US v. Brent E. Wood

Filing 920090814

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-4814

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. BRENT EARL WOOD, Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at New Bern. Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge. (5:05-cr-00044-BO)

Submitted:

July 9, 2009

Decided:

August 14, 2009

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Reversed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

George Edward Bell Holding, United States Attorney, Ann Margaret Hayes, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Brent Earl Wood, Cary, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM: The United States appeals from a judgment of acquittal and conditional new trial granted to Brent E. Wood after a jury convicted him of eight charges relating to fraudulent

misrepresentations made to investors in a venture capital fund. The district court found that, despite the jury's verdict, the Government's evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain Wood's convictions. The district court granted Wood a

judgment of acquittal and, in the event of a reversal of this judgment, a new trial. For the following reasons, we reverse

the district court's order, and remand for sentencing. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 provides that a district court "must enter a judgment of acquittal [when] the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction." Fed. R.

Crim. P. 29(a). determining

We review a judgment of acquittal de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most

whether,

favorable to the Government, a rational fact-finder could have found the essential elements of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. (4th Cir. 2008). The elements of substantive mail fraud are: (1) the existence of a scheme to defraud, and (2) the use of mails to perpetrate the scheme. 326 (4th Cir. 2001). United States v. Vinyard, 266 F.3d 320, To establish 2 the first element, the See United States v. Singh, 518 F.3d 236, 246

Government must prove that Wood "acted with the specific intent to defraud, which `may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances United
U

and v.

need

not

be

proven F.3d 659,

by

direct (4th

evidence.'" Cir. 2001)

States

Godwin,

272

666

(quoting United States v. Ham, 998 F.2d 1247, 1254 (4th Cir. 1993)). To Government prove a conspiracy (1) the to commit of mail an fraud, agreement the to

must

prove

existence

commit mail fraud, (2) the defendant's willing participation, and (3) an overt act in furtherance of the agreement. States v. Edwards, 188 F.3d 230, 234 (4th Cir. 1999). United The

Government must show that the defendant acted with a specific intent to defraud, which may be proven with circumstantial

evidence.

United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 858 (4th Cir.

1996) (en banc). To establish a conspiracy to commit money laundering,

the Government must prove (1) the existence of an agreement to commit money laundering, were (2) the defendant from knew the money and

laundering

proceeds

derived

illegal

activity,

(3) the defendant knowingly and voluntarily participated in the conspiracy. Singh, 518 F.3d at 248.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, we find that the Government presented evidence more than sufficient for a rational juror to conclude that Wood 3

acted money.

with

specific

intent

to

defraud therefore

investors erred in

and

launder a

The

district

court

granting

judgment of acquittal. The Government also argues that the district court

erred in conditionally granting Wood a new trial. district court's grant of a new trial for

We review a an abuse of

discretion. Cir. 1997).

United States v. Wilson, 118 F.3d 228, 237 (4th The district court should exercise its discretion

to award a new trial "sparingly," and should only grant a new trial when the evidence weighs so heavily against the verdict that to deny a new trial would be contrary to the "interest of justice." Fed. R. Crim. P. 33; see United States v. Smith, 451

F.3d 209, 216-17 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Campbell, 977 F.2d 854, 860 (4th Cir. 1992). trial, the district court may In deciding a motion for a new consider the credibility of

witnesses and is not required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. Here, the district Campbell, 977 F.2d at 860. failed to explain its

court

decision to grant a new trial, stating only that "the evidence in this case weighs heavily against the verdict." It appears

that the court granted a new trial based on its finding that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. Because we

have concluded that the evidence was sufficient, we must find the grant of a new trial an abuse of discretion. 4

For

the

foregoing

reasons,

we

reverse

the

district

court's judgment of acquittal and its conditional grant of a new trial. We deny Wood's motions to amend the informal brief and

for oral argument, and dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal before contentions the court We are and adequately argument for presented not in aid the the

materials decisional

would further

process.

remand

proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

5