US v. Terah Shelton

Filing 920081103

Opinion

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-4141

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. TERAH JAVAN SHELTON, Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, District Judge. (3:07-cr-00329-CMC-1)

Submitted:

October 8, 2008

Decided:

November 3, 2008

Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Jan S. Strifling, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Mark C. Moore, Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM: Pursuant to a plea agreement, Terah Javan Shelton pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base ("crack"), in violation of 21 U.S.C.A.

§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (West 1999 & Supp. 2008). court sentenced Shelton to 262 months in prison.

The district Shelton's

counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that, in his view, there are no

meritorious grounds for appeal.

Counsel questions whether the

district court complied with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in accepting Shelton's guilty plea and

whether the district court abused its discretion in sentencing Shelton. Shelton filed a pro se supplemental brief asserting

that the Government reneged on promises made to him. Counsel raises as a potential issue the adequacy of the plea hearing but concludes that there were no deficiencies in the district court's Rule 11 inquiries. Our careful review

of the record convinces us that the district court substantially complied with the mandates of Rule 11 in accepting Shelton's guilty plea and ensured that Shelton entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily and that the plea was supported by an

independent factual basis.

See United States v. DeFusco, 949

F.2d 114, 116, 119-20 (4th Cir. 1991).

2

Counsel

next

questions

whether

the

district

court

abused its discretion by denying Shelton's motion for a downward variance district sentence. court for We an review abuse of the sentence imposed Gall v. by the

discretion.

United

States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). leads us to conclude that steps the in

Our review of the record court followed the

district sentencing

necessary calculating

procedural the

Shelton,

properly that

guideline

range

and

considering

recommendation in conjunction with the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2008). Ct. at 597. See Gall, 128 S.

We also find that the district court meaningfully

articulated its refusal to vary from the guideline range and its decision to sentence Shelton at the bottom of the range. See

id.; Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462-69 (2007) (upholding sentence). presumption of reasonableness for within-guideline

Thus, we conclude that the sentence is reasonable. In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire

record

for

any we

meritorious affirm the

issues district

and

have

found

none. This

Accordingly,

court's

judgment.

court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for

We have reviewed the claims in Shelton's supplemental brief and find them to be without merit.

pro

se

3

further filed,

review. but

If

the

client

requests such a

that

a

petition would

be be

counsel

believes

that

petition

frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel's motion must state that We dispense with oral

a copy thereof was served on the client.

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED

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