Bruce Andersen v. Mack Trucks Inc, et al
Filing
NOT PRECEDENTIAL OPINION Coram: AMBRO, SMITH and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges. Total Pages: 7. Judge: SMITH Authoring.
Case: 15-3063
Document: 003112268826
Page: 1
Date Filed: 04/20/2016
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 15-3063
_____________
BRUCE ANDERSEN,
Appellant
v.
MACK TRUCKS INC;
VOLVO GROUP NORTH AMERICA,
f/k/a Volvo Truck North America, Inc.
_____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
District Court No. 5-11-cv-02239
District Judge: The Honorable R. Barclay Surrick
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
April 13, 2016
Before: AMBRO, SMITH, and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges
(Filed: April 20, 2016)
_____________________
OPINION*
_____________________
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does
not constitute binding precedent.
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This case comes to us on appeal from the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment against Bruce Andersen, who claims that his former employer, Mack
Trucks Inc.,1 violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1), when it terminated his employment.2 Andersen argues that gender bias
was the dispositive factor in his termination, or, in the alternative, that it was a
motivating factor. The District Court held that while Andersen adduced enough
evidence to establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination under Iadimarco
v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 1999), he failed to demonstrate that his
employer’s proffered reason for terminating him was a pretext for gender
discrimination. Further, the District Court concluded that Andersen also failed to
show that gender discrimination was a motivating factor in his employer’s
decision. For the reasons stated below, we will affirm.
I.
Andersen, a long-time employee of Mack Trucks, lost his job as part of a
reduction in force in 2009. Andersen was hired by Mack Trucks on May 3, 1971,
as a junior tax accountant. He worked his way up the corporate ladder until he was
promoted to Human Resources Business Partner (“HRBP”) in 2003. He held that
position until he was terminated.
1
Mack Trucks is a subsidiary of co-defendant Volvo Group North America.
2
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During the relevant time period, Andersen reported to Lesley Billow, Senior
Vice President of Human Resources for Mack Trucks and Volvo Trucks in North
America. Three other female HRBPs reported to Billow. All HRBPs performed
similar functions and only differed based upon the group of employees they served
and where they were located. Andersen and one other HRBP, Bonnie Miller, were
located in Allentown, Pennsylvania, while two others were located in Greensboro,
North Carolina. Also located in Allentown was Sheri Palopoli, a female Labor
Relations Supervisor.
On April 29, 2009, Billow notified Andersen that he was going to be laid off
in a reduction in force caused by adverse economic conditions. Billow stated that
she chose someone at the Allentown location for termination because the
employee-to-HRBP ratio was lower than in Greensboro, which meant that it would
be better for business to terminate someone in Allentown. Her stated reason for
terminating Andersen over Palopoli was that there were more bargaining unit
employees than non-bargaining unit employees in Allentown. Billow explained
that she selected Andersen over Miller because Miller was actively working on a
plan to transition employees from Allentown to Greensboro.3 After Andersen’s
termination all four full-time employees in Billow’s group were female.
2
Andersen also made an age discrimination claim, but does not appeal the District
Court’s grant of summary judgment on that claim.
3
Miller was also terminated at the conclusion of the transition plan.
3
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Andersen filed suit claiming that his selection for termination was
discriminatory under Title VII.
After discovery, the District Court granted
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all claims.
Andersen’s timely
appeal followed.4
II.
Andersen claims two errors: (1) the District Court erred in concluding that
he failed to prove that the employer’s proffered reason was pretext, and (2) the
District Court applied the wrong legal standard when it rejected his mixed-motives
claim. We “exercise plenary review over the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment” and “apply the same standard that the District Court should have
applied.” Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 276 (3d Cir.
2001). A district court may grant summary judgment when “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986).
III.
A. Pretext
The District Court concluded in a well-reasoned opinion that Andersen
established a prima facie case of gender discrimination under Iadimarco but failed
4
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28
4
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to demonstrate that the employer’s proffered reason for terminating him instead of
Palopoli or Miller was a pretext for gender discrimination. We look to the record
to determine if there are sufficient facts to show not only that the employer’s
reason was wrong, but that “it was so plainly wrong that it cannot have been the
employer’s real reason.” Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1109
(3d Cir. 1997).
That can be shown by pointing out “such weaknesses,
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s
proffered legitimate reasons” that no jury could find them credible. Fuentes v.
Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994).
Andersen fails to make that showing. He cites many facts, but all of those
facts are either irrelevant or attack the business judgment of his former employer.
Unwise does not mean discriminatory. See id. at 765 (“[T]he factual dispute at
issue is whether discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether the
employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent.”). Our review of the record fails
to reveal evidence that discriminatory animus was the motivating factor behind the
decision. We agree with the District Court’s reasoning and come to the same
conclusion that Andersen has failed to meet his burden of showing pretext.
U.S.C. § 1343. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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B. Mixed Motive
Andersen’s second claim, that gender was a motivating factor in his
termination, also fails. Under a mixed motives theory, a plaintiff must present
“sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that . . . sex . . . was a motivating factor” in the adverse employment
action. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003).
Anderson argues that the District Court erred by disposing of his mixed
motive claim because he lacked direct evidence. He is correct that direct evidence
of discrimination is not necessary in a mixed motives case. Id. Instead, a plaintiff
must only produce “sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude” that
gender “was a motivating factor.” Id. While the District Court faulted Andersen
for not having “direct evidence showing conduct or statements reflecting
discriminatory attitude toward his gender,” he is incorrect in alleging that the
District Court improperly required direct evidence of discrimination.
Instead,
evidence of a discriminatory attitude is inherently circumstantial evidence of
discrimination. Thus, the District Court determined that no evidence, direct or
circumstantial, supported the mixed motive claim.
We agree that “the record is devoid of evidence that could reasonably be
construed to support the plaintiff’s claim.” White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533
F.3d 381, 400 (6th Cir. 2008). At best, Andersen’s evidence could demonstrate
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that Billow liked one of the other HRBPs more than Andersen. That is not enough.
If Andersen had shown that Billow liked all of the female HRBPs more than him,
that might be enough to give us pause, but it is hardly unlawful for a supervisor to
prefer one employee over another. See Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, Div. of Sterling,
Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 642 (3d Cir. 1998) (explaining that, while “evidence of the
more favorable treatment of a single member of a non-protected group” may be
relevant, that “evidence can not be viewed in a vacuum,” and “[t]he ultimate
inquiry is whether the decision was motivated by the affected employee’s [sex].”).
If that was enough to show discrimination, then virtually all employer actions
could lead to discrimination liability.
IV.
Based upon the record before us we hold that no reasonable finder of fact
could conclude that Andersen suffered from gender discrimination or that his
termination was anything other than the result of an unfortunately all-too-frequent
corporate layoff during a recession. We will affirm the judgment of the District
Court.
7
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