United States of America v. Jones

Filing

OPINION, Concurring, by judges GC, PWH, FILED.[2120837] [15-1518]

Case 15-1518, Document 129, 09/11/2017, 2120837, Page1 of 9

1

GUIDO CALABR
O
RESI, Circuit Judge, with whom Peter W. H
w
m
Hall, Circu Judge, jo
uit
oins,

2

concurr
ring:
I believe Judge Walke opinio states th law corr
er’s
on
he
rectly, and I concur i
d
in

3
4

its reaso
oning and in its resu I write separately because t
ult.
y
that result, while
,

5

mandat by the law, seem to me to be highly unjust, an little sho of absu
ted
ms
nd
ort
urd.

6

To expl
lain why I think so, let me give the facts a proced
e
and
dural histo of this case
ory

7

in a way that is slightly diff
y
ferent from the major opinio
m
rity
on—which however is
h,
r,

8

also cor
rrect, and in which, as noted ab
i
a
bove, I join fully.
n,
A. Backgroun
B
nd 

9

Corey Jones is a nowC
-39-year-old man wi an I.Q. of 69.1 Wh at a
ith
hile

10
11

residential reentry center (“
y
“RRC”), fin
nishing a n
nearly eigh
ht-year sen
ntence for

12

felony possession of a firear (he wa five mon
p
n
rm,
as
nths’ shy o his sched
of
duled

13

release) Jones alle
),
egedly gru
umbled a threat and was insole to a sta membe
t
ent
aff
er.

14

The staf member called th federal marshals t take custody of Jon who
ff
rs
he
m
to
nes,

15

resisted arrest. Th marshal conceded that, dur
d
he
ls
ring his re
esistance, Jo
ones never
r

16

stepped towards, kicked, or punched them. Non
d
r
netheless, as they were trying to

17

lower his head to the groun the han of the m
h
nd,
nd
marshal wh was app
ho
prehending

18

Jones sl
lipped dow Jones’ face, and Jo
wn
f
ones bit hi causing the finge to bleed
im,
g
er
d.

19

Shortly thereafter Jones sai “I give,” and was arrested a taken away. The
r,
id,
s
and
e

20

marshal provided a sworn affidavit in
d
a
ndicating t
that he suf
ffered no lo becaus of
oss
se

21

the inju and tha he did not request damages. At trial, th bite wa describe
ury
at
n
t
.
he
as
ed

22

by the prosecutor as “not th most ser
p
r
he
rious woun you’ll e
nd
ever see.”

 This I.Q. s
score is con
nsidered to
o be in the
e “mentally
y deficient
t” range of
f 
intellect
tual functi
ioning, bel
low the gen
nerally acc
cepted ran
nge for “int
tellectual 
disability,” which
h is an I.Q. score of approximat
tely 70‐75. See Dist. C Dkt. 46
Ct.
6–1
at 5, Jon Sentencing Mem
nes
morandum, Exhibit A “Sentenc
A,
cing Memo Letter of Dr.
o
Sanford L. Drob”, at 5. 
d
,
1

1

Case 15-1518, Document 129, 09/11/2017, 2120837, Page2 of 9

Pursuant to a single-count indictment for assaulting a federal officer, Jones

1
2

was found guilty in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1)–(b). Under the Guidelines

3

as they were then calculated, and as described in Judge Walker’s opinion, Jones

4

faced a sentence of between 210–240 months, (seventeen-and-one-half to twenty

5

years), with the high end being the statutory maximum. This calculation was

6

based on Jones’ designation as a career offender, a status that was triggered by

7

two earlier convictions: (i) an assault in which the then twenty-year-old Jones

8

shot a man in the leg, which later needed to be amputated, and (ii) a conviction

9

for first-degree robbery in New York, a crime Jones committed when he was

10

sixteen years old.2
The district court, applying what it believed was the law of this circuit as it

