Rance Strunk, Sr., et al v. East Coventry Township Police, et al

Filing

NOT PRECEDENTIAL PER CURIAM OPINION Coram: AMBRO, KRAUSE and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges. Total Pages: 7. The Appellant's request for a certificate of appealability is denied.

Case: 15-2313

Document: 003112493348

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Date Filed: 12/20/2016

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 15-2313
___________
RANCE M. STRUNK, SR.; DARLENE STRUNK; CLIFFORD B. REPOTSKI;
CYNTHIA M. YODER; R.A.Y. (Minor),
Appellants
v.
EAST COVENTRY TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT;
MISTIE GREENWALT, Officer; CHRISTOPHER JASON, Officer;
CHESTER COUNTY DETECTIVE JOSEPH WALTON; D/C RICHARD
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 5-13-cv-00824)
District Judge: Honorable Jeffrey L. Schmehl
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 1, 2016
Before: AMBRO, KRAUSE and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: December 20, 2016)
___________
OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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The Appellants appeal from orders of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania granting the defendants’ motions to dismiss. For the
following reasons, we will affirm.
In 2011, the police were provided with computer discs containing child
pornography that had been left in a residence once used by Clifford Repotski. Based in
part on those discs, the police obtained a warrant to arrest Repotski. The arrest was made
at a home that Repotski shared with Rance Strunk, Sr., and Darlene Strunk (his
grandparents), Cynthia Yoder (his mother), and a minor identified as “R.A.Y.” (his
brother). Repotski was charged with possession with intent to distribute child
pornography and related crimes. He later pleaded guilty to four of the five charges
against him.
Thereafter, Repotski, the Strunks, Yoder, and R.A.Y. filed a complaint under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, which they later amended, alleging violations of their constitutional rights
in connection with Repotski’s arrest. They named as defendants the Chester County
Detectives Division, “D/C Richard,” Detective Joseph Walton, the East Coventry
Township Police Department, Officer Mistie Greenwalt, and Officer Christopher Jason.
The Chester County Detectives Division and Detective Walton moved to dismiss the
complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The District Court
granted that motion as to the Chester County Detectives Division, holding that a
municipal police department is not a proper party defendant in a § 1983 action. The
District Court also observed that the complaint “contain[ed] no facts and no numbered
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paragra[ph]s, merely setting forth vague and random citations to Pennsylvania and
Federal law[,]” but permitted the plaintiffs to amend their complaint. After the plaintiffs
filed an amended complaint, the defendants filed motions to dismiss. The District Court
granted those motions, concluding that (1) Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994),
barred the claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution; (2)
Officers Greenwalt and Jason did not participate in the search of the home; (3) the
Township was not liable because there were no underlying constitutional violations; and
(4) various remaining claims failed to satisfy the pleading requirements of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 8. The plaintiffs appealed. 1
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and review de novo the District
Court’s decision to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). See Dique v. N.J. State
Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). We accept as true all of the allegations
contained in the complaint and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (per curiam). To survive dismissal, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). We may affirm on any basis

1

A notice of appeal in a civil case in which the United States is not a party must be filed
within 30 days of the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed. Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(1)(A). Although the plaintiffs failed to file their notice of appeal within 30 days of
the order granting the defendants’ motions to dismiss, the District Court subsequently
granted the plaintiffs’ motion to extend the time to appeal under Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5) and deemed their appeal timely filed. See Ramseur v. Beyer,
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supported by the record. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per
curiam).
As noted, the District Court held that the Appellants’ false arrest, false
imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims were barred by Heck. Heck holds that,
where success in a § 1983 action would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction
or sentence, an individual’s suit for damages or equitable relief is barred unless he can
demonstrate that his conviction or sentence has been invalidated. See Heck, 512 U.S. at
486-87; see also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005). Thus, Heck bars only
claims which “seek[] to recover damages for an unconstitutional conviction,
imprisonment, or other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render the
conviction or sentence unlawful.” Torres v. McLaughlin, 163 F.3d 169, 173 (3d Cir.
1998). We have held that Heck requires District Courts to determine whether each claim
– if successful – would imply the invalidity of the conviction or sentence. Gibson v.
Superintendent, 411 F.3d 427, 447-49 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that a determination
whether Heck applies to a Fourth Amendment claim requires a case-by-case fact-based
inquiry).
We agree that Heck barred the Appellants’ malicious prosecution claim because
Repotski’s conviction has not been invalidated. 2 See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. But,

