US v. Valentino Tucker
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff Appellee, v. VALENTINO LEON TUCKER, Defendant Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (7:06-cr-00042-D-2)
February 17, 2009
March 30, 2009
Before MICHAEL and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Rudolph A. Ashton, III, Charles K. McCotter, Jr., MCCOTTER, ASHTON & SMITH, P.A., New Bern, North Carolina, for Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Banumathi Rangarajan, Jennifer May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM: Valentino Leon Tucker appeals his seventy-two month
sentence imposed following revocation of his original sentence of probation. Tucker pled guilty to one count of making a
material false statement in connection with the purchase of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) (2006), and was sentenced to three years of probation. Tucker admitted each of
the alleged violations in the three motions for revocation filed by his probation officer. Following a lengthy hearing, the
district court provided a detailed explanation for its sentence. Tucker timely noted his appeal and argues that, for various
reasons, his sentence is plainly unreasonable. This court reviews a sentence imposed upon revocation of a defendant's probation to determine whether the sentence is "plainly unreasonable." 656 (4th Cir. 2007). United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, In determining whether a probation
revocation sentence is "plainly unreasonable," this court must first determine whether the Id. Seven sentence is procedurally or
substantively unreasonable. must consider the Chapter
Although a sentencing court policy statements and the
applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors in fashioning its sentence, the sentencing court retains broad discretion to
revoke a defendant's probation and impose a term of imprisonment up to the statutory maximum. 2 Id. Only if the defendant
demonstrates that the sentence is unreasonable will this court consider whether the sentence was "plainly unreasonable." Tucker first claims that his seventy-two Id. month
sentence is unreasonable simply because it is higher than his original advisory guidelines range of eighteen to twenty-four months and his revocation advisory guidelines policy statement range of fifteen to twenty-one months' imprisonment. sentence however. and its was both procedurally and substantively Tucker's
The district court, in both its ruling from the bench written order, provided an exhaustive and reasoned
explanation for Tucker's sentence.
The record shows that the
district court considered the Chapter 7 policy statements and advisory § 3553(a) guidelines factors, range, § 3553(a)(4)(B), abysmal performance the on relevant probation,
his criminal history, his original sentence of probation after receiving a substantial assistance departure, and the arguments of counsel in sentencing Tucker. procedurally reasonable. The district court's decision to impose a sentence Thus, Tucker's sentence was
greater than both Tucker's original guidelines range and the advisory policy statement range was also Grade substantively C violations
including continued drug use, refusal of drug treatment, and
failure to submit to drug testing.
Tucker also pled guilty to
felony sale of marijuana, a Grade A violation. Tucker's only on the advisory of policy Grade statement A range was based not
reflect his numerous Grade C violations. at 658.
See Moulden, 478 F.3d
Moreover, Tucker's original sentence was based on a assistance Manual the departure. § 7B1.4 court See U.S. n.4 Sentencing (2008). the
substantial Guidelines Additionally,
inherent breach of trust in Tucker's conduct while on probation. USSG ch. 7, pt. A, introductory cmt. 3(b); United States v. Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d 122, 130 n.6 (2d Cir. 2008). Tucker continued his criminal behavior, virtually Finally, without
interruption, despite lenient treatment from the district court. Accordingly, because Tucker's sentence was substantively
reasonable, his first claim is without merit. Tucker next claims that "the district court failed to properly analyze sentences, Guidelines, policy statements and
sentencing disparity." record. Tucker next
This assertion is simply belied by the
credit for the seven months he spent in state custody on his federal detainer. "A defendant shall be given credit toward the
service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in 4
official detention prior to the date the sentence commences." 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (2006). Section 3585 does not permit a
district court to determine credit at sentencing. v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334 (1992).
Rather, only the Attorney Id.
General, through the Bureau of Prisons, may compute credit. at 334-35.
Therefore, the district court was without authority
to order the Bureau of Prisons to give Tucker credit for the time served. some credit Additionally, Tucker admitted that he received from the North seven Carolina months toward he his North Carolina for his not
entitled to have credit already applied to his state sentence counted a second time and applied to his federal sentence. U.S.C. § 3585(b). 18
Accordingly, the district court did not err
in failing to direct that Tucker be given credit for the seven months he spent in state custody on the federal detainer. Tucker's fourth argument on appeal is that the
district court failed to consider sentencing disparities between his co-defendant, Donte Nathaniel Johnson, and himself. A
district court need not robotically tick through each subsection of § 3553(a). Cir. 2006). United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Here, the context and record establish that the
district court considered the § 3553(a) factors and found the circumstances warranted a sentence above the advisory guidelines 5
policy statement range. unwarranted sentencing
Moreover, § 3553(a) seeks only to avoid disparities. Unlike his co-defendant,
Tucker was initially given a sentence of probation, and as the district advisory court noted, a sentence would within not Tucker's his original abysmal
performance on probation. Finally, Tucker contends that the district court
improperly punished him for the criminal conduct underlying his revocation by relying heavily on his new felony conviction and imposing a consecutive sentence without giving him credit for time served. Tucker's claim is without merit as the court was
entitled to consider the fact that his Grade C violations were likely to, and did, result in new felonious conduct, and the guidelines instructed that his sentence should be consecutive to his state sentence. USSG §§ 7B1.3(f), 7B1.4 cmt. n.3.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral argument as the facts and legal
contentions are adequately detailed in the materials before the court, and argument would not aid the decisional process.
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