11
12

stood at that time, found that Jones’ robbery conviction constituted a “crime of

13

violence” under the categorical approach to the Sentencing Guidelines. See

14

United States v. Spencer, 955 F.2d 814, 820 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that, under the

15

law of New York, the crime of attempted third-degree robbery constitutes a

16

“crime of violence” for the purposes of the “force clause” of the Sentencing

17

Guidelines), abrogated by Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (Johnson I);

18

see also United States v. Reyes, 691 F.3d 453 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam).3 Given this
 A defendant’s youthful offender adjudications are, for the purposes of the 
relevant Guidelines calculations, deemed “‘adult convictions’ [where the 
defendant] (1) pleaded guilty to both felony offenses in an adult forum and (2) 
received and served a sentence of over one year in an adult prison for each 
offense.” See United States v. Jones, 415 F.3d 256, 264 (2d Cir. 2005). 
3 A crime of violence, along with other factors, serves as a predicate 
requiring a district court to sentence a defendant as a “career offender” subject to 
an increased sentencing spectrum. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual 
§ 4B1.1(a) (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n Nov. 2014) (U.S.S.G.) (defining “career 
offender” as a defendant who is (1) “at least eighteen years old at the time [he] 
committed the instant offense of conviction;” (2) his “instant offense of 
2

2

Case 15-1518, Document 129, 09/11/2017, 2120837, Page3 of 9

1

holding, and because Jones’ prior conviction for assault certainly constituted a

2

crime of violence, the district court determined that the career offender status

3

applied. Absent Jones’ designation as a career offender, his Guidelines sentence
conviction is a felony that is . . . a crime of violence;” and (3) he “has at least two 
prior felony convictions of . . . a crime of violence.”) . 

As described in Judge Walker’s opinion, there were, at the time of Jones’ 
sentencing, two clauses in the Sentencing Guidelines, either of which could 
define a “crime of violence.” These two clauses are referred to as the “force 
clause,” and the “residual clause.” The “force clause” specifies that a crime of 
violence is a felony that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened 
use of physical force against the person of another.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). The 
“residual clause” comes at the end of a second set of enumerated offenses, and 
provides that a crime of violence also includes any offense that “otherwise 
involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 
another.” Id. § 4B1.2(a)(2).  

In Spencer, we had held that, under the force clause, third‐degree robbery, 
as defined by New York law, was a crime of violence. After the Supreme Court’s 
analysis of the force clause in Johnson I, however, we held that battery, as defined 
by the state of Florida, was not a crime of violence. Reyes, 691 F.3d 453. In Reyes, 
we noted Johnson I’s dictate that, to constitute a “crime of violence” under the 
categorical approach, a crime must involve the “use of physical force,” and 
found that battery did not meet that definition. Id. at 460. Even after Spencer, it 
was an open question whether first‐degree robbery was a crime of violence. After 
Reyes, that question depended on whether the use of physical force was, indeed, 
present in the New York definition of that crime.  

Judge Garaufis held that the reasoning of Spencer meant that first degree 
robbery was a crime of violence. In our former, withdrawn opinion, we held, for 
reasons similar to those given in Reyes, that first‐degree robbery was not. Cf., 
United States v. Yates, No. 16‐3997, 2017 WL 3402084 (6thCir. Aug 9, 2017) 
(finding in analogous circumstances that the force clause does not apply). All of 
that analysis, however, was with respect to the force clause, not the co‐extant – 
and here essential – residual clause.  

