat;
pointing a gun at a suspect; using an ASP or baton to contain a
suspect; or placing a suspect against a wall or on the ground.404
This misstates the law. It is incorrect in its specific claim that if an officer yelled
“STOP, POLICE!!!” and the person stopped, the result would not “[u]sually”
constitute a Terry stop.405 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine many contexts in which
404
Script of SQF Training Video No. 5 at 58–59 (formatting altered),
beginning at roughly 6:35 in SQF Training Video No. 5.
405
Perhaps the video reflects a misunderstanding of the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626–28. Cf. Def. Findings ¶ 42 n.19 (citing
Hodari D.). In Hodari D., the Court explained that the word “seizure” “does not
remotely apply . . . to the prospect of a policeman yelling ‘Stop, in the name of the
law!’ at a fleeing form that continues to flee. That is no seizure.” Id. at 626. The
Court’s point was that there is no seizure unless the individual is in fact seized, in
the sense of being stopped, either by physical force, or by submission to the
assertion of the officer’s authority — not that a Terry stop requires a display of
authority beyond shouted commands. See Swindle, 407 F.3d at 572 (interpreting
Hodari D.).
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an officer shouting this command, followed by the person stopping, would not
constitute a Terry stop. As noted above, the test for a Terry stop is whether “a
reasonable person would feel free ‘to disregard the police and go about his
business.’”406 If the “reasonable person” of Fourth Amendment law would feel
free to disregard an officer yelling “STOP, POLICE!!!” and go about his business,
then this “reasonable person” bears little or no resemblance to the many reasonable
people who have been or will be affected by the NYPD’s stop and frisk practices.
The video is also incorrect in its more general suggestion that an
officer must deploy something resembling physical force or the threat of such force
in order for an encounter to constitute a stop. It is true that Terry stops are
sometimes referred to as “forcible stops.”407 But the test for a Terry stop, again, is
not the use of force: it is whether a “reasonable person” would feel free “‘to
disregard the police and go about his business.’”408 The Second Circuit has held,
for example, that a stop took place where an officer twice ordered a person to “hold
on a second,” and after the second order the person stopped.409 The Second Circuit
406
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434 (quoting Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 628).
407
See, e.g., Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328 (1990) (referring to
Terry stop as “forcible stop”).
408
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434 (quoting Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 628).
409
Simmons, 560 F.3d at 101, 105–06.
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also held that a stop occurred where an officer pointing a spotlight at a person said,
“What, are you stupid? Come here. I want to talk to you,” and then told the
person to show his hands.410 In Davis, the City of New York conceded, and I held,
that a person was stopped when he encountered an officer in a stairway, the officer
asked if he lived in the building, the officer asked for his ID, and then the officer
asked him to step out of the stairwell and into the lobby.411 I also held in Davis that
a person was stopped “when she attempted to walk to the elevator, was told to
‘come back’ by [an officer], and stopped walking,” because the officer’s “order to
‘come back’ was an order to stop and [she] obeyed the order.”412
The Second Circuit held more than twenty years ago, in a case that
remains good law, that the following factors are indicative of a “seizure,” which
can mean either an arrest or a Terry stop:
the threatening presence of several officers; the display of a
weapon; the physical touching of the person by the officer;
language or tone indicating that compliance with the officer was
compulsory; prolonged retention of a person’s personal effects,
such as airplane tickets or identification; and a request by the
410
Brown v. City of Oneonta, N.Y., 221 F.3d 329, 340 (2d Cir. 2000). On
the other hand, the court held that where a person encountered two officers in his
dorm lobby, and the officers asked him to show them his hands, he was not seized.
See id. at 341.
411
See Davis, 2012 WL 4813837, at *5–6.
412
Id. at *14.
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officer to accompany him to the police station or a police room.413
Because the yelled command “STOP, POLICE!!!” contains both language and a
tone indicating that compliance is compulsory, the NYPD’s video is incorrect to
suggest that other actions would usually be required for an encounter to constitute
a Terry stop. Indeed, some of the “other actions” described by the NYPD’s video
— “using physical force to subdue a suspect; physically blocking a suspect’s path;
grabbing a suspect by the arm, shirt or coat; pointing a gun at a suspect; using an
ASP or baton to contain a suspect; or placing a suspect against a wall or on the
ground”414 — go significantly beyond the level of coercion suggested by the
Second Circuit’s list of factors that define a Terry stop. While any evaluation of
whether a Terry stop has taken place requires consideration of the totality of the
circumstances, it is clear that the NYPD’s video conflicts with the Second Circuit’s
guidance: there is a certain range of conduct that a viewer of the video would
identify as insufficiently coercive to constitute a Terry stop, while a reader of the
Second Circuit’s list would identify the same conduct as falling squarely within the
parameters of a Terry stop.
By raising the Terry bar above where it was set by the Second Circuit,
413
United States v. Glover, 957 F.2d 1004, 1008 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting
Lee, 916 F.2d at 819).
414
Script of SQF Training Video No. 5 at 58–59.
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the NYPD trains its officers that they do not need reasonable suspicion to engage
in conduct that the Second Circuit would identify as sufficiently coercive to qualify
as a Terry stop. In other words, the NYPD’s video, which was produced in 2012,
which has now been seen by nearly every officer in the patrol bureau, and which
defendants continue to present as a sign of their lack of deliberate indifference,415
trains officers that it is acceptable to engage in conduct that amounts to a Terry
stop without reasonable suspicion.
The Chief of Patrol Field Training Unit Program Guide, which is
distributed to supervisors in Operation IMPACT,416 also reflects the tendency of
NYPD training materials to exaggerate how intrusive a police encounter must be in
order to constitute a Terry stop. The Guide states that with something less than
reasonable suspicion,417 an officer may approach a person and engage in “pointed,
invasive, and accusatory” questioning that is “intended to elicit an incriminating
response,” and even “ask for permission” to search the person.418 While “[t]he
415
See Def. Findings ¶ 42.
416
See Tr. 10/19 at 744:2–6.
417
Using the language of De Bour Level 2, not Level 3, the Training
Guide requires a “founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot” in order to
approach and engage in an encounter of this kind. See Training Guide at 17.
418
Id. (emphases omitted). The Guide clarifies that the officer “may not
touch the person, display a weapon, or act in a threatening manner,” but notes that
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Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all contact between the police and
citizens,”419 it is difficult to imagine many circumstances in which a reasonable
person being aggressively interrogated by the police regarding suspected criminal
activity could feel free “‘to disregard the police and go about his business.’”420 The
more realistic outcome would be for the person to assume that if he refused to
answer, walked away, gave the wrong answers, or made a false move, serious
consequences would follow.421 As Abdullah Turner testified, “I don’t know
anyone . . . who ever just walked away from a cop in the middle of a
conversation.”422 Given the high stakes of any encounter in which an officer
interrogates someone regarding his suspected criminal activity, it is fanciful to say
that a reasonable person would as a rule feel free in the midst of such an
“[i]f a confronted citizen walks away without answering, the officer may follow to
continue questioning.” See id. at 17–18.
419
Delgado, 466 U.S. at 215.
420
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434 (quoting Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 628).
421
Indeed, based on the accounts of stops in the decline to prosecute
forms, this appears to be an accurate expectation. See App. A ¶¶ 12, 20, discussed
below. Moreover, it would not be surprising to learn that based on the experiences
of their families, friends, and neighbors, the residents of these buildings fully
appreciate the consequences that will follow if they attempt to walk away from the
police during questioning.
422
Tr. 10/17 at 491:22–23.
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interrogation to “‘terminate the encounter’”423 at will.
A lesson on TAP that was added to the Guide in 2012 similarly
reflects a model of policing in which the investigative questioning of suspects
routinely precedes rather than follows reasonable suspicion:
A uniformed member of the service may not stop (temporarily
detain) a suspected trespasser unless the uniformed member
reasonably suspects that the person is in the building without
authority. . . . Some factors which may contribute to “reasonable
suspicion” that a person is trespassing . . . are contradictory
assertions made to justify presence in the building and/or
assertions lacking credibility made to justify presence in the
building.424
423
Drayton, 536 U.S. at 202 (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436).
424
Training Guide at 65; Tr. 10/19 at 743:6–7. I recognize that many of
the NYPD’s training materials purport to derive from De Bour, as defendants have
emphasized. See, e.g., Def. Findings ¶ 42 & n.19. Because plaintiffs have brought
their case under the Fourth Amendment, and not New York law, Pl. Findings
¶¶ 64–71, it would lie beyond the scope of this Opinion to make general statements
regarding the precise relations between the law of De Bour and the case law
interpreting the Fourth Amendment. I note, however, that in theory, De Bour
should provide greater protection than the Fourth Amendment by restricting police
action even in encounters whose level of invasiveness falls below the minimum
threshold for Fourth Amendment scrutiny. See, e.g., De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d at 381
(prohibiting any investigative encounter, even at Level 1, if it is based on “intent to
harrass” or “mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity”).
Some commentators have expressed skepticism regarding the practical
virtues of De Bour’s multi-level analysis. LaFave questions whether De Bour’s
more sophisticated articulation of Terry’s balancing approach is advantageous, or
is likely to result in “such confusion and uncertainty that neither police nor courts
can ascertain with any degree of confidence precisely what it takes to meet any of
these standards.” L AF AVE, S EARCH & S EIZURE § 9.4(e). Accord Emily J. Sack,
Police Approaches and Inquiries on the Streets of New York: The Aftermath of
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Instead of reasonable suspicion providing a basis for investigative questioning, the
NYPD’s training materials suggest that the standard scenario is for investigative
questioning to lead to reasonable suspicion. The NYPD Legal Bureau’s
PowerPoint presentation at Rodman’s Neck similarly suggests that even when an
officer lacks reasonable suspicion for a stop, the officer may not only approach and
ask accusatory questions, but during the encounter may “place [his] hand on [his]
holstered firearm” or “draw and conceal” his weapon, all without escalating the
encounter to a Terry stop.425
What is most troubling about these materials is not the suggestion that
People v. De Bour, 66 N.Y.U. L. R EV. 512, 520, 548–53 (1991) (arguing that “the
courts routinely conflate the De Bour standards and use inappropriately low levels
of suspicion to justify police intrusions,” and that “the multitiered structure of the
De Bour model allows inadequately justified low-level intrusions to escalate
quickly into inappropriate forcible stops and arrests”). See also Anthony G.
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 M INN. L. R EV. 349, 394
(1974) (a “sliding scale approach” to the Fourth Amendment may “produce more
slide than scale”).
The NYPD’s training materials may illustrate the risk created by the
multi-level doctrine of De Bour. The mere existence of De Bour Level 2, and the
inevitable difficulty of clearly distinguishing an encounter on the more intrusive
end of Level 2 from an encounter on the less intrusive end of Level 3, creates
problems of administrability. In practice, the possibility of classifying a stop as
Level 2 or even Level 1 may lead police to perform a large number of stops — in
the ordinary sense of the word, but inevitably often in the Terry sense as well —
without the minimal foundation in reasonable suspicion required by the U.S.
Constitution.
425
Street Encounters Presentation at 16, 19.
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investigative questioning might under certain circumstances lawfully precede
reasonable suspicion, but that it should do so as a matter of course, routinely, as the
rule rather than the exception. If the difference between a Terry stop and a less
intrusive encounter hinges on indefinite factors such as the demeanor and
positioning of the officers; and if it is safe to assume that officers routinely display
their authority and power through aggressive behavior, as many of the officers did
in their encounters with plaintiffs in the instant case; then a training program that
invites officers to approach large numbers of people and question them without
reasonable suspicion will inevitably result in frequent Terry stops that lack
reasonable suspicion, effectively guaranteeing the commission of widespread
constitutional violations. The evidence of numerous unlawful stops at the hearing
strengthens the conclusion that the NYPD’s inaccurate training has taught officers
the following lesson: stop and question first, develop reasonable suspicion later.426
The NYPD’s training failures may also help to explain why no UF250s were located for any of the plaintiffs in the instant case. Based on training
426
I note that the NYPD’s stop practices also appear to conflict with the
considered judgment of the New York State Legislature, which enacted New
York’s stop and frisk law. This law states that without a warrant, “a police officer
may stop a person . . . when he reasonably suspects that such person is committing,
has committed, or is about to commit” a crime, “and may demand of him his name,
address and an explanation of his conduct.” CPL § 140.50. In other words, the
New York State Legislature envisioned reasonable suspicion preceding the request
for a name, address, and purpose.
