Matthew Jones v. Crisis Intervention Service

Filing

NOT PRECEDENTIAL PER CURIAM OPINION Coram: SHWARTZ, NYGAARD and FISHER, Circuit Judges. Total Pages: 3. CLD-192

Case: 17-1585

Document: 003112597329

Page: 1

CLD-192

Date Filed: 04/19/2017

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 17-1585
___________
MATTHEW JONES,
Appellant
v.
CRISIS INTERVENTION SERVICES
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civil No. 1:16-cv-00410)
District Judge: Honorable Richard G. Andrews
____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
April 13, 2017
Before: SHWARTZ, NYGAARD and FISHER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: April 19, 2017)
_________
OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM
Proceeding pro se, Mathew Jones filed suit against Crisis Intervention Services
(“CIS”) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware. Listing five separate

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

Case: 17-1585

Document: 003112597329

Page: 2

Date Filed: 04/19/2017

incidents in 2015, Jones claimed that CIS, among other purportedly unlawful acts, falsely
diagnosed him with mental illnesses, improperly removed Jones from his home, and
administered medication to him without consent.1 For a cause of action, Jones relied on
state tort law, federal criminal statutes, and the First and Eighth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution. For relief, Jones sought “$1,00,000 [sic].”
CIS moved to dismiss Jones’s pleading under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). Jones then
filed a motion for summary judgment.
The District Court granted CIS’s motion and dismissed Jones’s complaint,
determining that, insofar as Jones intended to raise constitutional claims, CIS was a state
agency and was thus immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. The District
Court determined that, insofar as Jones intended to raise state tort law or other nonconstitutional claims, subject matter jurisdiction was lacking because the parties were
non-diverse and no federal question was at issue. The District Court rejected Jones’s
attempt to use federal criminal statutes as a basis for subject matter jurisdiction. In
addition, the District Court determined that permitting Jones leave to amend would be
futile. The District Court denied Jones’s motion for summary judgment as moot. This
timely appealed followed.2

1

There appears to be some factual overlap between this action and others recently filed
by Jones. See, e.g. Jones v. Crisis Intervention Services, CA No. 17-1584 (3d Cir.).
2

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the District Court’s
grant of CIS’s motion to dismiss. See Maliandi v. Montclair State Univ., 845 F.3d 77, 82
(3d Cir. 2016); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2009).
2

Case: 17-1585

Document: 003112597329

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Date Filed: 04/19/2017

We will summarily affirm because the appeal presents no substantial question.
See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. We agree with the District Court’s disposition of
CIS’s motion to dismiss. See P. R. Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.,
506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993) (“Absent waiver, neither a State nor agencies acting under its
control may ‘be subject to suit in federal court’ under the Eleventh Amendment”)
(citation omitted); see also Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 69
(1989) (the State is not a “person” subject to § 1983); Robinson v. Danberg, 729 F. Supp.
2d 666, 675 (D. Del. 2010). We also agree with the District Court that Jones’s citation of
various federal criminal statutes is not a basis for jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to
the extent that Jones sought to impose criminal liability on CIS, because he lacked
standing to do so. See United States v. Friedland, 83 F.3d 1531, 1539 (3d Cir. 1996)
(“[T]he United States Attorney is responsible for the prosecution of all criminal cases
within his or her district.”); see also Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973).
Finally, we find no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s refusal to permit Jones an
opportunity to amend his complaint. Cf. Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox
Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 175 (3d Cir. 2010).

3