Lateefah Brown v. Division of Youth and Family, et al

Filing

NOT PRECEDENTIAL PER CURIAM OPINION Coram: FISHER, KRAUSE and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges. Total Pages: 4. Brown's motions to supplement the record, to add L.J.B. as a plaintiff in this case and appoint him counsel are denied.

Case: 14-1987

Document: 003111776498

Page: 1

Date Filed: 10/27/2014

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 14-1987
___________
LATEEFAH C. BROWN,
Appellant
v.
DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES (DYFS);
HONORABLE DARRELL M. FINEMAN J.S.C.
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:14-cv-01598)
District Judge: Honorable Renée M. Bumb
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 24, 2014
Before: FISHER, KRAUSE and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: October 27, 2014)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Lateefah Brown appeals pro se from an order of the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey dismissing her complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.

Case: 14-1987

Document: 003111776498

Page: 2

Date Filed: 10/27/2014

I.
Prior to this lawsuit, Brown was a party to New Jersey state court litigation
initiated by New Jersey’s Division of Youth and Family Services (“DYFS”). There,
Brown was found to have abused and/or neglected her minor child, L.J.B., and the child’s
father was awarded legal and physical custody. After the New Jersey Supreme Court
denied review in that case, Brown commenced this lawsuit, submitting a pro se complaint
and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). The complaint, which was brought
against DYFS and a New Jersey Superior Court judge who had presided over an aspect of
the state court litigation, reiterated the arguments of trial court error that Brown had made
in her state court appeal. Brown sought reversal of the state court’s rulings and
compensatory damages.
The District Court granted Brown’s IFP motion and screened the complaint
pursuant to § 1915(e). The court concluded that Brown’s claims were barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the doctrine of issue preclusion, and that amendment of her
complaint would be futile. As a result, the court dismissed the complaint without leave to
amend. This appeal followed.1

The District Court received Brown’s notice of appeal three days after the expiration of
the 30-day appeal period. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). Thereafter, she timely moved
the court to extend the appeal period pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
4(a)(5). The court, finding that Brown had established good cause for an extension,
granted the motion and directed the Clerk to file the notice of appeal nunc pro tunc. We
find no error in that ruling. See Ragguette v. Premier Wines & Spirits, 691 F.3d 315, 322
(3d Cir. 2012) (explaining that we generally review a district court’s ruling on a Rule
2
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Case: 14-1987

Document: 003111776498

Page: 3

Date Filed: 10/27/2014

II.
“It is standard practice that an appellant must state all issues raised on appeal in
the opening brief.” United States v. Albertson, 645 F.3d 191, 195 (3d Cir. 2011); see
Fed. R. App. P. 28(a); see also Al-Ra’id v. Ingle, 69 F.3d 28, 31 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting
that pro se litigants are not exempted from this requirement). “[A]n appellant’s failure to
identify or argue an issue in [her] opening brief constitutes waiver of that issue on
appeal.” United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005). Here, Brown’s brief
does not even mention the District Court’s judgment, let alone articulate an argument for
why that judgment should be disturbed. Instead, the brief’s five substantive pages
complain about various aspects of her state court litigation and allege facts relating to that
litigation. Because Brown has waived any challenge to the District Court’s judgment —
the complaints in her brief about her state court case do not justify relief here — we will
not disturb that judgment.
We note, however, that even if Brown had preserved a challenge to the District
Court’s judgment, we still would not disturb that judgment. The complaint essentially
asked the District Court to exercise appellate review over the state court’s adverse rulings
and reverse them. The District Court correctly concluded that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine barred it from doing so, and that amendment of Brown’s complaint would be

4(a)(5) motion for abuse of discretion). Accordingly, Brown’s appeal is timely, and we
have jurisdiction over it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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Case: 14-1987

Document: 003111776498

Page: 4

Date Filed: 10/27/2014

futile. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)
(explaining that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars “cases brought by state-court losers
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those
judgments.”).2 Although Brown seeks to supplement the record — ostensibly with the
state court records that she has submitted in her appendix and/or the DVD that she has
lodged as an exhibit3 — those materials would not change the outcome of this case.
In light of the above, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. Brown’s
motion to supplement the record is denied.4

2

We need not consider whether the doctrine of issue preclusion applies here.
Brown has referred to that exhibit as both a “DVD” and a “CD.”
4
Brown also asks us to add L.J.B. as a plaintiff in this case and appoint him counsel. But
Brown lacks any authority to make these requests on the child’s behalf — as noted above,
L.J.B.’s father has legal custody of the child. In any event, Brown has failed to
demonstrate that the requested relief is warranted. Accordingly, these requests are
denied. Finally, to the extent that Brown seeks an investigation into whether L.J.B. was
abused after he was removed from her custody, that request falls outside the scope of this
appeal and is not considered here.
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3