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materials like those above, the officers who stopped plaintiffs may very well have
perceived themselves as not engaged in Terry stops at all, but in something less
intrusive. The NYPD Legal Bureau’s PowerPoint presentation at Rodman’s Neck
continues to encourage this belief, and the constitutional violations that will
naturally follow from it, by redefining the standards for stops and arrests. Thus,
the final slide on arrests states: “If you are at probable cause, you have made an
arrest.”427 This is not correct. If you have arrested someone, you have made an
arrest; whether or not you had probable cause only determines whether the arrest
was constitutional. Similarly, the presentation states: “When an individual is
stopped based upon Reasonable Suspicion a UF-250 must be prepared.”428 IO 22
of 2012 offers a similar message: “When reasonable suspicion exists, a STOP,
QUESTION AND FRISK REPORT WORKSHEET shall be prepared . . . .” Both of
these statements are incorrect. Whether a stop constitutes a Terry stop and thus
requires the completion of a UF-250 form does not depend on whether the stop is
based on reasonable suspicion, but on whether a reasonable person would have felt
free to terminate the encounter.429
427
Street Encounters Presentation at 37 (capitalization altered).
428
Id. at 33 (emphasis altered).
429
See Drayton, 536 U.S. at 202.
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In response to criticisms directed at the NYPD’s training materials,
defendants have argued that the materials reflect New York state law, and in
particular De Bour and its progeny.430 Defendants assert that “New York Law
applies” in the instant case.431 But practices that violate the Fourth Amendment
cannot be saved by proving that they comply with state law.432 To the extent that
De Bour suggests a police officer, without reasonable suspicion, may lawfully stop
and question an individual in such a way that a reasonable person would not feel
free to terminate the encounter, that suggestion would be incorrect.
2.
Irreparable Harm
In addition to showing a clear likelihood of success on the merits,
plaintiffs have the burden of showing that they are “likely to suffer irreparable
harm in the absence of preliminary relief.”433 Plaintiffs have moved for class
430
See, e.g., Def. Findings ¶ 42 & n.19.
431
Id.
432
As I noted in the Introduction, the Supreme Court held in Sibron that
“New York is, of course, free to develop its own law of search and seizure to meet
the needs of local law enforcement. . . . It may not, however, authorize police
conduct which trenches upon Fourth Amendment rights, regardless of the labels
which it attaches to such conduct.” 392 U.S. at 60–61. Sibron makes clear that
any conflict between the Fourth Amendment and New York state law must be
resolved in favor of the Fourth Amendment.
433
Winter, 555 U.S. at 20.
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certification in connection with their motion for a preliminary injunction.
Plaintiffs’ putative class is “comprised of individuals who have been or are at risk
of being subjected to the New York City Police Department’s practice of stopping
individuals outside of buildings enrolled in Operation Clean Halls in the Bronx on
suspicion of trespassing inside those buildings.”434
While I have not yet ruled on plaintiffs’ motion, “[i]t is well
established that ‘[c]ertain circumstances give rise to the need for prompt injunctive
relief for a named plaintiff or on behalf of a class’ and that the ‘court may
conditionally certify the class or otherwise award a broad preliminary injunction,
without a formal class ruling, under its general equity powers.’”435 Based on the
conclusions in the preceding section, the putative class in this case is threatened
with imminent violations of their constitutional rights in the absence of preliminary
relief.436 The frequency of unconstitutional trespass stops outside Clean Halls
buildings reflected in the decline to prosecute forms and Dr. Fagan’s report
434
Class Mem. at 1.
435
Strouchler v. Shah, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2012 WL 3838159, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2012) (quoting A LBA C ONTE & H ERBERT N EWBERG, N EWBERG
ON C LASS A CTIONS § 9:45 (4th ed. 2002)).
436
See id. at *6 (“In order to merit preliminary relief, the threat of
irreparable harm must be imminent.” (citing Rodriguez v. DeBuono, 175 F.3d 227,
235 (2d Cir. 1999)).
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establishes that members of plaintiffs’ putative class will likely be subject to such
stops between now and the completion of trial if this Court does not act. Because
“[t]he violation of a constitutional right . . . constitutes irreparable harm for the
purpose of a preliminary injunction,”437 plaintiffs have carried their burden of
showing likely irreparable harm on behalf of the putative class.
3.
Balance of Equities
In order to qualify for a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs must show
“that the balance of equities tips in [their] favor.”438 Given that a preliminary
injunction is “‘an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right,’”439 it would be
inappropriate to award such an injunction if doing so would result in an
arrangement less fair to the parties than the status quo, such as an arrangement in
which the hardship imposed on one party outweighed the benefit to the other.
“[T]he Court should ‘balanc[e] . . . the equities to reach an appropriate result
protective of the interests of both parties.’”440
437
Ligon, 2012 WL 3597066, at *1 (citing Johnson v. Miles, 355 F.
App’x 444, 446 (2d Cir. 2009)).
438
Winter, 555 U.S. at 20.
439
UBS Fin. Servs., 660 F.3d at 648 (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 24).
440
Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer AG, 14 F.3d 733, 747 (2d Cir. 1994)
(quoting Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus., Inc., 832 F.2d 1325, 1330 (2d Cir.
1987)) (emphasis omitted).
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I do not take lightly the burden on defendants of altering NYPD
policies and training procedures. It is partly out of concern for defendants’
hardships that I have rejected some of plaintiffs’ proposed remedies.441
Nevertheless, the burden on putative class members of continued unconstitutional
stops goes far beyond administrative inconvenience. As I stated in Floyd:
The right to physical liberty has long been at the core of our
nation’s commitment to respecting the autonomy and dignity of
each person: “No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to
the possession and control of his own person, free from all
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law.”442
Eliminating the threat that the kinds of stops described by plaintiffs might occur at
any moment, without legal justification, in the vicinity of one’s home and the
homes of one’s friends and family, is itself an important interest deserving of
judicial protection.
Equally important are the potential consequences of an unlawful stop.
The stakes of “field interrogation”443 by the police have dramatically risen since
Terry was decided in 1968. The use of incarceration has increased, sentences have
441
See Pl. Findings ¶¶ 73–75.
442
Floyd, 283 F.R.D. at 158–59 (quoting Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford,
141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
443
Terry, 392 U.S. at 12, 14.
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grown, the threat of lengthy incarceration has created new incentives to plead
guilty, and the collateral consequences of a conviction — on employment, housing,
access to government programs, and even the right to vote or serve on a jury —
have become more common and more severe. If an unjustified stop happens to
lead to an unjustified arrest for trespassing, as it did in Charles Bradley’s case, not
every overburdened public defender will have the wherewithal to obtain a
notarized letter from the defendant’s host explaining that the defendant was
invited, as Bronx Defender Cara Suvall did on behalf of Bradley.444 When
considering the relative hardships faced by the parties, it is important to consider
the potentially dire and long-lasting consequences that can follow from
unconstitutional stops.445
444
See Tr. 10/16 at 269:2–9; Rappa Letter.
445
Though it is unnecessary to reach the issue in this Opinion, I note that
the appropriate form of Fourth Amendment analysis may differ depending on the
quantity and nature of stops being scrutinized, and the remedies available. Not
only are the consequences of stops different today than they were in 1968, but the
frequency of stops is far higher as well. See Floyd, 283 F.R.D. at 159 (over 2.8
million stops by NYPD between 2004 and 2009). As the stops have increased in
frequency, they have also become more standardized and predictable. In Terry, the
Supreme Court emphasized “the myriad daily situations in which policemen and
citizens confront each other on the street.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 12. “No judicial
opinion can comprehend the protean variety of the street encounter, and we can
only judge the facts of the case before us.” Id. at 15. In the instant case, by
contrast, the contested police encounters are strikingly uniform. The stops in the
decline to prosecute forms echo the stops of plaintiffs, which in turn echo aspects
of the training materials introduced at the hearing. See, e.g., IO 22 of 2012 at 2
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Weighing the equities in light of the totality of the circumstances, the
administrative burdens that defendants will face in revising the NYPD’s policies
and training materials are real, but are outweighed by plaintiffs’ interest in not
being subjected to unconstitutional stops outside their homes and the homes of
their family and friends.
4.
Public Interest
Any preliminary injunction must be “in the public interest.”446 Courts
(¶ 11). Terry envisions street stops as uniquely tailored to unforeseen
circumstances. The stops in the instant case are more like the products of fixed,
repeatable processes. The NYPD training materials that teach these processes can
be scrutinized in ways that an individual officer’s discretionary act cannot.
Because of this, a different constitutional analysis may be appropriate.
In addition, the constitutional framework for the ex post evaluation of
highly individualized, discretionary stops, where exclusion is the only remedy,
may not be appropriate to the ex ante evaluation of routinized, highly scripted,
largely predictable stops, where the remedy can involve changes in training.
Ultimately, “the central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment” is “the
reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of
a citizen’s personal security.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 19. An invasion of privacy that is
reasonable when it occurs on an ad hoc basis and is weighed in the context of the
exclusionary rule may not be reasonable when it occurs as a matter of
programmatic policy on a far larger scale.
Terry itself seems to invite scrutiny of stops falling below the
intrusiveness of Terry stops, provided that the remedies applied are less severe than
the exclusion of evidence. “[O]f course, our approval of legitimate and restrained
investigative conduct undertaken on the basis of ample factual justification should
in no way discourage the employment of other remedies than the exclusionary rule
to curtail abuses for which that sanction may prove inappropriate.” Terry, 392
U.S. at 15.
446
Winter, 555 U.S. at 20.
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have no special institutional competence in determining what the public interest is,
and the parties presented little evidence at the hearing directly addressing this
issue. Nevertheless, the public interests at issue in plaintiffs’ motion are familiar
from a long line of cases concerning “the power of the police to ‘stop and frisk’ . . .
suspicious persons.”447 In these cases, there is a recurring conflict between liberty
and dignity on the one hand, and safety on the other.448
Because any member of the public could conceivably find herself
outside a TAP building in the Bronx, the public at large has a liberty and dignity
interest in bringing an end to the practice of unconstitutional stops at issue in this
case. Even if the constitutional violations described by plaintiffs were confined to
the members of a discrete community, the public has a clear interest in protecting
the constitutional rights of all its members. At the same time, enforcing
constitutional restrictions on the NYPD’s ability to stop and potentially frisk
people outside TAP buildings could conceivably inhibit the NYPD’s ability to
provide security to the residents of those buildings and their communities.
In light of these considerations, and taking account of all the evidence
presented at the hearing, I find that the public interest lies with the enforcement of
447
Terry, 392 U.S. at 10.
448
See Davis, 2012 WL 4813837, at *1.
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the Constitution. It is “‘clear and plain’”449 that the public interest in liberty and
dignity under the Fourth Amendment trumps whatever modicum of added safety
might theoretically be gained from the NYPD making unconstitutional trespass
stops outside TAP buildings in the Bronx. I am not ordering the abolition or even
a reduction of TAP, which appears to be a valuable way of using the NYPD’s
resources to enhance the security in voluntarily enrolled private buildings.450 My
ruling today is directed squarely at a category of stops lacking reasonable
suspicion. Precisely because these stops lack rational justification, they are
presumably of less value to public safety than would be the stops of individuals
who displayed objectively suspicious behavior.
C.
Appropriate Scope of Injunctive Relief
Injunctive relief “‘should be narrowly tailored to fit specific legal
violations.’”451 In addition, “great[] caution is appropriate where a federal court is
asked to interfere by means of injunctive relief with a state’s executive functions, a
449
Reynolds, 506 F.3d at 198 (quoting Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378
(1976)).
450
See, e.g., Tr. 10/18 at 593:15–594:3 (testimony of landlord to the
advantages of enrollment in Operation Clean Halls).
451
Patsy’s Ital. Res., Inc. v. Banas, 658 F.3d 254, 272 (2d Cir. 2011)
(quoting Patsy’s Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., 317 F.3d 209, 220 (2d Cir.
2003)). Accord City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114,
143–44 (2d Cir. 2011) (summarizing limitations on scope of injunctive relief).
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sphere in which states typically are afforded latitude.”452 Prudence counsels in
favor of the exercise of restraint and caution when the important interests of
policing and safety may conflict with the equally important interests of protecting
the constitutional rights of all those who are or may be affected by police practices
in New York City.453 Nevertheless, where the levers of municipal democracy have
failed, leaving in place practices that violate constitutional rights, courts have a
duty to intervene. As I stated in Floyd, safeguarding the liberties guaranteed under
the Fourth Amendment “is quintessentially the role of the judicial branch.”454
In light of these considerations, as well as the findings of fact and
conclusions of law detailed above, I impose the following preliminary relief:
1.
