Mindy Zied v. Barnhart, et al

Filing

NOT PRECEDENTIAL PER CURIAM OPINION Coram: GREENAWAY JR., GREENBERG and ROTH, Circuit Judges. Total Pages: 5. Appellee's request to bar Appellant from filing further papers without leave of Court is denied. Appellant's motions are denied.

Case: 15-2821

Document: 003112784996

Page: 1

Date Filed: 11/22/2017

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 15-2821
___________
MINDY J. ZIED
v.
JO ANNE BARNHART, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, in her
official and individual capacities; SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION; MR.
HAWKSWORTH, SSA Employee, in his individual capacity; MRS. SHOPP, SSA
Employee, in her individual capacity; J.A. BREEM, SSA Employee, in her individual
capacity and any other unknown and unnamed individuals who may be liable on the
claims stated here, in their individual and/or official capacities while working as federal
employees for the U.S. or as an employee for the Social Security Administration at times
when the claim set forth herein took place
Mindy Jaye Zied,
Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-06-cv-02305)
District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 20, 2017
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., GREENBERG and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: November 22, 2017 )

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Date Filed: 11/22/2017

___________
OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant Mindy Zied appeals the District Court’s order denying her postjudgment motion. For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm.
Zied is a frequent and prolific litigant. In 2006, Zied filed a complaint in the
District Court that both challenged the decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
concerning her Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits and raised a variety of
statutory and constitutional claims. The District Court directed her to file separate
actions — one challenging the ALJ’s benefits determination and one raising her other
claims. Zied complied. In the case that is currently before us in this appeal, she claimed
that defendants — the Social Security Administration and several of its employees — had
violated her rights under the First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Privacy Act of 1974, and the Freedom of Information
Act. In D.C. Civ. A. No. 06-cv-01219, she pursued her disability appeal.
Ultimately, the District Court dismissed Zied’s complaint in this action,
concluding that all of her claims were time-barred. On March 17, 2011, we affirmed.
See Zied v. Barnhart, 418 F. App’x 109, 111 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (nonprecedential).

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
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More than four years later, on June 24, 2015, Zied filed a motion to reopen her
case and to amend her complaint. The motion — which is 227 pages long and contains
51 exhibits — is complicated and prolix. Zied discusses incidents dating back to the
1970s, complains about decisions made by District Judges in numerous separate cases,
challenges the constitutionality of 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8553 (which limits the amounts of
damages that can be recovered in certain types of cases), and argues at length that she has
been deprived of SSI benefits to which she is entitled. The District Court denied the
motion, and Zied filed a timely notice of appeal.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s
order for abuse of discretion. See Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 209 (3d Cir.
2002).
The District Court acted well within its discretion here. While Zied’s motion to
reopen is properly construed as arising under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), see id. at 208-09, she
is not entitled to relief under any subsection of Rule 60(b). A motion under Rule
60(b)(1)–(3) must be filed within one year of the judgment that is challenged, and a
motion under Rule 60(b)(5)–(6) must be filed “within a reasonable time.” Rule 60(c)(1).
Zied filed her motion more than four years after this Court’s judgment, which is plainly
untimely under either standard. See, e.g., Moolenaar v. Gov’t of the V.I., 822 F.2d 1342,
1348 (3d Cir. 1987) (Rule 60(b)(6) motion filed almost two years after judgment was not
made within a reasonable time).
While these time limits do not apply to motions under Rule 60(b)(4), see United
States v. One Toshiba Color TV, 213 F.3d 147, 157 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc), Zied does
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not claim that the District Court “lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or the parties or
entered ‘a decree which is not within the powers granted to it by the law,’” Marshall v.
Bd. of Educ., 575 F.2d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 1978) (quoting United States v. Walker, 109
U.S. 258, 266 (1883)). Moreover, to be entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6), Zied must
show “extraordinary circumstances where, without such relief, an extreme and
unexpected hardship would occur.” Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2014)
(quoting Sawka v. Healtheast, Inc., 989 F.2d 138, 140 (3d Cir. 1993)). She has not met
this onerous standard.
For similar reasons, the District Court did not err in refusing to permit Zied to
amend her complaint. See generally Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 23031 (3d Cir. 2011) (discussing standards governing post-judgment motions to amend). To
the extent that Zied sought to amend her complaint to raise allegations or claims that had
been previously available to her, it was appropriate to deny leave to amend due to her
undue delay. See Cureton v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 252 F.3d 267, 273-74 (3d
Cir. 2001). To the extent that Zied raised claims concerning her SSI benefits, the District
Court had previously ordered her to pursue her benefits appeal in a separate action; it was
permissible for the Court to reject Zied’s efforts to bring her benefits issues into this case
at this late date. Finally, while Zied asserted a number of other issues, we are satisfied
that she failed to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).1

1

Particularly in light of her history of inundating the courts with her filings, we also
conclude that the District Court acted within its discretion in ruling on Zied’s motion
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Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. We deny the
appellees’ request that we bar Zied from filing further papers without leave of Court. We
also deny Zied’s motions.

without awaiting her reply brief. See generally In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d
810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982).
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