Carl Brown v. Marriott International, Incorp

Filing 920090803

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-2347

CARL H. BROWN, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INCORPORATED, Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District Judge. (8:07-cv-01585-AW)

Submitted:

July 30, 2009

Decided:

August 3, 2009

Before MOTZ, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Francis H. Koh, KOH LAW FIRM, LLC., Bethesda, Maryland, for Appellant. Thomas L. McCally, Kelly M. Lippincott, CARR MALONEY, PC, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM: Carl H. Brown, an African-American male, appeals from the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Marriott International, discrimination Inc. ("Marriott") alleging and dismissing of his

employment

action

violations

Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006) ("Title VII"). Brown alleged that

Marriott unlawfully discriminated against him on the basis of race when he was not hired to a position as a production support manager. Our opinion review of the this record appeal and is the district court's The

discloses

that

without

merit.

familiar burden-shifting scheme set forth by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),

applies to Brown's claims.

We find the district court properly

determined that, even assuming that Brown established a prima facie case of discrimination, he failed to establish pretext for Marriott's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for failing to hire Brown for the position at issue. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, See Texas Dep't of Cmty. 253 (1981); Conkwright v.

Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 933 F.2d 231, 234-35 (4th Cir. 1991). Specifically, the record evidence is consistent that, after two telephone interviews and a number of email correspondences,

Marriott chose not to select Brown because of his poor verbal 2

and written communication skills.

While Brown contends that

Marriott gave inconsistent reasons for not hiring him, which support a finding that of pretext, evidence the district court correctly that

determined

the

established

conclusively

concerns regarding Brown's communication skills began with his first telephone interview and continued throughout the remainder of the interview process, that Marriott had several reasons for not hiring him, and that they communicated the most palpable reason to him. That Marriott chose to provide Brown with an

alternate reason for not hiring him does not establish pretext, as found by the district court. We find that there is no evidence that those who chose not to select Brown were motivated by any desire other than to select the candidate they felt was the best suited for the

position.

See Evans v. Technologies Applications & Serv., Co.,

80 F.3d 954, 960 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258-59). that the Because Brown failed to establish pretext, we find district court did not improvidently grant summary

judgment to Marriott. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order

granting Marriott's motion for summary judgment.

We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

3

adequately

presented

in

the

materials

before

the

court

and

argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED

4