452
Immediate Relief
Reynolds, 506 F.3d at 198.
453
Some recent scholarship has argued that the NYPD’s stop and frisk
program may be partly responsible for the decline in crime in New York City in
recent decades. See F RANKLIN E. Z IMRING, T HE C ITY THAT B ECAME S AFE: N EW
Y ORK’S L ESSONS FOR U RBAN C RIME AND ITS C ONTROL (2011). The issue in this
case, however, is not whether trespass stops outside TAP buildings in the Bronx
are effective at reducing crime, but whether they are constitutional. No matter how
effective a police practice may be, if it violates the Fourth Amendment, the
Constitution requires the government to find other means of achieving its goals.
For example, while preventive detention might be an effective law enforcement
tool, police departments are not allowed to employ it, because doing so would
violate the Constitution.
454
Floyd, 283 F.R.D. at 159.
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The NYPD is ordered immediately to cease performing trespass stops
outside TAP buildings in the Bronx without reasonable suspicion of trespass, in
accordance with the law as set forth and clarified in this Opinion.455 To
summarize: as the Fourth Amendment has been interpreted by the U.S. Supreme
Court and the Second Circuit, an encounter between a police officer and a civilian
constitutes a Terry stop whenever a reasonable person would not feel free to
“‘terminate the encounter.’”456 The stops in this case illustrate that the threat or use
of force is not a necessary or even typical element of Terry stops. Encounters
involving nothing more than commands or accusatory questioning can and
routinely do rise to the level of Terry stops, provided that the commands and
questioning would lead a reasonable person to conclude he was not free to
455
Defendants appear to believe that an order prohibiting stops outside
TAP buildings that lack reasonable suspicion is “a simple command that the
defendant obey the law,” and thus is not legally cognizable. See Def. Findings ¶ 54
n.21 (quoting S.C. Johnson, Inc. v. Clorox Co., 241 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 2001)
(interpreting Rule 65(d)). But as I stated prior to the preliminary injunction
hearing, “the City misapprehends the purpose of Rule 65.” Ligon, 2012 WL
3597066, at *3–4. Cases like S.C. Johnson do not prohibit courts from ordering
parties to obey the law, but rather require that such orders be specific and clear.
See S.C. Johnson, 241 F.3d at 240. “[A]n injunction must ‘be specific and definite
enough to apprise those within its scope of the conduct that is being proscribed.’”
Id. at 240–41. The immediate relief ordered here is specific, clear, and necessary
to correct the misconceptions of NYPD officers that led to the violations of
constitutional rights at issue in this case.
456
Drayton, 536 U.S. at 202 (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436).
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terminate the encounter.
In order for an officer to have “reasonable suspicion” that an
individual is engaged in criminal trespass, the officer must be able to articulate
facts providing “a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop,”457
which means “something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
hunch.’”458 In particular, an individual observed exiting or entering and exiting a
TAP building does not establish reasonable suspicion of trespass, even if the
building is located in a high crime area, and regardless of the time of day. For the
reasons described above, “furtive movement” is a problematic basis for a trespass
stop, especially when it is offered as a stand-alone justification. If an officer is
unable to articulate anything more specific than that a person displayed “furtive
movement,” including anything about the person’s furtive movement that
suggested trespass, then the statement that a person displayed “furtive movement”
is nothing more than an unparticularized suspicion or hunch, and does not
constitute reasonable suspicion.
2.
Proposed Additional Relief
In addition to the immediate relief ordered above, I propose to enter
457
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123.
458
White, 496 U.S. at 329 (quoting Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7) (certain
quotation marks omitted).
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the preliminary relief described under the following subheadings. I present this
relief as a proposal for two reasons. First, the parties in Ligon had little
opportunity to argue and present evidence at the preliminary injunction hearing
concerning the appropriate scope of relief. Second, the preliminary relief I propose
is similar though not identical to the relief sought by plaintiffs in the Floyd action,
where I have already certified a city-wide class of plaintiffs alleging that they have
or will be victims of unconstitutional stops. Floyd is scheduled for trial on March
11, 2013. As part of the proof in that case, plaintiffs intend to present evidence
regarding the remedies they seek.
Because of the rapidly approaching trial date in Floyd and the
inefficiency of hearing separate arguments regarding the closely related remedies
at issue in Ligon and Floyd, I am ordering the consolidation of the remedies
hearing in the instant case with the remedies portion of the Floyd trial. Thus, the
relief proposed under the subheadings below will not take effect until the parties in
this case have had the opportunity to participate in a hearing at which they may
present evidence or argument as to whether the proposed relief is insufficient or
too burdensome or otherwise inappropriate, as well as regarding the appropriate
timeline for relief. This remedy hearing will be held in conjunction with the Floyd
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trial, following the phase of the trial dealing with proof of liability.459 Plaintiffs’
counsel in Ligon and Floyd must coordinate their presentations with respect to
appropriate remedies.460 Submissions by counsel in Ligon related solely to
remedies must be filed no later than February 22, 2013, and may not exceed
twenty-five pages per side.
a.
Policies and Procedures
The NYPD is ordered to develop and adopt a formal written policy
specifying the limited circumstances in which it is legally permissible to stop a
person outside a TAP building on a suspicion of trespass. The policy must reflect
the fact that trespass stops outside TAP buildings are governed not only by New
York state law, but by the Fourth Amendment. Guidance in drafting this policy
should be drawn from the legal discussion found in this Opinion.
459
I emphasize that this ruling should in no way be taken to indicate that
I have already concluded that plaintiffs will prevail in Floyd. The evidence
presented by both sides in Floyd will be judged on its own merits. While the
Applicable Law section of this Opinion — see supra Part III — certainly applies to
issues raised in Floyd, the Findings of Fact section does not. As I have noted
throughout this Opinion, this case relates solely to trespass stops outside of TAP
buildings in the Bronx. It is only because of the unavoidable overlap between the
steps that are necessary to address plaintiffs’ harms in the instant case, and the
steps that would be necessary to address plaintiffs’ harms in Floyd if plaintiffs
prevailed there, that I am ordering the consolidation of the remedies presentations.
460
In the interests of efficiency, counsel in Floyd and Ligon are also
permitted, but not required, to invite the participation of counsel in Davis in the
presentation on appropriate remedies.
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A draft of the written policy governing trespass stops outside TAP
buildings shall be provided to the Court (or a monitor appointed by the Court) for
approval prior to distribution, with a copy to plaintiffs’ counsel.
b.
Supervision
First, the City is ordered to take all necessary steps to ensure that UF250s are completed for every trespass stop outside a TAP building in the Bronx.
Again, a “stop” in the relevant sense is defined as any police encounter in which a
reasonable person would not feel free to terminate the encounter.
Second, the City is ordered to implement a system of review modeled
on the one ordered by Chief Hall in paragraph 3 of Exhibit E. Supervisory
personnel in each Bronx precinct must review, on a quarterly basis, each UF-250
completed for a trespass stop outside a TAP building in the Bronx. To the extent
that such review reveals nonconformity with the formal written policy described
above, the City will take specific steps to retrain the officer. The results of these
reviews and any retraining will be periodically reported to the relevant precinct
commander, a designated member of the Bronx Borough Command, a designated
member of the Chief of Patrol’s Office, and plaintiffs’ counsel. Copies of all
reviewed UF-250s shall be provided to plaintiffs’ counsel.
c.
Training
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The City is ordered to revise the NYPD’s training materials and
training programs to conform with the law as set forth in this Opinion. The
instruction must be sufficient to uproot the longstanding misconceptions that have
afflicted TAP in the Bronx. It must include, but need not be limited to, the
following reforms: (1) The formal written policy governing trespass stops outside
TAP buildings, described above, must be distributed to each Bronx NYPD
member, and then redistributed two additional times at six-month intervals.
(2) The stop and frisk refresher course at Rodman’s Neck must be altered to
incorporate instruction specifically targeting the problem of unconstitutional
trespass stops outside TAP buildings. Whether the instruction includes additional
slides, role-playing, or exams, it must be sufficient to convey to all officers who
attend the course that reasonable suspicion of trespass is required before making a
trespass stop outside a TAP building. Training regarding these stops must also be
provided to new recruits and to officers who have already attended the Rodman’s
Neck refresher course and are not scheduled to do so again. (3) Chapter 16 of the
Chief of Patrol Field Training Guide must be revised to reflect the formal written
policy governing trespass stops outside TAP buildings described above. (4) SQF
Training Video No. 5 must be revised to conform with the law as set forth in this
Opinion. I recognize that this step, like some of the others above, will involve
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alterations to training materials used outside the Bronx and outside the context of
TAP. But such steps are necessary to correct the longstanding misconceptions that
led to the violations of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights described in this Opinion.
Drafts of the written or scripted training materials described above
shall be provided to the Court (or a monitor appointed by the Court) for approval
prior to use, with a copy to plaintiffs’ counsel.
d.
Attorneys’ Fees
Reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs will be rewarded as appropriate,
on application.
In closing, I stress that my conclusions in this Opinion are based on
the limited evidence presented at the preliminary injunction hearing. It could be
the case that the development and implementation of IOs 22 and 23 of 2012, as
well as the changes to NYPD training in 2012, have resolved the problem of
unconstitutional trespass stops outside TAP buildings in the Bronx. Because these
changes were so recent, however, and so late in the two-decade history of TAP,
they were insufficient to rebut plaintiffs’ evidence at the hearing of defendants’
deliberate indifference to a practice of unconstitutional stops. At any time that
defendants develop persuasive evidence, supported by reliable statistics, that
unconstitutional trespass stops are no longer taking place outside TAP buildings in
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the Bronx, defendants may move for the dissolution of this preliminary injunction
and the proposed relief.
CONCLUSION
VI.
For the reasons explained above, plaintiffs' motion is granted,
although the full extent of the relief has not yet been determined. 461 No action is
required by the Clerk of the Court, because plaintiffs' motion has already been
closed.
Dated:
February 14,2013
New York, New York
Subsequent to the publication of the original version of this Opinion
on January 8, 2013, I stayed the immediately ordered relief granted above. See
Ligon v. City ofNew York, No. 12 Civ. 2274, 2013 WL 227654 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22,
of lifting
2013). The pUblication of this Amended Opinion does not have the effect oflifting
publication
the stay.
461
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APPENDIX A
Excerpts from Decline to Prosecute Affidavits:
1.
The Arresting Officer observed the defendant exit the lobby of . . . a Clean
Halls Apartment Building, and asked defendant, why were you in the building?
Defendant stated in sum and substance: VISITING A FRIEND. The Arresting
Officer then observed defendant to have a white powdery substance on his nose . . .
however, the amount was too small to field test or recover.
The Arresting Officer arrested Defendant and charged him with violating
New York State Penal Law section 140.15 (Criminal Trespass). However, the
Arresting Officer failed to ask defendant [redacted] you know anyone in the
building; if so, what is the person’s name and apartment number.
2.
[T]he defendants were observed exiting a clean halls building. The
defendants stated that they were there to visit a tenant . . . . After being arrested a
tenant from the building did corroborate the defendant’s statements and the tenant
stated that both defendants were in the building as his guests.
3.
The Arresting Officer . . . observed defendant exiting the lobby of . . . a
Clean Halls Apartment Building. The Arresting Officer . . . approached the
defendant and asked the defendant do you live in the building and defendant stated
in sum and substance: NO. The Arresting Officer further asked the defendant what
apartment did you come from and defendant stated in sum and substance: I MET
WITH [redacted] IN THE LOBBY. The Arresting Officer further asked defendant
what apartment does [redacted] live in and defendant stated in sum and substance:
I DON’T KNOW THE APARTMENT NUMBER. [Another officer then went
inside the building and asked two people exiting if they knew anyone by the name
of the defendant’s host. When they said no, the defendant was arrested for
trespass.]
4.
. . . Arresting Officer observed defendant enter and exit a Clean Halls
Building. Arresting Officer approached the defendant and asked her where she
was coming [from], what was she doing in the building and what apartment
number was she visiting. Defendant responded in sum and substance: I WAS
VISITING A FRIEND. I AM NOT TELLING YOU THE APARTMENT
NUMBER OR THE NAME. [The defendant was then arrested for trespass.]
