US v. Walter Hawes
Filing
920090130
Opinion
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4181
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. WALTER ROBERT HAWES, Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, District Judge. (2:05-cr-00267-PMD)
Argued:
October 31, 2008
Decided:
January 30, 2009
Before WILKINSON and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and Martin K. REIDINGER, United States District Judge for the Western District of North Carolina, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Reidinger wrote opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Gregory joined.
the
ARGUED: John Robert Haley, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellant. Michael Rhett DeHart, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Reginald I. Lloyd, United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
REIDINGER, District Judge: After pleading guilty to the charge of identity fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1028(a)(7) and (b)(1)(D) (West 2000 & Supp. 2008), the Defendant Walter Robert Hawes was sentenced to 120 months' imprisonment. Hawes appeals, arguing that his
sentence is substantively unreasonable. discretion by the district court, we affirm.
Finding no abuse of
I. In 1995, Hawes was one of four roommates sharing a house in Charleston, South Carolina. After he abruptly moved out, it was
discovered that Hawes had stolen the Social Security card, birth certificate, and personal checks of one of his roommates, Robert Burke, and had It cashed was from those checks, receiving that Gary Hawes approximately had stolen and had
$2,000.00. personal
also
discovered roommate,
checks
another
Elliot,
cashed those checks, receiving approximately $1,800.00. After stealing the personal checks of his roommates, Hawes fled to North Carolina, where he obtained a driver's license in Burke's name using the stolen birth certificate and Social
Security card. medical bills,
While in North Carolina, Hawes incurred unpaid credit card debt, telephone bills, and cable
bills in Burke's name.
Using Burke's identity, Hawes married a
woman in North Carolina, fathered a child, and incurred child 2
support obligations. and moved back to
Hawes subsequently abandoned this family South Carolina, where he fathered another
child, still using Burke's identity.
When Hawes defaulted on
his child support obligations in North Carolina, there was an attempt to garnish Burke's wages for the child support
obligations incurred by Hawes using Burke's identity. Hawes used Burke's identity for more than a decade, and in the process, destroyed Burke's credit record. At the sentencing
hearing, Burke testified that he could never clean up his credit report because once he corrected it, "new things would pop up all the time. So it was a never-ending nightmare." J.A. 45.
Burke and his wife suffered substantial inconvenience and stress related to repairing his damaged credit record. Burke
testified that collection agencies have been calling him for over a decade for unpaid bills that Hawes incurred in his name. Burke testified that for several years, these calls occurred on a daily basis. Burke stated that collection agencies "aren't
kind people" and that they did not believe him when he told them that he was a victim of identity theft. J.A. 45-46. As a
result, he testified, "it was impossible to stop that nightmare from happening. It was an incessant, over and over, daily
matter that happened for a decade."
J.A. 46.
Burke testified that due to his ruined credit history, he had to pay 22 percent interest 3 for an automobile loan, far
higher than he should have paid given his actual credit history. He further testified that he had to pay higher interest for credit cards and that he could not be the primary borrower on his home mortgage. Burke's credit history was so damaged that
he was forced to obtain a new Social Security number from the Social Security Administration. Using Burke's identity, Hawes was convicted of at least three felonies and was incarcerated in state prison. Burke
testified that he was once denied a job because of the criminal record that Hawes he had lost compiled a job in his name. at Burke another further company
testified
that
opportunity
which paid $20,000 more per year than his position at the time because the company's background check revealed the crimes that Hawes had committed using Burke's identity. Burke testified
that this criminal record had "a chilling effect on my career over the past ten years because I'm afraid to leave jobs." 50. get J.A.
Burke testified that he was forced to travel to Raleigh to fingerprinted, and state authorities had to compare his
fingerprints to the fingerprints on every arrest record that Hawes had compiled in his name. Despite Burke's efforts, his
current job at Bank of America was delayed for more than one month because of this erroneous criminal record. In November 2004, the Secret Service located Hawes in
Ladson, South Carolina.
