Linda Prince-Garrison v. Maryland Department of Health

Filing 920090313

Opinion

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-1090

LINDA PRINCE-GARRISON, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE, MARYLAND BOARD OF PHARMACY, Defendant ­ Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge. (1:07-cv-01165-CCB)

Submitted:

December 17, 2008

Decided:

March 13, 2009

Before GREGORY and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael J. Snider, Jason I. Weisbrot, SNIDER & ASSOCIATES, LLC, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Douglas F. Gansler, Attorney General of Maryland, John S. Nugent, Assistant Attorney General, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM: Linda Prince-Garrison appeals the district court's

order dismissing her complaint against the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, Maryland and Board of Pharmacy origin

("DHMH")

alleging

race,

gender,

national

discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000) (ATitle VII@), and disability discrimination under the Americans with

Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to 12117 ("ADA") (2000). We conclude Prince-Garrison pled sufficient facts to create a reasonable inference of retaliation. Thus, this claim was

improperly dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. We find the district court properly dismissed

the claims of disparate treatment and hostile work environment. 1 This court reviews de novo a district court's Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissal for failure to state a claim.

DIRECTV, Inc. v. Tolson, 513 F.3d 119, 123 (4th Cir. 2008). "The purpose of of a a Rule 12(b)(6) . . . motion ." is to v. test City the of

sufficiency

complaint

Edwards

Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999).

In ruling on a

12(b)(6) motion, all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint Prince-Garrison concedes on appeal that the district court properly dismissed her age discrimination claim, claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000), and state tort claim.
1

2

are to be taken as true and all reasonable factual inferences are to be drawn in the plaintiff's favor. 244. Edwards, 178 F.3d at

"While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion does

not need detailed factual allegations, [it] requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do.

Factual allegations

must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . ." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, The

1964-65 (2007) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

complaint must contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 1974.

Under the notice pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a "short plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." A

civil rights plaintiff need not plead facts that constitute a prima facie case under U.S. the 792 framework (1973), of in McDonnell to Douglas a

Corp. v.

Green,

411

order

survive

motion to dismiss. 511-15 (2002).

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506,

Nevertheless, the plaintiff retains the burden

to allege facts sufficient to state all the elements of her claim. Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp., 458 F.3d 332,

346-47 (4th Cir. 2006). A plaintiff pursuing a Title VII claim may either

offer direct evidence of discrimination or rely on the burden-- 3

shifting McDonnell

framework Douglas.

that To

was

adopted a

by

the of

Supreme

Court

in

plead

case

disparate

treatment

sufficient to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Prince-Garrison must show: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she has satisfactory job performance; (3) she was subjected to adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated employees outside her class received more favorable treatment. See Holland v.

Washington Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 214 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 955 (2008). Prince-Garrison disparate origin. treatment contends upon that race, she was subject and to

based

gender,

national

The district court properly determined that Prince-

Garrison failed to state a claim of disparate treatment because, by her own description, Prince-Garrison's performance at DHMH was never satisfactory, as she consistently received reports of deficient work performance. In addition, Prince-Garrison did

not plead significant adverse employment actions, in view of the voluntary settlement she entered with DHMH and her voluntary resignation. The such as her other actions complained to of by Prince-Garrison, her with office with not

employer's

failure for

provide

supplies,

reprimands and

insubordination, to attend

meetings do

supervisors,

directions

counseling,

constitute adverse employment actions. 4

See Thompson v. Potomac

Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 651-52 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding that neither "disciplinary nor discussion" prompted by employee's by

insubordination

performance

evaluation

unaccompanied

tangible effects on employment were adverse employment actions for purposes of a retaliation claim under Title VII). The district court also properly dismissed Prince-

Garrison's claim of discriminatory discipline.

This court has

found that to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discipline under Title VII, the plaintiff must show: (1) she is part of a class protected by Title to VII; (2) her by prohibited employees

conduct

was

comparably

serious

misconduct

outside the protected class; and (3) the disciplinary measures taken against her were more harsh than those enforced against other employees. See Cook v. CSX Transp. Corp., 988 F.2d 507, An allegation of discriminatory discipline necessarily require proof of an adverse

511 (4th Cir. 1993). however, does not

employment action.

See Cook, 988 F.2d at 511.

