USA v. Shaliek Stroman

Filing

NOT PRECEDENTIAL OPINION Coram: JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR. and RENDELL, Circuit Judges. Total Pages: 7. Judge: GREENAWAY JR. Authoring.

Case: 16-1108

Document: 003112527577

Page: 1

Date Filed: 02/01/2017

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 16-1108
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
SHALIEK STROMAN,
Appellant
______________
APPEAL FROM THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(M.D. Pa. No. 3-14-cr-00270-003)
District Judge: Honorable James M. Munley
______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
November 4, 2016
______________
Before: JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and RENDELL, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: February 1, 2017)
______________
OPINION*
______________
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.
*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.

Case: 16-1108

Document: 003112527577

Page: 2

Date Filed: 02/01/2017

Shaliek Stroman seeks review of his sentence. He claims that the sentence was
both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. Since we find the sentence to be both
procedurally and substantively reasonable, we will affirm the judgment of conviction.
I.

BACKGROUND
In 2013, agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and local

police in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania commenced an investigation into the drug
trafficking activities of co-defendant, Desmond Mercer. On May 7, 2014, in connection
with the investigation, police officers in Kingston, Pennsylvania conducted a traffic stop
on a vehicle driven by a cooperating witness. Police seized 146 packets of heroin, three
cell phones, and $2,553 from Stroman, a passenger in the vehicle. On May 22, 2014 and
August 13, 2014, Stroman sold heroin in two controlled purchases to a confidential
informant. On October 22, 2014, agents arrested Stroman. At the time, he was in
possession of 60 packets of heroin, a small bag of marijuana, and $898.
Stroman pled guilty to conspiring to distribute and possess with the intent to
distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Following Stroman’s guilty plea, the
Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) calculated Stroman’s total offense level at 29
and established his criminal history category at VI. Accordingly, the United States
Sentencing Guidelines (the “Guidelines”) imprisonment range was set at 151 to 188
months.
Stroman filed a motion seeking a downward departure pursuant to Guidelines
§ 4A1.3(b), alleging that the criminal history category resulting from the application of
2

Case: 16-1108

Document: 003112527577

Page: 3

Date Filed: 02/01/2017

the career offender Guideline substantially overrepresented the seriousness of his
criminal history and the likelihood of recidivism. Additionally, Stroman filed a
sentencing memorandum requesting that the Court grant a downward variance based on
the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The Government opposed both motions.
At sentencing, the District Court expressed that the sentence “reflect[ed] full
consideration of [the § 3553(a)] factors.” App. 44. The Court considered “the necessity
of deterrence, just punishment, promotion for respect of the law, protection of the public,
assurance of correctional treatment for [Stroman], restitution to any victims where
appropriate, . . . the nature and the seriousness of the offense, [Stroman’s] history and
characteristics, the kinds of sentence available[,] . . . the advisory sentencing ranges[,]
and policies prescribed by our sentencing commission . . . .” App. 44. However, the
salient factor for the Court was Stroman’s criminal record. See App. 45 (observing that
Stroman “repeatedly committed criminal offenses while on bail” and that “he’s a
recidivist and a career heroin dealer since 2005”).
The Court ultimately sentenced Stroman to a within-Guidelines sentence of 151
months’ imprisonment to be followed by a three-year term of supervised release, and a
special assessment of $100. However, defense counsel did not object to the Court’s
failure to explicitly address proffered evidence of Stroman’s work history, good
character, and his efforts at post-indictment rehabilitation while released pending
sentencing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). This appeal followed.

3

Case: 16-1108

II.

Document: 003112527577

Page: 4

Date Filed: 02/01/2017

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. This Court has

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
When a defendant fails to preserve a procedural objection, we review the
procedural reasonableness of a criminal sentence for plain error. United States v. FloresMejia, 759 F.3d 253, 256 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc). “An error is plain if it is ‘clear’ or
‘obvious,’ ‘affects substantial rights,’ and ‘affects the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Id. at 259 (quoting United States v. Dragon, 471
F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2006)). If there is no procedural error, we review the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence and will affirm the sentence “unless no reasonable
sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for
the reasons the district court provided.” United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d
Cir. 2009) (en banc).
III.

