Todd Houston v. Township of Randolph, et al

Filing

NOT PRECEDENTIAL OPINION Coram: RENDELL, ROTH and BARRY, Circuit Judges. Total Pages: 7. Judge: ROTH Authoring.

Case: 13-2101

Document: 003111560597

Page: 1

Date Filed: 03/17/2014

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 13-2101
____________
TODD M. HOUSTON,
Appellant
v.
TOWNSHIP OF RANDOLPH;
TOWNSHIP OF RANDOLPH FIRE DEPARTMENT;
JOHN MCANDREW; JOHN DOES 1-5

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D. C. No. 2-11-cv-04810)
District Judge: Honorable Kevin McNulty

Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on January 17, 2014
Before: RENDELL, ROTH and BARRY, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 17, 2014)

OPINION

ROTH, Circuit Judge:
Todd M. Houston appeals the District Court’s order granting summary judgment
to the defendants, the Township of Randolph, the Township of Randolph Volunteer Fire

Case: 13-2101

Document: 003111560597

Page: 2

Date Filed: 03/17/2014

Department (RVFD), and RVFD’s Chief, John McAndrew. For the reasons set forth
below, we will affirm.
I.

Background

The material facts in this case are not in dispute. The Township of Randolph is
located within Morris County, New Jersey. Beginning in approximately 2001, Houston
served as a volunteer firefighter with RVFD. In addition, Houston was a full-time
firefighter for the North Hudson Fire & Rescue Company until 2009, when he retired
with a permanent disability after suffering an injury on the job. After this injury,
Houston remained involved with RVFD as the Captain of the Department’s Rapid
Intervention Team (RIT). Houston later resigned as RIT Captain, but continued to
participate in and direct training for the RIT.
The RIT is a firefighting unit that deploys to neighboring jurisdictions in Morris
County, New Jersey, to support the fighting of fires by the local jurisdiction. In essence,
crews of the RIT rapidly deploy to a fire to stand ready to rescue firemen who might get
caught in the blaze, but RIT crews do not actually fight the fire themselves. The genesis
of this dispute stems from Houston’s disagreement with Chief McAndrew about the
application of RIT policies in the field. In particular, Houston is of the opinion that a RIT
crew should not be dispatched to support firefighting efforts unless it can field a

2

Case: 13-2101

Document: 003111560597

Page: 3

Date Filed: 03/17/2014

minimum of five members. Houston regularly complained to Chief McAndrew any time
a RIT crew was dispatched with fewer than five members. 1
Morris County has adopted a set of RIT “Best Practice Guidelines,” which were
also adopted by RVFD in February 2011. The Guidelines state that a RIT “will have”
one “Group Supervisor,” one “Leader,” and three additional “members at all times.” The
Guidelines also indicate that “[a]nyone using this document should rely on his or her own
independent judgment.” Further, the Guidelines expressly state that the committee that
created the document makes “no guarantee or warranty as to the accuracy or
completeness of any information” published in the Guidelines. Standards promulgated
by the National Fire Protection Association, on which the RVFD Best Practice
Guidelines are based, indicate that a RIT “team shall consist of a minimum of two
personnel . . ., but four personnel are preferred and shall be used when possible.”
On three occasions in 2010 and 2011, 2 RVFD dispatched a RIT crew with fewer
than five members. Chief McAndrew explained that during those incidents, fewer than
five of RVFD’s RIT crew members were immediately available. Thus, RVFD decided to
promptly dispatch a partial team to the incident, rather than delaying the dispatch until a
full complement became available or being unable to assist the neighboring jurisdiction at

1

The record also reflects that Houston had disagreements with Chief McAndrew
regarding the training of RIT members, including at least one incident in which Houston
was defiant and openly criticized Chief McAndrew’s training plan.
2
We note that, even drawing all reasonable conclusions in favor of Houston, only one of
these dispatches occurred after RVFD adopted the Morris County Guidelines that
Houston relies on as the basis of his state-law claim.
3

Case: 13-2101

Document: 003111560597

Page: 4

Date Filed: 03/17/2014

all. Houston complained to Chief McAndrew after the first two incidents, arguing that no
RIT crew should be dispatched unless and until five RIT members are available.
After the third incident in July 2011, Houston sent Chief McAndrew a letter
stating that he could “no longer function as the training officer” of the RIT because of the
RVFD’s purported “repeated disregard of the numerous rules, regulations and guidelines
pertaining to” the RIT. In a response letter, Chief McAndrew “accept[ed]” Houston’s
“resignation” and further instructed Houston “not to proctor, lecture, instruct, or
participate in any training at all with the” RIT or RVFD. Chief McAndrew further
suggested that Houston “take a break and re-evaluate if [Houston could] be cooperative
and participate with” RVFD.
Houston filed this action on August 19, 2011, alleging various federal and statelaw claims. The District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants on each
claim. Houston appeals.
II.

