US v. Kim Prater
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff Appellee, v. KIM A. PRATER, Defendant Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Abingdon. James P. Jones, Chief District Judge. (1:01-cr-00018-jpj-1; 1:03-cr-00075-jpj-1)
March 10, 2009
March 27, 2009
Before TRAXLER, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Brian K. Miller, LAW OFFICES OF BRIAN K. MILLER, P.C., Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Julia C. Dudley, Acting United States Attorney, Randy Ramseyer, Assistant United States Attorney, Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM: Kim A. Prater appeals the district court's order
revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to sixty-six months' imprisonment. error. Accordingly, We have reviewed the record and find no we deny his motion to file a pro se
supplemental brief and affirm. Prater was originally found guilty of ten counts of filing false claims with the Internal Revenue Service; however, after Prater two was substantial sentenced assistance to only motions by the Government,
Prater was also convicted of failing to surrender for service of sentence and sentenced to an additional four months'
Prater was sentenced to a period of supervised He began his supervised release
release for both convictions. on February 14, 2005.
Prater's probation officer filed a supervised release violation report that alleged sixteen separate violations. At
the revocation hearing, the district court found that Prater committed each of the alleged violations and revoked his
The district court then sentenced Prater to
six months' imprisonment on each of the ten false claim counts and an additional six months' imprisonment on his failure to surrender conviction, all to run consecutively. On appeal,
Prater contends that his sentence was plainly unreasonable. 2
This court reviews a sentence imposed as a result of a supervised release violation to determine whether the sentence was plainly unreasonable. 433, 438 (4th Cir. 2006). United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d The first step in this analysis is Id. This court, in
whether the sentence was unreasonable.
determining reasonableness, follows generally the procedural and substantive sentences. considerations Id. employed in reviewing original
If a sentence imposed after a revocation is not
unreasonable, this court will not proceed to the second prong of the analysis - whether the sentence was plainly unreasonable. Id. at 439. Although a district court must consider the policy
statements in Chapter Seven of the sentencing guidelines along with the statutory requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (2006) and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006), the district court ultimately has broad discretion to revoke its previous sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461
F.3d at 439 (quoting United States v. Lewis, 424 F.3d 239, 244 (2d Cir. 2005)). On review, this court will assume a
deferential appellate posture concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion. Prater unreasonable Id. that his sentence failed to was prove plainly that he
obtained property by false pretenses. 3
Prater contends that any
representation that occurred in the transactions was as to a future event, and Virginia law requires a misrepresentation of a present or past fact. Even assuming that Prater is correct, the
evidence in the record is more than sufficient to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Prater made false See 18 of
representations at the time he received the property. U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2006) (providing that a
supervised release need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence). evidence release. Prater's sentence was also substantively reasonable. Upon revocation sentence of of his supervised release, Prater faced a to The district court did not err in relying on this establish that Prater violated his supervised
admitted to multiple violations of the terms of his supervised release. Moreover, after receiving the benefit of two
substantial assistance departures, Prater continued to engage in financial crimes that defrauded innocent third parties. We thus
conclude the district court did not err in sentencing Prater. Accordingly, supplemental court. we deny and Prater's affirm motion the to file of a the pro se
We dispense with oral argument as the facts and legal of the parties are adequately presented in the
decisional process. AFFIRMED
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