US v. Dion Montreal Coxton

Filing 920081119

Opinion

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-4239

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. DION MONTREAL COXTON, Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, Jr., Chief District Judge. (3:04-cr-00248)

Submitted:

October 20, 2008

Decided:

November 19, 2008

Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Robert L. Cooper, COOPER, DAVIS & COOPER, Fayetteville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM: Dion Montreal Coxton was convicted of: possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; possession with intent to

distribute cocaine, cocaine base, and marijuana; and using or carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking offense. sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 150 months. appeals. He was

Coxton now

His attorney has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), raising one issue but stating that there are no meritorious issues for appeal. filed a pro se brief raising additional issues. Coxton has

We affirm.

In the Anders brief, counsel argues that the district court improperly denied Coxton's motion to suppress statements made to the police because Coxton received inadequate warnings under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). When considering

a district court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we review the court's factual findings for clear error and its legal

conclusions de novo. (4th Cir. 2008).

United States v. Cain, 524 F.3d 477, 481

Here, the court found that Coxton was properly advised of his Miranda rights on March 11, 2004, and was advised the following day that he "still had Miranda rights." These

findings are not clearly erroneous.

They are supported by the

testimony of Detective Paul Conner and Officer Scott Sherwood, which the court credited over Coxton's testimony. 2 Further, we

find no infirmity in the court's legal conclusion that Coxton voluntarily, prior to intelligently, a statement Miranda and on knowingly March 12. waived his rights he was

making that

Notably,

reminded

the

warnings

administered

twelve

hours

earlier still applied, the same detective questioned Coxton on March 11 and March 12, Coxton did not hesitate to make his statement, and there were no unusually intimidating or coercive circumstances involved. Cf. United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d

241, 244-47 (3rd Cir. 2005). The claims raised in Coxton's pro se brief lack merit. First, his claim that counsel was ineffective is not cognizable on direct appeal because ineffectiveness does not conclusively appear on the face of the record. He should raise this claim, See United Cir. 1999). See

if at all, in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion. States v. Richardson, 195 F.3d 192, 198 (4th

Second, we discern no plain error in a license checkpoint.

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-43 (1993) (stating standard of review); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37-38 (2000) licenses ("roadblock and with the purpose of verifying would be

drivers'

vehicle

registrations

permissible"). We have examined the entire record in this case in accordance with the requirements of Anders, and we find no

meritorious issues for appeal. 3

Accordingly, we affirm.

This

court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further filed, review. but If the client requests such a that a petition would be be

counsel

believes

that

petition

frivolous, counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel's motion must state that a copy of We dispense with oral

the motion was served on the client.

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED

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