Hawes initially identified himself to 4
the
Secret
Service
as
Robert and
Burke,
and
he
provided as proof
Burke's of his
Social
Security
card
birth
certificate to
identity. identity. because he
Ultimately,
Hawes
confessed
stealing
Burke's
He explained that he had assumed Burke's identity previously had testified for the state in an
attempted murder trial and he was scared. the interview, and the agents he would advised receive Hawes a
At the conclusion of that he to would appear be for
indicted
that
summons
arraignment. Following his indictment in March 2005, Hawes absconded. While a fugitive, Hawes continued to use Burke's identity,
incurring over $4,000 in unpaid medical bills in Burke's name. Hawes committed additional identity theft by stealing the Social Security card and birth certificate of his employer's son, Eric Beltz. Using this stolen information, Hawes obtained a Georgia
driver's license and incurred more than $5,000 in credit card debt in Beltz's name. In July 2006, Hawes was arrested by state authorities for the theft of Beltz's identity. At the time of his arrest, Hawes
was living in Summerville, South Carolina, with his common law spouse, numerous Angel Sollars. A search through jewelry, of the residence revealed air
items
procured clothing,
fraud, tools,
including and
conditioners, appliances.
electronic
In an interview with the Secret Service following 5
his arrest, Hawes stated that he knew he was wanted by law enforcement, but he fled because he was afraid of going to jail. During this interview, agents described the harm that his
identity theft had caused Burke.
Hawes responded that Burke J.A. 62.
"didn't have a very good life to begin with."
II. On September 13, 2006, Hawes entered his plea of guilty to the indictment. A Presentence Report (PSR) was prepared, and
based upon a criminal history category of V and an offense level of 12, the appropriate advisory Guidelines range was calculated to be 27 to 33 months' imprisonment. In the PSR, the probation
officer recommended an upward departure from the Guidelines or an upward variance under 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 &
Supp. 2008). the PSR. Arguing
Hawes did not file objections to any portion of
that
Hawes'
acts
of
identity
theft
caused
substantial harm and inconvenience to his victim, the government moved for an upward departure based upon Application Note 19 of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 (2005). The government also moved for an
upward variance, arguing that the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) merited a sentence greater than the Guidelines range. At testimony the sentencing two of hearing, Hawes' the district Robert court and heard Eric
from
victims, 6
Burke
Beltz, as well as Secret Service Agent Phil Carter.
During his
testimony, Burke provided the district court with a detailed list of all unpaid credit accounts obtained by Hawes that have appeared on Burke's credit reports, as well as a calculation of the additional interest Burke has had to pay as a result of his poor credit rating resulting from the identity theft. estimated that these unpaid bills and additional Burke interest
payments amounted to $18,541.00, although he noted that this figure did not include the cost he had incurred in investigating the identity theft. Burke estimated that he has spent J.A.
"thousands of hours" trying to repair his credit record. 46. Beltz testified that his parents had employed
Hawes
to
perform work on several rental houses.
He testified that Hawes
had gained his parents' trust over the years, and that they had provided Hawes and his girlfriend financial assistance and had showered them with gifts. Beltz testified that Hawes stole his
identity for approximately two months and incurred approximately $8,000 in credit card debt. Beltz testified that because his
Social Security card is still missing, he has to "keep constant check on my credit report. pain." At J.A. 68. the sentencing hearing, the district court notified And it's just been a pain. A big
Hawes that it was "strongly considering" an upward departure 7
and/or variance, and the court continued the hearing to allow the parties time to brief the issue. J.A. 38. Following the
submission of briefs by both parties, the district court held a second counsel, sentencing the hearing. court an After hearing that arguments it to found be from the
district motion for
announced
government's
upward
departure
"clearly
warranted" pursuant to Application Note 19 of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. J.A. 94. Specifically, the district court found that Hawes had
caused substantial harm and inconvenience to Burke: To say that the victim in this case suffered substantial inconvenience is so understated, it would almost be laughable. Inconvenience doesn't begin to describe what . . . the victim suffered at the hands of this defendant. Not only was his reputation and credit not repaired, they were destroyed, so much so that the victim, Mr. Burke, after years and hours of harassing telephone calls, trips to Raleigh, North Carolina, identifying fingerprints to separate himself from the crimes committed by the defendant, ultimately [had] to get up and get a new social security number because he could never, ever repair his credit record. J.A. 95. The district court further found that Hawes had
committed crimes in Burke's name, "to such a degree that the people in the prison system, the lawful authorities dealing with him, didn't even known that he was doing so in the victim's name and identity." J.A. 96. Finally, the district court found that
not only had Hawes assumed Burke's identity, he had, through his acts of theft, managed to "live[] the victim's life more fully than the victim did," and the court noted that it did not know
8
"of a single case that could be more egregious in that regard . . . ." Id.