Discussion 3

We employ “a de novo standard of review to grants of summary judgment,
‘applying the same standard as the District Court.’” Montone v. City of Jersey City, 709
F.3d 181, 189 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Pa. Coal Ass’n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 236 (3d
Cir. 1995)).

Under this standard, a court must “view the underlying facts and all

reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A court “shall grant summary judgment

3

The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and
1367, and we have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
4

Case: 13-2101

Document: 003111560597

Page: 5

Date Filed: 03/17/2014

if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Although Houston asserted several federal and state-law claims related to the
termination of his role with RVFD, he presses only two on appeal: a First Amendment
retaliation claim and a state-law claim pursuant to the New Jersey Conscientious
Employee Protection Act (CEPA).
The District Court correctly granted summary judgment to the defendants on
Houston’s First Amendment claim. Houston’s role as a volunteer firefighter is sufficient
to trigger First Amendment scrutiny. See Versarge v. Twp. of Clinton N.J., 984 F.2d
1359, 1364 (3d Cir. 1993). Nevertheless, it is apparent that Houston’s statements
regarding RIT staffing levels and training procedures were made pursuant to his duties
with the RVFD and therefore receive no First Amendment protection. Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). As he stated in a letter to Chief McAndrew,
Houston’s role as “the person responsible for training” the RIT included the “duty to
correct errors and deviations in [RIT] procedures.” Thus, Houston’s complaints
regarding RVFD’s training and dispatch protocols for its RIT were made “pursuant to
[his] official duties” and receive no First Amendment protection. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at
421; see also Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 242 (3d Cir. 2006).
The District Court was also correct to grant summary judgment to the defendants
on Houston’s CEPA claim. Among other things, CEPA provides that an “employer shall
not take any retaliatory action against an employee because the employee . . . [o]bjects to,
or refuses to participate in any activity, policy or practice which the employee reasonable
5

Case: 13-2101

Document: 003111560597

Page: 6

Date Filed: 03/17/2014

believes . . . is incompatible with a clear mandate of public policy concerning the public
health, safety or welfare.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:19-3c(3). The “threshold determination”
that the court must make is to identify a “clear mandate of public policy” with “a
substantial nexus” to the complained-of conduct. Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 828 A.2d 893,
901 (N.J. 2003). A “clear mandate of public policy suggests an analog to a constitutional
provision, statute, and rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law such that . . . there
should be a high degree of public certitude in respect of acceptable versus unacceptable
conduct.” Maw v. Advanced Clinical Commc’ns, Inc., 846 A.2d 604, 607 (N.J. 2004)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Houston’s reliance on the Morris County Best Practices Guidelines does not meet
this standard. The Guidelines are expressly not an inflexible mandate on the RVFD, as
they indicate that “[a]nyone using [the] document should rely on his or her own
independent judgment.” Further, any potential mandate imposed by the Guidelines is not
“clear,” because the Guidelines were designed to be “consistent” with “NFPA standards,”
which indicate that fewer than five RIT members may be dispatched. Moreover,
Defendants submitted evidence to the trial court indicating that the practice throughout
Morris County was to defer to the judgment of the commander at the scene of the fire
with regard to RIT deployments, even if that deference resulted in the deployment of
fewer than five RIT members from a single jurisdiction. In light of this evidence, the
Guidelines are more properly characterized as an aspirational best practices document,
and not a clear mandate of public policy.

6

Case: 13-2101

Document: 003111560597

Page: 7

Date Filed: 03/17/2014

We recognize that the New Jersey Supreme Court has previously determined that
an industry safety guideline can, in some circumstances, be a source of public policy on
which a CEPA claim may be based. See Mehlman v. Mobil Oil Corp., 707 A.2d 1000,
1014–15 (N.J. 1998). The key factor in Mehlman, however, was that “the practical effect
of the guideline was essentially equivalent to the effect of governmental regulatory
action.” Id. at 1015. The Guidelines at issue in this case are expressly subject to the
discretion of the RVFD and therefore may not serve as the basis for a clear mandate of
public policy for a CEPA claim.
III.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting
summary judgment to the defendants.

7