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5.
Defendants entered . . . a clean halls building, and exited. Defendant was
stopped outside of the location. When the arresting officer questioned the
defendant, defendant stated, in sum and substance, I’M JUST CHILLING.
Defendant did not admit that he was in the location. [The defendant was then
arrested for trespass.]
6.
[A]rresting officer . . . observed the defendant enter and exit the lobby of . . .
a Clean Halls Apartment Building, asked defendant does he live there and
defendant did not respond. The arresting officer then asked the defendant if he
knows anyone in the apartment and defendant did not respond. Arresting officer
then asked defendant what was he doing in the building and defendant stated in
sum and substance I WASN’T THERE TO BUY DRUGS. [The defendant was
then arrested for trespass.]
7.
Arresting Officer observed the defendant enter and exit the lobby of . . . a
Clean Halls Apartment building, and asked defendant do you live in the building,
do you know anyone in the building, what are you doing in the building, to which
defendant stated in sum and substance: NO, NO, I WAS INSIDE FOR A
COUPLE OF MINUTES MAKING A PHONE CALL. [The defendant was then
arrested for trespass.]
8.
Arresting Officer . . . observed both defendants exit the lobby of . . . a Clean
Halls Apartment Building and asked defendants what was their purpose inside of
said building and defendant [redacted] stated in sum and substance: I WAS
VISITING MY COUSIN [redacted] IN [redacted] but defendant [redacted]
remained silent. [Another officer] entered the building to investigate further,
however, the arresting officer was unable to articulate how [the other officer]
disproved [the speaking defendant’s] claim. [Both defendants were arrested for
trespass.]
9.
Police Officer . . . observed the defendant exiting the lobby of . . . a Clean
Halls Apartment Building and asked defendant whether he lived in the building
and defendant stated in sum and substance: NO. [The officer] then asked the
defendant, were you visiting anyone in the building, and defendant stated in sum
and substance: YES. [The officer] then asked the defendant for the name of the
person he was visiting and the apartment number and defendant stated in sum and
substance: I DON’T KNOW. [The defendant was then arrested for trespass.]
152
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Filed 02/14/13 Page 153 of 158
10. Arresting Officer observed the defendant enter and exit the lobby of . . . a
Clean Halls Building, and radioed defendant’s description. Arresting Officer’s
partner asked defendant why did you go into the building, do you know anyone in
the building, to which defendant stated in sum and substance: I CAME OUT OF A
FRIEND[’]S APARTMENT. I WAS INSIDE FOR ABOUT AN HOUR. [The
defendant was then arrested for trespass.]
11. [T]he arresting officer observed the defendant enter into [a Clean Halls
building] and exit after approximately five (5) minutes. . . .
. . . The defendant was not observed in an area of the building that is not
open to the public such as the hallways, lobby and stairwells. [The defendant was
arrested for trespass.]
12. [A police officer] observed the defendant enter a Clean Halls Building and
exit moments later. . . . [W]hen the defendant exited the building, [the officer]
asked the defendant if he lived in the building, to which the defendant stated in
sum and substance, NO. . . . [The officer] did not ask the defendant if he was a
guest of a tenant in the building. . . . [T]he defendant attempted to walk away at
which time [the officer] grabbed the defendant[’]s arms, and the defendant pulled
away. [A struggle ensued, and the defendant was then arrested in part for
trespass.]
13. [T]he defendants entered a Clean Halls building, stayed there approximately
five minutes, and then left. The arresting officer stopped the defendants and asked
them where they were coming from. The defendants replied, in sum and
substance, WE’RE COMING FROM . . . WE’RE COMING FROM . . ., and could
not provide a name or apartment number. The officer placed both defendants
under arrest and searched them.
14. The Arresting Officer observed the defendant exit the lobby of . . . a Clean
Halls Apartment Building, approached defendant and asked, Do you live in the
building?, defendant stated in sum and substance: NO. The Arresting Officer then
asked the defendant, Do you know anyone in the building?, defendant stated in
sum and substance: YES, A FRIEND. The Arresting Officer then asked the
defendant, What’s your friend’s name? What apartment does your friend live in?,
defendant stated in sum and substance: I DON’T KNOW HIS NAME. HE’S IN
[redacted]. The Arresting Officer went to [redacted] however, the apartment was
unoccupied, and as a result, the Arresting Officer was unable to locate anyone who
153
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Filed 02/14/13 Page 154 of 158
could verify defendant’s claim. [The defendant was then arrested for trespass.]
15. The Arresting Officer observed the defendant exit the lobby of . . . a Clean
Halls Apartment Building and [another officer] approached defendant on the
sidewalk and asked defendant, Do you live in the building?, and defendant stated
in sum and substance: NO. [The officer] asked defendant, What was your reason
for being in the building?, and defendant stated in sum and substance: LOOKING
FOR A GIRL. [The officer] then asked the defendant, What’s the name of the
girl?, and defendant refused to provide an answer to the aforementioned question.
[The defendant was then arrested for trespass.]
16. Arresting Officer observed the defendant enter and exit the lobby of . . . a
clean halls Building. [The defendant was then arrested for trespass.] However,
arresting Officer could not obtain a clean halls affidavit.
17. [I]n front of . . . a Clean Halls building, [the arresting officer] observed
defendant and several unapprehended individuals exit the lobby . . . . [The officer]
approached defendant and asked defendant if he knew anyone in above-mentioned
location and defendant stated in sum and substance: NO. I’M JUST LOOKING
FOR MY FRIEND [redacted]. NO [redacted] DOESN’T LIVE HERE. [The
defendant was then arrested for trespass.]
18. [D]efendant was observed entering and exiting the lobby of [a Clean Halls
building].
Arresting officer asked defendant what he was doing in the building and
defendant stated in sum and substance I WAS IN THE BUILDING LOOKING
FOR WORK. Arresting officer asked defendant what kind of work he was looking
for and defendant stated in sum and substance I WAS LOOKING FOR MY
FRIEND [redacted]. Arresting officer asked defendant where his friend lived and
defendant stated in sum and substance I DON’T KNOW WHERE HE LIVES.
[The defendant was then arrested for trespass.]
19. Arresting officer observed defendant enter . . . a clean halls building and
observed defendant exit said building. Arresting officer approached and asked
defendant, what were you doing in the building and defendant stated in sum and
substance: I WAS THERE TO VISIT A FRIEND. I DON’T KNOW WHAT
APARTMENT THEY LIVE IN. [The officer then searched the defendant, found
crack-cocaine and a pipe, and arrested defendant in part for trespass.]
154
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Filed 02/14/13 Page 155 of 158
20. The arresting officer . . . observed defendant exiting the lobby of . . . a Clean
Halls Apartment Building. The arresting officer stopped defendant and defendant
clenched his fists on his sides and spread his feet apart and . . . stated in sum and
substance YOU’RE NOT GOING TO TOUCH ME. YOU’RE NOT GOING TO
TOUCH ME. YOU’RE NOT PUTTING YOUR HANDS ON ME. [The arresting
officer then handcuffed defendant and placed him in the patrol vehicle.]
21. [D]efendant was observed entering the above location, a Clean Halls
Apartment building, and was also observed exiting said location minutes later.
Arresting police officer . . . asked defendant if he lived in the building and
defendant stated in sum and substance, I’M NOT THERE, I’M IN [redacted]. [The
defendant was then arrested for trespass.]
22. Arresting Officer observed the defendant exit the lobby of . . . a Clean Halls
Apartment Building. Arresting officer approached defendant and asked him, do
you live in the building, do you know anyone in the building, what apartment does
your friend live [in], what is his name[,] to which defendant stated in sum and
substance: . . . NO I DON’T, YES I’M VISITING MY FRIEND ON THE
[redacted] FLOOR, NO I’M NOT GOING TO GIVE YOU MY FRIEND’S
NAME. [The officer then patted down the defendant and arrested him in part for
trespass.]
23. Arresting officer observed defendant enter . . . a clean halls building and
observed defendant exit said building. Arresting officer approached and asked
defendant, what were you doing in the building and do you know anyone in the
building and defendant stated in sum and substance: NO, I DON’T KNOW
ANYONE AND I WENT TO BUY DRUGS. [The defendant was then arrested in
part for trespass.]
24. The Arresting Officer states that . . . he observed defendant exiting . . . a
Clean Halls Apartment Building. The Arresting Officer approached defendant and
asked defendant if he lives in the building and defendant stated in sum and
substance: NO. The Arresting Officer further asked the defendant where are you
coming from and defendant stated in sum and substance: I’M COMING FROM
THE [redacted] FLOOR. The Arresting Officer asked the defendant what
apartment are you coming from and defendant stated in sum and substance: I
DON’T KNOW THE APARTMENT NUMBER BUT I’LL SHOW IT TO YOU.
[The officer went with the defendant to the apartment. No one answered the door.
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The defendant was arrested for trespass.]
25. Arresting Officer observed the defendant enter and exit the lobby of . . . a
Clean Halls Building. Arresting Officer told defendant that he observed him enter
said building along with separately apprehended [redacted] . . . and separately
apprehended stated in sum and substance WE WERE IN THE BUILDING.
Arresting Officer then asked separately apprehended and defendant what apartment
they were visiting, and neither defendant nor separately apprehended provided a
response. [The defendant was then arrested for trespass.]
. . . [T]he Arresting Officer did not observe defendant to go beyond the
public vestibule of said building, nor did defendant admit to being inside of said
building, beyond the public vestibule.
26. The arresting officer states that . . . inside of . . . a Clean Halls Building, she
observed defendant and separately apprehended [redacted] enter the lobby of said
location and exit shortly thereafter. Arresting officer stopped defendant and asked
him if he lived in the building and defendant stated in sum and substance I DON’T
LIVE IN THE BUILDING. Arresting officer asked defendant what he was doing
in the building and defendant stated in sum and substance I WAS WAITING FOR
A FRIEND. Arresting officer asked defendant for the name of the person he was
waiting for and defendant did not reply. Arresting officer asked defendant for his
identification and defendant was unable to produce one at which time arresting
officer attempted to handcuff defendant and defendant ran.
156
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Filed 02/14/13 Page 157 of 158
APPENDIX B
Blank UF-250 Form
L
l
l
l
COMPLETE ALL CAPTIONS
~
~
STOP, QUESTION AND FRISK Pel-Serial No.
Ic-~--~~~~---
REPORT WORKSHEET
PD344-151A (Rev, 11..02)
Time Of Stop
Dale
Pet. Of OCC.
Period Of Observation
Prior To Stop
Address/Intersection Or Cross Streets Of Slop
o Inside
o Outside 0 Housin
Type Of Location
Describe:
Specify Which FelonylP.L. Misdemeanor Suspected
Duration Of Slop
What Were Circumstances Which Led To Stop?
(MUST CHECK AT LEAST ONE BOX)
o
o
o
o
Carrying Objects In Plain V_
0
Actions Indicative Of Engaging
In Drug Tran&aClion.
0
0
Used In Commission Of Crime
o.g .. Slim JirN'Pry Bar. etc.
Fits Description.
Actions 1ncSic:atNe Of ·Casing"
VlClim Or Location.
Actions Indicative of Ading As A
Ftwtive Movements.
Actions Indicative Of Engaging
In VIOlent Crimes.
Wearing CIotheslOisguises
Commonly Used In
0
~
o DO
Commission Of Crime.
Lookovl.
I
D Suspicious BuIQelObjoct (Describe)
Other Reasonable Suspicion Of CrimirJal Activity (Specify)
o
Name Of Person Stopped
Nicknamel
Street Name
Date Of Birth
0000
ApI. No.
Address
o
Photo 1.0.
o
Refused
"
"
i
I•
Other (Scars, Tattoos. Etc.)
Did Officer Explain If No, Explain:
Reason For Stop
Yes ONo
Yes If Yes, Ust Pel. Serial Nos.
Were Other Persons Stopped! 0
Questioned/Frisked?
0
No
If Physical Force Was Used, Indicate Type:
o Hands On Susped
0 Drawing Firearm
o Suspect On Ground
D BatOll
D Polnllng Firearm At Suspect
D Pepper Spray
D Handcuffing Suspect
0 Other (Describel
o
o
Suspect Against WalllCar
Was Suspect Arrested? Offense
DYes 0
No
Was Summons Issued? Offense
DYes 0
No
OffICer In Uniform?
If No, How Identified?
o
i
Yes
0
No
Arrest No.