Having concluded that an upward departure was warranted, the district court found that there was still "a need for an upward variance in this case, simply because the facts are so unusual and so aggravating." J.A. 94. Upon reviewing the
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district court found the need for deterrence, the need for punishment, and the need to protect the public from future crimes to be significant factors in favor of an upward variance. Of particular import to
the district court was the fact that Hawes continued to use Burke's identity and stole the identity of another victim
following his indictment.
In the district court's view, these In the are
actions demonstrated a lack of remorse or contrition. end, the district resources court in concluded, the federal "I don't arsenal think to
there
enough
accomplish
[rehabilitation] with this defendant.
But what I do know is the
longer he's incarcerated, the fewer opportunities he'll have to do this to anyone else." J.A. 99. Accordingly, the district
court sentenced Hawes to a term of imprisonment of 120 months. This appeal followed.
9
III. A. In United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738, 160 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2005), the Supreme Court invalidated both 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), and 18 which made the Sentencing required Guidelines appellate from the
mandatory, courts to
U.S.C. a de
§ 3742(e), novo review
which of
conduct
departures
Guidelines. the Booker
543 U.S. at 260-62, 125 S. Ct. 738. decision, the Guidelines are now
As a result of advisory, and
appellate courts are limited to reviewing sentencing decisions to determine whether such sentences are "reasonable." Gall v.
United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 594, 169 L. Ed. 2d 445 (2007). As the Supreme Court has made clear, the "appellate
`reasonableness' review" required by Booker "merely asks whether the trial court abused its discretion." Rita v. United States,
127 S. Ct. 2456, 2465, 168 L. Ed. 2d 203 (2007). Although the Guidelines are no longer mandatory, they
remain "the starting point and the initial benchmark" for any sentencing decision. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 596. Thus, in making
a sentencing determination, the district court should begin by calculating Supreme the applicable Guidelines the range. Id. As the
Court a
has
recognized,
advisory of
Guidelines that
range might
"reflect[s]
rough
approximation
sentences
achieve § 3553(a)'s objectives." 10
Kimbrough v. United
States,
128 S. Ct. 558, 574, 169 L. Ed. 2d 481 (2007). using the advisory Congress' Guidelines desire for range as a
Consequently, point and
"starting
furthers
efficient
administration
nationwide consistency in sentencing." 511 F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 2007).
United States v. Pauley,
Once the appropriate Guidelines range has been calculated, the district court should give the parties "an opportunity to argue for whatever sentence they deem appropriate." S. Ct. at 596. Gall, 128
The district court then should consider the
factors set forth in § 3553(a) to determine whether such factors support the sentence requested by either party. Id. Those
factors are as follows: (1) "the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant"; (2) "the need for the sentence imposed (A) to reflect the
seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment to for the offense; (C) (B) to to afford the
adequate
deterrence
criminal
conduct;
protect
public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most
effective manner"; (3) "the kinds of sentences available"; (4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for "the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines" in effect 11
at the time of sentencing; (5) "any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission" which is in effect at the time of sentencing; (6) "the need to avoid unwarranted sentence
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct"; and (7) "the need to provide restitution § 3553(a). to any victims of the offense." 18 U.S.C.A.
The statute further requires the sentencing court to
"impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection." Id.
In determining the appropriate sentence, the district court "may Gall, not 128 presume S. Ct. that at the Guidelines Rita, 127 range S. is reasonable." at 2465 ("In
596-97;
Ct.
determining the merits of these arguments, the sentencing court does not enjoy the benefit of a legal presumption that the
Guidelines sentence should apply."). make an individualized and determine assessment, whether a
Rather, the court must based sentence upon the facts of the
presented,
outside
Guidelines is warranted.
Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597.
If the
district court decides to impose a non-Guidelines sentence, the court then "must consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance." Id. In Gall, the Supreme Court found
12
"it uncontroversial that a major departure should be supported by a more significant justification than a minor one." Id.
