USA v. Kareem Millhouse

Filing

NOT PRECEDENTIAL PER CURIAM OPINION Coram: RENDELL, CHAGARES and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges. Total Pages: 3. ALD-189

Case: 14-4014

Document: 003111979727

Page: 1

ALD-189

Date Filed: 06/03/2015

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 14-4014
___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
KAREEM MILLHOUSE,
Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(E.D. Pa. Crim. No. 2:06-cr-00397-001)
District Judge: Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to
Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
May 7, 2015
Before: RENDELL, CHAGARES and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 3, 2015)
________________
OPINION*
________________

PER CURIAM

Kareem Millhouse, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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Document: 003111979727

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Date Filed: 06/03/2015

the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissing his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. We will affirm.
In 2007, Millhouse was convicted in a bench trial of attempted aggravated sexual
abuse, attempted sexual abuse, attempted escape, assault, and possession of a dangerous
weapon in a federal facility.1 He was sentenced to 300 months in prison, and we
affirmed. United States v. Millhouse, 317 F. App’x 201, 202 (3d Cir. 2009). Millhouse
subsequently filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which was denied. It does not
appear that he sought a certificate of appealability regarding that decision.
In 2014, Millhouse filed a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 claiming
that he is actually innocent of aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, assault, and escape
because those offenses were not included in the indictment by virtue of the fact that he
was indicted on attempted offenses. The District Court dismissed the petition for lack of
jurisdiction, concluding that (1) the claim could be raised only, if at all, in a § 2255
motion, and (2) Millhouse had not obtained leave to file a second § 2255 motion. This
appeal followed.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we exercise plenary
review over the District Court’s legal conclusions. See Cradle v. United States ex rel.

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The amended judgment reflects that Millhouse was convicted of aggravated sexual
abuse, sexual abuse, and escape. United States v. Millhouse, No. 2:06-cr-00397 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 20, 2008), ECF No. 145. However, he was indicted on attempted offenses, ECF No.
12, and the trial judge’s opinions regarding a post-conviction motion for a new trial, ECF
No. 123, and Millhouse’s § 2255 motion, ECF No. 226, state that he was convicted of
attempted offenses. This discrepancy is the basis for Millhouse’s current challenge.
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Document: 003111979727

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Date Filed: 06/03/2015

Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam). We agree with the District Court
that Millhouse’s § 2241petition was not viable. He challenged the validity of his
convictions, and “[m]otions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 are the presumptive means by
which federal prisoners can challenge their convictions or sentences that are allegedly in
violation of the Constitution.” Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir.
2002). As the District Court noted, Millhouse could proceed with a § 2255 motion only
with authorization from this Court – something he had not obtained. See Robinson v.
Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 139 (3d Cir. 2002).
Although a petitioner may challenge a conviction pursuant § 2241 if a § 2255
motion would be “inadequate or ineffective,” this exception applies only in rare
circumstances. In In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251-52 (3d Cir. 1997), we recognized
that a § 2255 motion would be “inadequate or ineffective” where an intervening change
in the law decriminalized the conduct for which the petitioner had been convicted.
Millhouse, however, cannot avail himself of this exception. The conduct underlying his
convictions is still a crime, and Millhouse does not argue otherwise. Nor does his
contention of actual innocence, which is based solely on a ministerial discrepancy
between certain documents in the record, constitute an extraordinary circumstance
justifying the use of § 2241. See Cradle, 290 F.3d at 539. In sum, Millhouse may not use
§ 2241 to evade the stringent gatekeeping requirements of § 2255. Id. Accordingly, we
will summarily affirm the District Court’s order. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.

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