Matthew Jones v. Crisis Intervention Service

Filing

NOT PRECEDENTIAL PER CURIAM OPINION Coram: SHWARTZ, NYGAARD and FISHER, Circuit Judges. Total Pages: 3. CLD-191

Case: 17-1584

Document: 003112597281

Page: 1

CLD-191

Date Filed: 04/19/2017

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 17-1584
___________
MATTHEW JONES,
Appellant
v.
CRISIS INTERVENTION SERVICES, Southern Delaware;
DELAWARE STATE POLICE
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civil No. 1:16-cv-00005)
District Judge: Honorable Richard G. Andrews
____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
April 13, 2017
Before: SHWARTZ, NYGAARD and FISHER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: April 19, 2017)
_________
OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

Case: 17-1584

Document: 003112597281

Page: 2

Date Filed: 04/19/2017

Proceeding pro se, Mathew Jones filed this civil rights action against Crisis
Intervention Services (“CIS”) and the Delaware State Police (collectively, “Defendants”).
Jones supplemented his pleading with a document titled “Amendment to Complaint
Form: Additional Page(s).” We refer to those filings together as “the Complaint.”
Jones alleged in the Complaint that he has been “feloniously” diagnosed with
schizophrenia. He alleged further that on December 12, 2015, employees of Defendants
arrived at Jones’s home, placed him in handcuffs, and transported him to a 24-hour crisis
center operated by CIS. Jones alleged that CIS has since 1986 (his birth year) taken him
“away for lengths of time where I am forced to ingest drugs that make me very ill and
cause terrible allergic reactions.” Jones requested $175,000,000 in damages.1
Defendants jointly moved to dismiss Jones’s pleading under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b),
and to quash subpoenas Jones had served on two private physicians. Jones filed motions
for summary judgment and leave to amend the Complaint.
The District Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, and then denied Jones’s
motion for summary judgment as moot. It determined that Defendants—as arms of the
State of Delaware—both were immune from suit for damages under the Eleventh
Amendment. The District Court also determined that Jones failed to state a viable claim
under § 1983, based on Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 69
(1989) (the State is not a “person” subject to § 1983). Given those determinations, the
District Court denied on futility grounds Jones’s motion for leave to amend. Finally, the

1

Jones attached to the Complaint exhibits indicating, among other things, that CIS is an
agency of the State of Delaware.
2

Case: 17-1584

Document: 003112597281

Page: 3

Date Filed: 04/19/2017

District Court offered an advisory opinion on Defendants’ motion to quash, stating that
“were the case going forward, the Court would need to deny Defendants’ motion.”
Jones timely appealed.2 We will summarily affirm because the appeal presents no
substantial question. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. We agree with the District
Court’s disposition of Defendants’ motion to dismiss. See P. R. Aqueduct and Sewer
Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993) (“Absent waiver, neither a State
nor agencies acting under its control may ‘be subject to suit in federal court’ under the
Eleventh Amendment”) (citation omitted); see also Will, 491 U.S. at 69; Robinson v.
Danberg, 729 F. Supp. 2d 666, 675 (D. Del. 2010). And we therefore find no abuse of
discretion in the District Court’s denial of leave to amend. Cf. Great W. Mining &
Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 175 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Under Rule
15(a), futility of amendment is a sufficient basis to deny leave to amend.”).3

2

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the District Court’s
grant of Defendants’ motion to dismiss. See Maliandi v. Montclair State Univ., 845 F.3d
77, 82 (3d Cir. 2016); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2009).
We review for abuse of discretion its denial of Jones’s motion for leave to amend. See
U.S. ex rel. Schumann v. AstraZeneca Pharm. L.P., 769 F.3d 837, 849 (3d Cir. 2014).
3

We can only speculate that the District Court opined on Defendants’ motion to quash
subpoenas—a motion that it correctly recognized was moot—because Jones is a prolific
litigant with an almost singular focus on his own mental health. Whatever the District
Court’s motivation, we note for future reference that it “may not render an advisory
opinion.” Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 149 (3d Cir. 2009).
3