921 F.2d 504, 507 (3d Cir. 1990).
2
The malicious prosecution claims should have been dismissed without prejudice,
however, and we will modify the District Court’s order to that effect. See Curry v.
Yachera, 835 F.3d 373, 379 (3d Cir. 2016).
4

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contrary to the District Court’s conclusion, the claims for false arrest and false
imprisonment are not the type contemplated by Heck. See Montgomery v. De Simone,
159 F.3d 120, 126 n.5 (3d Cir. 1998). Dismissal of those claims was appropriate,
however, because the Appellants failed to plausibly allege that Repotski’s arrest was not
supported by probable cause. See Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d
Cir. 1995) (stating that a plaintiff alleging false imprisonment must demonstrate that his
arrest was unsupported by probable cause); cf. Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497,
514 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that although the issue of probable cause is usually a factual
one, a court “may conclude that ‘probable cause did exist as a matter of law if the
evidence, viewed most favorably to [the p]laintiff, reasonably would not support a
contrary factual finding” (internal citation and quotations omitted)).
Repotski was arrested pursuant to a warrant that was supported by an affidavit of
probable cause, both of which were attached to the Appellants’ amended complaint. See
Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating that a court may consider
exhibits attached to the complaint in adjudicating a motion to dismiss). Where an arrest
is made pursuant to a warrant, a plaintiff in a § 1983 action for false arrest must
adequately plead that “(1) that the police officer ‘knowingly and deliberately, or with a
reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that create a
falsehood in applying for a warrant;’ and (2) that ‘such statements or omissions are
material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause.’” Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d
781, 786-87 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir.
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1997)). The Appellants failed to meet this burden. Although they contended that the
officers’ statements inaccurately referred to the computer discs containing child
pornography as “abandoned,” the Appellants did not allege that the officers “‘must have
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of [their] statements or had obvious reasons to
doubt the accuracy of the information [they] reported.’” Id. at 788 (quoting United States
v. Clapp, 46 F.3d 795, 801 n.6 (8th Cir. 1995)). In fact, the Appellants appear to
acknowledge that the officers characterized the discs as “abandoned” because the person
who turned them in to the police explained that the discs had been left in Repotski’s
former residence. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the District Court
properly rejected the Appellants’ false arrest and false imprisonment claims.
The District Court also correctly dismissed the Appellants’ remaining claims. In
particular, we agree that the Appellants could not sustain their claims of an illegal search
against Officers Jason and Greenwalt because they did not actively participate in the
search of the home. Rather, other officers not named in the action executed the search.
See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (liability under § 1983
requires personal involvement in the alleged wrongs). In addition, the Appellants failed
to adequately set forth a basis for relief against “D/C Richard” and Detective Walton.
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “D/C Richard” was included in the caption and mentioned in
one paragraph of the amended complaint. The only substantive reference to Detective
Walton indicates that he was “going to be conducting forensic analysis of the items
seized” after being contacted by another police officer. Even construing the complaint
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liberally and in a light most favorable to the Appellants, we discern no viable claims or
grounds for relief based on these vague references to “D/C Richard” and Detective
Walton. See Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 179
(3d Cir. 2010) (holding that to plead a conspiracy claim properly, a plaintiff must allege
“facts that plausibly suggest a meeting of the minds”).
Furthermore, the Appellants appear to seek relief under various statutes – such as
Pennsylvania criminal laws, the state Landlord and Tenant Act, and the Racketeering
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act – but, to the extent that these statutes allow a
private cause of action, their allegations are insufficient to state a plausible claim for
relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”). Finally, the Chester County Detectives
Division is not a proper party, see Bonenberger v. Plymouth Twp., 132 F.3d 20, 25 n.4
(3d Cir. 1997), and the Appellants did not identify any official policy or custom of the
East Coventry Township Police Department that was the cause of the alleged
constitutional violations, see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment, but we
modify its order to reflect that the malicious prosecution claim is dismissed without
prejudice. See supra note 2. The Appellants’ request for a certificate of appealability is
denied, as is their request to introduce material not pleaded in the complaint. See Maio v.
Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 485, n.12 (3d Cir. 2000).
7