As the last step of the sentencing process, the district court must provide an adequate explanation of its sentencing decision "to allow for meaningful appellate review and to
promote the perception of fair sentencing." court "must give serious consideration to
Id. the
The district extent of any
departure from the Guidelines and must explain his conclusion that an unusually in lenient a Id. or an unusually case harsh with its sentence is
appropriate
particular at 594. is In not
sufficient sentencing each
justifications." decision, a
explaining required to
district
court
"discuss
factor set forth in § 3553(a) in checklist fashion"; rather, "it is enough to calculate the range accurately and explain why (if the sentence lies outside it) this defendant deserves more or less." United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 432-33 (4th
Cir. 2006)(quoting United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). On appeal, this Court reviews the reasonableness of the sentence imposed, whether the sentence is inside or outside the Guidelines standard." range, "under a deferential abuse-of-discretion
United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 260 (4th
Cir. 2008) (quoting Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 591), pet. for cert. filed, 77 U.S.L.W. 3242 (Oct. 6, 2008). 13 This review involves
two
steps.
First,
we
must
examine
the
sentence
for
"significant" procedural errors, such as "failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines factors, as mandatory, a failing to consider on the § 3553(a) erroneous
selecting
sentencing
based
clearly
facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence including an explanation of the Guidelines range." Ct. at 597. If the district court's decision is procedurally sound, we then consider whether the sentencing decision is substantively reasonable. In conducting this review, we must "take into Gall, 128 S.
account the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range." approach, role." the applicable guidelines range Id. plays "Under this an important
Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 261. range, we may
If the sentence is within the that the sentence is
Guidelines
presume
reasonable, although such a presumption is not required. 128 S. Ct. at 597. range, however,
Gall,
If the sentence is outside of the Guidelines we "may Id. not "To apply a presumption would of
unreasonableness."
hold
otherwise
fatally
undermine the Court's holding in Booker." 473. In reviewing a non-Guidelines
Pauley, 511 F.3d at the appellate
sentence,
court "may consider the extent of the deviation, but must give due deference to the district 14 court's decision that the
§ 3553(a) variance." reached alone a
factors,
on
a
whole,
justify
the
extent
of
the
Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597. different sentencing to result
"Even if we would have on our own, of the this fact
is
`insufficient
justify
reversal
district
court.'" 597). As
Pauley, 511 F.3d at 474 (quoting Gall, 128 S. Ct. at
always,
when
considering
the
reasonableness
of
a
sentence, we review the district court's legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. F.3d at 261. Abu Ali, 528
B. The first step in our review of Hawes' sentence is a
determination of whether there were any significant procedural errors. Hawes concedes that the district court committed no
procedural errors in determining his sentence. 1
The parties are
in agreement that the district court properly calculated the We note that the district court did not offer Hawes an opportunity to allocute until after the court began to impose sentence. Failure to afford a defendant the opportunity to allocate is reversible error where it can be shown that an exercise of the right of allocution could have resulted in a lesser sentence. See United States v. Muhammad, 478 F.3d 247, 249-50 (4th Cir. 2007). Hawes does not challenge this aspect of his sentencing, however, and therefore, we consider this issue to have been waived on appeal.
1
15
Guidelines range to be 27 to 33 months' imprisonment.
Upon
calculating the applicable Guidelines range, the district court advised Hawes that it was considering an upward variance and/or departure and afforded the parties ample opportunity to argue their respective positions on the issue. The district court
then considered the relevant Guideline departure provisions and the § 3553(a) sentencing factors and determined that the unique facts and circumstances of the case were sufficiently compelling to justify a sentence outside of the Guidelines. 2 district sentencing court provided an adequate its oral Further, the of its the
explanation remarks
decision
through
during
sentencing hearing.
Accordingly, we conclude that the sentence
imposed on Hawes was procedurally sound.
C. Having found no significant procedural errors, we now must determine whether the sentence is substantively reasonable.
While this Court previously has required a sentencing court to calculate a Guidelines departure sentence before considering the imposition of a variance sentence, see Moreland, 437 F.3d at 432, this two-step process no longer appears necessary under Gall, which merely requires the sentencing court to "consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling" to support a nonGuidelines sentence. 128 S. Ct. at 597.
2
16
Since district
Booker, court's
the
Supreme
Court
has are
stressed entitled
that to
the due
sentencing
decisions
deference and should be overturned only where the district court has abused its discretion. 128 S. Ct. at 597. proposition that the See Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2465; Gall,
In Gall, the Supreme Court rejected the district court must apply a heightened
standard of review to sentences outside the Guidelines range. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 595. rejected any rule that In so doing, the Court explicitly would require "extraordinary"
circumstances to justify a sentence outside the Guidelines range or which would use a "rigid mathematical formula" as a "standard for determining the strength of the justifications required for a specific sentence." Id. The Court stressed that "the abuse-
of-discretion standard of review applies to appellate review of all sentencing decisions whether inside or outside the
Guidelines range." This
Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 596 (emphasis added). standard of review requires appellate
deferential
courts to recognize that, for any given case, there is a range of permissible sentences which may be deemed substantively
reasonable.
