In re: Tormu Prall

Filing

NOT PRECEDENTIAL PER CURIAM OPINION Coram: SMITH, HARDIMAN and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges. Total Pages: 3. DLD-347.

Case: 14-3442

Document: 003111735252

Page: 1

DLD-347

Date Filed: 09/11/2014

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 14-3442
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IN RE: TORMU E. PRALL,
Petitioner
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On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
(Related to Civil No. 1-10-cv-01228)
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Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.
August 28, 2014
Before: SMITH, HARDIMAN and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges
(Filed: September 11, 2014)
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM
Petitioner Tormu E. Prall, proceeding pro se, seeks a writ of mandamus
compelling a district judge to disqualify himself and vacating an order of the District
Court. Prall is the plaintiff in a civil action currently pending before the Honorable
Jerome B. Simandle. A subset of the defendants in that action moved for summary
judgment. Prall opposed the motion and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment in
response. The District Court granted the defendants’ motion and denied Prall’s motion.

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Document: 003111735252

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Date Filed: 09/11/2014

Prall then moved to disqualify Chief Judge Simandle and to vacate the order granting
summary judgment for the defendants. Before the District Court could rule on the
motion, Prall filed a mandamus petition along with a motion asking this Court to expedite
our decision. This Court denied both the petition and the motion. The District Court
subsequently denied Prall’s motion for recusal. Prall then filed the instant petition, again
asking for Chief Judge Simandle to recuse and for the order granting summary judgment
to be vacated. For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition.
Mandamus is a drastic remedy that is granted in only extraordinary cases. In re
Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005). A mandamus petition is
a proper means of challenging a district judge’s refusal to recuse pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 455. See In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 774-75 (3d Cir. 1992). We review a
decision not to recuse for abuse of discretion. See In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 368 F.3d
289, 300-01 & n.12 (3d Cir. 2004).
Prall contends that Chief Judge Simandle is biased against him, as evidenced by
the Chief Judge’s alleged failure to give Prall’s submissions due consideration in ruling
upon the summary judgment motion. We disagree. There is no indication in the record
that Chief Judge Simandle is biased or that he failed to consider Prall’s contentions. The
opinion that accompanied the order granting summary judgment for the defendants
referenced Prall’s submissions nine separate times. In fact, the District Court explicitly
stated that it would arrive at the same conclusions even under Prall’s versions of the facts.
Dkt. No. 265, at 9, 13. We therefore discern no evidence of bias in Chief Judge
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Document: 003111735252

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Date Filed: 09/11/2014

Simandle’s handling of the summary judgment cross-motions, and we find that it was not
an abuse of discretion for Chief Judge Simandle not to recuse. We further note that
Prall’s displeasure with an adverse ruling does not form a basis for recusal. See
Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000).
We also deny Prall’s request to vacate the order granting summary judgment for
the defendants. To demonstrate that mandamus is appropriate, a petitioner must establish
that he or she has “no other adequate means” to obtain the relief requested and that he or
she has a “clear and indisputable” right to issuance of the writ. Madden v. Myers, 102
F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996). In Prall’s case, the summary judgment order at issue can be
challenged by filing a proper and timely notice of appeal from the District Court’s entry
of a final order. As a result, Prall cannot make the required showing that he has no other
adequate means to attain the desired relief.
Accordingly, we will deny Prall’s mandamus petition.

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