~
I
z
~
>
•
o
Summons No.
o Shield
~
I~I
01.0. Card
o Verbal
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Filed 02/14/13 Page 158 of 158
- Appearances For Plaintiffs:
For Defendants:
Christopher Dunn, Esq.
Alexis Karteron, Esq.
Taylor Pendergrass, Esq.
Daniel Mullkoff, Esq.
New York Civil Liberties Union
125 Broad Street, 19th floor
New York, NY 10004
(212) 607-3300
Heidi Grossman
Mark Zuckerman
Joseph Marutollo
Brenda Cooke
Richard Weingarten
Assistant Corporation Counsel
New York City Law Department
100 Church Street
New York, NY 10007
(212) 788-1300
J. McGregor Smyth, Jr., Esq.
Mariana Kovel, Esq.
The Bronx Defenders
860 Courtlandt Avenue
Bronx, NY 10451
(718) 508-3421
Juan Cartagena, Esq.
Foster Maer, Esq.
Roberto Concepcion, Jr., Esq.
LatinoJustice PRLDEF
99 Hudson Street, 14th Floor
New York, NY 10013
(212) 219-3360
John A. Nathanson, Esq.
Tiana Peterson, Esq.
Mayer Grashin, Esq.
Shearman & Sterling LLP
599 Lexington Avenue
New York, NY 10022
(212) 848-5222
158
EXHIBIT D
Case: 13-3088
Document: 247
Page: 1
CORRECTED MANDATE
10/31/2013
1081116
3
13-3123; 13-3088
Ligon, et al. v. City of New York, et al.; Floyd, et al. v. City of New York, et al.
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
31st day of October, two thousand thirteen.
Present:
John M. Walker, Jr.,
José A. Cabranes,
Barrington D. Parker,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
Jaenean Ligon, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees.
v.
City of New York, et al.,
13-3123
(Corrected)
Defendants-Appellants,
_____________________________________
_____________________________________
David Floyd, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees.
v.
City of New York, et al.,
13-3088
Defendants-Appellants,
_____________________________________
MANDATE ISSUED ON 10/31/2013
Case: 13-3088
Document: 247
Page: 2
10/31/2013
1081116
3
Pending before the Court is a motion filed by Appellants City of New York et al. seeking
a stay of the District Court’s August 12, 2013 remedial order and preliminary injunction
(“Remedies Opinion”).
It is hereby ORDERED that the District Court’s January 8, 2013 “Opinion and Order,” as
well as the August 12, 2013 “Liability Opinion” and “Remedies Opinion,” each of which may or
will have the effect of causing actions to be taken by defendants or designees of the District
Court, or causing restraints against actions that otherwise would be taken by defendants, are
STAYED pending the disposition of these appeals.
The appeal by defendants in both (consolidated) actions shall continue in the normal
course, under the following schedule:
Defendants shall perfect their appeals by January 24, 2014.
Plaintiffs shall file by February 28, 2014.
Defendants shall reply by March 14, 2014.
Oral argument shall be heard on a date after March 14, 2014, to be set by the Court in due
course.
The cause is REMANDED to the District Court for the sole purpose of implementation of
this Order, and the mandate shall otherwise remain with this Court until the completion of the
appeals process.
Upon review of the record in these cases, we conclude that the District Judge ran afoul of
the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, Canon 2 (“A judge should avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety in all activities.”); see also Canon 3(C)(1) (“A judge shall
disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably
be questioned . . . .”), and that the appearance of impartiality surrounding this litigation was
compromised by the District Judge’s improper application of the Court’s “related case rule,” see
Transfer of Related Cases, S.D.N.Y. & E.D.N.Y. Local Rule 13(a),1 and by a series of media
1
In a proceeding on December 21, 2007 involving the parties in Daniels v. City of New York, No. 99 Civ.
1695 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 8, 1999), the District Judge stated, “[I]f you got proof of inappropriate racial profiling in
a good constitutional case, why don’t you bring a lawsuit? You can certainly mark it as related.” She also stated,
“[W]hat I am trying to say, I am sure I am going to get in trouble for saying it, for $65 you can bring that lawsuit.”
She concluded the proceeding by noting, “And as I said before, I would accept it as a related case, which the
plaintiff has the power to designate.” Two of the attorney groups working on behalf of plaintiffs in Daniels, a case
2
Case: 13-3088
Document: 247
Page: 3
10/31/2013
1081116
3
interviews and public statements purporting to respond publicly to criticism of the District
Court.2
Accordingly, we conclude that, in the interest, and appearance, of fair and impartial
administration of justice, UPON REMAND, these cases shall be assigned to a different District
Judge, chosen randomly under the established practices of the District Court for the Southern
District of New York. This newly-designated District Judge shall implement this Court’s
mandate staying all proceedings and otherwise await further action by the Court of Appeals on
the merits of the ongoing appeals.
In taking these actions, we intimate no view on the substance or merits of the pending
appeals, which have yet to be fully briefed and argued.
The mandate shall ISSUE FORTHWITH for the sole purpose of implementation of this
Order and shall otherwise remain in this Court.
In the interest of judicial economy, any question, application, or further appeal regarding
the scope of this Order or its implementation shall be directed to this panel, which will hear the
case on the merits in due course.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
challenging the New York Police Department’s stop-and-frisk practices, helped file Floyd the next month. See
generally Joseph Goldstein, A Court Rule Directs Cases Over Friskings to One Judge, N.Y. Times, May 5, 2013.
2
See, e.g., Mark Hamblett, Stop-and-Frisk Judge Relishes her Independence, N.Y. Law Journal, May 5,
2013; Larry Neumeister, NY “Frisk” Judge Calls Criticism “Below-the-Belt,” The Associated Press, May 19, 2013;
Jeffrey Toobin, A Judge Takes on Stop-and-Frisk, The New Yorker, May 27, 2013.
3
EXHIBIT E
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D429flo1
THE COURT: Good morning everyone. Please be seated.
Are we starting with those tapes.
MR. CHARNEY: We are, your Honor. But I did want to
ask. We had submitted a letter.
THE COURT: Yes. I read the letter.
MR. CHARNEY: Do you want us to wait to hold off to
address that?
THE COURT: My problem is I'm sure the city wants to
write a letter or be heard.
MR. CHARNEY: Then the only concern we have -THE COURT: Tell us, Ms. Grossman. Do you want to be
heard or write later or what?
MS. GROSSMAN: I think we can address it now.
THE COURT: So you don't want to write a letter?
Okay. What do you want to say?
Ms. Grossman or Ms. Cooke.
MS. COOKE: Well two things, your Honor. I'll take
the RAND report issue first. This was the subject of a motion
in limine. On January 4 -- at the January 4, 2013 conference
the defendants raised the intention of the RAND report as an
exhibit. The plaintiffs objected on the very same grounds
they're objecting now. You ruled that, in fact, the city
intended to use it not for its truth but to show the lack -that we didn't -- weren't deliberately indifferent.
THE COURT: Sorry? Again.
SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.
(212) 805-0300
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MS. COOKE: That we intend to use it to show that
we're not deliberately indifferent. That's the purpose for
which we'd use it.
Professor Fagan, and the plaintiffs as well, have
taken testimony in depositions from city witnesses with respect
to the RAND report and the city's work with respect to the RAND
report. They're on notice of how we intend to use it. They're
calling most of the city witnesses on their case in chief.
The suggestion that Professor Fagan should be
permitted to be recalled to rebut makes no sense. He should be
put to the end of the order if he wants to hear the city
witnesses' testimony at trial with respect to the RAND report
first before he testifies.
Professor Smith and Purtell, in their reports, have
addressed the RAND report. That's in the report. To the
extent that they will address it, it's in the four corners of
their report. They're on notice of that.
We see no need to revisit the motion in limine ruling
or permit Professor Fagan to take the stand twice in
anticipation of what the plaintiffs will be presenting in their
case.
THE COURT: I'll get to the RAND report later I
actually thought the other issue was more important at the
moment.
MS. COOKE: With respect to the other issue, your
SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.
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D429flo1
Honor, you know, it's 2012 data that's been recently produced
to the plaintiffs in this case in December and in March of
2013. This is a 2013 trial seeking injunctive relief,
potentially awarding some time later in 2013. We think it's
relevant that the court have all of the available 2012 data
before the court at this trial. We did -- the experts did
tallies of the data. The charts and figures represent tallies
of the UF 250 data for the entirety of 2012. Because prior
both experts' reports had only covered up through June of 2012.
THE COURT: Right. But we don't get the third and
fourth quarter information until December 10, 2012 and March 8,
2013. When that finally comes in on March 8 -MS. COOKE: March 1.
THE COURT: It says March 8 in their letter.
MR. CHARNEY: We didn't get it until March 8.
MS. COOKE: Or March 8.
THE COURT: It seems to me that if you thought you
wanted to use that information at this trial there were still
ten days before we even began the trial when you should have
said we've now produced the third and fourth quarters of 2012.
We want our expert to analyze it. Obviously, the plaintiffs'
expert will want to analyze it. They may reach different
conclusions.
But nobody tells anybody anything. You don't tell the
court. You don't tell the adversary.
SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.
(212) 805-0300
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D429flo1
But on March 31, on a Sunday night in the middle of
the trial, you produce a report with no permission, calling it
a supplemental report, and you expect to be able to use it when
they haven't had their expert look at this data, their expert
test the report of your expert.
It's totally unfair and there was a way around it.
All you had to do on March 8 or March 1 -- you had it on
March 1, apparently the plaintiffs didn't get it until
March 8 -- is somewhere between that time period you should
have talked to me about it, said: We have two new quarters.
We want to bring this current. We'll want our expert to do it.
Surely the plaintiffs' expert will want to do the same thing.
So why don't we talk together and give a date for both experts
to analyze these two new quarters. And if they need to be -produce something in a short written report and be redeposed,
we can work it all out. But instead silence. March 31.
Mid trial. Out comes your report. I can't allow you to use
it. There is no fairness to that. I just don't see the
fairness. It's simple fairness. I know no way around that
fairness problem now. So we have to just stop the data in
June 2012 a if we just don't have those two quarters.
MS. COOKE: With all due respect -THE COURT: With all due respect is not a helpful
statement. It doesn't mean anything. Skip that and get to the
point. Because it's not respectful. I just told you it lacks
SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.
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1807
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fairness. All I want is a fair trial. There are two new
quarters of data. You knew about that March 1, for sure, the
second of those two quarters. Why didn't you come to the court
say we have to talk to you. We need a conference.
We were conferencing constantly. We conferenced right
through I think March 15, the Friday before trial. Talk to me.
Tell me the problem. Tell the plaintiffs the problem. Give -tell them what you intend to do and they will probably want to
do the same and then we could have used it. Now I can't.
There is no fairness. So skip the due respect and tell me your
idea.
MS. COOKE: The second point, your Honor, with respect
to the Ligon case, you specifically ordered in your liability
finding in Ligon, you invited the city to review additional
data.
THE COURT: You did.
MS. COOKE: We did attempt to produce and use in the
Ligon liability phase of the preliminary injunction. We have
done that. I have produced that on the same date, on Sunday,
of the 2012 data.
THE COURT: I have no problem with the production of
the data on December 10 and March 8 to the plaintiffs. But
what didn't happen was your alerting people that you intended
for the expert to do an analysis of this data and produce a new
expert report in this case in the middle of trial three days
SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.
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D429flo1
before their expert takes the stand. Their expert hasn't done
the same. Their expert hasn't seen Purtell's analysis, hasn't
had a chance to question Purtell's analysis or try to replicate
the work. I can't allow it. You've made it harder for me.
There was a really easy way to do this. Say we're getting the
new quarters coming in. We'd like to get our data current.
We'd like both sides' experts to have a chance to look at it.
Instead, you hit the ball.
MS. COOKE: I apologize your Honor we repeatedly told
by the plaintiffs we have a continuing obligation to produce
discovery and data in this case.
THE COURT: And you do. But data -- the data has been
produced. I cannot let the Purtell analysis of that data in.
That's what I can't do. If you can use the data in some way
without an expert -- I don't know how, maybe you can put it in
front of me -- say here's the data, Judge, you figure it out -I mean I'm allowed to look at the data.
I did ask you to keep it current. You've always
produced quarters; quarter, after quarter, after quarter for
years. That's fine. And the plaintiff had the data. Maybe
not the same day you did, sounds like seven days later. But I
can't have Purtell's analysis.
