Nicholas Purpura v. Chris Christie, et al

Filing

NOT PRECEDENTIAL PER CURIAM OPINION Coram: AMBRO, KRAUSE and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges. Total Pages: 5.

Case: 16-3173

Document: 003112598087

Page: 1

Date Filed: 04/19/2017

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 16-3173
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NICHOLAS PURPURA, a sovereign citizen, and for people similarly situated in New
Jersey that hold citizenship in United States,
Appellant
v.
GOVERNOR CHRIS CHRISTIE; PRES. SENATE STEVEN M. SWEENEY;
ASSEMBLY SPEAKER VINCENT PRIETO; ATTORNEY GENERAL JOHN J.
HOFFMAN; JOSEPH RICK FUENTES, Firearms Superintendent; JUDGE MICHAEL
A. DONIO; JUDGE RUDOLPH A. FILKO; JUDGE EDWARD A. JEREJIAN; JUDGE
THOMAS V. MANAHAN.; JUDGE JOSEPH W. OXLEY; JUDGE RONALD LEE
REISNER; JUDGE LEONARD P. STARK; JUDGE RUGGERO J. ALDISERT;
LORRETTA WEINBERG; SENATOR RICHARD J. CODEY; ANNETTE QUIJANO;
PETER J. BARNES, III; REED GUSCIORA; CLEOPATRA G. TUCKER; GORDON
M. JOHNSON; PAMELA R. LAMPITT; JOHN F. MCKEON; SEAN KEAN; BONNIE
WATSON COLEMAN; ROBERT SINGER; NIA H. GILL; L. GRACE SPENCER;
SHIRLEY K. TURNER; PATRICK J. DIEGNAN.; MILA M. JASEY; TIM EUSTACE;
GABRIELA M. MOSQUERA; JASON O’DONNELL; GARY SCHAER; LOUIS D.
GREENWALD; CHARLES MAINOR; VALERIE VAINIERI HUTTLE; HERBERT
CONAWAY; RICHARD COOK; ACHILLE TAGLIALATELA
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-15-cv-03534)
District Judge: Honorable Michael A. Shipp
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 11, 2017
Before: AMBRO, KRAUSE and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

Case: 16-3173

Document: 003112598087

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Date Filed: 04/19/2017

(Opinion filed: April 19, 2017)
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OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant Nicholas Purpura appeals the District Court’s orders dismissing
his complaint and denying his motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). For the reasons set
forth below, we will affirm.
Purpura objects to the New Jersey statute regulating the issuance of permits to
carry handguns in public. See N.J.S.A. § 2C:58–4. In the District Court, he sued a host
of defendants, including the politicians who passed the statute, the judges who have
upheld it, and the lawyers and public officials who have administered it. He presented
claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986. In short, Purpura alleged that the
defendants have conspired to enact, defend, and apply an unconstitutional law.
The parties filed a number of motions in the District Court. Purpura sought a
default judgment, while the defendants filed motions to dismiss. Ultimately, the District
Court granted the motions to dismiss, concluding that Purpura lacked standing to litigate
his claims. The Court also denied Purpura’s motion for a default judgment. Purpura then
filed a Rule 59(e) motion, which the Court denied, and a timely notice of appeal.

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
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We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.1 We review de novo the District
Court’s standing determination, see Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 266
(3d Cir. 2014), and review the Court’s denial of the Rule 59(e) motion for abuse of
discretion, see Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397, 415 (3d Cir. 2011).
The District Court did not err in concluding that Purpura lacked standing. Article
III of the Constitution limits federal judicial power to the adjudication of cases or
controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. “That case-or-controversy requirement is
satisfied only where a plaintiff has standing.” Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., 554
U.S. 269, 273 (2008). To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must show, among
other things, that he “has suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete and particularized
and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180 (2000). We “assess standing as of
the time a suit is filed.”2 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1157 (2013).
Here, Purpura failed to plead that he had suffered an injury in fact. He did not
claim that he had applied for and been denied a permit or that the statute had otherwise
harmed him. As the District Court explained, Purpura’s complaint, while presenting
We conclude that the District Court’s dismissal without prejudice is a final order under
28 U.S.C. § 1291 because Purpura has elected to stand on his complaint. See Frederico
v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 192 (3d Cir. 2007).
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In applying the standing rules, “our primary project is to separate those with a true stake
in the controversy from those asserting ‘the generalized interest of all citizens in
constitutional governance.’” Freedom from Religion Found. Inc v. New Kensington
Arnold Sch. Dist., 832 F.3d 469, 476 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Valley Forge Christian
Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 483 (1982)).
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extensive legal argument concerning the constitutionality of § 2C:58–4, contained just a
single allegation that linked the statute to Purpura: Purpura claimed that, if a police
officer stopped him when he was on his way to a shooting range, and if Purpura were
wearing his entrance tag to the shooting range, and if the officer noticed that tag and
inquired whether Purpura was transporting firearms, and if Purpura had made a mistake
in storing his guns or failed to separate his firearm from his ammunition, he could be
punished. This “highly attenuated chain of possibilities” does not satisfy the injury-infact requirement. Id. at 1148; see also City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 108 (1983); In
re N.J. Title Ins. Litig., 683 F.3d 451, 461 (3d Cir. 2012).
Purpura did allege in his complaint that certain other individuals have been
harmed by § 2C:58–4. However, to establish third-party standing, a litigant must
demonstrate that (1) he has suffered an “injury in fact” that provides him with a
“sufficiently concrete interest in the outcome of the issue in dispute”; (2) he has a “close
relation to the third party”; and (3) there exists “some hindrance to the third party’s
ability to protect his or her own interests.” Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991)
(quotation marks omitted). Purpura has satisfied none of those requirements here. See
generally Storino v. Borough of Point Pleasant Beach, 322 F.3d 293, 295 (3d Cir. 2003);
Nasir v. Morgan, 350 F.3d 366, 376 (3d Cir. 2003). Accordingly, we will affirm the
District Court’s dismissal order.3

3

Because the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, it properly denied
Purpura’s request for a default judgment. See Holt v. Lake Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 408
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The District Court also denied Purpura’s Rule 59(e) motion, explaining that Rule
59(e) motions are appropriate only to rectify plain errors of law or to offer newly
discovered evidence, and may not be used to relitigate old matters or to present evidence
or arguments that could have been offered earlier. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554
U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008); Blystone, 664 F.3d at 415. Purpura does not meaningfully
challenge that decision here.
We will therefore affirm the District Court’s judgment.

F.3d 335, 336-37 (7th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
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