US v. Shawn Lucas

Filing 920090326

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-4500

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. SHAWN MAURICE LUCAS, Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney, District Judge. (3:07-cr-00046-FDW-1)

Submitted:

February 20, 2009

Decided:

March 26, 2009

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Mark P. Foster, Jr., LAW OFFICES OF MARK P. FOSTER, P.C., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Gretchen C. F. Shappert, United States Attorney; Matthew T. Martens, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM: Shawn Maurice Lucas appeals from his conviction and 120-month sentence after pleading guilty to possession of a

firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(e) (2006). Lucas claims that the traffic stop that led to

his arrest was not supported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause, as the placement of his temporary registration plate in the window of his vehicle rather than the bumper did not violate any North Carolina motor vehicle regulation. Lucas contends the

district court's interpretation of the relevant motor vehicle statute went beyond the terms of the statute itself and that the court improperly characterized the relevant issue as being

whether the officer relied on a "reasonable" interpretation of that statute. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we

conclude the district court did not err in denying Lucas' motion to suppress. This court reviews the district court's factual

findings underlying a motion to suppress for clear error, and the district court's legal determinations de novo. United

States v. Wilson, 484 F.3d 267, 280 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)). suppression motion has been denied, this court When a the

reviews

evidence in the light most favorable to the Government. States v. Uzenski, 434 F.3d 690, 704 (4th Cir. 2006). 2

United

Because an automobile stop constitutes seizure of an individual, requirement police "that must it comply not with be the Fourth Amendment's under the

unreasonable

circumstances."

United States v. Wilson, 205 F.3d 720, 722 (4th

Cir. 2000) (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996)). cause or An a automobile reasonable facts, of stop "must be justified on by probable and v.

suspicion,

based

specific States

articulable

unlawful

conduct."

United

Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726, 729 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). While there are limited circumstances

under which suspicionless automobile stops are permitted, police may not carry out random or discretionary stops that are

unsupported by articulable, reasonable suspicion of a violation. Wilson, 205 F.3d at 722. In ruling on the motion to suppress, the district

court noted that, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 20-63(d) (2007), a vehicle registration plate is required to be "attached to the rear of the motor vehicle." that the statute lacked a specific The district court found definition as to what

constituted the "rear" of the vehicle and conceded that placing the registration tag in the back window, as Lucas had done, could arguably constitute compliance with the terms of § 2063(d). could The district court concluded, however, that § 20-63(d) not be read in isolation, 3 as another motor vehicle

statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 20-129(d) (2007), supported the officer's interpretation as to "proper placement" of the license plate, as a plate that was placed in the window could not be properly illuminated as required under § 20-129(d). While neither party has brought to our attention any applicable case law regarding the specific requirements for

placement of the registration plate under § 20-63(d), we note a recent decision by the North Carolina Court of Appeals, North Carolina v. Stone, 634 S.E.2d 244 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006), that addresses this very matter. In Stone, a police officer began

following a vehicle after he suspected the driver was speeding. Id. at 246. When the vehicle stopped in a parking lot, the

officer saw that "the vehicle's license plate was displayed on the rear window instead of the bumper," Id. at which point the

officer approached the vehicle. that the officer's (if not traffic probable

The trial court determined based the on a `reasonable had been

stop

"was

suspicion'

cause)

that

driver

speeding . . . and was not properly displaying the vehicle's license tag (in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-63(d))." at 247. Id.

Because the driver had been speeding and "the vehicle's

license plate was displayed in the rear window, rather than on the bumper," the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the officer had "reasonable suspicion, if not probable cause, to believe that two traffic violations had occurred." 4 Id. at 248.

Stone supports the conclusion that placement of the tag on the rear window, alone, constituted a violation of § 2063(d) and provided probable cause for a traffic stop. To the

extent that Stone leaves any room for doubt, however, we agree with the district court that, under the circumstances of this case, the display of the registration tag was unlawful under North Carolina law, as the tag was not properly illuminated

under § 20-129(d) of the North Carolina Code.

Accordingly, the

fact that the tag was displayed in the rear window in a manner in which it was unreadable provided the officer with probable cause to stop Lucas' vehicle. Hence, the district court

properly denied Lucas' motion to suppress. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

conclusions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

5