MS. COOKE: I think I'm mistaken on March 1. March 8
was my birthday. I didn't think it was my birthday. But the
letter does say March 8 the plaintiffs say we presented it, it
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was March 8. I apologize, your Honor, with respect to the lack
of notice. It was my understanding -THE COURT: But there's real prejudice. This is not
just a little tiff where I say to lawyers: Oh, you should have
written this letter or oh, you know, during the years of
discovery. That would be a little problem. It would be a
little slap on the wrist. We'd be done with it.
This is prejudicial. This is a problem. I have no
way to cure that problem in the middle of this trial.
So yes, you had an ongoing obligation to produce this
data, and the data can be brought current. But we can't have
this report and analysis.
MS. COOKE: With respect to the Ligon, you
specifically did invite the parties in the January decision -THE COURT: I remember.
MS. COOKE: -- to update and provide.
THE COURT: You always had an obligation to update
anyway.
MS. COOKE: No. To provide the updated analysis of
2012 data. So with respect to that analyses, and the fact that
the remedies phase of this trial is not for several weeks, I
would ask that you be permitted to use those figures and charts
with respect to the proximity stops for the Ligon remedy phase.
THE COURT: I don't have the Ligon plaintiffs' lawyer
here. It would be inappropriate to discuss that now.
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MS. COOKE: I just wanted to raise it.
THE COURT: You raised it. But I can't possibly rule
on it until the other side is here. So the next time you find
Mr. Dunn in the court tell him we would like to have a
conference.
MS. COOKE: So with respect to the 2012 data.
THE COURT: Of the last two quarters.
MS. COOKE: The last two quarters. To the extent the
city can present tallies or counts of that data that's usable
to the court, you would permit that.
THE COURT: The data is the data. The data -MS. COOKE: Counts of how many -THE COURT: Counsel has had the data the same time you
had the data. You've had an obligation to update the data.
What I can't allow is his analysis.
MS. COOKE: So counts of how many happened per month.
THE COURT: Just counting.
MS. COOKE: Counts.
THE COURT: I've guess so.
MR. CHARNEY: Then just to clarify, your Honor,
because the stuff they produced on Sunday included -THE COURT: I carefully didn't look at it.
See that's the point. This is a nonjury trial. So I
read the three-page letter but I purposely did not look at the
exhibits. Otherwise, I'm tainted. I don't want to look at
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what I'm not allowed to look at.
MR. CHARNEY: I understand.
So I'm just going to represent to you that we are a
little unclear on what tallies mean because some of what they
produced are simply -THE COURT: Can you talk to each other and leave me
out of it?
MR. CHARNEY: I understand.
THE COURT: The purpose of this -MR. CHARNEY: We will do that.
THE COURT: Good.
MR. CHARNEY: Hopefully we can resolve it.
THE COURT: With the guidance of the ruling I just
gave you, you have to learn to work it out.
Now -- now we can come back to the RAND report, which
I thought was the lesser of the two problems.
Now you've heard, Mr. Charney, you've heard what
Ms. Cooke said. Your response.
MR. CHARNEY: Our response is that we understand that
your Honor has said it can come in on the deliberative
indifference issue. But we still don't know exactly how the
city plans to use it. Are they going to put a certain witness
on to explain why they relied on it, or how they relied on it,
or what portion of it they relied on? And at this point we
really don't know what they're going to say about that because
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Shea - cross
Q. Can I ask why you moved -- you were the chief of the
terrorism unit, is that correct, prior to the police academy?
A. Yes, I was.
Q. Can I ask were you left and joined the police academy?
A. I was transferred there.
Q. Whose decision was that, do you know?
A. I'm an executive. The police commissioner's.
Q. As part of your work you put together the stop and frisk
refresher course that was offered at Rodman's Neck beginning in
the summer 2012, correct?
A. Yes.
I believe beginning before the summer, kind of, I
think.
Q. And you testified that you started work on that course in
March, April of 2012?
A. I believe.
Q. Chief Shea, under the law an officer makes a Terry stop
when he stops a person such that that person does not feel free
to leave, correct?
A. The standard -- the way I always say it is such that a
reasonable person would not feel free to leave.
Q. Okay. So when a reasonable person is stopped by an officer
and does not feel free to leave, that's when a Terry stop has
taken place, correct?
A. Yes.
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Shea - cross
Q. And this is also sometimes called a forcible stop, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. So if I say forcible stop you'll understand that I mean a
stop where a reasonable person does not feel free to leave,
correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And under the constitution to make a forcible stop the
officer must have reasonable suspicion that a person has just,
is committing, or is about to commit a crime, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And a police officer should fill out a UF 250 and enter
details into their memo book whenever that police officer makes
a forcible stop, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. But the recent training materials given to officers at
Rodman's Neck did not instruct police officers on that
standard, did it?
A. Pardon me?
Q. The recent training materials that were given to the active
duty police officers who attended the training at Rodman's Neck
didn't instruct officers on that standard, did it?
A. I believe it did.
(Continued on next page)
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Shea - cross
Q. Let's look at Exhibit C4. This was admitted in evidence
with Ms. Cooke. These are the PowerPoint presentation slides
for a presentation that you testified was given at Rodman's
Neck entitled, "Properly preparing stop, question and frisk
report."
Do you recognize this document?
A. Yes.
Q. This was the PowerPoint -- as you testified earlier -- this
was the PowerPoint that was given to officers at that stop and
frisk refresher course at Rodman's Neck, correct?
A. That was displayed to them. I don't think they left with
it, but I think it was shown.
Q. So they were shown this presentation?
A. Yes.
Q. I think that you just testified that as of now, 6,000
officers had attended the training at Rodman's Neck on the stop
and frisk refresher course?
A. Yes.
Q. So let's go ahead and look at page 3 of the presentation.
This slide says that, "We should only be preparing a
UF-250 for encounters that achieve reasonable suspicion, or
lead up to probable cause."
Did I read that correctly?
A. Yes. That's correct.
Q. And isn't it true that this presentation instructs officers
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Shea - cross
that they should prepare the UF-250 for encounters that achieve
reasonable suspicion?
A. Yes. But that's the standard for the Terry stop, is
reasonable suspicion.
Q. Isn't it true that this presentation does not instruct
officers to fill out a UF-250 when they have made a forcible
stop?
A. I would not agree with that statement.
Q. Can you tell me where it says on this page that they should
prepare a UF-250 for encounters that are forcible stops?
A. It doesn't use the words forcible stops, but a reasonable
suspicion stop is a forcible stop. They are interchangeable.
Q. So, in your view, any stop that has reasonable suspicion is
a forcible stop?
A. If an officer stops someone at the level of reasonable
suspicion, yes, that person is not free to leave until the
investigation is completed. So that is by definition a
forcible stop, even if you don't use force.
Q. But officers can sometimes make a forcible stop without
reasonable suspicion, isn't that true?
A. No, they cannot.
Q. Isn't it true that in the real world, there are possibly
officers who will make a forcible stop without proper
reasonable suspicion?
THE COURT: You mean a bad stop?
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Shea - cross
MS. HOFF VARNER: Yes.
THE COURT: I guess sometimes people make a bad stop.
A. Is it possible? Yes.
Q. And this document doesn't instruct officers, who make
forcible stops but who lack reasonable suspicion, that they
should fill out a UF-250, isn't that true?
A. They shouldn't be stopping the person at all if they lack
reasonable suspicion.
THE COURT: What she is saying is, but if they do,
which they shouldn't, they should still fill out the form? I
guess that's what she is saying.
A. I don't think we would be training them though, if you do a
bad stop, also fill out the form. I would be training them
don't do the bad stop.
Q. I understand that you don't want any officers to make bad
stops.
THE COURT: He's talking about training. He said he
would never train somebody that if you make a bad stop, fill
out the form. Because his training is don't make a bad stop.
It's one thing to ask him what he thinks in the theoretical
world, but in terms of training, he said he would never put
down, if you make a bad stop, fill out a form.
Q. Would you ever tell officers that they should fill out a
UF-250 whenever they have made a forcible stop?
A. Again, this is a -- I am telling them that. What we train
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Shea - cross
them, a stop based an reasonable suspicion means that the
person is not free to leave until you have concluded your
investigation of the offense you have the reasonable suspicion
for. What we train them is, at that point it is a forcible
stop, even if you do not use force. It doesn't even matter if
the person thinks they are allowed to leave. If you know you
wouldn't allow them to leave until the investigation is over,
you have forcibly stopped them and you will document that on a
250. So calling it a reasonable suspicion stop, to me it's
synonymous with a forcible stop.
Q. Do you worry that officers, who don't maybe have the same
background that you do, and who are seeing this on the screen,
would perhaps interpret this as only filling out a UF-250 when
they have reasonable suspicion?
A. No.
THE COURT: Well, I may understand where you're
heading, but I am not sure we are on the same page.
Under the DeBour levels, there seems to be levels of
questioning people or talking to people that are less than
reasonable suspicion stops, right?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: They don't have to fill out a 250 for
those, right?
THE WITNESS: No, they do not.
THE COURT: Is that what you're getting at?
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Lehr - direct
Q. How do you know that?
A. Just in the review process of the stop, question and frisk,
any glance at the index, you will see that a number of
supervisors that are in the field are endorsing a large portion
of the stop, question and frisk reports.
Q. Have you provided instruction to the supervisors in your
command that you expect, when possible, that squad supervisors
sign the 250s?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, while you were the CO in the 67 Precinct, how many
officers received 2.5 or lower on their evaluation?
A. None.
Q. Last year?
A. None.
Q. Now, going back to the questions that I asked you about the
civilian complaints, do you have an understanding of
approximately how many civilian complaints were filed against
officers in your command last year, just ballpark?
A. I think it was 46 or 49, around that range. I want to say
49, roughly.
THE COURT: By last year you mean all of 2012?
THE WITNESS: All of 2012.
Q. Now, what are the demographics of the officers in your
command?
MS. HOFF VARNER: Objection.
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5408
Lehr - direct
GROSSMAN: Did I ask that yesterday?
HOFF VARNER: I do object on relevance.
COURT: I don't know what the relevance is myself.
GROSSMAN: The demographic composition of the
MS.
MS.
THE
MS.
officers.
THE COURT: What is the relevance?
MS. GROSSMAN: I think that in terms of the
sensitivity to -THE COURT: I don't think that's fair to make any
inference that one race is more sensitive to another race or
their own race or anybody else. So I am not going to allow
that. That would require him to draw an inference about race,
which I don't think is appropriate.
Q. Now, are the uniformed staff in your command deployed
evenly throughout the precinct?
A. No.
Q. What determines the deployment of the uniformed staff?
MS. HOFF VARNER: Objection. I think all of these
questions about deployment were asked and answered yesterday.
MS. GROSSMAN: Not these specific questions.
THE COURT: Do you think you talked about this
yesterday, this particular question?
THE WITNESS: Not this particular one.
THE COURT: Go ahead.
A. The deployment is based on current crime trends and
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THE COURT:
We are discussing it right now on the
record.
MS. BORCHETTA: It's a different thing to have all of
his arrest records going back to 1987 a part of the public
record.
THE COURT: I agree. I see no reason for that at all.
If somebody wants to write an article about Mr. Provost, we are
all stuck now. We are discussing it here on the trial record.
Again, the city is directed to file the arrest records
under seal.
MS. PUBLICKER: I would only point out if -THE COURT: Ms. Publicker, I have had enough of this
issue. Thank you. You will file it under seal. The record of
today's transcript is not under seal.
So that takes care of the statistics. That takes care
of Mr. Provost. I am not going to address the proposed Fagan
rebuttal till I get the response letter.
That leaves the witness who is here. On this issue, I
have to say I agree with the plaintiffs and not the city. I
think that you're going beyond what I had originally ruled
could be done. You're going into the facts and details of a
number of stops as to which the plaintiffs do not have the
information to rebut the testimony. There is even a part of
this letter that says that he was able to refer back to his
memo book, and when he referred back to his memo books and
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found the names and found the details, then he was able to
testify to the details. This doesn't seem appropriate. So
there has to be a way to do this in the generalities that I
originally said could be done and not in the level of detail
that we had, whenever we last had it, Tuesday.
So my ruling on this one is in favor of the plaintiff.
