DeShanta Hinton v. Lanham Ford Motor Company

Filing 920090223

Opinion

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-1774

DESHANTA HINTON, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. LANHAM FORD MOTOR COMPANY; PAUL TIMKO, Special Agent for the FBI; KAREN NESTER, Special Agent for the FBI; UNKNOWN FBI AGENTS; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Defendants ­ Appellees, and JOHN DOE, General Manager, Lanham Ford Motor Company, Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District Judge. (8:05-cv-02425-AW)

Submitted:

February 19, 2009

Decided:

February 23, 2009

Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

DeShanta Hinton, Appellant Pro Se. Charles Henry Henderson, John Paul Lynch, MCNAMEE, HOSEA, JERNIGAN, KIM, GREENAN & WALKER, PA,

Greenbelt, Maryland; Ariana Wright Arnold, Assistant States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.

United

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM: DeShanta Hinton appeals from the district court's

order denying her motion to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal from the district court's final ruling in Hinton's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) proceeding. received notice of the district Hinton asserted that she never court's judgment. However,

under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6), a court may only reopen the time to file an appeal in these circumstances when the motion to reopen is filed within either 180 days after the judgment or order is entered or within seven days after the moving party receives notice, whichever is earlier. Here, the final order

was entered on May 16, 2007; Hinton admits that she received notice motion on to February reopen 14, until 2008; March however, 24. she did not file both her time

Thus,

because

periods in Rule 4(a)(6) had already expired, the district court was without jurisdiction to reopen the appeal period.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order.

We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED

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