US v. Jeronza Thorne

Filing 920090316

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-4606

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff ­ Appellee, v. JERONZA THORNE, Defendant ­ Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, Jr., Chief District Judge. (3:06-cr-00448-RJC-1)

Submitted:

February 11, 2009

Decided:

March 16, 2009

Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Claire J. Rauscher, Executive Director, Steven Slawinski, Ann L. Hester, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina; Dana Owen Washington, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM: Jeronza Thorne pled guilty, pursuant to a plea

agreement, to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, district in violation of 18 U.S.C. Thorne § 922(g)(1) to (2006). The

court

sentenced

seventy-two

months'

imprisonment, and Thorne timely noted his appeal. counsel for Thorne 386 has filed 738 a brief in pursuant which to

On appeal, Anders raises v. two

California,

U.S.

(1967),

he

potential errors for review. * Thorne first

Finding no error, we affirm. whether the district court

questions

erred in counting his two prior felony sentences separately for guidelines calculation purposes because the offenses were

consolidated for sentencing. September and October 2000

The record reveals that Thorne's offenses were separated from his

June 5, 2001 offenses by his arrest on January 7, 2001.

"Prior

sentences are always counted separately if the sentences were imposed arrest." (2007). for offenses U.S. that were separated by an intervening

Sentencing

Guidelines

Manual

§ 4A1.2(a)(1)

Accordingly, the district court did not err in counting

Thorne's offenses separately in calculating his criminal history

Thorne was informed of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief. He has elected not to do so. The Government declined to file a brief.

*

2

category. Cir. 1999).

See United States v. Huggins, 191 F.3d 532, 539 (4th

Thorne next questions whether the district court erred in enhancing his base offense level by two levels because the firearm was stolen. Thorne claims he was unaware that the

firearm was stolen. Even if true, however, this argument offers Thorne no comfort which as Application the Note 8(B) to USSG for § a

2K2.1(b)(4), stolen

provides no

two-level

enhancement it

firearm,

contains

scienter

requirement;

applies

even if the defendant did not know or have reason to know the firearm was stolen. USSG § 2K2.1(b)(4); see, e.g., United

States v. Martin, 339 F.3d 759 (8th Cir. 2003).

Therefore, the

district court did not err in enhancing Thorne's base offense level two levels. In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm Thorne's conviction and sentence. This

court requires that counsel inform Thorne, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Thorne requests that a petition be filed,

but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel's motion must state that a copy thereof

was served on Thorne. 3

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal before contentions the court are and adequately argument presented not in aid the the materials decisional

would

process. AFFIRMED

4