Carl Brown v. Marriott International, Incorp

Filing 920090803

Download PDF
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 08-2347 CARL H. BROWN, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INCORPORATED, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District Judge. (8:07-cv-01585-AW) Submitted: July 30, 2009 Decided: August 3, 2009 Before MOTZ, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Francis H. Koh, KOH LAW FIRM, LLC., Bethesda, Maryland, for Appellant. Thomas L. McCally, Kelly M. Lippincott, CARR MALONEY, PC, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Carl H. Brown, an African-American male, appeals from the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Marriott International, discrimination Inc. ("Marriott") alleging and dismissing of his employment action violations Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006) ("Title VII"). Brown alleged that Marriott unlawfully discriminated against him on the basis of race when he was not hired to a position as a production support manager. Our opinion review of the this record appeal and is the district court's The discloses that without merit. familiar burden-shifting scheme set forth by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), applies to Brown's claims. We find the district court properly determined that, even assuming that Brown established a prima facie case of discrimination, he failed to establish pretext for Marriott's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for failing to hire Brown for the position at issue. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, See Texas Dep't of Cmty. 253 (1981); Conkwright v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 933 F.2d 231, 234-35 (4th Cir. 1991). Specifically, the record evidence is consistent that, after two telephone interviews and a number of email correspondences, Marriott chose not to select Brown because of his poor verbal 2 and written communication skills. While Brown contends that Marriott gave inconsistent reasons for not hiring him, which support a finding that of pretext, evidence the district court correctly that determined the established conclusively concerns regarding Brown's communication skills began with his first telephone interview and continued throughout the remainder of the interview process, that Marriott had several reasons for not hiring him, and that they communicated the most palpable reason to him. That Marriott chose to provide Brown with an alternate reason for not hiring him does not establish pretext, as found by the district court. We find that there is no evidence that those who chose not to select Brown were motivated by any desire other than to select the candidate they felt was the best suited for the position. See Evans v. Technologies Applications & Serv., Co., 80 F.3d 954, 960 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258-59). that the Because Brown failed to establish pretext, we find district court did not improvidently grant summary judgment to Marriott. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order granting Marriott's motion for summary judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 3 adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 4

Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.


Why Is My Information Online?