ANALYSIS
On appeal, Stroman claims his sentence was procedurally and substantively

unreasonable because the District Court treated the Guidelines as mandatory and failed to
give meaningful consideration to the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
A.

Stroman’s Sentence Was Procedurally Reasonable

When imposing a sentence, courts must follow a three-step process. First,
“[c]ourts must . . . calculate a defendant’s Guidelines sentence precisely as they would
have before [United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)].” United States v. Gunter,
4

Case: 16-1108

Document: 003112527577

Page: 5

Date Filed: 02/01/2017

462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006). Second, courts “must ‘formally rul[e] on the motions
of both parties and stat[e] on the record whether they are granting a departure and how
that departure affects the Guidelines calculation, and take into account our Circuit’s preBooker case law, which continues to have advisory force.’” Id. (alterations in the
original) (quoting United States v. King, 454 F.3d 187, 196 (3d Cir. 2006)). Third, courts
must “‘exercise[ ] [their] discretion by considering the relevant [§ 3553(a)] factors’ . . . in
setting the sentence they impose regardless whether it varies from the sentence calculated
under the Guidelines.” Id. (alterations in the original) (quoting King, 454 F.3d at 194).
Under the third step, courts “must ‘acknowledge and respond to any properly presented
sentencing argument which has colorable legal merit and a factual basis.’” Flores-Mejia,
759 F.3d at 256 (quoting United States v. Begin, 696 F.3d 405, 411 (3d Cir. 2012)).
We turn to Stroman’s argument that the Court erred by treating the career offender
Guidelines as mandatory. Not only is this contention not supported by the record, the
record demonstrates the opposite—the Court referred to the Guidelines as “advisory
sentencing ranges.” App. 44 (emphasis added). Moreover, the District Court also
considered the § 3553(a) factors and Stroman’s arguments for a downward departure,
before ultimately rejecting those arguments. Accordingly, the Court did not commit

5

Case: 16-1108

Document: 003112527577

Page: 6

Date Filed: 02/01/2017

procedural error in this regard.1
B.

Stroman’s Sentence Was Substantively Reasonable

We next consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Our review of
the application of the § 3553(a) factors is “highly deferential.” United States v. Bungar,
478 F.3d 540, 543 (3d Cir. 2007). At a minimum, “the district court must furnish an
explanation ‘sufficient for us to see that the particular circumstances of the case have
been given meaningful consideration within the parameters of § 3553(a).’” United States
v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 216 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Levinson, 543 F.3d
190, 196 (3d Cir. 2008)). However, “meaningful consideration” does not require the
court to “discuss a defendant’s clearly nonmeritorious arguments, or otherwise ‘discuss
and make findings as to each of the § 3553(a) factors if the record makes clear the court
took the factors into account in sentencing.’” Bungar, 478 F.3d at 543 (quoting United
States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 2006)).

1

Parenthetically, Stroman failed to raise at any juncture, including any time during
his appeal, whether the District Court properly calculated the applicable Guidelines
range. A careful review of the record demonstrates that the District Court never formally
calculated the applicable Guidelines range. This is contrary to the first step of the threestep procedural requirement for imposing a sentence. See United States v. Gunter, 462
F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006). Nonetheless, the Court did note during the sentencing
hearing that it had reviewed the PSR. During the hearing, the parties did not formally
object to the calculation of the applicable Guidelines range within the PSR. And on
appeal, Stroman makes no claim that the Court miscalculated the Guidelines range. In
view of the parties’ complete agreement in these matters, the District Court’s failure to
explicitly calculate the Guidelines range did not “affect[] the outcome of the District
Court proceedings,” thus, the error was not prejudicial. See United States v. FloresMejia, 759 F.3d 253, 259 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507
U.S. 725, 734 (1993)).
6

Case: 16-1108

Document: 003112527577

Page: 7

Date Filed: 02/01/2017

Although Stroman sought a downward variance from the sentencing range based
on the § 3553(a) factors, the District Court properly considered these factors and
explained its reasoning. The Court’s decision to give Stroman a sentence at the lower
end of the applicable Guidelines range further demonstrates the Court’s meaningful
consideration of the § 3553(a) factors. Thus, this sentence is not substantively
unreasonable.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of conviction.

7