"[T]here is not a single reasonable sentence but, Consequently, reversal
rather, a range of reasonable sentences.
will result if and only if the sentencing court's ultimate determination universe." falls outside the expansive boundaries of that
United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 17
2008) (citation omitted).
"A sentencing court abuses or exceeds
its discretion when its decision . . . cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions." United States v. Cutler,
520 F.3d 136, 157 (2d Cir. 2008)) (quoting United States v. Canova, 485 F.3d 674, 679-80 (2d Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because there is a range of permissible
outcomes for any given case, an appellate court must resist the temptation to "pick and choose" among possible sentences and rather must "defer to the district court's judgment so long as it falls within the realm of these rationally available
choices."
United States v. McComb, 519 F.3d 1049, 1053 (10th
Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1917, 170 L. Ed. 2d 778 (2008); see also United States v. Carter, 538 F.3d 784, 790 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting substantive reasonableness "contemplates a
range, not a point"). Appellate district courts also "must that give due deference factors, to the a
court's
decision
the
§ 3553(a)
on
whole, justify the extent of the variance." 597.
Gall, 128 S. Ct. at
Such deference is justified because a district judge "is
in a superior position to find facts and judge their import under § 3553(a) in the individual case. The judge sees and
hears the evidence, makes credibility determinations, has full knowledge of the facts and gains insights not conveyed by the record." Id. "It is not for the Court of Appeals to decide de 18
novo whether the justification for a variance is sufficient or the sentence reasonable." Id. at 602.
Of course, the high degree of deference afforded a district court's sentencing decision did does not render a appellate regime of review total
meaningless.
"Gall
not
substitute
unreviewability for the fallen regime of Guidelines rigidity." Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 266. As this Court stated in Moreland, 437
"`reasonableness' is not a code-word for `rubber stamp.'" F.3d at 433. reasonableness
"The `totality of the circumstances' substantive calculus demands that we proceed beyond a
formalistic review of whether the district court recited and reviewed caters retains the § 3553(a) factors and ensure of that a the sentence yet
to a
the
individual of
circumstances consistency
defendant,
semblance
with
similarly
situated
defendants."
Evans, 526 F.3d at 167 (Gregory, J., concurring).
Such review is to ensure that the district court has not merely provided "lip service" to the § 3553(a) factors, but rather has given reasonable weight to such factors as the individual
circumstances of the case require, so as to achieve the purposes of sentencing as set forth in § 3553(a), and has not given
weight to improper factors.
With these principles in mind, we
now turn to the sentence imposed upon Hawes in the present case.
19
D. 1. In his appellate brief, Hawes first contends that the
district court erred in failing to justify adequately the extent of its departure from the top of the applicable Guidelines
range.
Specifically, Hawes relies upon United States v. Dalton,
477 F.3d 195 (4th Cir. 2007), in support of his argument that the district court failed to adopt an incremental approach
through the criminal history categories or offense levels to reach the appropriate sentence. In Dalton, this Court remanded for re-sentencing on the grounds that the district court in upwardly departing from the Guidelines range did not "employ the incremental approach This
dictated by [U.S.S.G.] § 4A1.3(a)(4)(B)." Guidelines provision governs upward
Id. at 199. from
departures
Criminal
History Category VI and requires district courts to "structure the departure by moving incrementally down the sentencing table to the next higher offense level in Criminal History Category VI until it finds the guidelines range appropriate to the case." Id. Dalton is not binding in the present case, however, as the
district court which sentenced Hawes did not base its decision for upward departure upon § 4A1.3(a)(4)(B), nor was Hawes within Criminal History Category VI. As such, Hawes' reliance on
Dalton is simply misplaced. 20
2. Hawes further argues in his brief to this Court that the district court's sentence is "unreasonable on its face" because the variance imposed was 264% above the applicable Guidelines range. The Supreme Court in Gall, however, explicitly rejected
the use of such a "rigid mathematical formula . . . as the standard for determining the strength of the justifications Thus, the
required for a specific sentence." the fact that a sentence is 200%,
128 S. Ct. at 595. or even 300%,
above
Guidelines range does not render a sentence unreasonable per se. Rather, as the Supreme Court instructed, the relevant inquiry is whether the justification for such deviation is "sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance." As such, the fact that Hawes' sentence was well Id. at 597. above the
Guidelines' range, while relevant, does not of itself render the district court's decision substantively unreasonable.