Because Prince-

Garrison failed to identify a fellow employee who engaged in misconduct similar to hers or was disciplined in any way, the district court correctly dismissed this claim. Next, to establish a hostile work environment

harassment claim, Prince-Garrison must show she was subjected to: (1) unwelcome harassment; (2) based on a protected ground; (3) "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions" 5

of her employment and create an abusive work environment; and (4) imputable to her employer. 733, 745-46 (4th Cir. 2006). work environment exists, See Baqir v. Principi, 434 F.3d In determining whether a hostile view the of totality the of the

courts Athe

circumstances,

including

frequency

discriminatory

conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, unreasonably Harris v. or a mere offensive with an utterance; and whether it

interferes

employee=s 510 U.S.

work 17, 23

performance.@ (1993). A

Forklift

Sys.,

Inc.,

defendant must show both that she subjectively perceived her workplace environment as hostile and also that it would be

objectively perceived as hostile or abusive.

Id. at 22.

The district court correctly determined that PrinceGarrison's conclusory allegations of discrimination on the basis of race, gender, and national origin were inadequate to state a claim. Prince-Garrison's complaint did no more than set forth

the legal standard for a hostile work environment and wholly failed to provide factual allegations to support her assertion that such a hostile environment existed at DHMH. Accordingly,

we conclude the district court properly dismissed this claim. Finally, Prince-Garrison contends that the district

court erred in dismissing her retaliation claim.

To establish a

prima facie case of retaliation, Prince-Garrison must prove that she engaged in a protected act, DHMH acted adversely against 6

her, and there is a causal connection between the act and the adverse action. activity within See Holland, 487 F.3d 208, 218. the meaning of Title VII includes Protected opposing

discriminatory practices or participating in any manner in a Title VII investigation, proceeding, or hearing. Kubicko v. The

Ogden Logistics Servs., 181 F.3d 544, 551 (4th Cir. 1999).

adverse action need not be an ultimate employment decision, but must be "materially adverse," meaning "it might well have

dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination." Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.

White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Moreover, to state a claim of retaliation, an

employee must be complaining of an unlawful employment practice or actions the employee reasonably believes are unlawful.

Jordan, 458 F.3d at 338-39. The district court found that Prince-Garrison failed to state a claim of retaliation because she did not show a materially adverse employment action. that an internal settlement and a between The court noted the fact the parties retracted and a

five-day

suspension

prospective

termination,

gave

Prince-Garrison backpay.

The court found a one-day suspension Moreover, the court

that remained was not objectively material.

found that Prince-Garrison failed to allege a causal connection between the protected activity and any adverse action because 7

three months separated her initial complaint of discrimination and the purported retaliatory conduct. We conclude that under notice pleading requirements, Prince-Garrison survive protected Maryland a stated to a claim of retaliation sufficient engaged with to in the

motion activity

dismiss. the

Prince-Garrison complaint and process when she

during on

Commission

Human

Rights

repeatedly

complained of discrimination to staff at MHDH. states that after her complaints she was

Prince-Garrison prospectively

terminated and immediately suspended. rescinded, Prince-Garrison contends,

After these actions were she was micromanaged and

treated with hostility.

Prince-Garrison asserts she was also

threatened with a cultural discrimination complaint to be filed by her supervisor if she did not rescind her complaints. While

the activities Prince-Garrison complained of do not amount to actual discrimination or harassment prohibited by Title VII, it is enough for a retaliation claim that Prince-Garrison

reasonably believed she was engaging in protected activity by complaining about them. Jordan, 458 F.3d at 339-40. Moreover,

the district court is incorrect in concluding that the mediation and settlement resolved all adverse employment actions. Prince-

Garrison was threatened with suspension at least three times and with termination twice, and despite later remedial action, there remains an inference of retaliation for engaging in a protected 8

act.

We

conclude

that

because

Prince-Garrison's

complaint

sufficiently creates an inference that retaliation occurred, the district court erred in finding that Prince-Garrison failed to state a claim of retaliation. Accordingly dismissing her we vacate the district and remand court's for order further

retaliation

claim

proceedings. 2

We affirm the remainder of the order.

We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid in the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED

By the disposition, we intimate no view as to the appropriate resolution of Prince-Garrison's retaliation claim.

2

9