MS. COOKE: I would just like to add, I don't know if
it was contained in Ms. Richardson's letter to the Court, but
with respect to the fact that the plaintiffs' expert, Professor
Fagan, has opined and drawn expert conclusions with respect to
the 4.3 million stops and their apparent reasonable suspicion,
there is a category of stops he determined apparently lacked
reasonable suspicion, and he is critical of the checking of
boxes such as furtive movements or high crime areas.
So to the extent that these stops contain those
checked boxes, the testimony by Detective Dang with respect to
his intent and his use of those boxes would certainly go to
rebuttal of Professor Fagan's -THE COURT: One is a statistical analysis based solely
on UF-250s of four and a half million stops. One is calling
one officer asking him to describe particular stops and when he
checked particular boxes. I don't think that rebuts the
statistical study.
MS. COOKE: If you do recall, professor Fagan has put
forward an opinion that officers are using a script.
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THE COURT: I understand that, because he is analyzing
4.4 million UF-250s, and he is seeing patterns within 4.4
million, and there is a statistical analysis at times of the
repeating combinations that he saw.
MS. COOKE: This witness has been identified for the
frequency of his stops being one of the highest UF-250s in the
third quarter of 2009 for the entire police department. And
the plaintiffs have prepared demonstratives trying to argue
with respect to the frequency and the checking of certain
boxes. We know that's an opinion that has been offered by the
plaintiffs' expert with respect to the aggregate. Here is an
officer who has been identified as an officer who has a higher
number of stops, and the plaintiffs are in fact attacking the
meaning to which he was attributing or lack of meaning -THE COURT: I can't have one rule for the plaintiffs
and one rule for the defendants. There was no way for the
plaintiffs to investigate the specifics of the stops that he
wants to go into. The names are redacted. They can't find the
people. They can't even attempt to have the two sides of the
story. He does have available to him the names. He can go
back to his memo book. He can go back to his records. He can
refresh his recollection. It's an argument the city has made
itself.
What is it, Mr. Hellerman?
MR. HELLERMAN: I just want to correct the record. I
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believe Ms. Cooke misspoke because Professor Fagan did not
opine about a percentage of stops that was based on reasonable
suspicion. He opined about a percentage of stops that he
believed were apparently justified.
THE COURT: That's true.
MR. HELLERMAN: He specifically said at the end of his
testimony that he does not believe that those apparently
justified stops were based on reasonable suspicion.
THE COURT: That's a fair correction. I remember him
very carefully using the phrase apparently justified.
MS. COOKE: I thought I used the word apparent.
At any rate, with respect to this witness, if this
witness would be able to testify with respect to his intent of
the use of those boxes, that would certainly -THE COURT: I think he can in generalities. That's
what I said in the first place, and I say it again today. If
he wants to describe in general what he means by furtive
movements, if he wants to describe in general what he means by
suspicious bulge, if he wants to describe in generalities what
he means by fits description. He can say, in my experience,
that can be either a radio run description, a wanted poster
description, a neighborhood source, either anonymous or known
description. He can explain what fits description means in
various contexts, but not a particular stop, on a particular
day, at a particular hour.
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MS. COOKE: I think it would be permissible for him to
explain the use of that box given the crime suspected that he
indicated on that 250, which is available to all parties to
review. He can describe what his practice is with respect to
furtive movements for burglary.
THE COURT: I agree. But not a particular stop, at a
particular hour, on a particular day, but his practices. When
I am investigating burglary, what kind of movement would I
think is a furtive movement.
MS. COOKE: I think the location of the stop.
THE COURT: Those are generalities. That's fine.
MR. COREY: Plaintiffs would just ask, now that we
understand your ruling that much of the testimony he gave
Tuesday was inappropriate, that we be given some time to
identify the certain lines we think should be stricken.
THE COURT: Correct.
MS. RICHARDSON: I believe that much of the testimony
that he did give was intermixed.
THE COURT: It was. You have a real problem. I
frankly would strike the whole thing and start again. I think
that would be the neater way to do it. Just say, we are
striking pages X, line Y, through page Z, line A, and then let
her do the generalities that we just discussed.
MR. COREY: Plaintiffs have no problem with that, your
Honor.
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MS. RICHARDSON: To be clear, the pages would be
stricken starting from when we started utilizing the 250s.
THE COURT: I think that's right. It doesn't mean you
can't cover much of the same ground because I agree with you
that it was intermixed. Some of the material was the
generalities. What do you mean by furtive movements? What do
you mean by fits description? What do you mean by suspicious
bulge? Just divorce it from a specific stop. That's all I am
asking. I would cover the same ground again, Ms. Richardson.
MS. GROSSMAN: I would just raise the fact of the
demonstrative the plaintiffs used with this witness.
THE COURT: The one that showed the combination of
what he checked most often and showed that 98 percent of the
time he checked this or that?
MS. GROSSMAN: Yes.
THE COURT: You can put it up so I know what we are
talking about.
MR. COREY: We haven't showed that witness that
demonstrative.
THE COURT: We have seen it at length.
MR. COREY: That's true. We have seen it with the
supervisor.
MS. GROSSMAN: My concern is that there is testimony
that the supervisor gave about stops that Detective Dang made,
and there are inferences that I think the plaintiffs are going
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to argue and ask the Court to draw inferences from the -THE COURT: The frequency of the combination?
MS. GROSSMAN: Not just the frequency, but the fact
that there was the gun retrieval or contraband retrieval or
about how many led to an arrest.
THE COURT: We know all of that. It's a bunch of
zeros. Let's put it up there.
There it is.
MR. MOORE: There are two charts. You're thinking of
the other chart. This is from Officer Dang.
THE COURT: This is Officer Dang?
Which one was I thinking of?
MS. MARTINI: The one use with Lieutenant Telford.
THE COURT: What was it?
MR. COREY: There were similar patterns expressed.
THE COURT: Was it about this officer also?
MR. COREY: No, your Honor.
MR. MOORE: It was about a different officer.
THE COURT: What officer?
MS. RICHARDSON: The chart that was used with
Lieutenant Telford was with respect to two officers, Officer
Gonzalez and Officer Noboa, and those are two officers that
Lieutenant Telford supervised. This chart was admitted through
Sergeant Marino.
THE COURT: I don't remember this as well because that
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was a little ways back. The other one was more recent.
Let me just look at this one for a minute.
There was one that had 132.
MS. MARTINI: I can find it.
THE COURT: Do you know which one I am thinking of?
MS. MARTINI: Yes.
MR. COREY: While she looks, if the city wants to
rebut the inferences we are asking your Honor to draw on these
patterns, the proper way to do that would have been to have
identified the people so we can get their side of the story.
THE COURT: Anyway, that's the one I was thinking of
at. Was that this officer?
MS. MARTINI: No.
THE COURT: Who is this?
MS. MARTINI: If I may, your Honor, these refer to
UF-250s filled out by Officer Edgar Gonzalez, who we submitted
deposition designation testimony for, and his sergeant who
oversaw his -THE COURT: This is the one I had in my mind. This is
the image. But we can take this down because this isn't this
officer. It is not relevant today.
Let's go back to the one that relates to him so we can
look at it again.
With Officer Gonzalez, where we just saw the chart, we
didn't have rebuttal where he tried to go into every specific
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stop, a sampling of specific stops with the details, did we?
MS. RICHARDSON: No. Officer Gonzalez is not being
called. We agreed to the designations.
THE COURT: I mean, in the portion that is designated,
there is no rebuttal where he defends individual stops in
detail.
MS. GROSSMAN: We have to look at the designations. I
personally have not looked at the designated testimony.
MS. MARTINI: I believe that's correct.
THE COURT: Correct what I said?
MS. MARTINI: Yes.
THE COURT: I have ruled as to what he can do and what
he can't do.
MS. GROSSMAN: I understand. The inferences that the
plaintiffs will be asking the Court to draw based on this
chart, we believe that we need to ask these questions and let
the testimony stand to rebut that.
THE COURT: I understand what you believe, and I have
ruled. The ruling is clear in the record. The record is
closed on this issue. I am ready to proceed with questioning
the witness. I have given three rulings this morning. You
might have noticed, two were favorable to the defense, one was
favorable to the plaintiffs, and I am ready to proceed.
You can leave that up if it's helpful to him.
KHA DANG, resumed.
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Walker - cross
Q. I don't actually have a copy. I just wanted to know if you
reviewed it.
MS. PATEL: He doesn't remember if he reviewed it.
THE COURT: That wasn't his answer.
The answer was?
A. I believe I did, but I would need to see the actual
document that you're referring to. I did see documents on the
New York State quota bill.
Q. Now, just to close up this section, your final
recommendation in this area of performance review is that the
NYPD should hire an expert in the field, and that expert would
evaluate the system and make recommendations, right?
A. That's correct.
Q. Now, we took some testimony today about these three consent
decrees that were put into evidence and I want to just -- my
last area of questioning with you is just going to be going
over these a little bit.
First of all, in all three of these locations, Puerto
Rico, New Orleans and East Haven, all three of the consent
decrees say that the police departments need to collect data on
stop activity, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Have you seen the forms for any of these locations that
those departments use to collect that data?
A. No, I have not. All of them are, I believe, 2012, and so
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Walker - cross
it's early in the stages of the implementation of those consent
decrees so they may or may not exist.
Q. Now, you were also asked a few questions about the size of
these police departments on direct, and we did some research
over the lunch break.
Would you agree that if the size of the East Haven
police department is 50 police officers, that the reforms that
are covered in this consent decree may not be applicable to the
City of New York?
A. No, I would not. The reforms I am recommending are a
generic approach to accountability, and they apply with equal
force to departments of all sizes, and with necessary
adaptations for particularly large departments and some other
changes for the very small ones.
Q. Going back to the fact that you haven't seen the forms,
possibly because they are not developed yet, I guess my point
is, you don't know if in any of the forms that these police
departments developed there will be narrative sections?
MS. PATEL: I object.
THE COURT: I can't allow the question because, of
course, he doesn't know what is in a form that's not yet
written or not yet published. Of course he doesn't know.
Q. Going back to the size of the police departments, you did
mention that New Orleans you thought was maybe around 1,000, a
little over. We looked it up. It's about 1,400.
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(Hearing resumed)
THE COURT: Let me begin by hoping that everybody has
power in their homes at least, comfortable in your home. I
know your offices are not comfortable; many of you have
problems with your offices. But I do hope everybody is
personally well.
Let me make sure I know who is here today.
Ms. Karteron, Mr. Dunn, Mr. Maer, Mr. Mullkoff,
Mr. Concepcion, Ms. Kovel, Mr. Smyth, Ms. Peterson,
Ms. Lustbader. That's everybody from plaintiffs' side.
Mr. Zuckerman, Ms. Grossman, Ms. Cooke, Mr. Marutollo,
Mr. Weingarten, Mr. VicKers. That's everybody at the counsel
table.
We are ready to begin summations. My chambers have
been in touch with you. I understand it's going to be
approximately 75 minutes per side. What I suggest we do is
after the defense 75 minutes, we take a short recess of
hopefully no more than 10 minutes, then we will have
plaintiffs' summation. I also understand that both sides are
splitting the summations; two attorneys are speaking for each
side. Who is beginning for the defense side.
MR. ZUCKERMAN: I am, your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Zuckerman.
MR. DUNN: Your Honor, I am sorry, before we start, I
just want, there is a letter submitted by the city on Monday at
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some point we would like to address, it doesn't need to be now,
it may become a subject of summations.
THE COURT: It doesn't need to be now but it's on the
subject of summations.
MR. DUNN: It may come up during their summation.
THE COURT: They may refer to it.
MR. DUNN: I am going to note we are going to object
to it coming into evidence.
THE COURT: Is this the same as what you did when I
said this is counting and I didn't mean to insult anybody but
anybody could count up the information. The information was
there and they chose to count it. They checked your counting;
you can check their counting. Is it really much more than
that.
MR. DUNN: Your Honor, that may be true for one of the
tables. We think it's harmless; that's OK. The second table
that's not true for.
THE COURT: I didn't look at it closely enough to know
the first table versus the second table, and I didn't bring it
to court.
MS. COOKE: I have a copy.
MR. DUNN: The first table is a further breakdown of
the period of observation for stops.
THE COURT: If it's merely counting information from
material that you have, on the same basis I allowed yours, I am
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going to allow this. It's counting, it's a little bit of
elementary math, it makes a percentage; that's OK.
MR. DUNN: We understand.
THE COURT: What's the second.