3. Finally, Hawes argues that the district court's sentence creates convicted an of unwarranted similar disparity and among that similar defendants is so
crimes,
this
disparity
severe that it requires that his sentence be vacated.
In so
arguing, Hawes points this Court to a recent data report of the Sentencing Commission detailing the median sentence and median 21
departure in identity fraud cases nationwide since the Supreme Court's decisions in Gall and Kimbrough. The fact that Hawes'
sentence may be more severe than the average sentence imposed in identity fraud cases nationally does not establish that the
district court's sentence in the present case failed to address the "need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities" recognized in § 3553(a)(6). is That is not to to the say that statistical calculus;
information
never
relevant
sentencing
indeed, it is precisely this type of information - the typical sentencing range for the typical defendant charged with a
particular offense -- which the Sentencing Guidelines themselves seek to provide. for every type "[B]y devising a recommended sentencing range of misconduct and every level of criminal
history, the Guidelines as a whole embrace `the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.'" United
States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 343 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6)). The particular determination case requires of an an appropriate sentence assessment in of any the
individualized
facts and circumstances presented by that particular defendant. While Hawes argues that the Court should consider statistical data regarding the median sentence imposed on defendants
convicted of similar crimes in reviewing his sentence, such data 22
does
not
provide
the
particulars
of
the
defendants
who
were
sentenced and the crimes they committed.
As such, this data
does not provide the information necessary to determine whether the defendants who received such sentences are truly comparable to the defendant at hand. As this Court found in United States
v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210 (4th Cir. 2008), a defendant should be compared only to other defendants with similar circumstances and histories. determine Id. the at 267. Because and the Court of cannot each possibly
circumstances
histories
individual
defendant whose sentences comprise this statistical information, the assignment of dispositive weight to this type of data would be antithetical to the notion of the individualized assessment required for fashioning an appropriate sentence for a particular defendant. In imposing Hawes' sentence, the district court calculated the advisory Guidelines range, but ultimately concluded that
this case fell "outside the heartland" of those cases to which the advisory Guidelines range was intended to apply. 127 S. Ct. at 2465. See Rita,
Indeed, the district court found that this
case warranted both a departure under Application Note 19 of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 and a variance under § 3553(a). Application
Note 19 provides that an upward departure may be warranted in an identity fraud case where:
23
(I)
The offense caused substantial harm to the victim's reputation or credit record, or the victim suffered a substantial inconvenience related to repairing the victim's reputation or a damaged credit record. An individual whose means of identification the defendant used to obtain unlawful means of identification is erroneously arrested or denied a job because an arrest record has been made in that individual's name. The defendant produced or obtained numerous means of identification with respect to one individual and essentially assumed that individual's identity. As the district court
(II)
(III)
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, app. note 19(A)(vi).
properly found, all three elements were clearly satisfied in this case. First, there can be no doubt that Hawes' actions of
identity fraud caused substantial harm and inconvenience to his victim. In the more than ten years during which Hawes stole
Burke's identity, Hawes incurred unpaid medical bills, credit card debt, telephone in and bills, name, cable all bills, of and child harmed record support Burke's was so
obligations reputation
Burke's credit
which credit
record.
Burke's
damaged that Burke was forced to obtain a new Social Security number. Burke testified extensively regarding the substantial and stress he suffered as a result of Hawes'
inconvenience conduct.
Burke testified that he could never completely clean
up his credit report because "new things would pop up all the
24
time.
So
it
was
a
never-ending
nightmare."
J.A.
45.
He
described how "the collection agencies became the worst," as they continued to call him for over ten years for the unpaid bills that Hawes incurred in his name. J.A. 45-46. Burke
testified that for several years, collection agencies called him at home and at work on a daily basis. Burke estimated that he
spent "thousands of hours" trying to repair his credit record. J.A. 46. Hawes' actions also caused his victim financial hardship. Burke testified that because his credit was destroyed, he had to pay 22 percent interest for a car loan, far higher than he should have paid. Burke further testified that he had to pay
higher interest on credit cards, and he could not be the primary borrower on his home mortgage. Based upon this evidence, the
district court did not err in concluding that Hawes had caused substantial harm and inconvenience to his victim. Second, the evidence establishes that Hawes stole Burke's Social Security card and birth certificate, and that he used these means of identification to obtain a driver's license in Burke's name. Burke's Hawes later committed numerous felonies using and he was arrested, convicted, and
identity,
incarcerated for these crimes.