3

Case 15-1518, Document 129, 09/11/2017, 2120837, Page4 of 9

1

range would have been betw
w
e
ween 36 an 48 mon
nd
nths (or thr to four years),
ree
r

2

instead of the ran of 210-2 month or the se
nge
240
hs,
eventeen-a
and-one-h years to
half
o

3

twenty years that the court deemed ap
t
pplicable.
Departing downward significa
D
antly from the Guidelines, Ju
m
udge Gara
aufis

4
5

sentenc Jones to fifteen ye
ced
o
ears.
B. Doctrinal D
D
Developm
ments and I
Impact on Sentencin
ng 

6

Ju
udge Gara
aufis’ opini rested on his inte
ion
erpretation of the ap
n
pplication o
of

7
8

the forc clause to New Yor State’s definition o robbery Because J
ce
o
rk
d
of
y.
Judge

9

Garaufi was of th view th first-deg
is
he
hat
gree robbe was a c
ery
crime of vi
iolence un
nder

10

the forc clause ev after Johnson I, Ju
ce
ven
J
udge Gara
aufis did n address the
not
s

11

addition possible determi
nal
inant of a crime of vi
c
iolence now at issue before us: the
w
:

12

“residu clause.”
ual
”
After Jones’ initial sen
A
ntencing, but before we heard Jones’ app
b
peal, the

13
14

Suprem Court fo
me
ound langu
uage in the Armed C
e
Career Crim
minal Act (“ACCA”)
)

15

which was identic to the language used in the residual c
w
cal
l
u
e
clause of th
he

16

Guideli
ines—the lynchpin clause unde
l
ergirding t author of Jone current
the
rity
es’
t

17

sentenc
ce—to be unconstitut
u
tionally va
ague. Johns v. Unite States, 1 S. Ct. 2
son
ed
135
2551,

18

2557 (20
015) (Johns II). Sub
son
bsequent to Johnson II most fed
o
I,
deral courts of appea
als

19

to decid the issue found th given the Suprem Court’s decision, the residu
de
hat,
t
me
s
ual

20

clause was also un
w
nconstitutionally vag
gue. See U
United State v. Pawlak 822 F.3d
es
k,
d

21

902, 907
7-11 (6th Cir. 2016); United Stat v. Hurlb
C
U
tes
burt, 835 F. 715, 72 (7th Cir.
.3d
25
.

22

2016); United State v. Calabr
U
es
retta, 831 F.3d 128, 13 (3d Cir. 2016); Un
F
37
.
nited States v.

23

Madrid, 805 F.3d 1204, 1210 (10th Cir. 2015); but see United States v. M
,
1
d
Matchett, 80
02

24

F.3d 118 1193-96 (11th Cir 2015).
85,
6
r.
As a result—
A
—with the applicatio of the fo
e
on
orce clause to Jones i doubt a a
e
in
as

25
26

result of Johnson I, and with the residu clause struck dow across several
o
I
h
ual
wn

4

Case 15-1518, Document 129, 09/11/2017, 2120837, Page5 of 9

1

circuits as a result of Johnson II—any number of defendan were fo
t
n
n
f
nts
ound not to
o

2

have co
ommitted crimes of violence, ei
c
v
ither as a m
matter of f
first instance, or on

3

appeal, for purpo
oses of dete
ermining their career offender status und the
t
r
der

4

Guideli
ines. Accor
rdingly, th were re
hey
esentenced (or sente
d
enced in th first
he

5

instance to lower sentences We are told the go
e)
r
s.
t
overnment is not cha
t
allenging th
hese

6

lower se
entences.
C. Removal of the Resid
R
dual Claus
se from th
he Guideli
ines 

7

The Sentencing Comm
T
mission, in light of th decision of sever courts o
n
he
ns
ral
of

8
9

appeals grounded on the Su
s
d
upreme Co
ourt’s deci
ision in Joh
hnson II, rev
vised the

10

Guideli
ines and re
emoved th residual clause as a basis for future sen
he
r
ntencing. (
(See

11

Majority Opinion n.1).
n,
D. Procedural
P
l History in
n this Cou
urt 

12
13

We heard Jones’ appe after Johnson II, an we held (i) that, under John
W
eal
nd
d:
nson

14

I, the fo
orce clause was not applicable to him; (ii) (like seve of our sister circu
a
t
)
eral
uits)

15

that the other pos
e
ssible grou for Jon career offender s
und
nes’
status, the residual

