Matthew Jones v. Justice of the Peace Court Num

Filing

NOT PRECEDENTIAL PER CURIAM OPINION Coram: CHAGARES, VANASKIE and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges. Total Pages: 4. DLD-295

Case: 17-1848

Document: 003112696739

Page: 1

DLD-295

Date Filed: 08/09/2017

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 17-1848
___________
MATTHEW JONES,
Appellant
v.

JUSTICE OF THE PEACE COURT NUMBER 4, in Sussex County, Delaware
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civil No. 1-16-cv-01306)
District Judge: Honorable Richard G. Andrews
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
June 29, 2017
Before: CHAGARES, VANASKIE and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 9, 2017)
_________
OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

Case: 17-1848

Document: 003112696739

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Date Filed: 08/09/2017

Proceeding pro se, Matthew Jones appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his
lawsuit alleging various criminal and constitutional violations against Justice of the Peace
Court No. 4, in Sussex County, Delaware (“Justice of the Peace Court”). We will affirm.
Jones alleged in his complaint that “a long standing enslavement, malicious
prosecution, fraudulent medical diagnosis, sexual slavery, forced labor, identity theft,
larceny, forgery, assault, attempted murder, rape, pedophilia, and other felonious acts
were committed” as a result of a September 17, 2015 traffic stop when he was ticketed
for using a cell phone while driving. The traffic case was heard in the Justice of the
Peace Court, and was dismissed when the arresting officer did not appear. The complaint
additionally referred to a number of other traffic incidents that occurred between 2002
and 2010, and Jones requested two billion dollars in damages.
The District Court dismissed Jones’s case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
on the grounds that his complaint sought money damages from a defendant who is
immune from suit, did not state a claim, and was also frivolous. The District Court
concluded that the complaint could not be amended to correct its deficiencies, and Jones
timely appealed.1 We will summarily affirm because the appeal presents no substantial
question. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
We agree with the District Court’s dismissal of the suit on the basis that the Justice
of the Peace Court is a Delaware state entity. The Eleventh Amendment provides that

1

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220,
223 (3d Cir. 2000). We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s order
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“[t]he judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI.
The Supreme Court interprets the Eleventh Amendment to protect states as well as their
agencies and departments from suit in federal court. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). A state agency or department is characterized as an
“arm of the state,” and is also entitled to immunity from suit under the Eleventh
Amendment, when a judgment against it “would have had essentially the same practical
consequences as a judgment against the State itself.” Fitchik v. N.J. Transit Rail
Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655, 659 (3d Cir. 1989) (en banc).
Whether an agency is entitled to sovereign immunity is determined by balancing
three factors: (1) whether the payment of the judgment would come from the state
treasury; (2) what status the entity has under state law; and (3) what degree of autonomy
the entity has. Maliandi v. Montclair State Univ., 845 F.3d 77, 83 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing
Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 659).
The Delaware Constitution vests the State’s judicial power in “a Supreme Court, a
Superior Court, a Court of Chancery, a Family Court, a Court of Common Pleas, a
Register’s Court, Justices of the Peace, and such other courts as the General Assembly []
shall have by law established[.]” Del. Const. art. IV § 1 (emphasis added). Moreover,
the constitution provides that “Justices of the Peace [] shall be appointed by the
dismissing the complaint. Id.

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Date Filed: 08/09/2017

Governor, by and with the consent of a majority of all the Members elected to the Senate,
for such terms as shall be fixed this Constitution or by law.” Del. Const. art. IV § 30.
Accordingly, it is clear that the Justice of the Peace Court is not independent of the State
and cannot be regarded as having significant autonomy. See Benn v. First Judicial Dist.
of Pa., 426 F.3d. 233, 239-40 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding that courts established by the
Pennsylvania constitution are part of a unified judicial system and are thus considered
state rather than local agencies) (citing Callahan v. City of Philadelphia., 207 F.3d 668,
672 (3d Cir. 2000)). And, in light of the Justice of the Peace Court’s relationship with the
State, “it is undeniable that [Delaware] is the real party interest in [this] suit and would be
subjected to both indignity and an impermissible risk of legal liability if the suit were
allowed to proceed.” Id. at 241. We, therefore, agree with the District Court that the
Justice of the Peace Court is immune from damages under the Eleventh Amendment.
We also agree with the District Court that Jones failed to state a viable claim
because Delaware is not a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Will v.
Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 69 (1989). Under the circumstances, we see no
abuse of discretion in the District Court’s denial of leave to amend.2 See Grayson v.
Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).

2

We also agree with the District Court’s decision to decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the state-law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
4