As a result of the substantial
criminal record incurred in his name, Burke was denied a job opportunity that would have paid him more than $20,000 more per 25
year
than
he that
had the
been
earning
at
the
time. by
Burke Hawes
further had a
testified
criminal
record
compiled
chilling effect on his career over the past ten years because he was afraid to leave jobs. Burke was forced to travel to Raleigh to be fingerprinted so that state authorities could compare his fingerprints to those on every arrest record that Hawes had
caused authorities to open in Burke's name.
Despite Burke's
efforts, his current job at Bank of America was delayed for more than one month due to the existence of this criminal record. Third, the evidence reflects that Hawes obtained numerous means of identification with respect to Burke and essentially assumed his identity for more than a decade. Hawes obtained a Using
driver's license in Burke's name using stolen documents. Burke's identity, Hawes married a woman in North
Carolina, Hawes he
fathered a child, and incurred child support obligations. abandoned this family and moved to South Carolina,
where
fathered another child with another woman while still pretending to be Burke. As Burke testified, "it wasn't a case of him just
stealing my identity to get a credit card and spend[ing] a bunch of money; he took on my identity. shape and form." J.A. 51. He was living as me in every
Based upon these facts, the district court was correct in determining that an upward departure was warranted pursuant to Application Note 19 of § 2B1.1. 26 "When the district court
imposes a non-Guidelines sentence based on a correct application of the Guideline departure provisions, the resulting sentence reflects Commission the judgment a of both the district is court and the
that
non-Guidelines
sentence
appropriate."
Evans, 526 F.3d at 165 n.4. In addition to finding that an upward deviation was
justified pursuant to Application Note 19 of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, the district court found that the § 3553(a) sentencing factors as a whole justified a deviation from the Guidelines in this case. "nature In so finding, the district court considered the specific and circumstances of the offense," 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3553(a)(1). had stolen
Specifically, the district court found that Hawes identity for more than a decade and had this
Burke's
caused time.
Burke
substantial
harm
and
inconvenience
during
The district court further considered the "history and Of particular import to
characteristics of the defendant." Id.
the district court was the fact that Hawes absconded after his indictment. The district court was especially troubled by the
fact that Hawes not only continued to steal Burke's identity while he was a fugitive, but that he also stole the identity of another person. Additionally, when Hawes was finally arrested
and confronted by Secret Service agents, Hawes dismissed the gravity of the harm he had inflicted upon Burke, stating that Burke "didn't have a very good life to begin with." 27 J.A. 62.
The
district
court
found
that
Hawes'
actions
following
his
indictment showed a profound lack of remorse, and that the "need for . . . deterrence in this case is greater than any case I've seen in 11 years on the bench." J.A. 98. The district court
further opined that "[t]here is no rehabilitation possible for [a] person who so disdains his fellow man as to do what he's done over and over and over." J.A. 99.
While Hawes does not contest that the district court was entitled to depart from the Guidelines range in this case, he argues that the extent of the deviation itself was unreasonable. We cannot agree. district court Based upon the unique facts presented, the concluded that a sentence of 120 months'
imprisonment was necessary in order "to promote respect for the law," "to provide just punishment for the offense," "to afford adequate deterrence," and "to protect the public from the We
further crimes of the defendant."
18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(2).
find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in this regard. While we may have imposed a different sentence
than the one chosen by the district court, we cannot say that the decision to impose a sentence of 120 months' imprisonment falls outside the range of rational choices available to the court. See Pauley, 511 F.3d at 474. "Although the deviation
from the Guidelines range in this case clearly is significant, the district court provided `significant justification' for the 28
degree of the deviation, which is all that is required."
Evans,
526 F.3d at 163 (affirming sentence of 125 months for defendant convicted of identity fraud, where sentence constituted 300%
upward deviation from advisory Guidelines range). reasons, we conclude that Hawes' sentence is
For these
substantively
reasonable.
IV. After careful review, we are satisfied that the district court's months' decision to impose was a non-Guidelines sentence of 120 the the
imprisonment
sufficiently we affirm
justified the
under of
circumstances. district court.
Accordingly,
judgment
AFFIRMED
29
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