In re: John E. Reardon, et al

Filing

NOT PRECEDENTIAL PER CURIAM OPINION Coram: MCKEE, JORDAN and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges. Total Pages: 4. ALD-276

Case: 17-2145

Document: 003112668454

Page: 1

ALD-276

Date Filed: 07/07/2017

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 17-2145
___________
In re: JOHN E. REARDON,
Petitioner
____________________________________
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the
United States District Court for District of New Jersey
(Related to D.N.J. Civ. Nos. 1-15-cv-00244;
1-15-cv-05520 & 1-15-cv-08597)
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.
June 8, 2017
Before: MCKEE, JORDAN, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 7, 2017)
_________
OPINION*
_________

PER CURIAM
John E. Reardon, who is a pro se plaintiff in three separate civil actions pending in
the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, seeks a writ of mandamus
to compel the District Court to take various actions in these cases. For the reasons set
forth below, we will deny the petition.

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

Case: 17-2145

Document: 003112668454

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Date Filed: 07/07/2017

I.
Reardon commenced the first action in January 2015 by filing a complaint in the
District Court against the judges and other individuals involved in his divorce and
custody proceedings, which evidently took place over two decades ago. D.N.J. Civ. No.
1-15-cv-00244. Reardon filed at least three motions for default judgment, all of which
the court denied on the ground that Reardon had not complied with Rule 55 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The District Court also denied Reardon’s request for
recusal. This matter is still pending in the District Court.
Next, in July 2015, Reardon commenced a second action in the District of New
Jersey against a different group of judges, court officers, and members of law
enforcement who appear to have been involved in a criminal matter against Reardon in
the early 1990s. D.N.J. Civ. No. 1-15-cv-05520. Reardon sought both a default
judgment and recusal in this case too, but the District Court denied his requests. This
matter is also still pending.
Reardon filed a third complaint in the District Court in December 2015, this time
asserting that he was denied his right to a jury trial when he was fined for various traffic
violations in 1988. D.N.J. Civ. No. 1-15-cv-08597. Reardon’s efforts to obtain a default
judgment and recusal failed in this case as well. The District Court subsequently granted
the defendants’ motion to dismiss, but Reardon’s motion for reconsideration of the
dismissal order is still pending.
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Reardon now petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the District
Court to enter a default judgment in his first two cases, and to “declare void” the District
Judge’s orders denying his requests for recusal in all three.
II.
We will deny the petition. Mandamus is a drastic remedy that is granted in only
extraordinary cases. In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir.
2005). To demonstrate that mandamus is appropriate, petitioners must establish that they
have “no other adequate means” to obtain the relief requested, and that they have a “clear
and indisputable” right to issuance of the writ. Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d
Cir. 1996). Mandamus may not be used as a substitute for appeal. See In re Diet Drugs
Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d at 378-79.
To the extent that Reardon asks us to compel the District Court to grant his
motions for default judgment in D.N.J. Civ. Nos. 1-15-cv-00244 and -05520, mandamus
relief is unavailable because he may obtain appellate review of the District Court’s orders
once these cases are finally resolved. See In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 353 F.3d 211, 219
(3d Cir. 2003) (“If, in effect, an appeal will lie, mandamus will not.”); Adult Film Ass’n
of Am., Inc., v. Thetford, 776 F.2d 113, 115 (5th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he district court’s denial
of [plaintiff’s] motion for a default judgment can be reviewed on appeal from the court’s
final judgment on the merits.”). Similarly, Reardon may not use mandamus as a
substitute for an appeal to challenge the District Court’s orders denying his requests for
recusal in D.N.J. Civ. Nos. 1-15-cv-00244, -055201, or -08597.
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To the extent that Reardon seeks recusal directly through mandamus, we will deny
the request. “The test for recusal under § 455(a) is whether a reasonable person, with
knowledge of all the facts, would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might be
reasonably questioned.” In re Kensington, 353 F.3d at 220. Although Reardon argues
that the District Court’s decisions in his three cases demonstrate bias, he does not point to
anything in the record that would lead a reasonable person to agree.
III.
Accordingly, we will deny the mandamus petition.

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