Jaffer v. Hirji
Filing
OPINION, Dissenting, by JAC, FILED.[2271207] [17-1881]
Case 17-1881, Document 91, 04/04/2018, 2271207, Page1 of 1
17‐1881‐cv
Jaffer v. Hirji
JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
The New York Court of Appeals may one day decide to
transform the constructive trust doctrine into an intent‐enforcing
remedy. But because it has not yet done so, I respectfully dissent.
According to the New York Court of Appeals, “the constructive
trust doctrine serves as a ‘fraud‐rectifying’ remedy rather than an
‘intent‐enforcing’ one.” Bankers Sec. Life Ins. Soc’y v. Shakerdge, 406
N.E.2d 440, 441 (N.Y. 1980); see also Superintendent of Ins. v. Ochs (In re
First Cent. Fin. Corp.), 377 F.3d 209, 216 (2d Cir. 2004) (“New York law
is clear that a constructive trust is an equitable remedy intended to be
‘fraud‐rectifying’ rather than ‘intent‐enforcing.’”); Binenfeld v.
Binenfeld, 537 N.Y.S.2d 41, 42 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (“Courts have
uniformly held that a constructive trust is a fraud‐rectifying remedy
rather than an intent‐enforcing one.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Neither appellants nor the majority, however, identify any
fact that creates a genuine dispute about whether appellees
committed fraud. At most, appellants and the majority establish that
there is a genuine dispute about appellant Ahmed’s subjective
expectations when he conveyed title to appellee Naushad.
Expectations are not enough to impose a constructive trust under
New York law. See Binenfeld, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 42. (“Although the facts
may reveal a case of unrealized expectations, we may not, without
more, fashion a constructive trust.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?