16

clause, was uncon
nstitutiona pursuan to Johnso II; and, (iii) that, a a result,
al,
nt
on
as

17

r
nviction did not qua
alify as a predicate vi
iolent offe
ense under the
r
Jones’ robbery con

18

Guideli
ines. We th
herefore or
rdered Jon sentenc vacated and sent the case ba
nes’
ce
d
ack

19

for rese
entencing. We expres
W
ssly instruc
cted the di
istrict cour that, in r
rt
resentencin
ng

20

Jones, it should no treat him as a care offende
t
ot
m
eer
er.
Before the district cou resente
B
d
urt
enced Jone howeve the Supr
es,
er,
reme Cour
rt

21
22

granted certiorari in Beckles v. United States, 137 S Ct. 886 (
d
v
S
S.
(2017), to c
consider

23

whether the langu
uage that, in Johnson II it had d
deemed un
nconstitutio
onally vag
gue

24

in a statute, was al void fo vaguene when th identica languag was
lso
or
ess
he
al
ge

25

employ in the Guidelines In view of the Supreme Cour action, we withd
yed
G
s.
o
rt’s
,
drew

26

our opin
nion, and suspended resenten
d
ncing pend
ding the Bec
ckles decision.

5

Case 15-1518, Document 129, 09/11/2017, 2120837, Page6 of 9

1

Interestingly, at least one district court, in an independent case, had already

2

granted a motion for resentencing in light of our now-recalled decision. Miles v.

3

United States, No. 11-cr-581, 2016 WL 4367958 (S.D.N.Y. Aug 15, 2016).
In Beckles, the Supreme Court held the relevant clause of the Guidelines not

4
5

to be unconstitutionally vague.4 Hence, the clause remained applicable to cases

6

like the one before us.
As a result, we are bound to consider Jones’ earlier convictions on the basis

7
8

of the revived (but no longer extant, since it has been removed by the Sentencing

9

Commission) residual clause. Under that clause, we today correctly find that

10

Jones’ robbery conviction constituted a crime of violence and, as such, served as

11

a predicate offense which—together with his assault convictions—categorically

12

renders Jones a career offender. He was, therefore, correctly subject to the

13

sentencing guidelines of 210–240 months on the basis of which the district

14

court—albeit, perhaps incorrectly relying on the force clause rather than the

15

residual clause— had imposed his original sentence of fifteen years.
Because that sentence was correctly based on the Guidelines as we now

16
17

hold they stood when the district court sentenced Jones, we now affirm that

18

sentence. We also hold that, given the applicable Guidelines, the sentence
4

 The Supreme Court held as it did based on the history of discretion in 

sentencing before the Guidelines and the discretionary nature of the Guidelines 
themselves. My concern with our holding today does not dispute the correctness 
of the Court’s decision. That the Court’s decision was unexpected, however, 
cannot be doubted. Between Johnson II and Beckles, courts of appeals, prosecutors, 
and the Sentencing Commission took actions which assumed a different result. 
Indeed, the Justice Department had taken the position that Johnson II governed 
Beckles, and the Supreme Court had to appoint special counsel to present the 
opposite view. It is that unexpectedness and what happened between Johnson II 
and Beckles that is, in significant part, responsible for making today’s result so 
troubling to me. 

6

Case 15-1518, Document 129, 09/11/2017, 2120837, Page7 of 9

1

imposed—which departed significant downw
tly
ward from these appl
licable

2

Guideli
ines—was not substa
antively un
nreasonable.
E. DISCUSSI
D
ION 

3

I agree that the senten is not substantiv
t
nce
s
vely unreas
sonable; bu I believe
ut
e

4
5

the resu to be clo to absu
ult
ose
urd.
Jo
ones was about to be released when he c
a
e
committed a crime w
d
whose full

6
7

nature and signifi
a
icance the district co
ourt is bette able to e
er
evaluate th we. Th
han
he

8

district court deci
ided on a fifteen-yea sentence Perhaps this senten was ba
f
ar
e.
nce
ased

9

on its view of Jones’ prior cr
riminal activity, and on Jones’ dangerou
d
’
usness.

