David Ruffin v. Superintendent Retreat SCI, et al

Filing

NOT PRECEDENTIAL PER CURIAM OPINION Coram: SHWARTZ, NYGAARD and FISHER, Circuit Judges. Total Pages: 3. CLD-237. Because the appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court. Ruffin's motion for appointment of counsel is denied.

Case: 17-1475

Document: 003112633972

Page: 1

CLD-237

Date Filed: 05/24/2017

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 17-1475
___________
DAVID RUFFIN,
Appellant
v.

SUPERINTENDENT RETREAT SCI; JACK AVERSA;
SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;
STACY MILLER; MICHAEL KLOPOTISKI; DR. EUGENE LUCAS;
JEDDIC; O'BRIAN; THERESA SHIBILSKI; GOVERNOR OF PENNSYLVANIA;
KURT T. LYNOTT; JOSEPH PAUL KALINOWSKI; VITO P. GEROULO
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 3-16-cv-01987)
District Judge: Honorable Malachy E. Mannion
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
May 18, 2017
Before: SHWARTZ, NYGAARD and FISHER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed : May 24, 2017)
_________
OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM
*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

Case: 17-1475

Document: 003112633972

Page: 2

Date Filed: 05/24/2017

David Ruffin appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of his complaint pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). We will summarily affirm.
In September 2016, Ruffin, an inmate at SCI-Retreat, filed a civil rights complaint
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania. Ruffin alleged that his maximum sentence date was June 14, 2016, and
that because he was charged with institutional misconducts, he is “stuck in the RHU on
disciplinary custody until June of 2018.” He claims that he has not “had an opportunity
to be heard by Parole, and no reason given for Parole rejection.” He further claims that
on June 6, 2016, he was transferred to SCI-Retreat from SCI-Dallas as a D-Stability
prisoner because he “suffers from a mental impairment consisting of emotional illness.”
However, at SCI-Dallas, he was “denied participation in D-Stability services for cussing
at PA O’Brien.” Ruffin’s requested relief is “to be seen and heard by [the] Parole Board
in a parole hearing” to determine whether “or not [he is] housed in the RHU undergoing
DC time or to be released from the DOC for early release,” and “to be re-examined for DStability programming or to be placed in D-Stability programming.”
By order entered on January 31, 2017, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)
and 1915A(a), the District Court dismissed Ruffin’s complaint as “legally frivolous”
because he failed to state a viable § 1983 claim. Ruffin appeals.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because Ruffin has been
granted in forma pauperis status pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, we review this appeal for
possible dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). We exercise plenary review of

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Case: 17-1475

Document: 003112633972

Page: 3

Date Filed: 05/24/2017

the District Court's order dismissing Ruffin’s complaint. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229
F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).
We agree with the District Court that Ruffin’s § 1983 complaint is not the proper
vehicle for his request for a parole hearing or release from confinement. See Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490 (1973) (“Congress has determined that habeas corpus is the
appropriate remedy for state prisoners attacking the validity of the fact or length of their
confinement, and that specific determination must override the general terms of §
1983.”). To the extent that Ruffin is seeking habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254,
he must pursue relief through a petition for habeas corpus.
To the extent that Ruffin is raising a due process claim by requesting to “be placed
in D-Stability programming,” it is well-established that prisoners have no constitutional
right to placement in any particular prison, custody classification, or housing assignment.
See Olim w. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983); Sheehan v. Beyer, 51 F.3d 1170,
1174 (3d Cir. 1995).
Because the appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily
affirm the judgment of the District Court. Ruffin’s motion for appointment of counsel is
denied.

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