MR. DUNN: The second table purports to be a breakdown
by the month of different categories of stops. You may recall,
the city attempted to adduce this information from professor
Smith on the stand. We objected to that. You sustained the
objection on the grounds it was not in his report. He in fact
testified, he went through his report and said I thought it was
in here, I guess it got taken out. The objection was
sustained. This is the exact same information; it's now
offered in table form.
THE COURT: Ms. Cooke, how can I take information that
I ruled out. I sustained the objection.
MS. COOKE: You sustained the objection with respect
to his opinion. You sustained an objection with respect to
professor Smith opining with respect to conclusions that he
could draw from the observations. Table 10 is simply a
distribution of the number of stops on a monthly basis for the
period time January 2011 through June 2012, the monthly stops
and the tallies based on professor Fagan's appendix L which
considers the front and back of the form and whether or not it
falls into the 1044 or it falls into the 800-and-some that he
didn't contest. It's just a tally of the 2 columns. It's the
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distribution by months.
THE COURT: Actually, I don't understand yet at all
what the chart is. It is my fault. I don't understand the two
headings on the top where it says basis for stop not questioned
as per Fagan's appendix L.
MS. COOKE: Professor Fagan identified, ultimately
appendix L reflects the exclusions, so he identified 1,663
stops from 2011 that were proximity stops. Of those 1,663
stops, he challenged 1,044. So, there is in that category of
2011 approximately 600 roughly stops that are not challenged,
so there is not, the basis of the stop is not questioned. So
those 600 are reflected in that column.
THE COURT: A total of 6 -MS. COOKE: Correct, because this goes through June
2012, because 2012 data is available. Professor Fagan has it
and is seeking injunctive relief as of today.
THE COURT: What are you telling me in the second
column, that 9 percent of the stops in January 2011 are not
being challenged.
MS. COOKE: 9 percent of 875. 9 percent of 875.
THE COURT: What I am learning from this chart is that
of the non-challenged stops, 9 percent occurred in January.
MS. COOKE: If you look at the total column, the
second column from the right, in January 2011 there were 216
proximity stops identified by professor Fagan analyses. 137 of
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those 216 are challenged and they would fall within the 1,044;
79 were not challenged. By a month-by-month basis, you can see
the distribution of challenged proximity stops for that month
versus non-challenged, and it goes through June 2012.
THE COURT: I still can't read it. I thought it was
totaled to 100; each month X percent were challenged and X
percent were non-challenged; shouldn't that be 100 each month.
MS. COOKE: That's a different percent calculation;
that's not reflected in this chart. The percentage calculation
was reflecting of the total stops challenged either 1191 or 875
not challenged, what percentage of that month does that number
reflect. Looking at the first column, 79 stops in January 2011
that are not questioned, that number 79 is 9 percent of the
total unchallenged stops which is 875.
THE COURT: What is the point, that more stops back in
January were not challenged than in June 2012. The percentage
of challenges is declining, is that it.
MS. COOKE: Correct, in the total, and if you look at
the total column, the total number of stops on an allocation of
a monthly basis goes from 216 in January 2011 to 16 total
stops. That's proximity stops in June 2012, there are 16.
THE COURT: Proximity stops are way down.
MS. COOKE: Correct. In addition to that you can see
the number of challenged versus not challenged also trends
down.
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THE COURT: OK. I think I now understand this chart.
The purpose of this chart is to show that proximity stops are
way down and Mr. Fagan, I forget if it is Dr. or Mr., whichever
he is, he is challenging less than he used to. The number of
stops is down and the challenges are down. So, now I need to
know why I should not take this chart now that I understand
what it is. It does again sound like mere counting.
MR. DUNN: There are two things. First, with respect
to the 2011 stops, they have now added 2012 which was never the
subject of the hearing. Nothing in their report is about 2012.
We didn't get that data until September I think.
THE COURT: OK, but it is November and you are seeking
a preliminary injunction. I guess the defense is going to be,
if we are talking care of our own problems, what's left to
enjoin.
MR. DUNN: That may be the defense. This goes to your
original ruling. In the original ruling they attempted to
adduce from Dr. Smith testimony about what they thought was
going to be the decline in stops during 2011. We objected to
that and I have the page and line number. At one point, Dr.
Smith said, I thought I had included that.
THE COURT: I remember that. This is the raw data.
MR. DUNN: That's what he said he thought he had
included in the report.
THE COURT: This is the raw data. This is just
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counting. You are welcome to check it but they are still
saying the number of proximity stops, if you look at 2011 only,
decline from a high in February 2011, the lowest number I see
is August 2011, that's the challenged. Where is the total.
MS. COOKE: August 2011, the total is 49.
THE COURT: August 2011. I look at that column. The
high, the highest month is February 2011 at 273 stops and the
lowest number was August 2011, 49 stops. Of course, it then
goes up; in October 2011, it's 110 stops. But whatever I make
of it, I make of it, but it's just counting. Unless you check
the data and say they are inaccurate, I can take this.
MR. DUNN: We will.
THE COURT: I gave you great leeway at last-minute
counting. It strikes me it really is counting. Your objection
about 2012 is interesting. You had data since September but
the real point is doesn't the court want a complete picture.
This is now November 2012. Shouldn't I want to know what's
going on, what's less to worry about.
MR. DUNN: I understand that, your Honor, and I am not
disputing that. What I am disputing is, for instance, the very
first time we learned anything about their intention of relying
upon 2012 data was Monday, we have done nothing to look at what
might explain this. For all I know, the June 2012 number you
see that's a total of 16, that is because they sent out that
video and trained everybody in the department to not do 250s
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when a police officer says stop police.
I don't have any idea what explains these things. We
have had no opportunity to explore that. To the extent they
are going to suggust as I am sure they will that this reflects
as a matter of fact things they have done in 2012. We have no
chance to test that. We should have been on notice of that
long ago.
THE COURT: Your point is well-taken.
MS. COOKE: Your Honor, just with respect to 2012, we
heard two weeks of testimony about activities the police
department has been undertaking during 2012.
THE COURT: I understand the police department did
many things in 2012 and it's in the record. That's not
Mr. Dunn point. He said there may be other explanations for
why there are only 16 proximity stops and he gave a very
concrete example that people were trained not to even write up
a UF-250 for a stop and simply said police stop. Yet if a
person is stopped, that person may still feel aggrieved.
I am not here to retry this case today. I am here to
hear the summations. I went out of my way to create this time;
it's a long story you don't want to know. We have to get to
summations. I have to reserve on this. The 2011 data, I know
I don't have a problem; it's merely counting. I gave the
plaintiffs great leeway on counting; you are entitled to the
same. I am going to reserve on the 2012. I understood Mr.
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Dunn's argument to say we don't have a chance to explore that
the number of 250s would have dropped that dramatically or the
number of stops. They may not be the same. The UF-250 and the
stop could be two different things. And without discovery, he
doesn't know. So I am sympathetic to that argument.
What's the problem, Ms. Grossman. I do see your face,
you know that. What's the problem. You seem concerned. You
want to speak, please do.
MS. GROSSMAN: I am just surprised that the plaintiffs
have not had an opportunity to advance this argument because
that's what this whole hearing has been about.
THE COURT: He got the 2012 data in September. He
didn't conduct any post-receipt discovery because it was never
in the report, there was never testimony about 2012, and on the
day of summations, suddenly there is an argument, look at
January through June and the number of stops has declined
dramatically.
He's saying, I don't know, these stops are not based
on stops but based on the UF-250s reflecting those stops. If
there is another explanation for writing left of that, I don't
know that, that's his argument not mine, but if there is
another explanation, he doesn't know it. He has not had a
chance to find out if they are writing them for different
reasons or not writing them for different reasons than they
used to, yet people might still be stopped but without a
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UF-250.
I am not here to try that case.
MS. GROSSMAN: I understand that. You asked me to
respond. I do think we have had months of expedited discovery
where plaintiffs had the opportunity to explore those very
questions. So when they say they have had not an
opportunity -THE COURT: But they didn't get the data for the 2012
stops showing the decline until September. What do I know;
that's what he told me just now. September is two months ago.
MS. GROSSMAN: They had the opportunity to look at
2012 data. He chose not to.
THE COURT: They had a chance to look at the data for
sure, but we didn't reopen discovery so he could take
depositions of supervisors, whatever, and find out when they
are required to write 250s and when they are not required to
write 250s. I am not trying this case right now. I thank you
for answering my question. I did ask you to and you did.
Thank you.
MS. COOKE: With respect to the stop police issue, I
have a case that I can tell you now with respect to New York
law with respect to that. I can provide that you now or wait.
THE COURT: I would like to have summations.
Mr. Zuckerman.
MR. ZUCKERMAN: May it please the court.
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EXHIBIT G
Case 1:12-cv-02274-SAS-HBP Document 90
Filed 11/26/12 Page 1 of 3
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------
)(
JAENEAN LIGON, individually and on
behalf of her minor son, J.G., FAWN
BRACY, individually and on behalf of her
minor son, W.B., JACQUELINE YATES,
LETITIA LEDAN, ROSHEA JOHNSON,
IGERON JOHNSON, JOVAN JEFFERSON,
A.O., by his parent DINAH ADAMES,
ABDULLAH TURNER, FERNANDO
MORONTA, and CHARLES BRADLEY,
individually and on behalf of a class of all
others similarly situated,
ORDER
12 Civ. 2274 (SAS)
Plaintiffs,
- againstCITY OF NEW YORK, RAYMOND W.
KELLY, COMMISSIONER OF THE NEW
YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT,
POLICE OFFICER JOHNNY BLASINI,
POLICE OFFICER GREGORY
LOMANGINO, POLICE OFFICER
JOSEPH KOCH, POLICE OFFICER
IGERON RAMDEEN, POLICE OFFICER
JOSEPH BERMUDEZ, POLICE OFFICER
MIGUEL SANTIAGO, and POLICE
OFFICERS JOHN DOE 1-12,
Defendants.
-------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------
1
)(
Case 1:12-cv-02274-SAS-HBP Document 90
Filed 11/26/12 Page 2 of 3
SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN, U.S.D.J.:
1. Plaintiffs' Table 14, annexed to Plaintiffs' November 16 letter to
the court ("11/16/12 Ltr."), is hereby admitted into evidence as part of the record of
the Preliminary Injunction Hearing ("PI Hearing") as Exhibit 98.
2. Plaintiffs' Table 15, annexed to the 11116/12 Ltr., is hereby
admitted into evidence as part of the record of the PI Hearing as Exhibit 99.
3. Defendants' Table 9, annexed to Defendants' November 5 letter to
the court ("1115/12 Ltr.") is received into evidence as part of the record of the PI
("11/5/12
Hearing, subject to reconciling the number of stops in Dr. Fagan's Exhibit 8.
4. Defendants' Table 10, annexed to the 11/15/12 Ltr. is received into
evidence subj ect to deletion of the rows relating to 2012.
Defendants should submit revised Tables 9 and 10 forthwith.
SO ORDERED:
Dated:
November 26,2012
New York, New York
2
Case 1:12-cv-02274-SAS-HBP Document 90
Filed 11/26/12 Page 3 of 3
- Appearances
-
For Plaintiffs:
For Defendants:
Christopher T. Dunn, Esq.
Alexis Brie Karteron, Esq.
New York Civil Liberties Union
125 Broad Street, 17th floor
New York, NY 10004
(212) 607-3300
Heidi Grossman
Mark David Zuckerman
Joseph Anthony Marutollo
Richard Keith Weingarten
New York City Law Department
100 Church Street
New York, NY 10007
(212) 788-1300
Foster S. Maer, Esq.
Puerto Rican Legal Defense and
Education Fund, Inc.
99 Hudson Street, 14th Floor
New York, NY 10013
(212) 739-7507
Mariana Louise Kovel, Esq.
The Bronx Defenders
860 Courtlandt Avenue
Bronx, NY 10451
(718) 508-3421
Tiana Jeanne Peterson, Esq.
Shearman & Sterling LLP
599 Lexington Avenue
New York, NY 10022
(212) 848-5222
3
Docket No. 13-3088-cv
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
DAVID FLOYD et al.
v.
CITY OF NEW YORK
MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF THE STAY
ORDER DATED OCTOBER 31, 2013 TO THE
EXTENT OF VACATING THE DISTRICT
COURT’S ORDERS DATED AUGUST 12, 2013.
MICHAEL A. CARDOZO
Corporation Counsel of the City of New York
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
100 Church Street
New York, N.Y. 10007
Of Counsel: Celeste Koeleveld
Tel: (212) 356-2300 or 0826
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