Derrick Brown v. Warden Lewisburg USP

Filing

NOT PRECEDENTIAL PER CURIAM OPINION Coram: RENDELL, CHAGARES and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges. Total Pages: 3. ALD-176

Case: 14-3588

Document: 003111955673

Page: 1

ALD-176

Date Filed: 05/07/2015

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 14-3588
___________
DERRICK L. BROWN,
Appellant
v.
WARDEN LEWISBURG USP
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 14-cv-01093)
District Judge: Honorable Richard P. Conaboy
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
April 23, 2015
Before: RENDELL, CHAGARES and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 7, 2015)
_________
OPINION*
_________

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

Case: 14-3588

Document: 003111955673

Page: 2

Date Filed: 05/07/2015

PER CURIAM
In June 2014, Derrick Lakeith Brown, a federal inmate housed in Pennsylvania,
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. In the petition, Brown
alleged that he had been sexually assaulted by prison staff and denied medical care in
connection with the assault. Brown further alleged that prison staff had attempted to
cover up the incident, and claimed that their actions violated his rights under the Eighth,
First, and Fifth Amendments, the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, and other Bureau
of Prisons (“BOP”) regulations. The District Court screened Brown’s petition pursuant

to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Habeas Cases and determined that, because Brown
was challenging the conditions of his confinement rather than the validity, duration, or
execution of his conviction and sentence, his claims were not within the scope of
habeas corpus. Therefore, the District Court summarily dismissed Brown’s petition
without prejudice to his right to bring his claims in a civil rights action. Brown now
appeals from the District Court’s order.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and our
review of the District Court’s dismissal of Brown’s § 2241 petition is plenary. See
Cradle v. U.S. ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam).
We agree with the District Court that Brown’s claims were not properly brought
under § 2241. As the District Court correctly explained, § 2241 “confers habeas
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Case: 14-3588

Document: 003111955673

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Date Filed: 05/07/2015

jurisdiction to hear the petition of a federal prisoner who is challenging . . . the execution
of his sentence.” Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2005).
While we have noted that “the precise meaning of ‘execution of the sentence’ is hazy,”
we have made clear that a challenge under § 2241 must be to the manner in which the
sentence is being “put into effect” or “carr[ied] out.” Id. at 242-43; see also Cardona v.
Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533, 537 (3d Cir. 2012) (explaining that, in order for a prisoner to
challenge the execution of his sentence under § 2241, he must allege that “the BOP’s
conduct was somehow inconsistent with a command or recommendation in the
sentencing judgment”). Brown’s allegations of sexual assault and complaints about the
prison’s response thereto concern the conditions of his confinement, not the manner in
which his sentence is being carried out. See Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 542 (3d
Cir. 2002) (“[W]hen the challenge is to a condition of confinement such that a finding in
plaintiff’s favor would not alter his sentence or undo his conviction, an action under
§ 1983 [and not habeas corpus] is appropriate.”). Therefore, the District Court properly
determined that Brown’s claims are not cognizable under § 2241, and properly dismissed
the petition.

Because this appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm
the District Court’s order. See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.

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