10

Perhaps the sente
s
ence, depar
rting down
nward not
tably from the Guide
m
elines, was
s,

11

howeve imposed because the distric court bel
er,
d
ct
lieved that given those
t,

12

Guideli
ines, it had gone dow as much as it felt it reasona
d
wn
ably could.
.
The fact is that we do not know what sen
T
t
o
w
ntence the d
district cou would
urt

13
14

have de
eemed app
propriate if Jones had been sub
f
d
bject to diff
ferent Guidelines. H
Had

15

our opin
nion come down slig
e
ghtly earlie as did t
er,
those of m
most other c
circuits

16

dealing with simi issues, Jones wou have b
g
ilar
uld
been resent
tenced pur
rsuant to a

17

substan
ntively low Guideli
wer
ines range We woul then, kn
e.
ld,
now what sentence
t

18

would have seem approp
h
med
priate to th district c
he
court in th
hose circum
mstances. H
Had

19

that sen
ntence been lower—a it appar
n
as
rently was in any number of ot
ther cases in

20

other ci
ircuits—th Governm
he
ment apparently wou not ha objected to it. Ha
uld
ave
ad

21

Jones co
ommitted his crime under the currently e
u
existing G
Guidelines, (i.e., in wh
hich

22

the residual claus has been removed by the Sen
se
n
d
ntencing C
Commissio and
on),

23

assumin that we would ha read th force cla
ng
e
ave
he
ause not to apply (as we did in
o
s
n

24

our earl
lier, now-r
retracted opinion), th district court wou have ha again, the
o
he
uld
ad,

25

opportu
unity to ga
auge Jones’ degree of dangerou
f
usness und a very different s
der
set

26

of Guid
delines than those we today, fi
n
e,
inally conc
clude it cor
rrectly app
plied at

27

sentenc
cing.

7

Case 15-1518, Document 129, 09/11/2017, 2120837, Page8 of 9

Because we (advisedly) withdrew our earlier opinion in light of the

1
2

Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Beckles, and because of the Supreme Court’s

3

ultimate decision in Beckles, I agree that we now are bound to affirm Jones’

4

original sentence. This means that, as a result of timing quirks (his appeal to us

5

was slightly too late, leading to our decision to pull our earlier opinion; his

6

crimes too early so that the now-removed, but no longer unconstitutional,

7

residual clause was in effect when he committed them), Jones receives a very,

8

very high sentence in contrast with almost every similarly situated defendant.
What is more—and this may be the true source of my sense of absurdity—

9
10

there appears to be no way in which we can ask the district court to reconsider

11

the sentence it ordered in view of the happenstances that have worked against

12

Jones, and in view of its assessment of Jones’ crimes and of its downward

13

departure.
Were this a civil case, there would be any number of ways of letting the

14
15

lower court revisit matters.5 But, as far as I have been able to discern, there is no

16

way for us to send this back to the district court and ask it to tell us what I

17

believe should determine Jones’ sentence:

18

In the light of sentences that other similarly guilty defendants have

19

received, and in the light of Jones’ own situation, both of which you, as

20

a district judge, are best suited to determine, what is the sentence that

21

you deem appropriate in this case?

 For example: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) provides a court 
with the power to entertain a motion to relieve a party from a final judgment for 
“any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). To similar effect, 
Rule 60(d) states that a court has the power to “entertain an independent action 
to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding.” Id. 60(d)(1).  
5

8

Case 15-1518, Document 129, 09/11/2017, 2120837, Page9 of 9

1

I find our inability to learn this to be both absurd and deeply troubling. I

2

believe our affirmance is correct, and that we can do no other. I hope, however,

3

that somewhere, somehow, there exists a means of determining what would, in

4

fact, be an appropriate sentence for Jones.

9